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Abstract
This thesis examines the development of the Mission of Siam during the period 
1909-47, when it was still being administered by the French missionary order, the 
Missions Etrangeres de Paris (M.E.P.).
Under the leadership of Vicar-Apostolic Rene Perros, the Mission of Siam 
expanded its missionary efforts for the first time to the north of Thailand and 
strengthened its reputation and networks in local society through the construction, 
upgrade, and maintenance of social works such as clinics, hospitals, and schools. 
However, problems were also encountered. The Mission was badly affected by the 
economic depression of the 1930s, while some of its administrative practices, in 
particular the ceding of jurisdiction over the northeast of Thailand to the Mission of 
Laos, aggravated tensions between the missionaries, the government, and elements 
of the local community.
The thesis also examines the concurrent development and effects of Thai 
nationalism during the period 1909-47 on the Mission of Siam. Concepts of Thai 
national identity underwent major transformations during this period, and its effects 
on the Church were unpredictable. As the first Pibul government geared itself to 
seize former Siamese territories from French Indochina, anti-French rhetoric reached 
its height. At the same time, the move to make Buddhism a sine qua non of Thai 
identity was made. Together, the two factors unleashed a wave of persecution on the 
Thai Catholic population from 1940-45. Yet, the inconsistencies of the persecution 
suggest that there was more at stake than just nationalist pride; ulterior local political 
and economic motives, along with pre-existing tensions between the Catholic and 
non-Catholic communities also played a part in prolonging the persecutions.
For the Church, the persecution of the 1940s gave it eight martyrs and 
accelerated the handover of the Missions to the local clergy, thereby spelling the 
formal end of the Mission. Meanwhile, the state was left, once again, to grapple 
with what it meant to be a Thai and the consequences of a violated Constitution; 
consequences that echo, arguably, down to the present day.
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Notes on Thai Transliteration and Names
There are several systems for the transliteration of Thai into English, not least the 
system that was used by the Catholic missionaries’ administration during this period. 
Although not perfect, the thesis will use the Royal Thai General System of 
Transcription (R.T.G.S.T.) for Thai terms, with the exception of personal and place 
names for which the thesis will follow the common use rather than a specific system.
In addition, Thai names during this period provide a number of other 
complications. It is customary (and still the current practice) for Thais to be referred 
to by their personal instead of their surnames, partly as a consequence of surnames 
only being introduced in 1913. Thus, Pridi Phanomyong is known as Pridi rather 
than Phanomyong. It is also customary for the longer names such as Phraya 
Manopakonnitithada to be shortened: so Phraya Manopakonnitithada becomes 
Phraya Mano and Phraya Phahonphonphayuhasena becomes Phraya Phahon. This 
system also extends to Thai priests in the Catholic Church, where they refer to 
themselves and others only by their first name: so Fr. Raphael is used as opposed to 
Fr. Raphael Titra. The thesis will follow this system.
It should also be noted that, under the absolute monarchy, every official on 
his appointment was accorded an official title that corresponded with his rank, upon 
the receipt of which it was customary for the official to change his name. Thus, 
before he received his commission as army captain, Pibul was originally known as 
Plaek Kittasangka. After he received his commission, he became Luang 
Pibulsongkhram, where the title Luang effectively became a part o f his name. This 
is also the name by which his is still generally known today. These official names 
have also subsequently evolved into surnames, so descendants of Pibul use 
“Pibulsongkhram” rather than “Kittasangka” as their surnames.
These official names did not always stick, however. Thus, when Pridi was 
appointed as an official at the Justice Ministry in 1927, his name was changed to 
Luang Praditmanutham but his original name was, and continues to be, better known 
in the contexts of both general reference and academic works.
Notes on Thai Titles
The system of Thai royal and feudal titles is complex. There have been 
attempts to translate them in relations to the European systems of peerage, but these 
translations are not perfectly accurate. Here follows a brief explanation of the more 
common royal titles in descending order:
Chao Fa This is the most senior royal rank after the king and the
queen.
Mom Chao (M.C.), This title is given to children of a male Chao Fa,
marking them out as direct grandchildren of a king.
Mom Rachawong (M.R.) This title is given to children of male Mom Chao.
Mom Luang (M.L.) This is the lowest o f the royal titles and is bestowed 011
children of male Mom Rachawong.
There are no further titles after Mom Luang, but their descendants may 
append “na Ayutthaya” to their surnames to denote their royal descent.
In addition, during this period, there were also feudal titles, which were 
awarded to males only, usually for services in the civil administration or the military. 
All of these titles were non-hereditary. In descending order, the highest of these 
ranks was Chao phraya , Phraya, Phra, Luang, Khun (pronounced with a higher 
tone),1 Muen, Pan, and Nai. The awarding of these titles to new recipients was 
abolished after 1932 but those who had already attained the titles before then were 
allowed to continue to use them. Thus, in the modem day, the feudal titles are all but 
obsolete with the exception of Nai, which has evolved into the modern-day 
equivalent of ‘Mister’.2
1 In the modern-day Khun with a lower pronunciation is a commonly used honorific for both sexes. 
“ There is also a modem female equivalent -  Nang, which is the equivalent o f  ‘Mrs.’.
To the Catholics o f  Thailand, 
Past, Present, and Future.
1I
Introduction
For all the saints, who from their labours rest,
Who thee by faith before the world confessed,
Thy name, O Jesus, be forever blest.
Alleluia, Alleluia!
William How, For All the Saints
Had the villagers of Songkhon, a sleepy settlement on the meandering banks of the 
Mekong, been watching the police station, they would have presumed that they had 
been witness to a scene of youthful innocence. A young woman, Budsri Cecilia 
Wongwai, had just delivered a letter and a small package to the Police Sergeant 
Bunlue Muangkot in charge of the police unit that had recently been sent to the 
remote region. Observers could rightly have assumed that the young woman was 
acting on a teenage crush, seeing her skip merrily away from the station. Indeed, to 
the predominantly Catholic inhabitants of Songkhon, the day was a special one, a 
most appropriate day to display sentiments of peace to one’s neighbours and, indeed, 
to all mankind. It was Christmas Day, Anno Domini 1940.
Nevertheless, storm clouds had been gathering over the village for the past 
few months. After a series of violent skirmishes, the government in faraway 
Bangkok had entered into armed conflict against French Indochina, just across the 
river from the village. The swift collapse of France in the European war had 
provided the Bangkok government with an unprecedented opportunity to restore 
national pride. After decades of Siamese concessions to the colonial powers, 
constitutionalist Thailand -  not absolutist Siam -  would now restore national pride 
by seizing back the lands that belong to it. Never mind that ‘The Leader’, as the 
followers of Field Marshal Pibulsongkhram (December 1938-August 1944 and April
1948-September 1957) now liked to call the prime minister, was partly educated in 
France and took pride on having been bom on 14 July, Bastille D ay.1 France and its 
agents were now all enemies of the state and everyone was urged to faithfully 
believe in the Leader for the good of the nation.2
For the village, the change in the government’s attitude manifested itself 
mainly in the posting of a police contingent to the village, ostensibly for its 
protection. There had been some trouble between the villagers and the police, 
mainly involving women,3 but nothing that would indicate a major outbreak of 
violence. What was more traumatic for most of the villagers was the departure of 
their priest, Fr. Paul Figuet on 30 November 1940. Since the priest was French, he 
was obliged to vacate the area within forty-eight hours.4 In the absence of the priest 
and his sacraments, the remaining pillars of religious leadership were Philip Siphong, 
a catechist and teacher o f the village, and a number of Thai Catholic nuns who 
resided in the village. Through their instruction and example, the villagers continued 
steadfastly in their faith in Catholicism and prayer.
The police, all o f them Buddhists, may have seen this steadfastness as 
obstinacy. Some o f them may have even seen the villagers’ faith as an act of treason. 
After all, across the country, a group patriotically calling itself the Khana lueat Thai 
(the Thai Blood Group or Organisation) had been burning Catholic churches, 
assaulting its remaining priests, and threatening Catholic laymen, branding them as 
Fifth Columnists for the French. For most of the police in the contingent, having
1 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand: A Storv o f  Intrigue (University o f  Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 
1991),p. II.
“ One o f the best-known official slogans formulated by the first Pibul government was “Chitea 
Phnnam chatphon p h a i” (“Obey the Leader and the Nation will prevail”).
3 Archbishop Lawrence Kliai Saen-Phon-On et al, Bunyarasi t hang f e d  haeng Prathet Thai [The 
Seven Blessed Martyrs o f  Thailand] (Khana kamakam jad ngan chalerm chalong bunyarasi thang jed, 
Bangkok, 1989), p. 18.
4 Archbishop Lawrence Khai Saen-Phon-On et al, Bunyarasi thang je d ,  pp. 15-16.
3such a concentrated group of ‘Fifth Columnists’ so near the border was a danger that 
they could have lived without in the uncertain times. They would have been 
disappointed though, had they thought that the departure of the priest would have led 
to the diminishing of the villagers’ faith. On the contrary, like the early Christians, 
faith grew stronger under the difficult circumstances and the leadership of Philip 
Siphong and the sisters.
Therefore, for the good of the villagers and the nation, Catholicism -  the 
religion of the French enemies -  had to be wiped out. Indeed, the central 
government appeared to concur, since certain ministries and local authorities had 
apparently received ‘secret orders’ and were gathering Catholics and other religious 
minorities into long ‘meetings’, urging the participants to convert to Buddhism, the 
religion of ‘true’ Thais. The central government would later go on to proclaim in 
May 1944 that “Thailand is a nation that worships the Buddhist religion like life 
itself’, implying that those who did not were not Thais.
All of these ‘secret orders’, meetings, and proclamations were in violation of 
the 1932 Constitution. Never mind the fact that this veiy constitution had been the 
key platform for the 1932 revolution that brought many of the men in government to 
power in the first place. But the meetings at Songkhon would prove to be a 
challenge with such a strong leadership. In religious terms, the standing of Philip 
Siphong rested on his role as the village school’s headmaster and catechist, while in 
political terms he had connections with the Nai amphoe (district chief officer)5 of
5 The Thai provincial administrative system is divided into monthon (a collection o f  changwat or 
provinces), changwat (provinces), amphoe (also can be amphur or districts), tambons (sub-districts), 
and imtban (villages). A  thesaphiban (royal commissioner) led the monthon w hile a Phu wa 
ratchakan changwat (in this period they can also be referred to as khaluang or provincial governors) 
led the provinces, Nai amphoe (district chief officers) administer the districts, Kamnans (sub-district 
headmen) fulfil the same role in the sub-districts, with Phuyai Ban (village headmen) forming the 
lowest tier o f  the administration in the villages. With the exception o f  the monthon (which was 
abolished in 1933), this system o f  administration is still currently in use.
4Mukdahan. Even when the priest was present, Philip Siphong was already a 
formidable leadership figure. It was thus unlikely that any of the villagers would 
abandon their faith if Philip Siphong was still in charge. One way or another, the 
catechist had to be eliminated.
On 16 December 1940, while he was on his way to a supposed meeting with 
the district chief officer o f Mukdahan, Philip Siphong was shot dead in a nearby 
village. The death of the catechist alerted the villagers that conflicts with the police 
were no longer a trivial matter. The incident also propelled the nuns into a 
leadership role that they took on with a vigour that surprised the police. The leader 
of the police then told the nuns to discard their religious habit and wear normal 
clothing for the sake of the safety of their fellow villagers. At first, the nuns 
complied, until they saw the real intention of the police. The intention of the police, 
it seemed, was to neutralise the sacred aura provided by the habit, thereby 
undermining the sisters’ position in village society. It was not long before the sisters 
read the motives of the police, saw their broken promises, and once again assumed 
their habit.
Even with this failure, the police thought that they could now assemble the 
villagers and urge them to convert. A meeting was called on 23 December 1940, 
where the head of the police contingent, Nai Bunlue, brandished the ‘order’ from the 
government with the addition of the death penalty as the consequence of non­
conversion. The police were right to think that the threat would cow most of the 
villagers; but they did not count on one teenage girl standing up to them, exclaiming 
that she would never abandon her religion, amidst the urging of concerned villagers
5telling her to sit down, since they feared the girl would be shot on the spot.6 Nai 
Bunlue and the police, however, strenuously ignored her and the meeting was 
adjourned in chaos, with a massive loss of face for the police. The same night, the 
sisters gathered in a meeting of their own to deliberate the day’s events. During the 
meeting, they had been taken aback by the police’s sudden, albeit not entirely 
unexpected demands, and had made no answer. Together, they came to a decision 
and drafted the following letter, affixed with their signatures:
To the head of the village of Songkhon, with respect:
This evening you have been given the order to definitely wipe out the name 
of God, our only life and soul and the only one whom we worship. Two or 
three days ago you told us that you would not wipe out the name of God, so 
we willingly abandoned the habits that marked us out as servants of God.
This is not the case today. We hereby declare that the Christianity is the only 
true religion. And so we will answer your question o f yesterday evening as 
to who is willing to continue holding this religion.
Yesterday evening we were not prepared to answer your question, but now 
we ask you to wipe us out; do not hesitate any longer to follow your orders. 
We are willing to return our lives to God, our creator. We are unwilling to 
become the prey of demons. Please proceed and open to us the gates of 
Heaven so that we can declare that there is no other road to salvation other 
than the religion of Christ. Come, we have prepared everything. Once we 
are gone, we shall not forget you. Have pity on our souls and we shall thank 
you and will not forget you at the End of Days when we shall see each other 
face to face again. On that day, please be our witness to Him that we have 
kept His commandments.
We are Agnes, Lucia, Mae Puttha, Nang Budsri, Nang Buakai, Nang Suwan. 
We ask that we can take the girl Puma with us,7 for we love her so much.8
6 Sakon Naklion Mission Archives (henceforth S.N.M.A.), Testimony o f  Agatha Thep, 15 February 
1949.
7 O f the women who signed the letter, three survived. Nang Buakai became afraid and did not go 
through with the martyrdom, while Nang Suwan was prevented from following the sisters to the 
cemetery by her father, who locked her up in his house. Puma (Cecilia Sorn) went with the sisters 
and, despite having lined up with the rest, was unharmed by the shots o f  the police. She was taken 
away by the villagers before the police returned to finish the botched execution.
8 There have been many certified photographs, transcripts, and reproductions o f  the original, undated 
letter in S.N.M.A., as well as at the Bangkok Archdiocese Archives, (Undated, 58/1/1) made 
subsequent to the incident and the successful beatification process. However the original appears to 
have been lost.
6This letter was the one that was delivered to the police station by Cecilia 
Budsri -  the first person who stood up when the police asked in a meeting as to who 
would continue to be Catholic, despite the threats that they had made.9 If the 
villagers who saw her had any misgivings, these were confirmed by Cecilia when 
she stopped to say goodbye to some of them, saying that she was “going to Heaven” 
as she skipped away.10
It was inevitable that the letter would provoke a reaction from the police 
chief. By the next day, Boxing Day, Cecilia was dead along with two nuns and five 
other Catholics. She, and the others, had been shot at point-blank range in the local 
cemetery by the police officers from the same station that she had visited the day 
before. Far from being a flighty love missive, the letter was a statement of her and 
the others’ faith in God as well as their categorical refusal to adopt the Buddhist 
religion, even in the face of violent intimidation. The small package did, however, 
contain a Christmas present for the police. They were vials of coconut oil -  so that 
the guns of the officers would not jam when they carried out the killings.11
At first the police wanted to execute the women on the banks o f the Mekong, 
presumably so that they could later claim that the women were Laotian spies trying 
to escape to French Indochina.12 But the women, as if able to read the intentions of 
the police, refused to go and insisted that they went to the village cemeteiy.13 They 
paraded through the village -  as if they were going to a feast rather than their own 
execution. Indeed, as one of them said to a fellow villager, “Today, I didn’t have
9 S.N.M .A., Testimony o f  Agatha Thep o f  Songkhon, 15 February 1949.
10 Archbishop Lawrence Khai Saen-Phon-On et al, Bunyarasi ThangJed , p. 32.
11 S.N.M .A., Testimony o f  Maria-Joseph Teng, 16 February 1949.
12 After the execution, Nai Boonleu would claim that the nuns were shot while they were trying to 
cross the Mekong, S.N.M. A., Testimony o f  Anthony Buathong, 17 February 1949.
13 S.N.M. A., Testimony o f  Joseph Agad, 17 February 1949.
breakfast because I will feast in Heaven. Pray for me”.14 At the cemetery, the 
women were lined up, kneeling, resting their hands on a large log, in a final prayer.
In spite of the Christmas present from the women, the police guns jammed. Then 
some bullets missed, leaving one girl unscathed. She would survive to bear witness 
of the day’s atrocities. Two others, Sister Agnes and Maria, were not so lucky; they 
were seriously wounded and, suffering in agony, they asked the horrified villagers to 
call the police back to finish what they had started.15 When the police returned, they 
shot the fourteen year-old Maria and Sister Agnes a further three times. But Sister 
Agnes remained alive, and silently re-positioned herself so that the police could 
shoot her. It was not until the fourth shot that Sister Agnes breathed her last16 and 
the police, now completely terrified, fled the scene, shouting instructions at the 
stunned villagers to bury their victims “like dogs”.
In total, seven had been killed at the hands of the police in Songkhon. Philip 
Siphong was 33 years old when he was assassinated. Sister Agnes Thipsuk was 31, 
while Sister Lucia Khambang was 23 years old. The oldest of the dead was Agatha 
Phutta, who was 59. Shockingly, three girls who were barely in their mid-teens were 
among those executed: Cecilia Budsri was 16, Bibiana Khampai was 15, and the 
youngest, Maria Porn, was only 14 years old. All were beatified by Pope John Paul 
II on 22 October 1989.
The murders at Songkhon were undoubtedly the most appalling act against 
the Catholic Church in Thailand during the suppression of the 1940s. However, they 
were only one of many events. Across the country, priests and their parishioners 
were subjected to various forms of harassment and abuse. Some Catholics in the 
civil service were pressured to either convert to Buddhism or resign. Buddhists were
14 S.N.M .A., Testimony o f  Joseph W ong, 17 February 1949.
15 S.N.M .A., Testimony o f  Edual Kosali, 17 February 1949.
16 S.N.M .A., Testimony o f  Edual Kosali, 17 February 1949.
encouraged to be ‘patriotic’ and boycott Catholic businesses and refrain from having 
any contact with Catholics. Churches and parish schools were burnt down, 
confiscated, or vandalised across the country. Priests, both foreign and Thai, were 
harassed, arrested, and detained 011 spurious charges. One Thai priest, Fr. Nicolas 
Bunkerd Kitbamrung, was arrested in January 1941 for ringing bells to celebrate a 
religious feast day. He was later tried for being a Fifth Columnist and was given a 
fifteen-year sentence at Bang Kwang Prison in Bangkok. He was to die there on 12 
January 1944, but not before converting 68 of his fellow inmates to Catholicism. Fr. 
Nicolas was beatified by Pope John Paul II on 5 March 2000.
Many who hear the little-known accounts of the anti-Catholic persecution in 
Thailand for the first time may wonder as to how such an incident could have 
occurred. The shock may be compounded by the modern perception that Thailand 
remains a country where the concept of religious tolerance has been practiced to an 
extraordinarily effective degree, both officially and unofficially. Thailand’s 
portrayal of itself as a Buddhist nation, with its teachings of metta or loving kindness 
and tolerance has become an orientalist stereotype in the eyes of many casual 
observers of this Southeast Asian nation. Along with the boom in the tourism 
industry in the last few decades, Thailand has managed, at least until recently, to 
portray itself to the world as a model of a successful multi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
nation. Indeed, the Tourism Authority of Thailand website markets the country as 
one that “embraces a rich diversity of cultures and traditions. With its proud history,
9tropical climate and renowned hospitality, the Kingdom is a never-ending source of 
fascination and pleasure for international visitors”.17
This thesis, therefore, aims to place the horror that occurred at Songkhon and 
other anti-Catholic incidents in the 1940s in the historical context of the development 
in the Thai political world, notably the different conceptions of Thai identity that was 
in currency during this period, as well as developments of the Church in 
Siam/Thailand during the period 1909-47. In Chapter I, the thesis will examine the 
shifts in Thai identity during this period, from the time of King Vajiravudh (1910-25) 
to the extreme nationalism that became the currency under the first government Field 
Marshal Pibulsongkhram (1938-44),18 and their effects on the Missions where 
society’s views on them changed seemingly overnight from seeing them as usefi.il 
contributors to society in the 1910s, 1920s, and even up to late 1930s to them being 
dangerous Fifth Columnists in the early 1940s.
In Chapters II, III, and IV, the thesis will also focus on the general and local 
developments in the Church in Thailand during this period. Newly available and 
unpublished primary sources will be drawn upon to illustrate the characters and 
growth of regional churches in Chapters III and IV, the problems they encountered, 
and how these may have instigated and affected the course of the persecution in the 
1940s. The thesis will argue that, in certain cases, it was the local conditions and the 
local relationships (or lack thereof) between the Mission and the non-Catholic 
communities that were more influential on determining the course of the persecution, 
rather than central policy and that this local factor was the main motivator behind the 
persecution extending to well beyond the conclusion of the Thai-French war (1940-
17 Tourism Authority o f  Thailand, About Thailand,
http://www.tourismthailand.org/about/aboutthailand.aspx [Last Access: 9 March 2007].
18 Field Marshal Pibulsongkhram (also known as Plaek Pibulsongkhram) was to head two 
governments. The first was between 1938-44 and the second was between 1948-57. Unless 
otherwise stated, the thesis w ill be referring to his first government.
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41) and even the Pacific War on 2 September 1945,19 while Chapter V will illustrate 
that it was the local government apparatus, rather than central policy, that was 
instrumental in the execution of the persecution. This inconsistency between central 
policy and local action will be explained in terms of the dysfunctional relationship 
between the central government and its local apparatus.
Equally key to understanding the persecution was the public face of the 
Catholic Missions at the time. The leadership of the Mission of Siam under Vicar- 
Apostolic Perros (1909-47) was mainly French, although during this period it was 
moving gradually towards the establishment of an indigenous hierarchy, that is, a 
Church run completely by an indigenous clergy. Relations between France and Siam 
had been ambivalent at best since the 1893 Paknam incident,20 but the Missions’ 
association with the French became an obvious liability as tensions mounted 
between the two countries in the run-up to the Thai-French War, which broke out in 
November 1940. Nevertheless, the thesis will illustrate in Chapter VI that divisions
19 Following the deployment o f  nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito 
delivered the Imperial Rescript on Surrender in a public radio address on 15 August 1945, marking 
the commonly understood end o f  the Pacific War. However, Japanese fighting continued against 
Soviet and Chinese forces until early September o f  the same year. The Allied occupation o f  Japan 
began on 28 August 1945 but the Japanese Instrument o f Surrender was not signed on the U.S.S. 
Missouri until 2 September 1945, w hile Japanese forces in Singapore waited until 12 September 1945 
to follow suit.
20 This incident is also known in Thai as Wikritakarn Ro So 112 (inqeifmtu t.n. 112) or the Crisis o f  
Year 112 (counting from 1781, the year o f  the founding o f  Bangkok). The incident began as a dispute 
between French Indochina, who wanted to bring the territory o f  Laos under their sphere o f  influence, 
and Siam, which held traditional suzerainty over Laos. In reaction to Bangkok’s refusal to accede to 
their demands, the French sent two gunboats to Bangkok. The two vessels did not have permission to 
sail up the Chao Phraya River, the main artery o f  trade between the capital and the outside world, and 
so came under fire from the fort at Paknam, at the mouth o f  the river, on 13 July 1893. The French 
were able to force their way to Bangkok and when the government there still refused to immediately 
comply with demands for territory, the withdrawal o f  Siamese garrisons, and the payment o f  2 million  
francs in war indemnities from the fighting at Paknam, the French proceeded to blockade the Chao 
Phraya. The incident ended with the conclusion o f  the Franco-Siamese Treaty on 3 October 1893 in 
which Siam effectively agreed to cede the territories requested by the French and pay the indemnity 
demanded. The incident remained traumatic for many years after, indicated by the fact that one o f  the 
main aims o f  the Thai-French War (1940-41) was the seizure o f these territories that were lost to the 
French in 1893. For a general background on the incident, see D.K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short H isto iy  
(Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 2004), pp. 187-89. An English translation o f  the Franco-Siamese 
Treaty o f  3 October 1893 can be found in W.E.J.H. Tips, Siam's Struggle fo r  Survival: The 1893 
Gunboat Incident at Paknam  (White Lotus, Bangkok, 1996), pp. 217-22.
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along the lines of national identities were not clear cut. French missionaries in Siam 
did not always support the cause of their government, while their government did not 
always fully endorse the work of the missionaries. The same chapter of the thesis 
will also examine the methods with which national identities, a concept which has 
been analysed as “constructed” could be exploited for concrete material and social 
gains.
Finally, in Chapters VII and VIII, the thesis will explore the implications and 
consequences of the persecution on the future of the Missions in Thailand and the 
Thai state. For the Church it meant the acceleration of the establishment of an 
indigenous hierarchy. However, for the state, revisions in the Thai identity were 
perhaps more a reaction to Cold War realities rather than to the unintended 
persecutions.
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Historical Background of Thailand, 1238-1947
In Thailand's history there has been dissension from time to time, but in general,
unity has prevailed.
- King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX), 1946—
This section will be a short recapitulation of the main developments and periods in 
general Thai political history that may be helpful to readers less familiar with the 
general history of Thailand so that they can put the historical developments of the 
Catholic Missions as seen through this thesis in their appropriate historical contexts.
The area covered by present-day Thailand has long been inhabited by 
humans but in orthodox Thai histories, the first unified Thai or Siamese kingdom 
was the Kingdom of Sukhothai which was founded approximately in 1238. The 
capital of the kingdom was the city of Sukhothai, which is located in the present-day 
province of the same name. The Sukhothai period21 was to last from 1238 to 1350, 
although Sukhothai would continue to be ruled by its own dynasty until 1448 when 
the city was absorbed into the orbit of its southern neighbour, Ayutthaya.
Sukhothai was only one of a number of competing city states in the area.22 In 
the course of the fifteenth century, the influence of Sukhothai was overshadowed by 
its southern neighbour, the kingdom of Ayutthaya which was established in 1351. 
The founding o f the city of Ayutthaya by King Uthong (1351-69) marked the start of 
the beginning of the Ayutthaya period that would endure for several centuries (1351- 
1767).
21 The history o f  Thailand from the thirteenth century onwards is traditionally divided into four 
periods corresponding to the capital o f the dominating state: the Sukhothai period (c. 1239-1438), the 
Ayutthaya period (1351-1767), the Thonburi period (1767-82), and the Bangkok or Rattanakosin 
period (1782-present). It should be noted that there is some overlap between the Sukhothai and 
Ayutthaya period, reflecting the competition for influence between the two city states at the time. 
Sub-divisions o f  the periods are also possible. There were also earlier periods before the Sukhothai 
period, but they are not relevant to the thesis.
22 D.K. Wyatt, Thailand, pp. 50-3.
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Siam had been conducting overseas trade for sometime, particularly with 
China, India, and Persia but it was during the Ayutthaya period that Siam made first 
contact with westerners in the sixteenth century, with the Portuguese being the first, 
followed rapidly by the Dutch, English, and the French. Catholic missionaries also 
arrived with the traders and both gained influence at the court of Ayutthaya. 
However, foreign influence at the court was to cause considerable resentment among 
the native courtiers and during the reign of King Narai (1656-88), this resentment 
culminated in the 1688 coup, during which King Petracha (1688-1703) usurped the 
throne and began the first persecution of Catholics in the history of Siam. Trade 
with western nations also diminished from this point.
The period was also characterised by wars with neighbouring kingdoms, 
particularly with those located in present-day Burma. Indeed, the Burmese were to 
successfully assault Ayutthaya twice: once in 1569, from which Siam was able to 
recover sovereignty under King Naresuan (1590-1605) and again in 1767 when the 
whole capital was destroyed and abandoned.
Prior to the destruction of Ayutthaya, one of the city's military generals and 
his followers were able to break through the Burmese lines and establish a base of 
operations outside in present-day Chantaburi province in the east of present-day 
Thailand in 1767. The general was a half-Chinese called Phraya Taksin (b. 1734).
He was later able to expel the Burmese occupiers, reunite the Siamese kingdom 
which had fragmented with the destruction of Ayutthaya, and establish a new capital 
at Thonburi, on the opposite bank of the river to present-day Bangkok. In the 
absence of old leadership from Ayutthaya, Phraya Taksin made himself the new king 
of the Thonburi dynasty of the short-lived Thonburi period (1768-82).
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King Taksin was to be the first and only monarch of this dynasty since he 
was deposed in 1782. Contemporary accounts suggest that he was deposed due to 
his increasingly erratic behaviour and tyranny. These include his claim that he had 
gained such mastery over esoteric techniques of Buddhist meditation that he had the 
ability to fly, punishing Buddhist monks who refused to bow to him, the expulsion of 
Catholic missionaries for their refusal to participate in Buddhist ceremonies, while 
some officials, even some of his own wives and sons, were arbitrarily tortured or 
executed for imaginary crimes.23
Following the successful rebellion, the general who ordered the execution of 
King Taksin, Phraya Chakri, ascended the throne as Phra Phuttayotfa (1782-1809) 
thereby becoming the first king of the present-day Chakri dynasty. During his reign, 
the capital was moved to present-day Bangkok and thus began the Bangkok or 
Rattanakosin period (1782-present day). In the nineteenth century, just as pressures 
from the Burmese subsided, Siam came under new pressure - namely from the 
western powers who were systematically subduing the traditional ‘superpowers’ of 
the region, such as China. Britain was the first to exert its influence during the reign 
of King Mongkut (1851-68) with the signing of the Bowring treaty on 18 April 1855. 
The treaty gave Britain trade privileges, which overrode the existing royal monopoly 
on trade, as well as rights o f extra-territoriality. Similar treaties with other western 
nations soon followed.
In an effort to maintain the nation's independence, Siam initiated a concerted 
policy of modernisation and administrative reform under King Mongkut, which 
continued in earnest during the reign of King Chulalongkom (1868-1910). During 
his reign, King Chulalongkom pushed through reforms such as the abolition of
23 B.J. Terwiel, Thailand’s Political History, pp. 56-60 and D.K. Wyatt, Thailand, p. 127.
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slavery and corvee labour and established modern schools as well as a military cadet 
academy for the training of the members of the newly-established modem civil 
service and professional armed forces.
Nevertheless, these reforms did not prevent the French from increasing its 
influence at the expense of Siam. The most notable incident was the 1893 Paknam 
incident, where the French were able to force the Siamese government to concede to 
their territorial demands through gunboat diplomacy. The incident led to Siam 
conceding its suzerainty over Laos and Cambodia to France and northern Malaya 
and the Shan states in northern Burma to Britain as a counterbalance to French gains. 
This process was completed by 1907.
Thus, the period the thesis examines begins just as Siam was trying to 
recover from this catastrophic loss of its territory. For those less familiar with the 
political developments during this period, the detailed chronology in the appendices 
of this thesis will be helpful. The following will be merely a summary of the major 
developments for the benefit o f those who are more familiar. In the short-term, the 
1893 Paknam incident had a major impact on the policies of the immediate successor 
of King Chulalongkom, the Oxford-educated King Vajiravudh (1910-25) but, as 
events in the 1940s proved, there were also long-term consequences to French 
aggression.
Nevertheless, during the reign of King Vajiravudh, the incident inspired 
policies that promoted the national consciousness and modernisation. The monarch 
achieved this through the dissemination of his writings in a wide range of media 
from journals to magazines to plays as well as through the creation of national 
symbols such as a new national flag and the concrete conceptualisation of the 
institutions that he thought to be lynchpins of Thai society: Chat, Sasana, and
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Mahakasat -  Nation, Religion, and Monarchy. In addition, he also expanded 
educational provisions. In 1911 he used money from the Privy Purse to establish the 
Royal Pages’ School (present-day Vajiravudh School) and founded Chulalongkom 
University, the first university in Siam, in 1917. Furthermore, he granted 
scholarships to nobles and commoners alike to study abroad.
In the international arena, the monarch took Siam into the First World War 
on the side of the Allies in July 1917, going so far as to send an expeditionary force 
to France from Siam. The tricolour of the new Siamese flag was to fly alongside that 
of the victorious Allies at the signing of the Versailles treaty in June 1919, indicating 
the equality of status that Siam had achieved under King Vajiravudh. Taking 
advantage of this new status, the monarch took the initiative of re-negotiating the 
unequal treaties that had been imposed in the reigns of his predecessors. By 1926, 
all western powers had conditionally given up their fiscal and extraterritorial rights 
to Siam.
The successor of King Vajiravudh, his brother King Prajadhipok (1925-35) 
continued these policies. However, his reign was affected by two major events. The 
first was the Great Depression. The monarch’s British military education did not 
serve him well in dealing with this crisis. Indeed he confessed in February 1932 to a 
group of military officers that:
The financial war is a very hard one indeed. Even experts contradict one 
another until they become hoarse... I have never experienced such hardship; 
therefore if I have made a mistake I really deserve to be excused by the 
officials and people of Siam.24
Honest as it was, the admission did not inspire confidence. At the same time, 
there was also an additional problem: what to do with the students on scholarship
24 C. Baker, A H istory o f  Thailand, p. 118.
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who were returning abroad. Government ministries and the armed forces were 
undergoing severe retrenchment as a result of the economic crisis, as a result some 
scholarship students felt that their fall potential were not being utilised while the 
dominance of the princes and the aristocracy in the ministries gave rise to farther 
resentment. The situation led to the second major event of the reign: the 1932 
revolution.25
The revolution was not the first attempt at toppling absolutism. There had 
been another abortive attempt in 1912 during the reign of King Vajiravudh but the 
1932 attempt was the first successful seizure of power. It had been planned as early 
as 1927 when a group of seven overseas Thai students had met in Paris to discuss the 
end of the absolute monarchy. These students were to form the core group of the 
Promoters -  for the ending of the absolute monarchy. Among them was Pridi 
Phanomyong and Plaek Kittasangka (later Field Marshal Pibulsongkhram) who were 
to become rivals and instrumental figures in the following decades o f Thai history.
Despite the tranquil nature of the revolution, it ushered in a period of political 
turbulence as rival factions of the Promoters vied for power. There was a successful 
coup in 1933 headed by Phraya Phahon that deposed Phraya Manopakonnitithada 
(the first prime minister of Siam’s constitutional government) and an unsuccessful 
rebellion later in the same year led by Prince Bovoradej, while King Prajadhipok 
abdicated in 1935 in favour of Prince Ananda Mahidol (1935-46) who was King 
Prajadhipok’s ten year-old nephew, studying in Lausanne, Switzerland at the time.
25 There is still some debate as to whether the 1932 revolution was really a ‘revolution’. On the one 
hand, it did fundamentally change the system o f  government from an absolutist monarchy to a 
constitutional monarchy. However, the revolution did not originate from the masses. It was earned 
out by a small number o f  civilian and military officials. Indeed, the initial public reaction to the coup 
was muted. Moreover, the way with which som e o f the Promoters subsequently exercised their power 
did not differ significantly from the practices o f  the aristocrats in the absolutist period. These factors 
have led to some historians, such as Wyatt to argue that the 1932 incident was in fact a standard 
military coup and that it “can in no sense o f  the word be accurately described as a revolution, save in 
its long-term implications” -  implications which did not become apparent until much later on. See 
D.K, Wyatt, Thailand, p. 234.
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Ultimately, it was the military that were in the ascendant and their zenith during this 
period was reached during the first government of Field Marshal Pibulsongkhram 
(1938-44).
The Pibul government emerged at a time of great international uncertainty. 
Germany was only a year away from starting the Second World War. Closer to 
home, Japan was resurgent and was seemingly unstoppable in its conquest of 
Chinese coastal cities. The seeming invincibility of the Japanese war machine and 
its subsequent invasion of Thailand in December 1941 pushed the Pibul government 
to closer co-operation with the Japanese, sealing a military alliance with Japan in 
1941 and declaring war on Great Britain and the United States in January 1942.
The success of the German war effort in Europe, in particular, the Fall of 
France in June 1940, also encouraged the regime to exploit the weakness of the 
French Indochinese colonies in an effort to regain territories that had been lost 
during the absolutist era, culminating in the Thai-French War that started in 
November 1940. The conclusion of the war led to the return of territories that had 
been conceded to France following the 1893 Paknam incident. It was a triumph for 
the constitutional regime, and a personal one for Pibul.
Internally, the Pibul government also enacted significant measures, most 
significantly the Cultural Mandates which, among other things, changed the name of 
the country from Siam to Thailand in June 1939. The name change was a reflection 
of the government's active policy to reclaim control of the economy, long in the 
hand of Chinese immigrants, for “Thais”. Thus discriminatory laws prohibiting 
Chinese from entering certain professions from lawyers to umbrella-making were 
passed, while measures such as the closure of the Chinese schools and the increased
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promotion of the use of the Siamese language in schools were designed to integrate 
ethnic minorities that had been bom in Thailand but had hitherto failed to integrate.
As the Second World War drew to a close, resistance to Pibul increased as 
his earlier association with the Japanese became a liability. Chief among the 
resistance was Pridi who, by 1944, had become the regent. Apart from organising 
parliamentary resistance to the Pibul regime, which eventually forced Pibul’s 
resignation in July 1944, he was also the head of the Seri Thai (Free Thai) movement 
in Thailand whose objective was the ending of the Japanese occupation. In the 
person of Pridi, the Allied command was confronted with the curious situation of a 
nominal head of state of an enemy country, passing on valuable intelligence. Pridi 
was to become prime minister in 1946.
The period covered by the thesis thus ended like it began: with Siam (as it 
was renamed in 1945) trying to find its feet after a major conflict and a new role in 
the emerging international order. To that end, Siam made peace with the Allies, 
particularly the French who withdrew their veto of Siam’s membership to the United 
Nations once the territories claimed during the course of the 1940-1 Thai-French 
War were returned. Siam eventually joined the United Nations as its 55th member in 
December 1946. Internally, there were also efforts to continue national development. 
A new constitution was drafted and came into force in 1946 -  it was to be the second 
‘permanent’ one and the first to introduce a bi-cameral legislature with a Hilly 
elected lower house that would, in turn, elect members of the upper house.26
Yet the country remained unstable as indicated in the mysterious death of 
King Ananda Mahidol in June 1946, which threw the nation into another political 
upheaval as the people sought for someone to blame. The period ends with a
26 A s o f  2009, Thailand has had a total o f  17 constitutions and charters since 1932.
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military coup against the Pridi-backed regime, with Pibul as the figurehead of the 
coup. At first, a civilian administration under Kliuang Aphaiwong (1947-8) was 
appointed. However, by April 1948, Pibul had returned to power as the leader of 
Siam and, in the following year, of a re-named Thailand.
Thus, the period 1909-47, which coincided with the ministry of Vicar- 
Apostolic Perros, was an important one in terms of the modern political history of 
Thailand. During this period, Thailand underwent major political changes: from 
being an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy; from being the subject of 
unequal treaties, on the verge of formal colonisation, to a nation o f equal status and 
of such confidence that it would end up declaring war on Great Britain and the 
United States on the side of a resurgent Japan in 1942.
It was in this turbulent environment that the Missions in Siam were tiying to 
operate. Yet, at the same time, it was also during this period that the ideas of Thai 
nationhood were being formed. What did it really mean to be “Thai”? Was 
Catholicism included in these ideas, and if so, did these roles change over time?
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Nation, Religion, Monarchy, Constitution, and Dictatorship
God forbade it, indeed; but Faustus hath done it: fo r  vain pleasure o f twenty-four 
years hath Faustus lost eternal jo y  and felicity. I  writ them a bill with mine own 
blood: the date is expired; the time will come, and he will fetch me.
Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus
In order to see the origin of the poisonous atmosphere that allowed the anti-Catholic 
persecution to take place in the 1940s, it is necessary to first understand Thai 
conceptions of national identity and its relationship with religion from the reign of 
King Vajiravudh (1910-25)27 to the time of the persecutions, and the changing role 
of Buddhism in these formulations. King Vajiravudh was instrumental in the 
formulation of Thai identity, creating the “three pillars” : Chat, Sasana, and 
Mahakasat (Nation, Religion, and Monarchy),28 the core of which has endured to 
this day and is embodied in national symbols such as the present tricolour flag (red, 
white, and blue) that was first introduced during King Vajiravudh\s reign.
As Vella argued, the relationship between the Thai monarchy and Buddhism 
was nothing new, where he describes it as being “close since earliest history” and “a 
symbiotic relationship: the Buddhist Order supported the state, the state supported 
the order.”29 Indeed, the predecessors of King Vajiravudh had been heavily involved 
in the practice or reform of Buddhism in Thailand. King Taksin (1767—82)30 was
‘7 Also known as King Rama VI.
28 It has been argued that King Vajiravudh’s original inspiration was the British Empire’s trinity o f  
God, King, and Country. For example, in Sulak Sivaraksa, ‘The Crisis o f  Siamese Identity’ in C.J. 
Reynolds (ed.), N ational Identity and its Defenders (Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 2002), p. 35. 
However, other European countries had similar concepts. For example, Russia had adopted 
Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality as its guiding pillars since the reign o f  Tsar Nicholas I in 1833.
29 W.F. Vella, Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development o f  Thai N ationalism  (University Press 
o f  Hawaii, Honolulu, 1978), p. 214.
30 Bom  in 1734, King Taksin was the sole monarch o f the Thonburi Kingdom, which was established 
following the second fall o f  Ayutthaya in 1767. In his reign he was responsible for expelling the 
Burmese occupational forces and re-establishing a re-unified order in Siam. He also found a new  
capital city at Thonburi (on the opposite side o f  the Chao Phraya River from Bangkok). The 
atmosphere at his court in the last years o f  his reign became strained as the monarch became 
increasingly obsessed with esoteric methods o f  Buddhist meditation. He was ousted in a coup d’etat
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obsessed with Buddhist meditation and arranged for monks with reputations of 
expertise in this area to regularly instruct him.31 On the other hand, King Mongkut 
or Rama IV (1851-1868), initiated reforms when he was still a monk by establishing 
a separate order of monkhood -  the Dhammayutika (“Order adhering to the 
Dhamma” as opposed to the existing Mahanikai, which the contemptuous Mongkut 
referred to as the “Order of Long-standing habit”).32 The Dhammayutika order 
would continue to be supported by Mongkut when he became king, as well as his 
successors where, for example Dhammayutika monks were appointed to the position 
of supreme patriarch o f the Sangha (the head of the order of Buddhist monks) in 
Siam.33
However, what was novel in King Vajiravudh’s case was his use of 
Buddhism to buttress nationalism.34 This concept was incorporated into visible 
public symbols, such as the re-designed tricolour flag which was infroduced on 28 
September 1917, following Siam’s entry into the First World War on the side of the 
allies.35 From King Vajiravudh’s own words, the white colour on the flag represents 
“purity and betokens the three gents”36 -  the Buddha, the Dhanna, and the Sangha. 
King Vajiravudh’s views on Buddhism and its centrality to national identity were 
expressed in various mediums such as plays, speeches, essays, and poems. As Vella 
has argued, there were four messages that the monarch wished to convey to the 
public regarding Buddhism. The first was the essential role of the moral citizen, as
and executed in 1782. In the same year, the general who ordered Taksin’s execution, Chao Phraya 
Chakri, ascended the throne as Phra Phuttayotfa (Rama I), becoming the First king o f  the present 
Chakri dynasty. It was during his reign that the capital was moved to present-day Bangkok. See D.IC. 
Wyatt, Thailand, pp. 122-9
31 B.J. Terwiel, Thailand’s  Political H istoiy: From the Fall o f  Ayutthaya to Recent Times (River 
Books, Bangkok, 2005), p, 53
32 D.K. Wyatt, Thailand, p. 161.
33 C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H isto iy o f  Thailand (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005), p. 66.
34 W.F. Vella, Chaiyol, p. 216.
35 Ibid., p. 140.
36 Ibid., p. 140.
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informed by Buddhism, as the strength of the state. The second was that a moral 
state, composed of moral citizens, would be stronger in competition with other, less 
moral states. The third was the assertion that Buddhism was the best route to 
morality for Thais. The final message was that Thais had a mission to preserve and 
protect the Buddhist faith.37
The assertion that Buddhism was the best route to morality for Thais led 
Vajiravudh to make some unfavourable comparisons between the major world 
religions and Buddhism, in particular Christianity and Islam. At first, some of the 
comparisons appear designed to be disrespectfiil to the religion concerned. The 
doctrine of the virgin birth was seen as a cover for Mary’s pre-marital 
indiscretions,38 which Buddhism found unnecessary because of the established 
lineage of the Buddha. Islam was also similarly analysed unfavourably.39 
Furthermore, Buddhism’s place in Thai society was cemented by its historical place, 
having arrived and been adopted by the majority before Christianity and Islam. 
Buddhism was thus the “natural” religion for Thais, just as Christianity was for 
Western societies. However, these criticisms were not meant to make Buddhists 
disrespectful o f other religions, since King Vajiravudh repeatedly pointed to the 
similarities between religions and argued that the criticism of the Buddhist religion 
by clerics from the other religions amounted to a tacit acknowledgement of 
Buddhism as both a rival and an equal in the competition for the people’s faith.40
The ultimate goal for King Vajiravudh was thus the buttressing of 
Buddhism’s position in Thai society, and confirming its place in Thai society as the 
primus inter pares among the religions respected by the Thai population. Although
37 Ibid., p. 216.
38 Ibid., p. 220.
39 Ibid., p. 219.
40 Ibid., p. 221.
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the points made by King Vajiravudh appear quite emphatic, they were never 
imposed upon the population through legislation. Indeed, the monarch remained 
sensitive towards the feelings of the religious minorities of his kingdom,41 being 
particularly responsive to the Malay Muslim minority throughout his reign.42
Nevertheless, the line between Buddhism being the “first among equals” and 
being “the best” was a thin one. For Thai Catholics, it was the shift from Buddhism 
as the primus inter pares to being at the centre of nationhood during the first Pibul 
government that created an atmosphere that was permissive for the persecutions. 
When the government, in defining “khwam pen thai” (“Thainess”) declared that 
“Thais love Buddhism more than life itse lf’,43 the implication was that those who 
were not Buddhists were also not Thais. The shift was, in part, a reflection of the 
turbulent political processes of the 1930s, and the systematic failure of one or more 
of the three pillars (later, four, with the inclusion of the Constitution as the fourth 
pillar after 1932) to underpin national identity. Nevertheless, much of the ideology 
with regard to nationhood after 1932, as well as Pibul’s ideology, was built on the 
foundation laid by King Vajiravudh.
Perhaps the most obvious sign that the Pibul regime aimed to definitively 
change the face of the countiy was the change of the country’s name from Siam to 
Thailand in 1939. In the view of Reynolds and Anderson, it was ostensibly a 
response to nationalistic aspirations elsewhere in Asia and was an expression of the 
new ruling elite’s desire to monopolise the nation for Thai speakers and its attempt to
41 Ibid., p. 228.
42 Ibid., pp. 197-8.
43 Thamsuk Numnond, Muang Thai sam ai Songkhram lok khrang ihi song  [Thailand in the Second 
World War] (Saitham, Bangkok, 2005), p. 100.
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“instil pride and equality with the West in the country’s citizenry”.'4'1 The triumph of 
Pibul’s vision of Thai national identity was also a reflection of his, and the military’s, 
political triumph. Considering the military’s role in the birth of Thai democracy, 
Pibul’s triumph was arguably inevitable.
In the present day, the political role of the military has come under greater 
public scrutiny. Nevertheless, given the military’s crucial role in the establishment 
of the constitutional order, the military’s interference in political affairs up to the 
present day was perhaps an unavoidable development. The 1932 coup d’etat that 
toppled the absolutist regime under King Prajadhipok (1925-35)4:> and established 
the Thai constitutional order would have been impossible without the active support 
of the military. While by 1927, there were about fifty ‘promoters’ for the end of the 
absolute monarchy, this group comprised mainly of junior civilian and military 
officials recently returned from abroad, all of whom wielded little political, never 
mind military, influence.46 Wyatt argued that the eventual success of the coup was 
contingent on the support of a small number of key senior military men, particularly 
Phraya Phahonphonphayuhasena and Phraya Songsuradet, who already had 
ambitions of their own.47
Unlike the early promoters, these two men were already senior officials by 
1932. Phraya Phahon was a colonel and held the post of Deputy Inspector of
44 C.J. Reynolds, National Identity and its Defenders, p. 4.
4:1 Bom  in 1893, King Prajadhipok or Rama VII was the younger brother o f  his immediate predecessor, 
King Vajiravudh. He was educated at Eton and W oolwich Military Academy. After the 1932 coup, 
the king was to continue his reign as a constitutional monarch until 1935, when he abdicated while he 
was undergoing medical treatment in England. He was to remain in England until his death in 1941. 
Like his elder brother, he left no male heir. Subsequently, the crown was passed to his nephew,
Prince Ananda Mahidol (Rama VIII). See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 371.
46 The first meeting o f  the promoters’ group to end the absolute monarchy took place in Paris, where 
many o f  the promoters were studying, took place in Februaiy 1927. Seven people were present, 
including Pibul. Following the successful coup in 1932, the members o f  this group went on to form 
the Khana Rasadon  or People’s Party, which continued to dominate Thai politics until the end o f  the 
Second World War. See J.A, Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, pp. 11-3.
47 D.K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short H isto iy  (Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 2004), p. 234.
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Artillery while Phraya Songsuradet held the same military rank, and the post of 
Director of Education at the Military Academy. Both officers were also popular for 
different reasons; Phraya Phahon was affable while Phraya Songsuradet was "widely 
regarded as having the most brilliant military mind of his generation”.48 These 
qualities allowed the two men to greatly influence political developments in the early 
1930s. By June 1932, both men were in a strong position to either support or destroy 
any attempt at a coup. As it happened, both men already resented the dominance of 
the princes in the ministries, a situation exacerbated by the economic retrenchment 
imposed on the military in early 1932. Indeed, they were already thinking along the 
lines of the promoters before they were formally approached. Both were crucial in 
rallying military support for the 1932 coup, and thus its eventual success.
The importance of military support for the regime was emphasised in a series 
of dramatic events in 1933. The year was marked by a proroguing of the Assembly 
following Pridi Phanomyong’s49 failed ‘communist’ economic plan, a successful, 
bloodless coup by the junior military faction in June, and the Bovoradej rebellion in 
October. Pridi’s economic plans50 failed largely because of the military opposition, 
while the coup was essentially a power-grab by junior military officers from their
48 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 14.
49 A lso known as Luang Pradit Manutham. Bom  in 1900, Pridi gained a doctorate in law and a 
diploma in political economics from the Sorbonne and was one o f  the seven who was present at the 
first meeting o f  the promoters in Paris in 1927. Following the vehement opposition to his 
controversial 1933 national economic plan, he was temporarily exiled to France, accused as being 
communist. He was subsequently cleared in 1934 and returned to take up a variety o f  government 
posts: Minister o f  the Interior, 1934-6, Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, 1936-8, and Minister o f  Finance 
1938-41, He became the regent in 1941 holding the post until 1945, during which he acted as the 
leader o f  the Seri Thai movement in Bangkok, the Thai resistance movement aimed at the ending o f  
the Japanese occupation. In November 1947 he fled into exile following a military coup, after which 
he helped plan the abortive Palace Rebellion in February 1949. Thereafter, he lived in exile, first in 
China (1949-70) and then Paris, where he died in 1983. See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 
372.
50 The plan had two main proposals. The first was that land was to be sold to the state, which would 
then raise its productivity through the use o f  better technology, while all fanners would become civil 
servants. The second was to decrease the reliance on imports through kick-starting industrial and 
commercial enterprises by using capital that would be raised through taxation and loans from a new  
national bank. See C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H isto iy  o f  Thailand (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. 122.
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more senior, conservative counterparts. However, it was the last event, the 
Bovoradej rebellion that sealed the military faction’s place in national government, 
as well as the ultimate fate of the constitutional regime. The rebellion has generally 
been branded as a royalist rebellion.51 However, it would be more accurate to argue 
that the rebels were an eclectic group of politicians whose ambitions had been 
thwarted, frustrated, or disappointed by the constitutional government.52 Indeed, the 
second ultimatum sent by Prince Bovoradej53 proclaimed his respect for the 
constitution and made demands for a reform of military policy and for official 
appointments to be based on merit rather than political connections.54 The royalist 
streak of the rebellion was only evident in the first ultimatum sent by Phraya 
Srisith,55 which demanded the government’s resignation for allegedly encouraging 
anti-monarchy senti ments.56
The demands were thus largely democratic, albeit delivered in the most 
undemocratic manner. A compromise with the moderates among the rebels may 
have been possible, but the government’s ruthless suppression of the rebellion 
clearly showed that they were not interested in making compromises. Perhaps they 
felt too insecure or were too obsessed with preserving political power at all costs.
51 C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H istoiy o f  Thailand (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005), p. 120 and B.J. Terwiel, Thailand’s P olitical H istoiy: From the F all o f  Ayutthaya to Recent 
Times (River Books, Bangkok, 2005), p. 264.
52 Prince Bovoradej was one o f those who were excluded from any role in the Phraya Mano 
government, even advisory ones, while Phraya Srisith Songkhram’s military career had been thwarted 
by the promoters, see J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 61.
03 Before the 1932 coup, Prince Bovoradej had approached Phraya Phahon to persuade him to stir up 
discontent in the army in the hope o f dislodging the ruling princes. The promoters used this 
opportunity to spread rumours o f  the prince’s disaffection, so as to distract the police from their own 
plot, and as a spur for the other promoters to pre-empt any attempt by Prince Bovoradej to seize 
power for himself. See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, pp. 14-15.
54 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 63.
55 A classmate o f  Phraya Phahon at the Thai military academy, Phraya Srisith had initially refused to 
join the promoters. However when the coup was successful, he changed his mind and was excluded. 
He was appointed director o f  military operations on 18 June 1933 but was dismissed two days later, 
which arguably spurred his rebellious intentions. He was killed at the Battle o f  Hin Lap during the 
1933 Bovoradej rebellion. See .T.A, Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 376.
i6 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, pp. 62-3.
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Nevertheless, given the fact that the rebellion arose from conflicts of personal 
political interests, it was politically expedient for the government to portray the 
rebels as wanting a return of the deeply unpopular and ineffective absolutist regime 
of the princes. The tactic was a success and the government enjoyed the support of 
the Bangkok population throughout its fight with the rebels, thereby further 
buttressing the ‘constitutionalist’ cause. Furthermore, they also managed to create a 
new, popular hero of democracy, Luang Pibulsongkhram, the field commander of the 
government’s military counterattack against the rebels.
The role of the king in the rebellion came into question by the victorious 
government forces. According to their view, the king had been less than enthusiastic 
in his support of the government. Then again, neither did he offer concrete support 
for the rebels, even though they were allegedly fighting on his behalf. In a word, the 
monarch was being criticised for being absolutely constitutional by 
‘constitutionalists’. The most that could be said of his role was that he was aware of 
the growing discontent against the constitutional government, but remained 
nevertheless committed to the constitutional process, as his August 1933 letter to 
James Baxter, Siam’s British financial advisor,57 shows:
There are a few diehard absolute monarchists whose idea is to make a coup 
and wipe out all the revolutionaries. They hope for the King to call on his 
troops, make war on Bangkok, execute the revolutionaries, and re-assert his 
personal rule. All of this is sheer madness. There is no turning back. All 
efforts must be concentrated on making the constitution work/’8
57 James Baxter resigned on 31 July 1935 in protest o f  the government’s inaction over an illicit affair 
involving the head o f  the Excise Department, who happened to be a civilian promoter. He later 
publicly condemned the Siamese government as “morally bankrupt” and expressed hope that Pibul 
would soon assume power, much to the embarrassment o f  both the British government and Pibul. See 
J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 86, 88.
’8 D. Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, P olitical Conflict in Thailand: Reform , Reaction. 
Revolution  (Gunn & Hain, Cambridge Mass., 1981), p. 41.
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Two years later, in his abdication statement, the monarch framed the 1933 
rebellion in terms o f a call for real freedom for the people in the face of the radical 
policies and internal politics of the People’s Party, rather than a conflict between 
royalists and constitutionalists:
Because the People’s Party did not establish real political freedom, and the 
people had no opportunity to express their opinions before important policy 
decisions were made, a rebellion broke out, with Thai killing Thai.''9
From the perspective of the king therefore, the new revolutionary 
government was nothing more than the continuation of the same absolutist autocracy 
in another guise. This time with generals and ideologues rather than highborn 
princes in charge, contrary to the original manifesto of the 1932 coup makers 
promising a country “governed by the people and for the people”.60
The events of 1933 were not only indicative of the internal political conflicts 
between the 1932 coup-makers and their supporters but also of competing visions of 
the nation’s luture and the position of the constitution in the new regime. While 
King Prajadhipok seemed determined to make the constitution work in its original 
sense of giving the people political rights and freedoms, it seems he was only one of 
a few. Many within the People’s Party saw the constitution merely as a vehicle to 
gain and preserve their power, at the veiy least as a method with which to get rid of 
the previous government by princes. Given the harsh treatment of political prisoners 
such as Prince Sittipom61 and others following the events of 1933, contemporary 
observers could have been forgiven for thinking that the constitutional regime was
‘9 B. Batson, The E nd o f  the Absolute Monarchy in Siam (Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1984), 
p. 316.
60 D. Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand, p. 15.
61 The younger brother o f  Prince Bovoradej, he was one o f  the few  princes who supported the 
transition to a constitutional system and continued to work under the constitutional regime as 
Director-General o f  Agricultural Research. The sight o f this prince o f  the Chakri dynasty, who had 
no role in his brother’s rebellion, under arrest for political reasons and in chains shocked many.
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more concerned with conducting a witch-hunt against their political opponents than 
expanding the rights and welfare of the people.62
Meanwhile, moderate constitutionalists may have expected the military to 
withdraw from politics and return to the barracks. On the contrary, the 1932 and 
1933 incidents were arguably the key events in cementing the ‘natural’ place of the 
military in Thai politics. The pact with the military faction worked in that the 
constitutional regime was saved, albeit temporarily, but the agreement was a 
Faustian one. When the Devil came to collect, it was in the form o f Pibul and his 
brand o f leader-centred nationalism that effectively rode rough-shod over the 
constitutional mechanisms that he had helped to save in 1933. Even if Pibul’s 
leadership has been described as ‘timid’ by dictatorial standards, by the time his 
government fell from power in 1944, it could be said that the soul of the 
constitutional regime and the sanctity of the 1932 constitution was entirely lost. In 
effect, the constitutional democracy had traded its soul, its “eternal joy and felicity”, 
in exchange for its temporary salvation from the ambitions of Prince Bovoradej and 
his faction.
In terms of national identity, Pibul had certainly staked out his role in the new 
interpretation of Thai national identity. Superficially, he built on the foundation laid 
by King Vajiravudh and the post-1932 regime, as one of his speeches puts it:
The Japanese have the Emperor as their mentor. We Thai have nothing.
What we have are Nation, Religion, Monarch, and Constitution. Nation is 
still a vision; Religion is not yet sacred enough; Monarch is just a child 
whom we can see only in picture and Constitution is merely a notebook. 
When the country is in trouble we cannot rely on anything. That is why I 
want you all to follow me -  the Prime Minister.63
62 J.A. Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand, p. 73.
63 Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and M alay Nationalism: A Case Study o f  the Malay-M uslims o f  Southern 
Thailand (Thammasat University, Bangkok, 1985), p. 88.
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Clearly, Pibul wished to be the new centre of national identity, but it is 
notable that his proclamation was still based on the old royalist and constitutionalist 
concepts of national identity. The constitutional regime had not done much to alter 
the formula. Instead, it retained the old formula with the addition of a fourth pillar: 
the Constitution, indicating its importance to the new regime, both as an intrinsic 
idea and as a legitimating device. Pibul’s formulation thus appears to be the 
continuation of the trend, where a fifth pillar, the Leader, was being added but with 
the difference that the other pillars now had to be subservient to this latest addition.
The process o f redefining national identity appeared to be evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary. Indeed, there was a large degree of continuity and precedence in 
Pibul’s conception and enforcement o f Thai identity. The Pibul government’s vision 
of Thai identity was codified in a series ofRatthaniyom  (Cultural Mandates)”4 that 
set out precisely what the state expected from its citizens. These codes were issued 
in the name of Pibul and were never debated in the Assembly,65 and thus their 
implications may not have been fully realised at the time of their release.
The first of these concerned the changing of the country’s name to Thailand. 
O f the twelve mandates, three were related to the flag and the national and royal 
anthems (Cultural Mandates 4, 6, and 8). Four focused on the shaping of Thai 
identity in terms o f naming conventions, language, dress, and daily routine (Cultural 
Mandates 3, 9, 10, and 11). The remaining four were concerned with preserving 
national interests and nation-building such as through buying Thai-made goods and 
helping the disadvantaged (Cultural Mandates 2, 5, 7, and 12).66
04 An alternative translation is “State Convention”.
65 J.A. Stowe, Siam Becom es Thailand, p. 124.
66 Thamsuk Numnond, Mnang Thai sam ai Songkhram lok khrang thi song, p. 61.
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The Cultural Mandates had a major impact 011 the ethnic minorities, 
particularly the Chinese who were also the target of additional legislation due to their 
dominance of the country’s economy. For example, they were banned from taking 
up certain types of employment and were liable for additional taxes and restrictions 
on movement.67 Yet the targeting of the Chinese was nothing new. King Vajiravudh, 
for example, had described the Chinese as the “Jews of the East”.68 However, during 
the reign of King Vajiravudh, there was a distinction drawn between the Chinese 
who intermarried with Siamese ethnic groups and eventually settled in Thailand, and 
those who sought only to do business in Thailand, married exclusively with Chinese 
nationals, sent remittances home in support of their families or even the Kuomintang 
or Communist parties, and then returned to China. Whilst the latter became a cause 
for increasing concern (though never a subject of active legislation) for officials 
under King Vajiravudh, the former were largely left alone.69 Even in the Pibul era, 
measures against the Chinese were directed at new immigrants rather than long-time 
settlers, since acting against the latter would probably have meant taking action 
against a large and influential portion of the population and even some key members 
of the government, such as Luang Vichitvatakarn.70
Pibul’s policies vis-a-vis the Chinese were therefore building 011 the 
foundations laid by King Vajiravudh. However, the debt of the post-1932 regime to
67 Liang Chua Morita, ‘Language Shift in the Thai Chinese Community’, Journal o f  Multilingual and  
Multicultural Developm ent, 24, 6 (2003), pp. 491-2.
68 King Vajiravudh may have been trying to pander to an audience in Europe where, at the time, anti- 
Semitism and fear o f  the “Y ellow  Peril” were gaining ground. Apparently, at the time, racial and 
religious discrimination was a ‘mark o f  civilisation5 that needed to be emulated by Siam, see W.F. 
Vella, Chaiyo!, p. 194.
69 It probably did not help that there were no formal procedures for applying for Thai citizenship until 
1939.
70 Luang Vichitvatakarn was vehemently anti-Chinese in his writings, such as Nan Chao, a play 
which portrayed the Chinese driving the Thais out o f their homelands. He also compared the Chinese 
unfavourably with the Jews, commenting that “the Chinese cannot be compared [to the Jews]; [the 
Chinese] come to work here but send money back to their country; so w e can say that the Chinese are 
worse than the Jews”. Even so, Luang Vichitvatakarn was him self o f  Chinese descent and was 
previously known by his Chinese name, Kim Liang, see C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H isto iy o f  
Thailand, pp. 130, 288.
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the absolutist regime extends beyond the Chinese policy. Indeed, the national 
concepts of the constitutional regime owed much to the Oxford-educated monarch. 
As already mentioned, the ‘pillars’ of the regime were clearly inspired by King 
Vajiravudh’s original three pillars. Furthermore, the concept of issuing the Cultural 
Mandates itself was inspired by the previous practice of issuing Phrarachaniyom (a 
monarch’s opinion o f how their subjects should conduct themselves), which was also 
designed to change citizen’s behaviour, in absolutist times.71 Even the cultural 
codification and standardisation was arguably an extension of the traditional practice 
of standardising stories and legends such as the Mahachat (the stories about the 
previous lives of the Buddha) in monarchist times.72 The main differences between 
these earlier decrees and the Cultural Mandates of Pibul were the extent and quantity 
rather than the principles behind their conception.
While Pibul’s vision was built on a foundation prepared by King Vajiravudh, 
it was not devoid of new ideas. The country’s naine-change reflected this new 
element -  irredentism. The pan-Thai idea, that Thailand would not be a land for just 
the Thais inside the borders, but also beyond them, were expressed in the plays of 
Luang Vichitvatakarn. The British Minister to Thailand at the time, Josiah Crosby,73 
noted the implication of this idea:
But the fact that an official change of nomenclature should have been made 
in coincidence with the launching of the Pan-Thai movement may be 
interpreted not unfairly as the indication of a desire to familiarise outsiders 
with the claims of Siam to be regarded as the mother-country of all peoples 
of the Thai race.74
71 Chai-anan Samudavanija, ‘State-identity Creation, State Building and Civil Society, 1939-1989’ in 
C.J. Reynolds (ed.), N ational Identity and its Defenders, p. 52 and J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes 
Thailand, p. 124.
Ibid., p. 58.
?J Sir Josiah Crosby was the British Minister to Siam from 1934-41. He spent the majority o f  his 
career in Siam and was able to speak Siamese fluently and cultivate close friendship with those in 
power. See J.A. Stowe, Siam Becomes Thailand, p. 94.
74 B.J. Terwiel, ‘Thai Nationalism and Identity: Popular Themes o f  the 1930s’ in C.J. Reynolds, 
National Identity and its Defenders, p. 115.
The irredentist sentiments had their origins in the 1893 crisis when Siam was 
humiliated by France and subsequently had to pay indemnities as well as cede 
territory to the colonial powers. The loss of territory remained an issue in the late 
1930s, since according to Josiah Crosby, the irredentist tendency “was first shown in 
the shape of a Pan-Thai agitation which sprang up at Bangkok after the coup d ’etat, 
tacitly encouraged by the Government of Luang Pibul, and aiming at the 
incorporation of all those territories whose peoples are of Thai extraction”.75 These 
sentiments would eventually lead to the Thai-French War (November 1940-May 
1941) and the consequent public questioning of the loyalties of the French-led 
Missions in Thailand.
The 1893 incident also coloured subsequent Thai attitudes towards not only 
the French activities in the region, but also the actions of the Allied nations during 
the Second World War. In 1893 Britain had remained non-committal, despite the 
British dominance of the Siamese shipping trade.76 At the time, the stance of the 
British Minister in Bangkok, Ernest Satow,77 was endorsed by Lord Randolph 
Churchill, then the Secretary of State. In the opinion of Satow, “the Siamese should 
not, in my opinion, be led to expect from us more than merely moral support in their 
relations with other powers. The king should learn that ‘every herring must hang by
7:1 J. Crosby, Siam: The Crossroads (Hollis & Carter, London, 1945), p. 111.
76 At the time, the external trade o f  Siam was worth some £4.5 million per annum, 87 percent o f  the 
tonnage and 93 percent o f  the value were in British hands. The French had less than 2 percent o f  the 
whole. The blockade therefore would have seriously affected British trade interests in Siam, see P. 
Tuck, The French W olf and the Siamese Lamb: The French Threat to Siamese Independence, 1858- 
1907 (White Lotus, Bangkok, 1995), p. 121.
77 Ernest Satow served as the Minister-Resident o f  Bangkok from 1885-88. It was not an enjoyable 
posting due to the malaria he contracted during a journey to Chiang Mai in 1885-6. However, he is 
perhaps better known for his diplomatic and scholarly work on Japan, where he began his Foreign 
Service career in 1862, becoming the British Minister in Tokyo in 1895. He also continued to advise 
the Foreign Office up to his retirement in 1906 as the British Minister in Beijing, where he was 
involved in the negotiations following the suppression o f  the Boxer Rebellion. See E. M. Satow, A 
D iplom at in Siam (Kiscadale, Gartmore, 1994), pp. 5-6.
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his own head’.”7S Siam, essentially, was abandoned to its fate until the French 
blockade of the Chao Phraya River threatened British trading interests, while an 
annexation of Siam by France would have broken the balance of power in the 
region.79 The French encroachment led to the pushing for the neutralisation of Siam 
by Britain. On 15 January 1896, a joint Anglo-French declaration was made which 
guaranteed the independence of the central plain o f Siam.80
By 1940, however, the situation had reversed. France had fallen to Nazi 
Germany. Britain remained the lone power in Europe still resisting the Axis, while 
European colonies in East Asia, such as Flong Kong and Singapore, were under 
direct threat from Imperial Japan. Despite its non-interventionist history with 
Thailand, the British government expected the Thai government to stand and fight on 
its behalf, should the Japanese invade Malaya and Singapore via the Thai southern 
provinces of Songkhla and Pattani. On the night the Pacific War started, Winston 
Churchill sent a telegram urging a sacrificial last stand to be made by the Thai armed 
forces against incoming Japanese forces, promising that British help would be 
forthcoming:
There is a possibility of an imminent Japanese attack on your country. If you 
are attacked, defend yourself. The preservation of the full independence and 
the sovereignty of Thailand is a British interest and we shall regard an attack 
on you as an attack on ourselves.81
It was highly doubtful that Pibul took such assurances seriously, given 
Britain’s past history with Thailand, coupled with the fact that the British and her 
allies had failed to protect countries nearer to home, like Czechoslovakia and
78 P. Tuck, The French W olf and the Siamese Lam b , p. 242.
79 The Siamese concession o f  Laos to France led to the signing o f  a treaty between Britain and France, 
defining the border between British Upper Burma and French Laos in 1896. The two powers did not 
settle their regional rivalry until after the signing o f  the Entente Cordiale in 1904.
80 P. Tuck, The French W olf and the Siamese Lamb , pp. 155-67.
81 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 224.
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Poland,S2 from invasion and occupation. Indeed, if the Thai government had any 
confidence remaining in the power of the British Empire in Southeast Asia after the 
successful Japanese invasion of southern Thailand on 8 December 1941, they were 
literally sunk by the destruction of Force ZS3 by Japanese air squadrons on 10 
December 1941. The subsequent actions of the Pibul government, in particular its 
alignment with Japan (which promised and eventually delivered further territorial 
gains, namely the Shan States and some provinces of Malaya) was perhaps its way of 
saying “every herring must hang by its own head” to the son of Randolph Churchill. 
In Thailand itself, it meant that those who did not agree with the irredentists and the 
‘Leader’ could easily be smeared as ‘unpatriotic’ or accused of working with the 
enemy as ‘Fifth Columnists’. The ascendancy of the totalitarian vision, at the 
expense of the constitutionalist vision, was thus sealed by the developments and 
opportunities offered by the international situation.
Arguably, Thai democracy under the first Pibul government was once again 
ensnared in a Faustian pact. The alignment with Japan was as much about 
Thailand’s survival as a sovereign nation as it was about the expansion of existing 
interests. It is true that, by doing so, Thailand was saved from the excesses that a 
Japanese invasion and occupation would have entailed and might have reaped some 
rewards for their support had the Japanese been ultimately victorious. But that did
S2 The German invasion o f  Poland in 1939 did lead to the declaration o f  war by the British 
government. However, this would have been o f  little comfort to the Poles who saw their country 
divided between the victorious German forces and the complied Soviet government as according to 
the secret clauses o f  the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. They would remain under the influence o f  the latter 
until 1989.
Sj Force Z comprised o f  HMS Prince o f  W ales and HMS Repulse -  two capital ships o f  the British 
navy. The naval detachment sent to Malaya as a deterrent against Japanese invasion. The news o f  the 
ships’ destruction shocked the British in Singapore and in Britain itself, while Churchill, in his 
recollection o f  the moment he received the news, wrote: “In all the war, 1 never received a more direct 
shock... As I turned over and twisted in bed the full horror o f  the news sank in upon me. There were 
no British or American ships in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific except the American survivors o f  
Pearl Harbour, who were hastening back to California. Over all this vast expanse o f  waters Japan was 
supreme, and w e everywhere were weak and naked”. See F. Owen, The Fall o f  Singapore (Michael 
Joseph, London, 1960), p. 65.
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not mean that there were no political or economic costs. The totalitarian tendencies 
of the Pibul government had also taken its toll on the Constitution. Despite the 
provisions for negating legislation that was contraiy to the principles of the 
Constitution,84 that piece of paper could not prevail in the face of raw political power.
The drafting of the 1946 Constitution could be seen as an attempt to redress 
the flaws exposed by Pibul’s regime, but it was also an exercise in restoring the 
Constitution to a central position in the Thai political regime. Of course, it is 
debatable whether the Constitution really ever held such an exalted position in the 
first place. However, considering the centrality of the idea of a constitution in the 
demands of the 1932 coup-makers, its subsequent apotheosis as the fourth pillar of 
national identity, and its annual celebration (arguably usurping the King’s birthday 
celebrations) in the 1930s, there were certainly some sectors of society who 
supported constitutionalism. The 1946 effort itself reconfirms the existence of this 
group. However, ultimately it was a futile exercise. The ultimate test of a 
constitutional regime is its ability to perform in extremis. In the Thai case, it had 
simply been abandoned by Pibul in favour of political expediency. The 1947 coup 
that eventually swept Pibul back to power, and to an extent all subsequent coups and 
constitutional re-drafting, merely served to mark the acknowledgments of political 
realities.
The development of the pillars of Thai national identity thus reflected the 
general political circumstances of this period. The eventual focus on Buddhism 
indicated the weakening of the other pillars of the state and the desire of the Pibul 
regime to legitimise itself. Indeed, Pibul consciously linked the well-being of
84 Section 6, Article 61 o f  the permanent 1932 Constitution stipulated that “All laws that are in 
conflict or contradict this constitution are rendered invalid”.
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Buddhism to the health of the nation, when in 1943 Colonel N. Saranupraphan, the 
Director of the Religious Department, confirmed that:
His Excellency the Prime Minister ardently wishes to promote and uphold 
Buddhism so that it will prosper and be esteemed in the highest possible 
fashion. The reason is...that the Nation and Buddhism cannot be separated.85
Moreover, he used Buddhism as a way to distinguish the Thai nation from 
others, most notably, Catholic Indochina, stating in October 1940 that: “Our Thai 
brothers in Laos and Cambodia are Buddhists but the French are followers of 
Catholicism”.86 Thus under the first Pibul regime religion evolved into an effective 
marker to distinguish Thais and non-Thais: Thais were Buddhists, non-Thais were 
not.
The anti-French sentiments also reflected contemporary international 
developments in the 1940s, historical grievances from the 1890s, as well as the 
government’s emphasis on a chauvinistic Thai identity. The conjunction of the 
Buddhist emphasis and the anti-French attitude of the government was to have 
disastrous consequences for the Catholic Missions in Siam. However, before 1940, 
these developments, while politically momentous, meant very little to the Church. 
Missionaries did record the passing of major events, such as the 1932 coup d’etat, 
but they also noted that they had had little impact on the activities of the Mission.
As the annual report for 1932 stated:
I will only say a little about the sensational development for the country: the 
‘coup d’etat’ of 24 June 1932. The absolute monarchy has become 
constitutional... This revolution was achieved in a surprising calm for those 
who do not know the mentality of the people of this country. Tranquillity
S;i Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand’s Durable Premier: Phibun through Three Decades, 1932- 
1957  (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1995), pp. 129-30.
86 Ibid., pp. 130-1.
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continued to reign in Siam, for the good o f the people and the advancement 
o f the reign of the divine Lord!87
Indeed, since the Church had enjoyed a renaissance and steady growth under 
Kings Mongkut (1851-68), Chulalongkom (1868-1910), Vajiravudh (1910-25), and 
Prajadhipok (1925-1935), there was little reason for the missionaries to believe that 
their activities would be affected by a change of regime, especially considering how 
calm the whole process appeared to be.
However, in little more than a decade, the new regime had changed the name 
of the country, and arguably much of society as well. By 1942, many Mission 
stations and parishes had been destroyed, arbitrarily seized, or vandalised.
Numerous foreign priests and nuns had taken refuge in French Indochina, Singapore, 
the Dutch East Indies, and India, while those who remained were under increasing 
pressure to convert to Buddhism, a religion not previously known for such militant 
fundamentalism. Congregations were also being forced to convert, even more so if 
members were in the civil service and wished to keep their jobs.ss Those who did 
not convert were assaulted or arrested and accused of being unpatriotic Fifth 
Columnists. The lucky ones escaped with only minor injuries; others were given 
prison sentences or were executed in cold blood by state agents.
Paradoxically, while Pibul’s definition o f Thai identity was inclusive in its 
pan-Thai aspect, so much so that it potentially included those beyond the borders, it 
was also exclusive in tying this identity to Buddhism.8<> It was this emphasis on 
Buddhism as the religious cement for the pan-Thai nation that had the gravest 
implication for Catholics. Later scholars noted the social implications of an over­
87 M .E.P.A., Compte-Rendu 1931-32.
88 Kobkua Swannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Prem ier, p. 130.
89 Pibul’s patronage o f  Buddhism was to become even more pronounced in his second regime, albeit 
less militant than in his first government, see Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The P olitics o f  
D espotic Paternalism  (Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Ithaca, 2007), pp. 66-7.
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emphasis on Buddhism where, in the best case, minorities will merely feel alienated 
from society, as Keyes argued with reference to the southern Malay Muslims:
Insofar as equation of being Thai with being Buddhist is a cornerstone of 
Thai official thinking, non-Buddhists could be denied access to participation 
in the national community. It could be predicted that such a policy would 
lead to increasing alienation...90
The argument is echoed by Tambiah: “The constant strain to identify the 
religion with the state and the Buddhist state, in turn, with a Buddhist society creates 
perpetual internal cleavages”.91 The worst case scenario is reflected in the Catholic 
experience o f the 1940s although even then, as well as subsequently, they were not 
the only group to become victims through being perceived as ‘un-Thai’.
Together with the regime’s emphasis on “Thailand for Thais”, the new 
concept of national identity placed the foreign leadership of the Church in Thailand 
under increasing pressure. The experiences and eventual survival of the Church 
during this period was a reflection o f this contradiction of intolerance within 
inclusiveness. In effect, the Church was akin to the company of actors in 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, who were urged to “hold as ‘twere the mirror up to nature”, 
and reflect reality. Like the players, the missionaries acted as mirrors to the regimes 
they experienced. They inadvertently reflected the virtue of the absolutist regime, as 
much as they reflected the scorn o f the totalitarian regime, and by doing so they 
showed the very age and body of the times they experienced.
90 C.F. Keyes, ‘Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand’, Asian Studies, 30, 3 (1971), p. 567.
91 S.J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study o f  Buddhism and Polity in 
Thailand against a H istorical Background  (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976), p. 521.
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What is a Mission?
Come with me and I  will make you fishers o f people.
- Matthew 4:19
This thesis mainly examines the development in the Mission of Siam and its 
relationship with the Thai state. Since, at this stage, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of 
the Church in Thailand was divided between different types of Mission, a 
clarification of these different types might be helpful at this point. In the modem day, 
the Church in most territories with a high number of resident Catholics will be 
organised into dioceses and archdioceses -  administrative territorial units run by a 
bishop or an archbishop. However, in cases where there was an insufficient number 
of Catholics as to warrant the establishment of a diocese or archdiocese or where 
missionary activities were in their early stages, it is common for the territory to go 
through four stages of development, best illustrated by the development of the 
modern-day Diocese of Ratchaburi.
In the first instance, especially in places where missionary prospects are 
uncertain, a Mission “Sui iuris” may be set up. A Mission “Sui iuris” is effectively 
an independent mission headed by an Ecclesiastical Superior who may be a regular 
priest, bishop, archbishop, or a cardinal, although the Superior does not necessarily 
have to be in residence. These Missions are usually located in remote areas, with 
few Catholics. Upon its separation from Bangkok, Ratchaburi gained this status in 
June 1930. The territory was in turn led by Gaetan Pasotti, a priest of the Salesian 
Order, who was appointed Superior.
If the Mission “Sui iuris” successfully develops by establishing and 
maintaining a stable Catholic population, as Ratchaburi had done by May 1934, the 
area of jurisdiction may be re-organised into an apostolic prefecture (or prefecture
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apostolic) — the second stage of development. A prefect-apostolic (or apostolic 
prefect) acts as the administrator of the territory, and is subject only to the Pope.
Their authority thus derives from the Pope, rather than directly from their office, as 
would be the case with diocesan bishops.92
Further development of the apostolic prefecture will be marked by the third 
stage of development -  the elevation to the status of an apostolic vicariate (or 
vicariate apostolic), headed by a vicar-apostolic (or apostolic vicar). The Prefect- 
Apostolic o f Ratchaburi was thus elevated to this status in April 1941. There is little 
difference between an apostolic prefecture and an apostolic vicariate in terms of 
jurisdiction and the exercise of authority. However, in terms of official hierarchy, a 
vicar-apostolic outranks a prefect-apostolic. Vicars-apostolic are still subject only to 
the Pope, and are usually appointed to titular sees. The elevation marks the 
penultimate step to the establishment of a diocese or an archdiocese.
The fourth, and last step, is the establishment of a diocese or an archdiocese. 
Depending on a number of factors including history, territorial extent, and number of 
Catholics, a vicariate apostolic may become a suffragan diocese or an archdiocese in 
its own right, led by either a bishop or archbishop.93 Thus, the Apostolic Vicariate of 
Siam/Bangkok94 was elevated into an archdiocese in December 1965 while the 
Apostolic Vicariate of Ratchaburi, which had originally derived its territories from 
Bangkok, was elevated to the status of a diocese but one that was suffragan to the
92 Although som e prefects-apostolic may refer to themselves as being bishops o f  their area as a short­
hand, in actual fact, technically they were bishops o f  titular sees only. Thus, Prefect-Apostolic Pasotti 
o f Ratchaburi may have been known informally as the Bishop o f  Ratchaburi but, in actual fact, he was 
the Titular Bishop o f  Barata.
93 Some bishops or archbishops may also be appointed to the position o f  Cardinal. Thailand’s only 
and current cardinal is Michael Michai Kitbunchu, former Archbishop o f  Bangkok, who was 
appointed on 2 February 1983 as Cardinal-priest o f  San Lorenzo in Panispema.
94 The Apostolic Vicariate o f  Siam underwent several name changes. In 1841, it became the 
Apostolic Vicariate o f  Eastern Siam (Siam Orientale), and in 1924 it became the Apostolic Vicariate 
o f Bangkok. However, despite these changes it continued to term itself as the M ission o f Siam until 
the early 1940s.
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Archdiocese of Bangkok. On the other hand, Tha Rae and Nongsaeng, derived from 
the Apostolic Vicariate of Laos,9’1 which had separated from the Apostolic Vicariate 
of Bangkok in 1899, became an archdiocese in its own right.
The normal progression is thus: mission, apostolic prefecture, apostolic 
vicariate, and then diocese or archdiocese. There are, however, some exceptions.
For example, the first Mission in Siam in 1662 was actually set up as an apostolic 
vicariate rather than a Mission “Sui iuris”. The designation was made possible 
through the combination of the past missionary efforts of the Portuguese, the needs 
of the French missionaries to establish their own authority in a formal hierarchy, and 
what was thought to be a high chance of future success for the Mission, thanks to the 
positive atmosphere generated by King Narai (1656-88). In the 1940s, due to the 
pressures being exerted on the Apostolic Vicariate of Bangkok at the time and the 
prior existence of a strong Catholic community there, Chantaburi was immediately 
elevated to the status of an apostolic vicariate. In more recent times, Chiang Mai 
also skipped the Mission “Sui iuris” stage and became an apostolic prefecture in 
1959, also because of the earlier and successful missionary efforts conducted by the 
Mission o f Siam. Shortly thereafter, it also leapfrogged the apostolic vicariate stage 
and became a full diocese in December 1965.
In formal correspondence with the Church authorities, these territories would 
use their proper titles, whether they were apostolic prefectures, apostolic vicariates, 
and so on. However, given the variety of statuses and titles and the confusion they 
might cause for those unfamiliar with the Catholic hierarchy, in day-to-day 
communications to elements within or outside the Church, it was normal practice for
95 The Apostolic Vicariate o f  Laos had jurisdiction over French-controlled Laos as w ell as 
Northeastern Thailand, which was sometimes referred to provocatively as “Western Laos” in 
missionary correspondence.
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these territories to be referred to generally as a Mission and their leader as the 
“bishop” of the Mission,
Thus, prior to its elevation as a diocese, Ratchaburi was always known as the 
Mission of Ratchaburi, regardless of its changing status as a Mission “Sui iuris”, 
apostolic prefecture, or apostolic vicariate. After its elevation to the status of a 
diocese, the Mission effectively ceased to exist, and today the territory is referred to 
as the Diocese of Ratchaburi.%
96 The diocese has undergone some formal name changes since its elevation. Immediately on its 
elevation as a diocese in 1965, it was known as the D iocese o f  Bangnokkhwaek. A year later, it 
became the Diocese o f  Ratburi, finally settling in 1969 in favour o f  the current name o f  the Diocese o f  
Ratchaburi.
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Literature Review
But anything shown up by the light will be illuminated and anything illuminated is
itself a light
Ephesians 5: 13-14
Given the small number of Thai Catholics (today, numbering just under 300,000 or 
around 0.45 percent of the total Thai population), it is not surprising to see that there 
is little scholarly work directly on this subject. Previous academic works have 
tended to focus on the Church’s activities during the Ayutthaya period (1351-1767) 
and the accompanying diplomatic activities and their ultimately disastrous 
consequences in the seventeenth century.97 These works form a valuable 
contribution to the understanding of the history of the Church in Thailand and have 
shed much light on the activities of various parties and nationalities during the 
Ayutthaya period. Foreign accounts -  mainly French and Dutch but there also exist 
Portuguese and English sources -  form the main sources for these histories, due to 
the paucity of indigenous material dating from the same period, thanks mainly to the 
local climate and the destruction of Ayutthaya in 1767.
These works are, however, largely irrelevant to the period and focus of this 
thesis although they are useful in their examination o f how previous persecutions in 
Siam developed. Historians have traditionally placed the blame for the 1688 
persecution, which were the first state-endorsed persecutions against Catholicism, on 
the rise of the French influence at the court of Ayutthaya.9S Whilst the French 
missionaries were responsible for the spectacular diplomatic activities of King Narai
97 M. Smithies and L. Bressan, Siam and the Vatican in the Seventeenth Centiny (River Books, 
Bangkok, 2001).
98 See for example F.H. Turpin, A H istoiy o f  the Kingdom o f  Siam up to 1770 (White Lotus, Bangkok, 
1997), p. 71: D. van der Cruysse, Siam and the West, 1500-1700 (Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 
2002), p. 469: and M. Smithies (ed.), Witnesses to a Revolution: Siam 1688  (Siam Society, Bangkok, 
2004), pp. iii-iv.
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(1656-88) that went as far afield as England, France, and the Vatican, as a 
consequence of which the monarch was given the epithet ‘the Great’, their meteoric 
rise at the court disturbed the balance of power between the foreign factions within 
the court, most notably the Persians, not to mention the Dutch," the English, and 
even the Catholic Portuguese.100
Together with the influence of Constantine Phaulkon, a Greek who rose from 
being a cabin boy in the English East Indian Company to become the Siamese king’s 
most powerful and trusted minister, the ascendancy of foreign factions upset the 
native courtiers who became increasingly xenophobic. The crisis occurred in 1688 
when Petracha (1688-1703), a childhood friend of King Narai, usurped the throne 
whilst the king was on his deathbed. Phaulkon was arrested, tortured, and executed, 
French troops garrisoned at Bangkok were expelled, and all diplomatic ties with the 
French were cut. As for the Church, although the French bishop and the mainly 
French Jesuit missionaries were temporarily arrested and Church activities were 
suppressed, it was never driven out or underground.
Although political meddling can be seen as the main cause of the conflict in 
the seventeenth century, Robert Costet in his Siam-Laos: Histoire de la Mission,101 
the only general work on the Thai Church to address the persecution of the 1940s, 
argues that it was Thai nationalism, rather than the actions of the Church that 
provoked the crisis of the 1940s. A priest of the Missions Etrangeres de Paris 
(M.E.P.),102 a religious order that played a key role in a large part of Thai Catholic
99 Dhiravat na Pombejra, Siamese Court Life in the Seventeenth Century as D epicted  in European  
Sources (Chulalongkom University, Bangkok, 2001), p. 209.
100 Ibid., pp. 171-5.
101 There are two versions o f  Costet’s book. The original is in French: R. Costet, Siam-Laos: Histoire 
de la Mission  (Eglises Asie, Paris, 2003) and the translated Thai version, which has some variation: R. 
Costet, P raw at kan phoei phrae Khristsasana nai Syam laeL ao  [The History o f  Missionary Activities 
in Siam and Laos] (Sue muanchon Kliatholik Prathet Thai, Bangkok, 2006).
102 Also known as the Paris Foreign M issions Society.
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history and that of much of Asia, his account is sweeping and covers the history of 
the Thai Catholic Church from its somewhat enigmatic beginnings under the 
Portuguese and the entry of the M.E.P. during the reign of King Narai up to the 
1950s when the Mission was moving to form an indigenous hierarchy. However, the 
account’s vast area of coverage is the work’s main weakness. Costet is useful in that 
he provides a good general overview of the periods involved. Nevertheless, because 
the book is such a general survey of the histoiy of the mission from the sixteenth 
century onwards, it is thin 011 details. It portrays the major events of the persecution 
such as the arrests of priests and the Songkhon martyrdoms, but it neglects the more 
localised persecutions and does not explain why some parishes managed to escape 
relatively unscathed whilst others faced unprecedented harassment and violence.
Costet attributes the persecution to a Thai nationalism that overly emphasised 
Buddhism as the national religion, and the outbreak of the Thai-French conflict that 
allowed the authorities to portray French nationals, and thus many Catholic priests 
(and by implication Catholics in general), as members of an imaginary “Fifth 
Column”,103 despite the fact that by that time, the Catholic Missions had entirely 
withdrawn from all political involvement. Notably, Costet’s book was translated 
into Thai and published in 2006, and was promoted by the Church. As such, it can 
be regarded as an official version of the histoiy of the Church in Thailand and thus 
can form a useful basis for comparisons with the “subaltern” histories that will 
emerge from the more localised historical records.
There is, however, much more material regarding Thai nationalism and its 
development,104 particularly its effects on the southern Muslim and Chinese
103 R. Costet, Siam-Laos, pp. 656-7.
104 General works on Thai nationalism during this period and its effect on modern-day Thailand 
include C.J. Reynolds (ed.), N ational Identity> and its Defenders: Thailand Today: Chaiyan 
Rajchagool, The Rise and Fall o f  the Thai Absolute Monarchy (White Lotus, Bangkok, 1994): J.A,
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communities during this period. General material on Thai nationalism during this 
period builds on Gellner’s and Anderson’s idea that the nation was essentially an 
artificial or ‘’imagined’ construct. Gellner argued that “nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist”,105 while Anderson agreed that communities constructed by nationalism are 
very much “imagined”; he argues that they are “limited” and “sovereign”.106 Baker 
(2005) takes these ideas further by suggesting that the actual process of creating 
nations or imaginary communities was not so much linear as evolutionary: that there 
was not one, monopolistic way to ‘imagine’ a state (though one vision may become 
dominant over time) but multiple and often opposing ways, internally and 
externally.107 Externally, especially for the substantial Chinese ethnic minorities in 
Thailand, there was also the additional element of Chinese nationalism which, in turn, 
became split between the factions of the Kuomintang and the Communists,108 while 
internally there was a tension in the 1930s between the royal-centric nationalism of 
King Vajiravudh and the nation-constitution centric vision that was espoused by the 
post-1932 government.
In addition, even the post-1932 vision had differences. For example, the 
vision that appeared to have been favoured by Pridi Phanomyong was centred on the 
people and the constitution, where the constitution sometimes appears as a separate, 
additional entity. Pibul’s more virulent version was centred on the nation and 
obedience to ‘the Leader’ as the nation’s ‘embodiment’, with an emphasis on the 
religion of Buddhism as the focus of unity. Essentially, Pibul had turned to the two
Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand: C. Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A H isto iy o f  Thailand, pp. 105-39: 
and D.K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short H istoiy, pp. 241-50.
105 E. Gellner, Thought and Change (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1972), p. 168.
106 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso, London, 2006), pp. 5-7.
107 C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H istoiy o f  Thailand, p. 105.
108 C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H isto iy o f  Thailand, pp. 129-31.
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pillars of ‘Religion’ and ‘Nation’ to safeguard his legitimacy while still maintaining 
the monarchy and Constitution in nominal existence, but out of politics. Royalist 
parties would, naturally, emphasise the institution of the King although, again, the 
degree varied considerably.
The conflict between various conceptions of the nation, and its nature, was 
also a reflection of wider political disagreements. Nevertheless, in the Thai context, 
the different versions of the Thai nation were built on the foundations of prior ideas. 
Thus, characteristics such as King Vajiravudh’s three pillars of Nation, Religion, and 
King continued to be maintained throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The main 
difference was in the addition or elimination of ‘pillars’ and emphases, for example 
the Constitution became the main emphasis as a fourth pillar post-1932, while the 
Leader superseded the Constitution as an informal fifth pillar after 1938, but was 
subsequently excised after the fall of the first Pibul government in 1944.109
On the effects of the differing visions of national identity on specific 
communities, previous works have focused on the experiences of the Chinese110 and 
the southern Malay communities.111 The work on the Chinese has some relevance, 
since the Chinese formed a significant proportion of some parish communities. 
However, the experiences of the southern Malay community are less relevant for the 
Catholic community, since the differences in the origins of the grievances and issues 
between the southern Malay community and the Thai government are substantial. 
First, the Malay community claims sovereignty over a certain territory, whereas the
109 C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H isto iy o f  Thailand, p. 139.
110 Apart from M. Stuart-Fox, // Short H isto iy  o f  China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade, and  
Influence (Allen & Unwin, Singapore, 2005), there are also V. Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia 
(Oxford University Press, London, 1965) and G.W. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An 
Analytical H isto iy  (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1957).
111 In addition to Surin Pitsuwan, op. cit., which provides an extensive survey o f  the literature and 
bibliography, there is also R. Davies, Siam in the M alay Peninsula (Fraser and Neave, Singapore, 
1902).
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Catholic community has never done so. Second, the Catholic communities are not 
concentrated in a single area, but are distributed across the country. Third, while 
loyalty to the Thai state has been a long-running source of internal contention in the 
case of the southern Malays, the Catholics have never had an issue with this concern, 
even when they were being actively persecuted. Fourth, the Malays constitute a 
largely homogenous community, whereas the composition of the Catholics cut 
across ethnic boundaries. Finally, although Catholics can imagine themselves to 
belong to a larger ‘Catholic world’ that exists beyond their border, this is arguably 
not as strong as the sense of belonging the southern Malays feel as part of a wider 
‘Malay world’ that encompasses Malaysia, Indonesia, and the wider Islamic world. 
Therefore, whilst the two groups are superficially similar in that they were affected 
by certain government policies in the 1940s, on closer examination the origins and 
impact of state policies were quite different.
Further afield, there has also been significant work on the Church and its 
activities in the region, particularly in countries where Catholics form a minority 
such as Japan, Korea, and China. This body of literature is useful in forming a basis 
for further comparative studies. However, since this is not the main objective of the 
thesis this body of literature, significant as it is, will not be directly usefiil to this 
thesis.
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Research Issues
He who would climb to a lofty height must go by steps, not leaps.
St. Gregory the Great
Previous works on Thai nationalism during this period have focused on the 
Ratthaniyom and other policy initiatives under Pibul and their effects on the various 
ethnic minorities, with a particular emphasis on the ethnic Malays and Chinese.
Some of these policies, especially the Cultural Mandates, were overtly aimed at 
specific groups, for example, the Chinese. Although pressure was brought to bear on 
those in the civil service who adhered to religions other than Buddhism,112 there does 
not seem to be a consistent government policy specifically targeting Catholics in the 
general population. Instead, the Church seems to have been the indirect target of 
several measures that targeted ethnic groups. Thus for this reason, while it is easier 
to assess government attitudes towards specific ethnic groups, it is harder to do so 
for the Catholic Church.
A second problem is that the Church did not consist of a single, homogenous 
ethnic group. Indeed, parish records suggest that the Church and its network was 
actually a melange of ethnic groups and social classes.113 As such, one group within 
the Church, such as the Chinese, may be more affected by new laws than others. In 
the case of the Chinese, they actually become double minorities -  as ethnic Chinese 
and as Catholics -  and this picture can be even more complicated as some Chinese
112 R. Costet, Praw at kcm ph oei phrae Khristsasana nai Siam lae Laos, p, 659 and Bangkok 
Archdiocese Archives (henceforth B.A.A .), Fr. Andre to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 8 May 1942, 30/2/42  
and 19 August 1943, 30/2/50.
113 For example B .A.A., Fr. Colombet’s Memorial, 1 September 1945, 31/1/10 sees the establishment 
o f  an orphanage trust committee consisting o f  members o f  the nobility and Chinese businessmen, 
whilst B .A.A., Parish Petition, 7 November 1937, 30/1/48 sees the ethnic-KIimer parish battling with 
local thugs, gamblers, and moonshine distilleries who were tenants on parish land.
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were divided between supporters of the Kuomintang and the Communists.114 
However, the affected group’s affiliation with the Church may have, at the same 
time, caused the authorities to become more suspicious of the Church.
With regard to the political dimension, the Church had become entangled in a 
complicated political network through its social networks. Prior to the establishment 
of the constitutional monarchy, the Church’s most significant network was with the 
aristocracy, the effective administrators of the government ministries. However, the 
fall o f the absolute monarchy meant that these ties were severed. Church sources 
from the period actually paid little attention to political developments, arguably 
because whilst the network was usefiil to the Church when it was faced with 
problems from local officials and issues, the network had little impact on day-to-day 
parish life. Nevertheless to the Church leadership, the connections with the 
aristocrats did allow it to assess the pulse and direction of the government. On the 
other hand, the failure of the Bovoradej rebellion, given the Church’s previous royal 
connections, arguably eroded the new government’s trust in the Church.
In addition, the Church’s foreign connection, particularly with the French, 
complicates the picture. For some decades, collaboration between colonial 
authorities and the Church was a particular concern of the Vatican. Popes Gregory 
XVI (1765-1846) and Benedict XV (1854-1922) both issued apostolic letters 
(Neminem Profecto in 1845 and Maximum Ilhtd in 1919) stressing the importance of 
the role of the local clergy in missionary activities and encouraging priests to put 
their loyalty to the Church before loyalty to their state. Assuming that some of the 
clergy in Thailand ignored these instructions, they would have been in a difficult
114 M. Stuart-Fox, A Short H istoiy o f  China and Southeast Asia, pp. 139-40.
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position during this period, considering the split between Vichy France, which was 
in nominal control of the neighbouring Indochinese colonies, and Free France.
While the Church’s network with the government was important, local 
circumstances and networks were equally vital, if  not more so to the survival of 
individual parishes. As each parish had different ethnic and social compositions, as 
well as different economic circumstances, they also formed individual local 
networks, relations, and conflicts. The latter was arguably the determining factor as 
to which parish suffered persecution. For instance, conflicts over land and rent that 
may have simmered in the 1930s exploded in the 1940s, as local opportunists sought 
to settle the conflict conclusively through a timely display of “patriotism” and 
arbitrary seizure of Church property, seizures that could be excused since the 
property did not belong to a “patriotic Thai”.
The final issue to be examined is that although the Church suffered because 
of the specific interpretation of Thai identity, it has to be remembered that many of 
its members were ethnic Thais, and did not remain unaffected by the government’s 
propaganda encouraging a chauvinistic brand of Thai patriotism. As the leadership 
of the Church up to this time was primarily French, the rise of a militant Thai 
nationalism may have encouraged Thai priests to demand a greater role in the 
administration of their Church. However, paradoxically, rather than decreasing the 
government’s suspicions of them by doing so, the Thai priests actually remained 
targets because of their continuing adherence to Catholicism.
54
Primary Sources
We pray fo r  our Mother, the Church upon earth 
And bless, sweetest Lady, the land o f our birth.
Abbe Gaignet
The main sources used for the thesis are located in the Bangkok Archdiocese 
Archives (B.A.A.). Reflecting the centralised nature of the Church in Thailand at the 
time, the archives house parish records, which include correspondence, wills, 
inventories, as well as other miscellaneous documents ranging from share holdings 
in local companies, newspaper clippings of stories related to parish affairs to 
timetables and prospectuses of parish schools, from across the country, as well as 
records of the schools that the Church had established. It also includes the personal 
correspondences of the Rene Marie-Joseph Perros (1909-47), the Vicar-Apostolic of 
Siam at the time of the persecution and those that were written by his predecessors 
and eventual successor, Louis-August Chorin (1947-65), the last Vicar-Apostolic 
who oversaw the creation of the first Thai diocese and the transfer of power from 
foreign bishops to Thai ones.
Furthermore, the B.A.A. holds documents that were used in the beatification 
processes in 2000 for the case of Blessed Nicholas Kitbamrung. Apart from the 
documents relating directly to the beatification process itself, including letters, 
witness testimonies, and summaries of the case and proceedings, a significant part of 
this collection is Fr. Victor Larque’s unpublished account of the persecution, En 
Thailande de 1940 a 1945, that was assembled in 1984. Fr. Larque himself was a 
French M.E.P. priest and a victim of the 1940s persecution, and his account was 
essentially a collection of various Thai documents from the years 1940 to 1945 with 
French translations. These documents range widely from parish letters, government
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orders, testimonies, and newspaper articles. The purpose of the documents was not 
so much to analyse the origins or impact of the persecution but to prove that the 
persecution had taken place, as the first step in the beatification processes of the 
Songkhon martyrs and of Fr. Nicholas Kitbamrung. One of the conditions for a 
successful beatification process, especially in cases of martyrdoms, was that odium 
fidei or “hatred of the faithfiil” must have taken place and was a plausible reason for 
the martyrdom. The two volumes of documents were crucial in buttressing the 1989 
and 2000 beatification cases, and establishing the existence of odium fidei.
The sources are also interesting linguistically since they reflect the 
developments within and outside the Mission. Prior to the 1930s, with few 
exceptions, the correspondence was overwhelmingly in French, indicating the nature 
of the Church leadership at the time. The dominant force within the Thai Church at 
the time was the Missions Etrangeres de Paris (M.E.P.). Whilst the M.E.P. itself had 
priests of nationalities other than French, the majority of the M.E.P. priests active in 
Thailand were French or had French connections. This dominance is demonstrated 
by the almost continuous succession of the Apostolic Vicariate of Siam by M.E.P. 
priests since 1669.115 In effect, the M.E.P. held an almost uninterrupted monopoly 
on the leadership of the Siamese Church. Notably, all o f the Siamese Vicars- 
Apostolic, including those from outside the M.E.P., were French. In addition, due to 
the efforts of Vicar-Apostolic Vey (1875-1909), there were also other French 
religious orders operating in Siam at the time, such as the Order of St. Paul de 
Chartres and the Brothers of St. Gabriel. Thus, the language used during this period 
in correspondences and documents essentially reflects the realities of the Church 
leadership and personnel at the time. The major exceptions to this are some letters
Ui There were only two exceptions: Vicar-Apostolic Louis Champion de Cice (1700-27) and his 
successor, Vicar-Apostolic Jean-Jacques Tessier de Queralay (1727-36).
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and wills from the parishioners themselves, which are mostly written in Thai, an 
indication perhaps of an imperfect interface between the shepherd and his flock.
After the 1930s, there is a marked increase in correspondence using a 
romanised version of Thai with the use of accents, similar to the system that had 
been introduced to Vietnam. Although thisphasa wat (‘Church language’ or Church 
Thai) was used before this period, there were very few examples of this usage in the 
correspondence. The change was gradual and could point to transitions in the local 
leadership of the Church or the adaptation of the predominantly French leadership to 
local conditions. After all, local conversions and vocations into the priesthood 
would be impossible if all operations within the Church were conducted in a 
language that is incomprehensible to the local population. Even so, there are some 
idiosyncrasies in the correspondence written in Church Thai; for example letters start 
with a Latin address, months are still written in Latin or French, the majority of the 
content will be in Church Thai, but the letter itself will be signed off in the French 
form.
A further aspect that present Thai Catholics would find strange from this 
period is the fact that, contrary to present practices, the Thai priests were known and 
signed their correspondence with their given Christian names rather than Thai names. 
Indeed, amongst Thai lay Catholics as well as within the priesthood, the present 
normal practice is to address each other with Thai rather than Christian names. Thus, 
for example, a Thai Fr. Gabriel would be better known to his parishioners as Father 
Supot and enquiries for a Fr. Gabriel would most likely be met with puzzled 
expressions from his parishioners. In the present, the few times that the Christian 
name would be used fleetingly would be in Church ceremonies, such as baptisms, 
marriages, and funerals or on occasions where there are Vatican officials present.
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The 1940s saw another change in the language of correspondence, where 
documents written in the Thai script proper conies into increasing use. Given the 
surge of Thai nationalism under Pibul during this period, the development is 
arguably a reflection of the prevailing circumstances. It is also during this period that 
the more nationalistic or recalcitrant priests, depending on one’s perspective, began 
to use their Thai names as opposed to their Christian names in correspondence.
The second relevant collection in Thailand is at the Sakon Naklion Mission 
Archives (henceforth S.N.M.A.). The collection consists of the documents sent to 
the Vatican for the 1989 beatification cases involving the Seven Martyrs of 
Songkhon and again consists of letters, witness testimonies, and summaries of the 
proceedings. There is a major problem for the treatment of sources from this 
collection since they have not been formally organised and catalogued.
The third collection is a private one, assembled by Fr. Bruno Arens 
(henceforth C.B.A.), a priest of the Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate (O.M.I.). 
The thesis does cite some documents from this collection, but all of the cited 
documents can be cross-referenced at the Thai National Archives. The usefulness of 
the Thai National Archives itself, however, is limited since there was no official 
policy on paper advocating persecution against Catholics. Furthermore, the relevant 
government policy documents have already been kept by the Mission archives and 
these, as well as material from other sources, have been drawn upon and 
incorporated into the two beatification cases. Thus, between the archive documents, 
beatification documents, and the analyses conducted by secondary sources, the 
stance of the Thai government at the time can be established. Although the Church 
faced persecution of varying degrees across the country, it seems that in many cases 
the acts were perpetrated by criminal and thuggish elements in the local society or
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local Thai officials acting in an ‘unofficial’ capacity. Local networks played a 
greater role in the persecutions and whilst Thai officials were involved in some of 
the incidents, the ‘unofficial’ nature of their involvement makes it less likely that 
there will be a documentary trail at the centre.
In addition, there are also relevant archives outside Thailand. While a case 
can be made for the Church being an “imagined community”, the bureaucratic nature 
of this community has made locating documentary evidence much easier than other 
more nebulous global ‘communities’. Thus, in addition to the archives of the 
Bangkok Archdiocese, there are also the Archives of the Missions Etrangere de Paris 
in Paris (henceforth M.E.P.A.). The M.E.P. was founded by Bishops Francois 
Pallu116 and Pierre Lambert de la Motte,117 both of whom were missionaries to Siam 
under Pope Alexander VII in the mid-seventeenth century, specifically to deal with 
missionary activities in Asia. The organisation was also the headquarters of the 
Vicars-Apostolic of Siam-Thailand and Laos (which also covered northeastern 
Thailand).
Another potential line of investigation was the Vatican archives, particularly 
the records of the Propaganda Fide, but the documents from that period are still not 
open for public viewing.118 However this does not pose a problem for three reasons. 
First, the Catholic Missions did not have an intimate connection with the Propaganda 
Fide in day-to-day affairs. Secondly, copies of the more important letters and reports
116 Born in Tours in 1626, during his life Bishop Pallu was to take charge o f  the territories o f Laos, 
Tonkin, and southwestern China. He also co-founded the General Seminary in Ayutthaya in 1665 
with Pierre Lambert de la Motte, which after much peregrination has become the present day General 
College in Penang. He died in China in 1684.
117 Bom  in La Boissiere in 1624, in i658 he was appointed as the Vicar-Apostolic o f  Cochinchina. He 
was a co-founder o f  the General Seminary in Ayutthaya in 1665. In 1670, while he was in Tonkin, he 
created the order o f  the Amantes de la Croix de Jesus-Christ (the Lovers o f  the Holy Cross). He died 
in Ayutthaya in 1679.
118 The most recent opening was for the documents from the pontificate o f Pope Pius XI, who reigned 
from 1922-1939, by the current Pope, Benedict XVI, see Zenit, ‘Benedict XVI Opens Archives on 
Pius X I’, 2 July 2006, http://www.zenit.org/article-164697Lenglish [Last Access: 11 October 2008].
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that were sent out have been preserved in the Bangkok-based archives and, in some 
cases, also at the M.E.P. Archives. Finally, the beatification documents, some of 
which were drawn from the archives of the Propaganda Fide, cover many of the 
relevant documents from this source.
Finally, given the wide variety of languages used in the correspondence in 
these archives, including French, Thai (Church and official), English, Latin, Italian, 
and Chinese, the quoted sources have all been translated into English by the author 
for easier reading.
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II
Historical Background of the Church in Siam,
1544-1939
Thou who didst come to bring,
On Thy redeeming wing,
Healing and sight,
Health to the sick in mind,
Sight to the inly blind,
Oh, now to all mankind 
Let there be light!
John Marriott, Thou Whose Almighty Word
Alongside methodological considerations, the previous chapter discussed the 
historical background, debates and ideas that have been put forward regarding Thai 
political developments in the 1930s as well as issues pertaining to the construction of 
Thai national identity and its evolution. However, in this chapter, the focus will shift 
to charting the general development of Catholic missionary activities in Thailand 
prior to the 1939.
The Church in Siam, 1544-1909
The Catholic Mission has nothing to do with politics and is focused on doing good
deeds and helping others. 1
Vicar-Apostolic Perros, October 1942
The issues that faced Catholic Missions in Asia throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth century were thus diverse. In examining Siam, it can be seen that 
missionaries there too faced challenges common to the region: an entrenched, 
complex religious system and occasional persecution. Yet, in Siam they also found
1 Bangkok Archdiocese Archives (B .A .A.), Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Interior Minister, 22 October 
1942,33/4/61.
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many blessings. Until the closing years of the seventeenth century, the monarchs of 
Ayutthaya, the old capital of Siam, were largely favourable to the Catholic presence. 
Indeed, under King Narai the Great (1656-88), the missionaries were able to gain 
unprecedented influence over the court and its foreign policy. Although this 
influence provoked jealousy among the courtiers and the eventual downfall of the 
French missionaries, the Catholics were never totally expelled or forced into hiding.
Even as the tide of xenophobia rose and ebbed, so did the Buddhist instinct 
for tolerating other religions. One monarch may have decreed the expulsion of 
missionaries, but it usually did not take long before he himself, or his successor, 
moderated or reversed the decision. While during the Ayutthaya period (1351-1767), 
much was subject to the individual whims of the monarch, in nineteenth century 
Bangkok, other considerations also had to be taken seriously, namely the 
encroachment of the western colonialists. Missionaries were once again useful as 
initial diplomatic contacts, as well as a source of information on everything from 
religious beliefs to the latest technological innovation. Nevertheless, as the colonial 
powers made their presence felt, some saw the missionaries that came with them as a 
threat to Siamese sovereignty. Yet others, like the monarch, saw in the work of 
missionaries a chance to ensure the kingdom’s integrity through its ‘civilisation’, 
even if they would never think of converting to the Christian religion.
Throughout the history of the Church in Siam, no matter how severe the 
persecution or how friendly the regime, neither sentiment, it seems, would ever die 
out completely.
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The First Missionaries and Court Politics, 1544-1767
Assurez ces Messieurs queje suis ravi des les avoir vus, et que je  fera i pour le roi de 
Siam, monfrere, meme avec beaucoup de plaisir, ce qu ’ilpourra desirer de moi.
Louis XIV to Siamese Ambassadors, 1684
While Thailand, as a country, is not commonly associated with a strong Catholic
presence, Thai Catholic tradition states that the first missionaries to the kingdom,
and indeed the region, were Dominican chaplains that arrived in Ayutthaya with the
Portuguese traders in the first half of the sixteenth century. Little detail is known
concerning this period, due to a lack of documentary evidence, although there are
apocryphal stories of a king who converted to Christianity, taking the name of Dom
Joao in 1544.2 The reliability of this tale is suspect since there is no firm
documentary evidence either on the Siamese or the Catholic side to substantiate it.
The earliest documentary source available for this period is a letter written by Friar
Fernando di S. Maria dated 26 December 1569.3 The letter describes the favourable
treatment that was afforded to the missionaries by the monarch, the ease with which
the missionaries learnt the native language, and their community’s conflicts with the
existing Muslim community and their leaders, who were envious of the sudden rise
of Portuguese influence at the court at their political and economic expense.4
The tension between the Muslim and Catholics eventually led to an
altercation in 1569, during which Fr. Jeronimo da Cruz, a Catholic priest, was killed.
The incident was brought to the knowledge of the royal court, which launched an
“ The dates given for this conversion would place it during the reign o f King Chairacha (1534-47). 
Since he was poisoned, court dissatisfaction with his conversion might have been a motive behind the 
assassination. However, in the light o f  the lack o f  evidence and given the standard volatility of  
Ayutthaya court politics, it is likely that more secular motives were responsible for the monarch’s
premature demise.
3
Surachai Chumsriphan, ‘The Great Role o f  Jean-Louis Vey, Apostolic Vicar o f  Siam (1875-1909), 
in the Church History o f  Thailand during the Reformation Period o f Rama V, the Great (1868-1910)’, 
(PhD Thesis, Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, 1990), p. 72.
4 At the time o f  the Portuguese missionaries’ first arrival, the influence o f  traders from Persia was at 
its zenith in the court o f  Ayutthaya.
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investigation into the affair. Eventually, the matter was resolved in favour of the 
Catholics and a death sentence was passed on the Muslim offenders. However, the 
sentence was commuted at the insistence of the Catholics.5 The magnanimous 
intervention impressed the monarch and enhanced the prestige o f the Portuguese in 
the eyes of the royal court. Politically too, the monarch may have been glad to 
acquire a faction to balance the Islamic influence at the court. At the same time, the 
missionaries also began various works that further ingratiated them with the ruler 
and the local populace. These works included assistance in the construction of city 
fortifications, provision of basic western medical services, and the establishment of a 
school. While assisting in the construction of defence works was perhaps rather 
unorthodox, the provision of medical services and education not only stemmed from 
western monastic traditions but would also go on to become a longstanding Catholic 
tradition in Thailand.
Missionary activities continued, in spite of the first fall o f Ayutthaya to a 
Burmese invasion in 1569, and were bolstered with the entry o f other religious 
orders such as the Spanish Franciscans, the first arriving in 1582 and the Jesuits who 
came as early as 1606. More often than not, their efforts were hampered by the 
lingering Persian influence rather than by any Buddhist or xenophobic sentiments on 
the part of the Siamese.6 It was under the Jesuits that the Thai Church reached its 
zenith during the reign of King Narai (1656-88). Missionary activities were 
promoted in tandem with French diplomatic activities, encouraged in part by the 
Greek-bom advisor, Constantine Phaulkon (also known as Luang Wichayen). Just 
as the Portuguese were employed as a counterweight to the Persian influence, the 
French newcomers were seen as an effective counterbalance to the influence of the
R. Costet, Siatn-Laos, p. 20.
6 D. van der Cruysse, Siam and the West, 1500-1700  (Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 2002), p. 13.
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established Dutch traders who had become too powerful in the eyes of the court. As 
a result of the influx of foreigners, this period is one of the best documented in the 
history of Ayutthaya and could be considered to be the “Golden Age” of missionary 
activities in the old capital.
Probably valued more for their knowledge in mathematics, architecture, 
engineering, and astronomy rather than their religion, the Jesuits quickly ingratiated 
themselves with the monarch. Under their guidance, new forts were built and a new 
royal residence was constructed at Lopburi, referred to in French accounts as 
‘Louvo’, and the construction of an observatory in the same city was commenced. 
However, the Portuguese did not take their eclipse easily and disputed the French 
missionaries’ authority and their right to propagate the faith. While their colonial 
empire was in decline, the Portuguese still clung to their rights under the Pradroado, 
which gave them the right to propagate the Catholic faith in Siam and other areas 
across the globe. French activities in Ayutthaya were seen to be a breach of this 
historic right, thus leading to vehement disputes between the Portuguese and French 
Catholics.7 Moreover, there was bitter resentment among Europeans from the 
Protestant nations who saw the meteoric rise of the French as a direct threat to their 
religious and economic interests.
In spite of the obstacles thrown up by the Portuguese and the opposition of 
the Protestants, the French missionaries were able to facilitate the hitherto 
unprecedented exchanges of diplomatic missions between France, Siam, and the 
Vatican. Although similar long-distance missions had been dispatched prior to the 
arrival of the French by Siam and other countries in the region,s this was the first 
time the Siamese embassies were so well-received. Previous Siamese missions to
7 D. van der Cruysse, Siam and the West, p. 151.
s For example, the 1613 Japanese mission o f  Hasekura Tsunenaga, dispatched at the behest o f  Date 
Masamune, was received in Spain, France, Italy (the Vatican), the Philippines, and Mexico.
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Europe had ended in failure (due to shipwreck)9 or were aborted even before they 
began;10 those that made it, such as the one to Holland in 1608 proved to be rather 
low-key. Indeed, thanks to the personalities of the ambassadors, the first Siamese 
mission that arrived in France followed this depressing precedent.11 The embassies 
headed by Kosa Pan, however, were entirely different. Unlike their predecessors, 
Kosa Pan and his team were congenial, curious, and, best of all, unfailingly 
diplomatic.12 The French were consequently swept up in a fascination of all things 
Siamese and, in the fanciful setting of Versailles, dreamt of the news o f the King of 
Siam’s conversion to the Catholic religion.13
Reality was much more difficult, however, and missionaries on the ground 
were quick to realise that the conversion of the monarch, even if it could be effected, 
would be premature, and even dangerous, given the rising level of resentment against 
Catholic or, perhaps more accurately, French influence at court. Historians have 
debated whether King Narai ever had the inclination to convert to another religion.
At worst he was playing one side against another to his political advantage, and at 
best he had an enlightened and open mind, since he also received a mission from the
9 The first mission dispatched to Portugal and France in 1684 under Ok-khun Chamnan was brought 
to a premature end o ff  the coast o f  Madagascar. The ambassador survived and, after many adventures 
in southern Africa, during which he picked up the Portuguese language, he eventually returned to 
Siam in 1687. Shortly thereafter, he was dispatched on the 1688 mission to France and the Vatican. 
See M. Smithies, A Siamese Embassy Lost in Africa, 1686: The O dyssey o f  Ok-khun Chamnan 
(Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1999).
10 D. van der Cruysse, Siam and the West, p. 25.
11 Ibid., pp. 238-68.
12 Chaumont had written that “these three gentlemen are very gentle, obliging, and good natured, and 
have a very equable disposition.” He, as well as others, also commented on the insatiable curiosity o f  
the ambassadors (which may have irritated some observers), Donneau de Vise commenting in the 
M ercure Galant that “they keep, day by day, an exact record o f  what they have seen...they even count 
the trees o f  the places they visited.” See D. van der Cruysse, Siam and the West, p. 354.
13 The fantasy o f King Narai’s conversion was not helped by the ambiguous statements o f  Kosa Pan, 
who “thought there would one day be many Christians in the kingdom o f  Siam”. In the meantime, 
medals were struck in the ambassadors’ honour, their portraits painted for a room in Versailles, and 
their likeness engraved and distributed. They were also often greeted by huge, curious crowds on 
their travels. At the end o f  their embassy, the Duke de la Feuillade, the Marshal o f  France (1625-91), 
was aid to have remarked “that who was not a good Siamese, was not a good Frenchman.” See D. van 
der Cruysse, Siam and the West, pp. 381, 384.
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Shah of Iran that aimed at his conversion to Islam in a manner no less favourable 
than with the French.14 On the economic front too, there was an unmistakable sense 
of gilded failure. The trade treaties that were signed by the missions were practically 
worthless in the face of the royal trade monopoly, which was also the root cause for 
the decline of Ayutthaya’s position as a regional trading entrepot.
For the French and the Catholics, the storm broke as the king was on his 
deathbed. Petracha (1688-1703) used the opportunity to seize the throne in a coup 
supported by a xenophobic court fearful of the growth of foreign influence.
Christians were actively persecuted until 1691, when Petracha returned the seminary 
to Mgr. Laneau. Nevertheless, the persecutions did not stop. Another wave of 
repression occurred under King Taisra (1709-33) when missionaries were not 
allowed to preach in Thai or Pali to Thais, Mons, and Lao people, or participate in 
debates involving or criticising Buddhism.15 On the economic front, the negative 
effects of the royal trade monopoly greatly contributed to the decline of foreign trade 
and the economic importance of Ayutthaya. Despite the early promise of Ayutthaya, 
the reality provided little incentive for foreigners, be they merchants or missionaries, 
to bother with the kingdom, when there were richer and easier pickings available in 
India, the Dutch East Indies, and even China. Indeed, even the M.E.P., which was 
initially established to propagate the faith in Siam, with the aim o f making it a base 
for the conversion of the rest o f Indochina and China, had diverted its missionary 
efforts directly to Indochina and China, its original mission all but forgotten.
This uneasy situation continued, together with the usual internal court 
intrigues, until the arrival of the Burmese military expeditions that eventually 
resulted in the second, and last, fall o f Ayutthaya in 1767. In the conflagration that
14 The full account o f the Persian embassy can be found in J. O’Kane (trans.), Muhammad Rabi’ ibn 
Muhammad Ibrahim, The Ship ofSulaim an  (Routledge, London, 1972).
15 R. Costet, Siam-Laos: Histoire de la Mission, pp. 148-9.
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consumed the city before its fall and the looting that occurred afterwards, the 
seminary and St. Joseph’s church, along with the remnants of the Portuguese and 
other foreign settlements were completely destroyed. The resident bishop was taken 
as a prisoner to Burma, together with the remainder of the city’s population, nobles, 
and members of the royal family that had been unable to make their escape.
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Restoration, Renewal, and Growth, 1767-1899
What you teach as to do is admirable, bat what you teach as to believe is foolish.
King Mongkut (Rama IV)
For both the Thai Catholic Church and Siam, the period that spanned the latter half 
of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century could be described as a period of 
restoration, renewal, and growth. Even almost one hundred years later, the Catholic 
Church was still reeling from the events o f 1688 and subsequent persecutions. 
Although the religious persecution that followed the 1688 usurpation was brief, the 
climate established by King Petracha and his dynasty was at best tense, and 
sometimes even reverted to full-scale persecution up to the final destruction of 
Ayutthaya in 1767.
However, during the counter-strike against the Burmese, the ethnic and 
religious minorities once again proved their worth, both on the battlefield and off it, 
leading to an improved situation on the accession of the half-Chinese King Taksin in 
1767. However, the situation once again deteriorated in the latter half of the king’s 
reign. It is debatable whether the resurgence of persecution was a result of residual 
policies from Ayutthaya or from the monarch’s over-adherence to quasi-Buddhist 
principles. The commoner King Taksin, lacking blood-links to the dynasties of 
Ayutthaya, arguably saw Buddhism and court ceremonies, such as the oath of 
allegiance ceremony, as the only remaining methods of legitimating himself and his 
dynasty. However, in religious terms, for the missionaries and their congregation, 
their participation in these ceremonies was clearly against their beliefs. At the same 
time, politically, the failure to participate in these ceremonies would apparently 
signal not only the Christians’ denial of the monarch’s legitimacy but also a rejection 
of the Buddhist state being constructed by the monarch. With neither side willing to
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compromise, the conflict ultimately resulted in the complete expulsion of foreign 
missionaries from the kingdom.16 It would certainly not be the last time state 
ceremonies would create a rift in the relationship between the Catholic Mission and 
the state.
The missionaries were not to return until after the death of King Taksin in 
1782,17 during the reign of King Phra Phuttayotfa or Rama I (1782-1809), when the 
monarch recalled them ostensibly to assist in trade and diplomatic negotiations with 
foreign powers. A sense of normality, however, was not to return until the reign of 
King Mongkut or Rama IV (1851-68) who, upon his accession in 1851, rushed to 
recall all the missionaries that had been expelled during the reign of the previous 
king. The new king received the missionaries in a solemn audience in February 
1852. In marked contrast to his predecessors, the reception was lengthy, cordial, 
with tea, coffee, and cigars being served to the missionaries. During the audience, 
the monarch would even declare that: “It is a bad system to persecute religion. I am 
of the opinion that one should leave everybody free to practice the one he desires to 
follow”.18 To the missionaries, it appeared as if the Ayutthaya of King Narai was 
about to return under King Mongkut. The sudden turnaround in the establishment’s 
attitude could be attributed in part to the monarch’s previous personal experience 
with missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, during his time in the Buddhist 
monkhood. However, there may also have been a more pressing concern for the 
state, for any further ill-treatment of missionaries could lead to unwelcome 
intervention by the resurgent European colonial powers.
16 Nevertheless, Christian bodyguards were to form King Taksin’s last line o f  defence before his 
forced abdication in March 1782, see B.J. Terwiel, Thailand's Political H istoiy: From the F all o f  
Ayutthaya to Recent Times (River Books, Bangkok, 2005), pp. 58-9.
17 The king was ritually executed on 7 April 1782, coincidentally the same date Ayutthaya fell in 1767.
18 J. Pallegoix, D escriptions o f  the Thai Kingdom o f  Siam: Thailand under King M ongkut (White 
Lotus, Bangkok, 2000), p. 402.
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By the time King Mongkut came to power, Burma, the perennial enemy of 
Siam had been systematically neutralised by the British following their success in 
the First (1824-26) and Second Anglo-Burmese war (1852-53). The French were 
following not far behind in its empire-building in Southeast Asia with its first 
incursion into Vietnam occurring in 1858.19 The shift in the balance of power was 
highlighted by the defeat of the traditional regional superpower, China, in a series of 
armed conflicts with British forces (1839-42 and 1856-60) and the forced opening of 
Japan by Commodore Perry on 14 July 1853. King Mongkut clearly recognised the 
new political reality, severing tributary ties with the Chinese in favour of a 
rapprochement with the western powers to prevent the disasters that had befallen 
Siam’s immediate neighbours.
By April 1855, the Bowring Treaty had been signed with Britain, breaking 
the traditional royal monopoly on trade and guaranteeing extraterritoriality for 
British subjects. Similar treaties with other western powers soon followed. By the 
following year, a treaty had been concluded with France that, among other clauses, 
guaranteed religious freedom to the Siamese and gave the Catholic missionaries the 
freedom to build schools, seminaries, hospitals and travel freely throughout Siamese 
territory. Commercially and legally, the treaties were undoubtedly unequal. 
However, to the missionaries, the treaties officially granted them freedoms that they 
had not seen in the kingdom since the days of King Narai. Emboldened by the new 
freedoms, the missionaries went about their work with zeal and by 1872, Siam could 
boast around 10,000 Catholics, 20 European missionaries, and 8 native priests.20
The later part of the nineteenth century saw an expansion of missionary 
activities into Laos and the northeast of Thailand under the auspices of Mgr. Jean-
19 The attack on Da Nang by Charles Rigault de Genouilly was ostensibly to protect the Catholic 
missionaries from Vietnamese persecution.
20 Surachai Chumsriphan, ‘The Great Role o f  Jean-Louis Vey, Apostolic Vicar o f  Siam’, p. 133.
Louis Vey (1875-1909). Inside Siam, the missionaries concentrated on the 
conversion of the Chinese ethnic minority, a focus encouraged by the government, 
since it discouraged the Chinese from joining secret societies, as well as building 
new schools, including the Assumption College that would produce numerous 
distinguished Thai leaders in various fields throughout the twentieth century and 
beyond. One of the notable aspects of Mgr. Vey’s ministry was the encouragement 
of religious orders to come to Siam. His ministry saw the arrival of the sisters o f St. 
Maur and St. Paul de Chartres and the brothers of St. Gabriel. The trend continued 
under his successor, Vicar-Apostolic Perros (1909-47), with the arrival of three more 
religious orders: the Ursuline Sisters in 1924, the Carmelites in 1925, the Salesmans 
in 1927. However, unlike the missionary orders that arrived during the ministry of 
Vicar-Apostolic Vey, these orders were not so distinctively French. The Ursulines 
and Salesians were founded in Italy, while the Carmelites were originally based on 
Mount Carmel in the Middle East.
Thus, apart from a potential fracture following the French incursion during
the 1893 Paknam crisis,21 the Church had managed to regain a secure position, albeit
on the back of gunboats. In the light of the belligerence of the French, the position
of the Thai Catholic Church, with its overwhelmingly French leadership, was not so
different from the situation towards the end of King Narai’s reign. The major
difference between the early twentieth century and the seventeenth century is that the
Church had consciously moved itself away to the periphery of national politics. By
the dawn of the twentieth century, it did not have a permanent ‘advisor’ to the
monarch in court, it was not involved in any serious negotiations with outsiders on
behalf o f Siam but instead seemed to have been content to immerse itself in purely
21 There was no immediate fracture between the Catholic M ission and the Siamese government as a 
result o f  the 1893 incident but, as w ill be seen, anti-French sentiments lingered into the twentieth 
century specifically in areas that were affected by the incursion and the resulting concessions.
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missionary work, with the proviso that if they were harassed by local or central 
authorities, they would not hesitate to call on the protection of the French consulate 
if they could not first obtain satisfaction from the Siamese authorities.
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The Calm before the Storm, 1909-39
Three things cannot be long hidden: the sun, the moon, and the truth.
Siddhartha Gautama
By the time Vicar-Apostolic Perros began his ministry in 1909, the Mission in Siam 
appeared secure. The monarchy, as well as the social and business elite, were 
sponsoring and supporting some missionary endeavours, although perhaps they were 
doing so under the threat of colonial encroachment. At the same time, the Mission 
also received some support from the French colonial government in Indochina, even 
though their interests often did not coincide. The tensions between the Siamese fear 
of colonialism and the Mission’s aim of promoting and integrating the western-style 
social work of the Mission into the wider Siamese society was a defining factor in 
the pre-1939 Church.
The Vicar-Apostolic himself probably knew all too much about conflicting 
loyalties, having grown up in Alsace-Lorraine, an area disputed by France and 
Germany, before he was assigned to Siam at the age of 23. At the same time, the 
situation also provided many opportunities to play on the hopes and fears of various 
parties, to the advantage of the Church. Occasionally, the Church was able to 
synergise these hopes and fears. For example, the Siamese elite, keen to modernise 
in the face of the colonial threat, could be induced to support western-style 
educational initiatives. Meanwhile, French colonial officials who were keen to see 
the projection of the gloire de lapatrie in foreign lands could be persuaded to offer 
generous financial donations to support certain schools that were teaching French 
language and culture in a state where they could not exert their influence. Thus the 
Siamese had their modernised institution and the French could be satisfied that they 
had projected their gloire.
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Yet this strategy placed the Mission on a precarious balance. The 
arrangement was perfect when the Mission was able to find a way to bring together 
the needs and wants of the various parties without overtly taking sides. But what if 
these interests could not be reconciled? Where would the loyalties of the Mission 
and its foreign clerics then be? Already before 1939 there were troubling indications. 
When the First World War broke out in Europe in 1914, the Vicar-Apostolic, along 
with a number of French priests, were recalled to France to serve as military 
chaplains. There was little problem with this reassignment at the time, since King 
Vajiravudh soon declared himself for the Allies. Nevertheless, to suspicious 
Siamese observers, the situation begged an urgent question: if a crisis occurred 
between France and Siam, which country would the French missionaries and their 
congregation support? The question was not only pertinent to the French 
missionaries but also the various ethnic minorities that made up the congregation of 
the Mission. Whom would they serve -  their country of birth or their adopted 
country?
The natural, safe answer for the clergy was neither -  that they were serving 
the Catholic Church and, had they limited their social and financial association with 
their home government, this answer could have been convincing. Yet had they 
limited their dealings in such a manner, they would have denied the Mission critical 
support, especially when its members encountered trouble with the local authorities.
It was the maintenance of this precarious balance that occupied the minds of the 
Mission leadership before 1939, all the while trying to keep the Mission and its work 
operating on an even keel in an increasingly difficult economic climate.
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Rene Marie-Joseph Perros, Bishop of Zoara, Vicar-Apostolic of Siam
...every Catholic, even i f  they differ in nationalities ...are all children o f their 
motherland and must love their coantiy with the highest love.
- Vicar-Apostolic Rene Perros, Parish Circular, Undated
Unlike his more famous predecessors, such as Vicar-Apostolic Pallegoix, there is 
actually very little material concerning the personal history o f the Vicar-Apostolic of 
Siam during this period, although what is available22 gives rise to some interesting 
speculation. The Vicar-Apostolic of the Mission of Siam, Bishop Rene Marie- 
Joseph Perros would have been acutely aware of the problems of conflicting 
identities. According to the records of the Missions Etrangeres de Paris, he was bom 
on 12 March 1870 at Guewenheim in Haute-Alsace (modem day Haut-Rhin in 
France). The region of Alsace-Lorraine had always been a point of dispute between 
France and Prussia/Germany, and scholars of European history are aware that the 
area was in contestation during the Franco-Prussian War (19 July 1870-10 May 
1871) that erupted shortly after the birth of Rene Perros, and that much of the 
territory was ultimately lost to Prussia following the defeat of France in that conflict 
and would not return to French control until the enforcement of the diktat of the 
Treaty o f Versailles after the end of the First World War.
The people of Alsace-Lorraine during this period were thus faced with a
choice; whether to acknowledge the de facto  situation of Prussian sovereignty over
the area or to retreat into an equally distinctive French identity. The third choice was,
of course, to try to live as best as possible with both sides. For the family of Rene
Perros, even though they lived outside the territories annexed to the German Reich in
22 The official biographical information for Vicar-Apostolic Perros, along with that o f  most M.E.P. 
missionaries, are now available online (in French) at the website o f  the M.E.P. Archives. Searches 
can be made at: http://www.mepasie.org/?q=archives-des-missions-etrangeres-de-paris [Last Access 
29 January 2009],
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the area near Belfort, it seems that they too had chosen the path of compromise. 
Although the Belfort area was already overtly French before the war,23 
distinguishing itself from the rest of Alsace that spoke predominantly German 
(Alemannic) dialects, some of the German-influenced population also spilled into the 
French areas, as evidenced by the marriage certificate of Rene Perros’s parents.
There are indications that his paternal grandparents (Ludovico and Francisca Petizon) 
and father (Ludovico Perros) were French, while his maternal grandparents (Joseph 
and Francisca Walch) and mother (Josephia Rigenbach) were probably part of the 
Germanic population of Alsace.2"1
Between Prussia and France, Rene Perros appeared to have chosen France 
since he enrolled at the College Libre de Lachapelle in the vicinity of Belfort from 
1882-87, at the end of which he had graduated with a Bachelor of Letters from the 
University of Besan9 on. On 14 September 1887, he entered the seminary of the 
Missions Etrangeres de Paris, and in 1889 was received into the minor orders. His 
clerical career was interrupted by military service at Belfort from November 1891 to 
September 1892, after which he resumed his studies at the seminary. On 15 October 
1893, he was ordained priest and was assigned to Siam in the same year, leaving for 
Siam on Christmas Eve 1893, not to return to France until the outbreak of the First 
World War. On arrival in Siam, he underwent training in the Siamese language and 
continued to do so, while assisting Fr. Guillou in Naklion Chaisi. During this period, 
he also began studying the Chinese language. In 1896, he was named professor of 
the seminary at Bangchang, where he stayed for ten years, at the end of which he 
was assigned to the community of Huaphai, However, after only three years in
It was partly due to the overt and traditional French presence in the area as w ell as the determined 
resistance o f  the town o f  Belfort itself (the town only “fell” when it was ordered to, 21 days after the 
signing o f  the Franco-Prussian armistice) that dissuaded the Prussians from annexing the area.
24 B .A.A., Extractus ex Libro Matrimoniali, 29 September 1866, 141/1/15.
77
Huaphai, he was recalled to the seminary to replace Fr. Matrat, the Superior who had 
to return to France due to ill-health. This development suggests that the Church 
leadership valued Fr. Perros’s administrative abilities as well as his intellectual 
capacity, although the length of time he spent in the seminary indicates a 
contemplative rather than active form of leadership.
In any case, it appeared that Fr. Perros’s form of leadership was thought by 
the Superior General to be just what the Mission needed at that stage of development. 
Thus, following the death of Vicar-Apostolic Vey on 21 February 1909, Fr. Rene 
Peiros was appointed to the position of Vicar-Apostolic of Siam in September of the 
same year, taking the official title of the titular Bishop of Zoara. The consecration 
ceremony took place in the Holy Rosary Church on 30 January 1910. However, 
following the outbreak of the First World War, the Vicar-Apostolic was recalled to 
France where he served as a military chaplain in Belfort until he was granted 
permission to return to his post in Siam in October 1915. As will be seen later, this 
period is vital to understanding the Bishop’s sense of identity and his relationship to 
France, his native country, and to Siam, his “country of adoption”, and his role as a 
missionary of the universal Church.
The work of his ministry will be covered in more detail further in the thesis, 
but for now it shoirld be sufficient to say that he continued to make slow headway in 
moving the Thai Church from being a purely missionary organisation to one that was 
run by the indigenous clergy, a process that would be accelerated by the traumatic 
events of the Second World War. To that effect, between 1910 and 1931 he 
ordained 34 Siamese priests, including one assigned to the Mission of Laos, and 
established a new seminary at Sri Racha in January 1935, although it would be some 
time still before an indigenous cleric would be appointed to head a part of the
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Mission, and even longer for an indigenous hierarchy to be established. Furthermore, 
he assigned Ratchaburi and the southwest of the Mission of Siam to the Italian 
Salesians under Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti and expanded missionary efforts to Chiang 
Mai in the north of Siam, which hitherto had been the domain of Protestant 
missionaries, mainly from the United States.
However, the expansion of the Mission came at a great financial cost and the 
Mission during his tenure was constantly accosted by financial deficits. This 
situation appeared to have caused great strain between the Vicar-Apostolic and his 
procurator, Fr. Louis-Auguste Chorin, prompting the latter to write a letter of 
complaint to the M.E.P. headquarters in Paris in 1924, alerting the superior to the 
Mission of Siam’s dire financial situation and, by implication, the deficiencies of the 
Vicar-Apostolic’s leadership.25 Nevertheless, the Vicar-Apostolic was able to ride 
out the storm and continued to hold his position for more than another two decades. 
Although Perros’s relationship with his procurator continued to be cold, Fr. Chorin 
never again wrote to the M.E.P. regarding Perros. There are indications that some 
sort of political deal was worked out between Perros and Chorin, where Chorin 
would be named successor on the retirement of Perros, as long as he did not rock the 
boat. Indeed, when Chorin was eventually appointed as Vicar-Apostolic after 
Pen'os’s retirement in July 1947, some of the Mission’s priests were taken aback by 
the unexpected decision. Judging from Perros’s correspondence alone, the 
relationship between the two was cold if not non-existent since the procurator was 
hardly mentioned. Costet in his historical account wrote that Chorin’s eventual
^  M.E.P.A., Chorin to M.E.P. headquarters, Paris, 1924, v. 897/68.
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appointment came “as a veiy great surprise”,26 indicating the high probability that a 
deal had been made and had been kept very secret.
The anti-Catholic persecution was, of course, the major problem that faced 
the Mission of Siam during Rene Perros’s tenure. It is also worth noting that prior to 
the general persecution, the Vicar-Apostolic was already confronted with problems 
that stemmed from new Siamese legislation (some of which he interpreted to be 
aimed at the French) as well as the problem of the slow conversion o f the Mission 
into an indigenous hierarchy. It can be said therefore that by the time o f his 
retirement in 1947, the Vicar-Apostolic had led a challenging life during a 
tumultuous time. The numerous issues he faced during his ministry will form the 
main themes of this thesis.
26 R. Costet, Siam-Laos: H istoire de la Mission , p. 439.
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Population and Ethnicity
Even i f  you are a minority> o f one, the truth is the truth,
Mahatma Gandhi
Despite Vicar-Apostolic Perros’s lack of spectacular achievements in comparison 
with some of his predecessors, he did accomplish significant gains in effecting 
conversions. Under his rule, the Catholic population continually expanded, with the 
possible exception of the years 1909-18, when no accurate statistics were collected,27 
and 1929-30, when there was a dramatic decrease. The decrease could be attributed 
to declining global economic conditions, but clearly the more important factor was 
the creation of the Mission of Ratchaburi in the west of Siam since during this 
process, the Mission of Siam had ceded control of all the parishes and their property 
to the Salesians, who were in charge of the new Mission. The transfer also included 
the obligation to account for the number of Catholics in their area, hence the ‘fall’ in 
numbers in the area under the jurisdiction of the Mission of Siam.
Even so, by 1936, the population had surpassed the level of 1929. The 
figures also mirror the activities of the missionaries during this period. Increases in 
the 1930s were reflections o f the creation of, and investments made into, the new 
Mission stations in the north. Furthermore these activities appeared to have been 
little affected by the change to the constitutional regime and subsequent political 
movements.
What did affect the figures were the movements of the Chinese to and from
their homeland. Although the Chinese settled in Siam and had conducted business
there for many decades, many of them would return to China upon retirement. Some
27 From the Mission records, the population did not fluctuate at all between the years 1909-18.
Clearly, this cannot be accurate and it can be assumed that the Mission did not expect huge 
fluctuations and so worked from the figure o f  24,400. Nevertheless, the trends suggest that even in 
these years with dubious statistics, the trend was towards growth rather than decline.
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would take their families and economic gains with them, but there were also some 
who would leave their family behind and write them a ‘will' distributing goods and 
assets in Siam to the remaining family.:s For these reasons, the Vicar-Apostolic 
added a note of caution to his figures, saying that “It is legitimate to conclude that 
the total known figure is smaller than reality,\2', In addition, the figures do not 
include the Catholics of the northeast which, by the time of Vicar-Apostolic Perros's 
tenure, was already a part of the Mission of Laos.
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How the Catholic population was precisely distributed across the country is 
unclear, since the annual general reports only give the total figure. Nevertheless, an 
approximation can be made from a 1929-30 calculation and has been reproduced in 
Table I below. Calculations are still problematic, however, since it is likely that the 
figures included non-Catholic Christians as well, hence the anomaly of the “Phayab"
An example o f  this is B.A.A.. 15 June 1933, 31/4/52. In this w ill, Hong Zhucun. an elderly 
Chinese businessman transferred his property in Siam to his family as he retired to China.
29 M.E.P.A., Compte-Rendu 1920.
For detailed figures and references, see Appendix C: Catholic Population in the Mission o f  Siam. 
1917-47.
(in the north) statistics, which account for 15 percent of the total Christian population. 
The Catholics did not set up a Mission in the north until the early 1930s. 
Nevertheless, the table is helpful since it reflects the general trends o f missionary 
activities. Around 32 percent of the Christian population was located in the central 
region, while 27 percent were located in the northeast. The other regions with high 
concentrations were the east with 14 percent of the population, and the west with just 
under 10 percent. The west would be ceded to the Salesians in 1929-30, while the 
east was coming under the control o f the indigenous clergy.
L ocation Population
Bangkok 8725
Ayutthaya 4118
Prachinburi 4250
Chantaburi 2912
Phayab 7338
Phitsanulok 237
Udon 9016
Nakhon Sawan 245
Nakhon Chaisi 2781
Nakhon Ratchasima 4532
Nakhon Si Thammarat 192
Ratchaburi 4839
Pattani 16
Phuket 261
Total 49462
Table 1. Population and Distribution o f  Christians in Siam, 1929-3031
Intriguingly, the statistics also record the presence of Christians in the south. 
However, in 1923, the Vicar-Apostolic noted had noted that there were no Catholics 
in Phatthalung province (in the south) or its vicinity, mentioning only that there were 
missionaries in Perak, which lies in modern-day Malaysia.32 Furthermore, there are 
no records of the Mission of Siam sending missions to the south during this period,
31 B .A .A ., Population o f  Siam by religion (1929-30), 64/1/27.
32 B.A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to R.P. Shmidt, 27 October 1923, 50/5/53.
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unlike its contemporary efforts in the north which were extensively documented. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that these small communities were either Protestants or 
were being administered more efficiently by another authority, such as the Mission 
of Malacca.
Thus, the major points of concentration for the Christian population were in 
the central region and the northeast. That a significant proportion of Catholics in 
Siam were under the administration of the Mission of Laos may have given the 
Siamese authorities cause for concern, especially amidst rumours of Catholics 
paving the way for further French annexations in the region. The lack of concern on 
the part of the Missions of Siam and Laos over this issue suggests that the Church 
authorities regarded divisions of jurisdiction that did not follow national borders as 
entirely normal. The Church’s lack of sensitivity to these national concerns would 
become a major source of antagonism in the 1930s and 1940s.
Also problematic was the fact that many of the converts were from ethnic 
minorities, mainly Chinese and Vietnamese, but also other groups as diverse as 
northern hill-tribes and descendants of Portuguese settlers. When arrangements were 
being made for the Salesians to take over parishes in Ratchaburi, the Vicar-Apostolic 
had commented that:
[The Salesians] study the Siamese language with much ardour, but a single 
language is insufficient for this polyglot country; they are fortunate to have 
some seminarists from their Institute that have stayed in China and each 
knowing a Chinese dialect, sufficient to perfect them among the Chinese of 
Siam.33
The comment reflects the diverse language skills that were required for 
missionaries to operate effectively in Siam due to the differences between the local
33 M .E.P.A., Compte-Rendu 1928.
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communities that priests were expected to serve. A concrete example of this 
diversity is the Bangkok parishes, all of which had different ethnic compositions.
The Church of St. Francis Xavier primarily had an Annamese or Annamese 
descendant congregation, while their counterparts at the Santa Cruz and Holy Rosary 
Churches were primarily ethnic Chinese. It should be noted here that the Santa Cruz 
and Holy Rosary Churches had past connections with the Portuguese fathers and a 
small Portuguese descendant community. Similarly, the Church of the Immaculate 
Conception was dominated by Khniers or Khmer descendants. To a certain extent, 
some of this heritage had, even by this early point, been diluted. For example, the 
language found in Church documents from St. Francis Xavier and Immaculate 
Conception Churches were in Thai rather than Vietnamese or Khmer. Nevertheless, 
there was still a consciousness within the parish community that they were 
descended from a race other than Siamese, although this realisation was no longer 
expressed explicitly.
In contrast, there are a considerable number of Chines e-language documents 
that appear in the records of the Santa Cruz and Holy Rosary Churches. Thai or 
Church-Thai language documents were also signed with Chinese characters. The 
differences between these four parishes suggest that the degree of integration into 
Siamese society was different for each ethnic group. The Chinese in particular had 
or were given prefixes such as “Jin” and “Jek” that announced their ethnicity.
Whilst the term “Jek” has devolved into a pejorative term, its regular occurrence in 
documents drafted by the Church as well as by the parishioners themselves suggests 
that it was a common term at the time and did not have any offensive implications. 
Also unique to the Chinese community was their itinerant character, which caused 
headaches for Mission authorities who wished to keep accurate statistics. For some
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in the Siamese government, watching developments in China, it was also perhaps 
further evidence of the lack of integration and loyalty to their adopted homeland 
among the Chinese. The fact that the Chinese characteristics were so distinctive in 
Church life, in contrast to the other ethnic minorities, would support this view. 
Belonging to the Catholic Church may not have been conducive to integrating into a 
country with a Buddhist majority. For Chinese Catholics, the question was to what 
extent were anti-Catholic sentiments simply an extension of anti-Chinese feelings?
While the exact proportion of the ethnic make-up of the overall congregation 
is unclear, the picture is much more apparent in terms of the clergy, at least after 
1930 when the annual reports become much more detailed. In population terms, the 
number of male clergy was stable throughout the 1930s, averaging around 90-100. 
The population even saw a net increase before the outbreak of war between Thailand 
and French Indochina in 1940. The most significant data, however, is the proportion 
of indigenous to foreign priests in this period.
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Despite starting the decade at near parity, the French clergy was being 
continuously outnumbered by indigenous priests throughout the 1930s. Yet the 
leadership of the Mission continued to be dominated by members of the French 
M.E.P. Even if there were internal debates on increasing the role of the indigenous 
clergy in the running of the Mission and tentative steps taken in that direction, the 
Mission still had an undeniably French face. Indeed, the presence of the Spanish 
priests was insufficient to dispel the impression that the Mission was a French 
institution as opposed to a multi-national organisation.
The disparity between the indigenous and foreign clergy is even more 
apparent among the female religious orders. In terms of total population, the nuns 
were more numerous than priests -  double if not triple the number of male clergy. 
Furthermore, the proportion of indigenous nuns had already surpassed the number of 
nuns from other nationalities by as early as 1930.
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" For detailed figures and references, see Appendix E: Population o f  Nuns in the Mission o f  Siam by 
Nationality. 1930-46.
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Indeed the disparity continued to increase throughout the decade. Ethnicity 
was much more varied among the female orders, however. There was a wide 
representation from European countries including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and Italy. There were also nuns from the United 
States and Canada. Other Asian territories were also represented by nuns from 
Singapore, the Philippines, China, and Vietnam, with the latter making up the largest 
Asian contingent next to the Siamese.
In the light of the statistical evidence, it is surprising to find that there was no 
evidence of pressure from below for the French leadership to hand over more roles to 
the indigenous clergy before the 1940s. It is possible that both the leadership and the 
indigenous clergy knew that the conditions were not right. Some of the Mission’s 
more prominent schools and hospitals relied on subsidies from various international 
agencies, from the French colonial government to the Propaganda Fide. Obtaining 
these subsidies required some adroit diplomatic skill, along with knowledge of 
languages as well as personal relationships and connections. Although some 
indigenous priests had been sent to Penang and Rome to be educated in a more 
international environment,36 some foreign priests did argue that it was premature for 
the entire Mission to be handed over to the indigenous clergy. Furthermore, the fact 
that some of the indigenous clergy, particularly those in the eastern parishes, were 
allowed virtually to run their own affairs may have helped to quell any resentment.
Nevertheless, the demographics and their trends suggest that it would not be 
long before the dominant role of the French priests and their relevance would come 
into question. Demographically, therefore, it was inevitable that the M.E.P. would
36 For example, during this period, Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung was sent to Penang, while Joseph 
Khiamsun Nittayo, the first Bishop (rather than Vicar-Apostolic or Titular Bishop) o f  Bangkok was 
sent to Rome.
8 8
have to give up control of the Mission of Siam in the near future. The question was 
when. And how would this transformation would come about? Would it be done 
willingly or under duress?
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Society, Health, and Education
Whatever your work is, put your heart into it as done for the Lord and not fo r human 
beings, blowing that the Lord will repay you by making you his heirs.
Colossians 3: 23-4
Although the Mission did succeed in increasing the population of converts during 
this period, the increase was modest. In tenns of the total national population, even 
at its peak in 1939, the Catholic population amounted to only 0.4 percent of the total 
population (around 8 million at the time). In the face of its failure to gamer mass 
conversions, the Mission took a different approach to raise its profile in society and 
increase its attractiveness. Much of the work in the existing parishes was already 
complete by the time Vicar-Apostolic Perros came to power. Although the 1930s 
would see the first Catholic missionary efforts in the northern region, the Mission’s 
priority in its other parishes was already shifting from establishing new institutions 
to maintaining and expanding core, existing operations.
Evidence is sparse for the 1910s, but annual reports suggest that Mission 
operations were extensive by the 1920s, although there were minor fluctuations in 
the number of institutions at the beginning of the decade. Between 1922 and 1923, 
the number of hospitals was reduced from five to four while pharmacies were 
reduced from five to one. The pharmacies did not appear to be popular in the first 
half of the decade — the five initial pharmacies held only 54 consultations between 
them in one year but by 1929, more than 300 treatments were being handed out at 
the Mission’s one remaining pharmacy. The Mission appeared to be winding down 
operations in its foundling hospitals, which were reduced from seven to four. The 
number of its orphanages remained stable throughout the 1920s at 24. One notable 
trend was the fact that female orphans consistently outnumbered male orphans, and
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this trend would continue into the 1940s.37 The statistics reflected perhaps the values 
of contemporary society, particularly that of the Chinese, who generally valued boys 
over girls.
The economic depression in the 1930s led to the rearrangement of priorities 
and inevitable cutbacks in services. Orphanages were significantly reduced from 24 
in 1928 to 17 in 1930 and then 12 in 1932.38 The existence of foundling hospitals 
was no longer registered in the annual reports, indicating that the operations may 
have been discontinued entirely or merged with existing orphanages. Nevertheless, 
demands for these and other services continued to rise throughout the 1930s. The 
pharmacy, which was not so popular in the 1920s, was handling more than 1,000 
consultations by 1935, peaking at 2,410 consultations in 1939.39 However, the rising 
demands for its services did not encourage the Mission to expand these provisions 
any further. Indeed, given the Mission’s new venture and commitments to the north 
during this period, it was financially impossible.
Even at its peak, the Mission’s contribution in its social services was modest. 
Arguably, the Mission’s focus had never been on these sectors. Instead, the statistics 
show that it was the education sector that took up most of the missionaries’ efforts 
and attention. The schools established by the Mission were arguably the most 
visible symbols of its presence and contribution to wider Siamese society. Leaving 
aside, for now, the social objectives behind the setting up of these schools, the 
number of those in the missionary education system was significant. In 1922 alone, 
there were more than 8,000 pupils studying in Catholic-run schools across the
j7 See Appendix G: Orphanages, 1922-46.
3S Another explanation for the reduction could be that they were transferred to the jurisdiction o f the
Mission o f  Ratchaburi.
j9 See Appendix G: Pharmacies, 1922-46.
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country.40 This number had increased to more than 10,000 by 1939,41 in spite of the 
difficult economic conditions and the fact that some schools had been ceded to the 
Missions of Ratchaburi and Laos.
The statistics are more confusing for the number of schools and colleges. At 
face value, it appears as if the Mission was responsible for the administration of over 
160 institutions during the 1920s. However, surviving records suggest that the 
numbers were probably fewer. The discrepancies originate from the way the schools 
were officially classified and counted in the annual reports. Some schools were co­
educational, while others were only for boys or girls. Some schools were reserved 
for local Catholic parishioners, while others were open to everyone. Naturally, there 
were schools that could fall into multiple categories -  leading to an inability to 
accurately establish the definitive number of institutions under the Mission’s control 
over certain periods.42
Nevertheless, a glimpse of the nature of these operations can be gleaned from 
a set of unofficial reports. In 1920 the Mission of Siam was running 37 primary 
schools for boys and the same number for girls, with an additional 14 schools that 
were co-educational. Altogether, the schools had a total o f 3,557 pupils. By 1927, 
there were still 37 primary schools for boys but the number of schools for girls had 
dropped to 32. However, the number of co-educational schools had increased to 19. 
The total number of pupils attending these schools had also increased to 4,620. The 
trend of increased enrolment can also be seen in the secondary schools. In 1920, 
there were three institutions for boys and another three for girls, with a total of 2,660 
pupils between them. By 1927, the Mission had opened an additional institution for
40 B.A.A., Prospectus Status M issionis, 31 July 1922, 62/3 /34.
41 B .A.A., Prospectus Status M issionis, 30 June 1939, 64/2/13.
42 The lowest estimate is around 60, while the highest is around 160.
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girls and although the number of secondary schools for boys remained the same, the 
total number of pupils had increased to 3,548.43
The schools in Bangkok, namely Assumption College, St. Gabriel College, 
and Mater Dei were arguably the best provided for in the country. Certain provinces 
were also not lacking good schools, the notable examples being Montfort College 
and Regina Coeli in Chiang Mai and St. Paul’s School in Paetriu, Chachoengsao 
province, that were founded on the model of the Bangkok schools by the same 
religious orders. These schools were arguably ‘flagship’ schools that illustrated what 
the Mission was fully capable of. However, conditions and standards in the rest of 
the schools were more varied. Some responded directly to the needs o f the 
immediate community, in addition to providing the basic curriculum, for example in 
language tuition, while others taught only the most elementary courses centred on 
literacy, numeracy, and the Catechism. A typical example of a ‘customised’ school 
was the St. Nicolas primary school in Phitsanulok. This school was one of the many 
that provided Chinese language tuition in addition to the basic curriculum. The 
school divided pupils into two groups -  one followed a Siamese syllabus, while the 
other had both Siamese and Chinese tuition, with the former group being larger than 
the latter.44 Although the authorities did not seem to appreciate their efforts, the 
school made great efforts to accommodate government demands in teaching the 
Siamese language, unlike other schools in the area that operated a purely Chinese 
curriculum.''5 Seminaries were also customised for the immediate needs of the 
Siamese priesthood. The curriculum was heavy on language tuition — Siamese, Latin, 
and French, with courses in physiology, geography, history, hygiene, mathematics,
43 B.A.A., Unofficial Report to the Society for the Propagation o f  the Faith, 26 November 1920 and 
21 August 1927, 107/5/7.
44 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Ministry o f  Religious Affairs, 12 May 1933, 79/4/7.
45 B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Phitsanulok Minister o f  Religious Affairs, 21 July 1933, 79/4/8.
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and science rounding out the course during the week. Saturdays were devoted 
entirely to ethics.46
While the lack of national standard requirements allowed the Mission and 
other private organisations to respond directly to the needs of the communities they 
served, it also led to major differences in the achievements of the schools. The 
discrepancy was reflected in the public examination results of the late 1930s -  this 
was after the government had already initiated its campaign to standardise schools.
In 1938, 70 percent or more of pupils in the Mission’s ‘flagship’ schools such as 
Assumption College, St. Gabriel College, and Mater Dei had managed to pass the 
state university examinations. In contrast, parish schools such as Santa Cruz did not 
fare so well, with pass rates ranging from 40 to 60 percent. The lowest achiever 
among the Mission’s schools in Bangkok was St. Maiy’s, where only 28.6 percent of 
its pupils managed to pass their exams. In contrast, Suan Kularb, a prestigious state 
school, achieved a pass rate of 92 percent, despite fielding more candidates than 
most of the other schools. However, Suan Kularb was an exception rather than the 
standard since the pass rates at other prestigious schools such as Vajiravudh College 
and Thepsirin hovered in the 60 percentile -  below that of the ‘flagship’ Mission 
schools, while ordinary schools such as Suvit and Ratchada Wittaya Sapha had 
considerably lower pass rates.47 Thus, while the standards among the Mission 
schools varied greatly, it was no more than the variation seen among contemporary 
state schools. The statistics suggest that while the Mission schools may not have 
always been the first choice for parents, especially non-Catholic parents, they proved 
to be attractive alternatives, especially for those who lacked the connections and 
resources to enter prestigious state institutions.
46 B.A.A., Timetable o f  Holy Redeemer Seminary, Chonburi, Undated, 82/5/21.
47 B.A.A., 1937 Public examination results, March 1938, 81/2/27.
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The Mission was not always able to get away with the lack o f common 
standards in its curriculum and management. A major concern of the Vicar- 
Apostolic was the passage of a series of laws that sought to regulate the provisions of 
private schools. Essentially, the period saw the increasing intrusion of the state into 
the Catholic private schools in various categories across the country. The 
interference ranged from the imposition of new taxes to changes in the curriculum. 
The process had started under the absolute monarchy, as early as 1918. In this case, 
a law introduced a new tax, payable by all taxpayers between the ages o f 18 and 60, 
which would go to support state schools. For the Mission, the problem was that 
since they already levied fees for their local schools, parents sending children to 
Catholic schools would in effect have to pay twice, thereby decreasing the 
attractiveness of the school to an already impoverished local population.48
The solution was either to close the schools down or change the status of the 
affected schools from private schools to community schools. Apart from involving 
the establishment of new administr ative structures, including a five-member school 
committee led by the Vicar-Apostolic, the change in status also meant that the 
schools would have access to public funding, but would no longer be open only to 
Catholics (suggesting that the ‘flagship’ schools, which were open to all, were meant 
to be a limited experiment and that the Mission remained concerned with giving its 
members an exclusively Catholic education). At first the Vicar-Apostolic was 
hostile to the new law, arguing to the French Minister Plenipotentiary that it gave too 
much power to the Minister of Education to decide the curriculum — to the detriment 
of religious teaching, while “the law does not accord to [the Mission] a sufficient 
delay to keep or find the headmasters for all of our schools [and] our native priests
48 M.E.P.A., Compte-Rendu 1922.
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are not prepared to take the teaching exams that had not existed previously” ,49 Even 
so, a few years later, the Vicar-Apostolic could note the new opportunities that had 
opened up, reporting that: “we have hope that we can further our action and come to 
obtain cathechumens, because already many pagan families prefer to send their 
children to Christian schools more than any other”.50 At the same time, the 
government left ambiguous its attitude to the teaching of religion in school. This 
attitude remained problematic for some time, and it was only six years later that the 
Ministry of Education issued the following clarification:
The primary school curriculum is compulsory in accordance with the law 
pertaining to primary education, thus there are no provisions for the teaching 
of religion but practical ethics that are relevant to good citizenship should be 
taught. In the cases where religious principles can be used, it has to be 
understood that if there are pupils that do not follow that religion in class, 
they have a right to choose not to attend classes where there are religious 
teachings involved.51
The trouble with government regulations did not end there, however. Indeed,
it intensified post-1932 as the new regime sought to impose its standards on the
private and state education systems. For the Mission schools, the most damaging of
these were those pertaining to language requirements and the qualifications of
teachers. The Vicar-Apostolic’s fear of the Ministry of Education being given too
much power was realised in 1935 when he, once again, felt compelled to petition the
French Minister regarding the matter. His complaints ranged from the official
distribution of books that promoted communism, interference in the school timetable
and the teaching of foreign languages, as well as the Ministry’s tardiness in
approving the opening of a new Catholic school, despite the fact that the Mission had
been scrupulous in following government regulations, unlike some of its
49 B .A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Minister Plenipotentiary o f  France, 16 November 1921, 50/3/45.
50M .E.P.A., Compte-Rendu 1922.
51 B .A .A ., Ministry o f  Education: On Religious Teachings, 1 January 1924, 84/4/2.
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competitors.32 Pressure intensified in 1938, with the imposition of more bureaucracy 
and an examination for teachers in the Siamese language. Teachers teaching 
Siamese now had to take an exam in the language, not only when they first took up a 
post, but also every time they moved to another school.53 The same year also saw 
the government favouring English rather than French as the primary foreign 
language, where French had worryingly become “the object of an inexplicable 
animosity”,54 an attitude that convinced the Vicar-Apostolic that the Siamese 
government clearly “wanted to eliminate instruction in the French language” from 
the curriculum.55
The intensifying hostility o f the constitutional regime towards the Mission’s 
institutions and France was a real worry for the Vi car-Apostolic. Unlike his 
counterparts in the Mission of Laos, Vi car-Apostolic Perros was reluctant to appeal 
to French diplomats on eveiy matter that remotely involved the Siamese authorities, 
whether local or otherwise. That he should choose to appeal so frequently and 
emphatically on the subject of the government’s interference in the Mission’s 
schools suggests that it was indeed a serious matter to him. As the 1930s progressed, 
the Vicar-Apostolic’s options became increasingly limited. The majority of the 
indigenous priests had not been prepared for the new restrictions. At the same time, 
foreign priests who could take advantage of some exceptions, notably the exam in 
Siamese, were either retiring due to failing health or dying out altogether. The small 
increase in the number of M.E.P. priests could not cover the shortfall and, as a result, 
some schools had to be closed since there were no qualified masters or teachers 
available. Moreover, the government’s interference in the minutiae of the school’s
52 B.A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Minister Plenipotentiary o f  France, 4 June 1935, 54/1/37.
33 B.A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Minister Plenipotentiary o f  France, 7 January 1938, 54/4/1.
34 B .A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Minister Plenipotentiary o f France, 4 April 1938, 54/4/24.
33 B .A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Peiros to Minister Plenipotentiary o f  France, 2 June 1938, 54/4/34.
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administration, including its timetable and taught subjects, contributed to the erosion 
of overall standards and thus the schools’ attractiveness to the local community.
Ostensibly, the restrictive measures had been introduced as a countermeasure 
to the proliferation of Chinese schools in Siam.56 Since many of the Mission’s 
communities consisted of Chinese ethnic minorities, the measures also had an 
indirect impact on its schools. Thus, by 1939, whether by intention or not, the 
government appeared to be targeting the French. For the French missionaries, the 
perception that they were now targets was underlined by the attitude of some 
ministers who chose to display their hostility by addressing French diplomats in 
English, despite having been educated in France. The Vicar-Apostolic saw such 
actions as an “open declaration of [their] contempt for [the French] language”57 but, 
as subsequent events proved, hostility went deeper than merely linguistic contempt.
The restrictive laws were arguably the first instance of Thai nationalist ideas 
intruding into the Mission’s traditional spheres of interest. Undoubtedly, the 
restriction on the teaching of languages, in favour of only Siamese and English, was 
to have far-reaching effects on the development of the nation -  although not always 
in the way the government hoped. In 1940, the parish school of Holy Rosary Church 
that had formerly been attended mostly by ethnic Chinese had to stop its teaching of 
the Chinese language, replacing it with English and Siamese classes -  with a special 
nationalistic emphasis on the latter. At the end of year exam, out of 20 Grade 4 
(Prathom 4) students, there was only one failure in the Siamese language 
examination. That student was Siamese.58
56 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Minister Plenipotentiary o f France, 7 January 1938, 54/4/1,
57 B .A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Minister Plenipotentiary o f  France, 2 June 1938, 54/4/34.
58 B.A.A ., Holy Rosaiy (Calvary) Church School Report, 13 September 1940, 31/4/78.
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Church Finances
Religion, o f  course, does bring large profits, hut only to those who are content with
what they have.
1 Timothy 6:6
Naturally, all of the above work had to be maintained and paid for. In general, the 
Church's financial situation was volatile and corresponded with the national and 
global economic conditions at the time. There is no information on the Mission's 
finances in the 1910s, and the first picture given is of a modest surplus in 1922, 
which continued to grow until the mid-1920s. After 1922 there was a dramatic 
growth in the Mission's income, although the initial phase was fuelled by loans, 
mainly from the Bank of Indochina. The Mission appeared to have invested its 
resources well, and saw its income reaching a peak in 1926 at 682,195 francs.
M ission o f Siam Finances. 1922-30
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Chart 4. Mission o f  Siam Finances. 1922-30'"
Favourable economic conditions did not last because, by 1927, income had 
declined and by the following year had fallen significantly, albeit not to the level of
" The figures for the year 1929 are unknown: for detailed figures and references, see Appendices G 
and H.
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1922. The Mission experienced its first deficit in 1928 and continued to be in deficit 
until 1939. The post-1929 descent into deeper deficit was likely the consequence of 
adverse global economic conditions and the handover of certain assets to the Mission 
of Ratchaburi.
The outlook was not positive at the beginning of the 1930s. Expenditure still 
vastly outstripped income, thanks mainly to the Mission's new venture in the north 
that saw the establishment of many new and expensive institutions -  some of which 
remain in operation today. The nadir was reached in 1932, where the deficit reached 
an all time high of 396,177 francs. In terms of income, the Mission did not reach the 
lowest point until 1934 at 168,710 francs, by which point the deficit was coming 
under control. The Mission was successful in cutting costs and slightly augmenting 
its income in the following years, although it remained in slight deficit until 1939,
when it finally returned a modest surplus of 18,000 francs.
Mission o f Siam Finances, 1930-40
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Chart 5. Mission o f  Siam Finances, I930-401
f'° The figures for the years 1931 and 1935 are unknown: for detailed figures and references, see 
Appendices G and H.
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The pattern of the Mission’s expenditure during this period is also interesting. 
Despite its work in education and social provision, the evidence suggests that very 
little money was being channelled from the central funds directly to this work. It is 
highly probable that the Mission expected most of its institutions to be independent 
from central funds after the initial investment. Notably, the Mission had spent 
nothing on religious provision, presumably because it also expected parishes to be 
self-supporting after the initial support. 1 lowever, the same could not be expected 
for the missionaries themselves and the seminaries which, by their very nature, were 
not designed to be profitable enterprises. Indeed, the bulk of the Mission’s 
expenditure was dedicated to the upkeep of the missionaries as well as the 
seminaries. Although some schools and other works did receive subsidies, these 
were significantly less than the funding allocated to the missionaries and the 
seminaries.
M issio n  o fS ia n i E x p en d itu re, 1922-30
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Chart 6. Mission o f  Siam Expenditure. 1922-30**'
The Mission's allocation for its missionaries, seminaries, and social work 
took up the majority of its budget. It should be noted though, that there were also
hl For detailed figures and references, see  Appendix 1: M ission o f  Siam  Expenditure, 1922-30.
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other regular and irregular expenses such as those related to the training of catechists, 
travelling expenses for missionaries, taxes, repayment of loans, and funds for the 
maintenance of buildings, but these were not as significant as the allocations listed 
above. There were, however, some notable exceptions. Between the years 1922 and 
1925, the Mission was losing an average of 12,000 francs per year on loan 
repayments. However this changed in 1926 since the repayments ended and the 
Mission began a programme of acquisition. Between 1926 and 1932, it had spent a 
total of around 350,000 francs on acquiring new buildings and assets. Where had the 
money suddenly come from? Part of the money came from a 1926 business 
windfall,62 but the main factor behind the Mission's long-term increase in income 
was funding from external sources -  particularly from foreign organisations.
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Chart 7. Mission o f  Siam Expenditure, 1930-406'
6~ It is unknown what exactly caused the spike, but one possibility is that the Mission had sold some 
o f  its shares in various industries, ranging from railways to tin mining. It is also likely that its 
partnership in the Bo Hae Seng hardware store was performing better than usual, but by itself, this 
business cannot account for the spike.
For detailed figures and references, see Appendix I: Mission o f  Siam Expenditure (French Francs), 
1930-46.
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External sources of income would have always been welcomed by the 
Mission, even without the financial volatility of the 1930s. The question is: just how 
much did the Viear-Apostolic rely on this external income, and to what extent did it 
influence the work and political stance of the Mission?
The Mission derived its income from five major sources: fixed assets, mobile 
assets, contributions from the Propaganda Fide, contributions from other religious 
institutions, as well as donations from the faithful and other parties. Although the 
period 1925-28 saw a significant proportion of the Mission’s income derive from its 
business activities, mainly investment in some local companies such as Bo Hae Seng, 
a hardware company, and the Mekong Railway Company, the other income sources 
proved to be more reliable over time.
In addition to its business activities, the Mission also derived income from its 
fixed assets and donations. However, as Chart 8 below illustrates, the revenue from 
these sources were unreliable and varied considerably from year to year.
Mission of Siam Income Sources, 1922-30
i« i
Chart 8. Mission o f  Siam Income Sources, 1922-30,v4
,v4 For detailed figures and references, see Appendix II: M ission o f  Siam  Incom e. 1922-47.
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In marked contrast to the 1920s, the picture in the 1930s is of a Mission 
whose income was derived mainly from external sources. The Mission still collected 
revenue from its fixed and mobile assets but these, by themselves, could not sustain 
its activities, as indicated by the consistent deficits during this period.
The Mission thus became heavily reliant on income from external sources. 
Determining the origins of the external income is crucial to understanding the 
Mission's allegiances and obligations during this period. In the 1940s, the Mission 
of Siam was accused of being a ‘Fifth Column’ for the French and one of the 
methods for confirming whether this allegation was true or not is arguably through 
the Church's finances. If the clergy were Fifth Columnists, they would have 
received external subsidies for their ‘insurgent’ activities.
Mission of Siam Income Sources, 1930-40
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Chart 9. Mission o f  Siam Income Sources, 1930-40'’'
The Mission of Siam’s allegiance to external funding organisations is not so 
easily fathomed, however, since it received external income from a variety of
For detailed figures and references, see Appendix H: M ission o f  Siam  Incom e, 1922-47.
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sources. The first sources were organisations that were affiliated with the Church, 
such as the Propaganda Fide, the Sainte Enfance, and the M.E.P. The second 
sources were governments, most notably the colonial government of French 
Indochina. The third sources were private individuals although, unlike the first two, 
these usually funded the Mission on an occasional rather than a regular basis. Out of 
all of these, the Propaganda Fide afforded the most in terms of general funding. 
Subsidies provided by the other groups were normally for a specific purpose only. 
For example, funding from Sainte Enfance was reserved for children’s projects, 
mainly orphanages, while private donations were usually solicited for a specific 
cause, such as the construction of a school or the restoration of a church building.
The major obstacle for those arguing that the Mission of Siam had no 
connection with the French government was the fact that the Mission solicited and 
received subsidies from the French government in Indochina. The first record of this 
donation appears in 1927,66 and amounted to 1,345 French Indochinese piastres or 
around 13,450 French francs.67 The amount remained constant until 1934,68 when 
the subsidies were calculated and transferred in French francs. The French 
government in Indochina sent funds to the Mission annually, with the exception of 
the years 1933, 1936, 1938, and 1943-47.69 The trend of the donations suggests that 
the French colonial government remained consistent in its commitment to the 
Mission of Siam, in spite of the negative economic conditions. A sense of crisis is 
palpable in the years 1939 and 1940, when the subsidies increased substantially,
66 B.A.A., French Legation to Vicar-Apostolic Petros, 15 April 1927, 51/4/19.
67 The French Indochinese piastre was on the silver standard until March 1930, when it was pegged to 
the French franc at the rate o f  1 piastre to 10 francs.
68 B.A.A., French Legation to Vicar-Apostolic Petros, 1928, 52/1/3; 1929, 52/2/8; 1930, 52/4/4; 1931, 
53/1/16; 1932, 53/2/23; 1933, 53/4/4; 1934, 53/4/42.
69 There is a possibility that funds were sent during these years but records have either been lost or 
destroyed.
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amounting to a total of 202,400 francs.70 Superficially therefore, the evidence 
suggests that the Mission of Siam was in the pay of the French Indochinese 
government and was expected to act in favour of French interests in return.
However, this argument becomes problematic under closer examination.
The funding did not come without strings attached because the French 
Indochinese government imposed conditions where the funding had to be used by 
specific institutions. Initially in 1927, these institutions were Assumption College 
and Convent, St. Gabriel’s College, St. Joseph’s Convent, St. Francis Xavier 
Convent, and St. Cross Convent. The list did change over time. In 1939, the listed 
institutions were Assumption College, the Mater Dei Institute, St. Louis Hospital, St. 
Joseph’s School, St. Paul’s School (Paetriu), Regina Coeli School (Chiang Mai), and 
Montfort College (Chiang Mai). Besides these institutions’ involvement in 
education and healthcare, there was an additional common factor among them. They 
were either run by French-based religious orders or, in the case o f the schools, 
offered tuition in French (alongside other languages).
St. Louis Hospital, for example, had a management board that consisted of 
the French Minister, the Vicar-Apostolic, the Mission procurator, the hospital’s 
Mother Superior, and one o f the hospital’s doctors.71 As a result, with the possible 
exception of the doctor, the management board would be entirely French. The 
funding was thus dedicated entirely to ‘French’ institutions, the ones that would best 
serve France by spreading its gloire in Siam, rather than the rumiing of the whole 
Mission.
Furthermore, the amount was significantly less than the sums other 
organisations, such as the Propaganda Fide, were prepared to give. In 1927, the
70 B.A.A ., French Legation to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 1939, 55/1/74-81; 1940, 55/2/47.
71 B.A.A ., P. de Margerie to Fr. Colombet, 27 June 1909, 102/1/7.
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contributions of the French Indochinese government amounted to just 12 percent of 
the amount the Propaganda Fide allocated to the Mission of Siam just for that year.
In 1927, the French-Indochina funds were equivalent to only 2 percent of the income 
of the Mission, while at its maximum in 1939 it equated to around 14 percent of the 
Mission’s total income,72 This proportion is considerably less than the Propaganda 
Fide’s contribution. In 1927, the Propaganda Fide subsidies amounted to 17 percent 
of the Mission’s total income, while in 1939 they accounted for some 38 percent. 
While 1940 saw a significant jump in the French subsidies, where they formed the 
equivalent of 39 percent o f the Mission’s income, this was still less than the 
Propaganda Fide subsidies o f that year, which amounted to 54 percent of the 
Mission’s income. The French-Indochina government’s generosity appeared to be a 
one-off, since the proportion fell to around 9 percent of the total income in the 
following years.
In addition, unlike the French funds, the funding from the Propaganda Fide 
was general in nature -  the Mission was not forced to use it for a specific purpose 
but could employ it in various projects or use it as part of the missionaries’ 
allowances, as it saw fit. As such, it is arguable that the Mission of Siam was more 
obliged to the Propaganda Fide than to any other party.
Even so, those who argue that the Propaganda Fide’s generosity was bom out 
of some special favour for the Mission of Siam, being located in the only 
independent territory in Southeast Asia, would be mistaken. Indeed, if  anything, the 
Mission of Siam was rather neglected in contrast to its neighbours. The Propaganda 
Fide’s contribution to the Mission Siam was significantly less than its contribution to 
some of the other Missions in the region, most notably Cambodia, Korea, and even
72 Since the French funding was ear-marked for specific institutions, they did not appear in the general 
accounts, unlike the subsidies from Propaganda Fide and some o f  the other Church organisations.
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Laos, and even these were not the main foci of the Propaganda Fide. From its 
spending, the foci of the Propaganda Fide were clearly China and Japan. At best. 
Southeast Asian Missions were sideshows compared to the achievements of the Fast 
Asian Missions and their yet-to-be fulfilled but seemingly limitless potential. The 
Propaganda Fide's funding seems to reflect the East Asian Mission's progress. From 
1923-28, average total Propaganda Fide contributions to Missions in Japan was 
778,341 francs per annum, whereas in the same period, average contributions to 
Siam were only 93,525 francs.
Propaganda Fide Subsidies by Country/Territory, 1917-28
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Chart 10. Propaganda Fide Subsidies by Country/Territory, 1917-28
The conclusion then is that while the Mission appreciated the contributions 
from the French government of Indochina, they were not crucial to the overall 
running of the Mission, although they were instrumental in running the Mission’s 
‘French' institutions. Some of these were the Mission's ‘flagship' institutions, and 
their loss would have been a grievous blow to the Mission’s prestige and influence, 
but they certainly did not make up the entirety or even the majority of the Mission's 
activities. Furthermore, in percentage of income terms, the French subsidies were
' For detailed figures and references, see Appendix J: Propaganda Fide Subsidies by 
Country/Territory, 1917-28.
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not significant in comparison with other more generous and less restrictive sources. 
Technically, it was the ‘French’ institutions that were obliged to the French- 
Indochina government rather than the entirety of the Mission.
But nationalistic mobs rarely dwell on such fine technicalities. It seems that 
it was not how much or how little the Mission received from the French Indochinese 
government, or indeed the obligations, or lack thereof, that came with the funding 
that mattered. What really mattered were the implications of accepting funding from 
such a source in the first place. In the 1920s and even up to the late 1930s, the 
source of the Mission’s funding was not controversial but was indeed useful in 
maintaining the Mission in difficult economic times. However, by 1940, it had left 
the Mission of Siam dangerously exposed politically as well as financially.
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III
The Church in Siam, 1909-39
To see a world in a grain o f sand,
And a Heaven in a wildflower,
Hold infinity in the palm o f your hand,
And eternity in an hour.
William Blake, Auguries o f Innocence
In order to understand the nature of the persecution, it is vital to examine the 
historical background not only at the macro but also at the micro level. At the macro 
level, it appeared as if  the most difficult challenge facing the Mission of Siam during 
this period was not the threat of persecution but a severe lack of funding. 
Nevertheless, superficially, the Mission was secure; its activities were expanding and 
appreciated by the elite and general society. Furthermore, rather than being 
disunited by the diverse ethnic composition of its congregation, the Mission’s 
cohesion was reinforced by the common faith in Catholicism. Indeed, there is no 
record of internal ethnic conflict within the Mission, while authorities did not make 
ethnicity an issue in its dealings with the Catholic communities.
Historians of the anti-Catholic persecution are thus left in a quandary. Given 
the apparent secure position of the Church in pre-1939 Siam, the later explosion of 
random violence against Catholics is surprising. The Mission’s position was 
certainly influential, given the number of its converts and its role in education. But 
its influence during this period did not in any way impinge on the conduct of daily 
government business. There is also the problem of inconsistencies in the persecution. 
As seen in the introductory section, while nuns and teenage girls in the borderlands 
who had little to do with the Church leadership were subject to horrific violence, the 
Vicar-Apostolic, who was head o f the Mission and resident in the capital, never
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came to harm. These discrepancies raise the question whether the most violent anti- 
Catholic persecution was merely a local phenomenon rather than part o f a pan­
national movement? If so, would local conditions in pre-persecution times be able to 
account for the discrepancies in the levels of persecution across the country? Finally, 
did the activities of the Mission in these areas in any way contribute to encouraging a 
backlash against them?
This chapter has been divided into five separate sections: Bangkok and the 
central plain, the west, the north, the east, and the northeast. While this division is 
somewhat arbitrary, they follow the demarcations used by both the state and the 
Mission. Furthermore, although some problems such as the shortage of priests and 
minor conflicts with the local authorities were common to more than one, specific 
region, each region appeared to have its own unique problems and assets. It is 
arguable that these factors, which seemed insignificant at the time, acted as Tenses’ 
dining the persecution period, where they came to determine the intensity o f the anti- 
Catholic violence.
I l l
Bangkok and the Central Plain
Go therefore, make disciples o f  all nations; baptise them in the name o f the Father 
and o f  the Son and o f  the Holy Spirit, and teach them to observe all the commands I
gave you.
Matthew 28:19-20
As the seat of the Mission of Siam’s Vicar-Apostolic, Bangkok was the 
administrative nerve-centre of the Mission, while some of its parish priests were also 
responsible for outlying parishes in the Central Plain. In general, the parishes in 
Bangkok were more prosperous in terms of their economic activities and more 
diverse in their ethnic composition than many of their provincial counterparts. 
Bangkok proved to be as ethnically diverse as the old capital of Ayutthaya,1 and the 
ethnic composition of the city’s parishes reflected this reality. Francis Xavier 
Church, for example, was a haven for ethnic Annamese (Vietnamese) Catholics. 
Holy Rosary2 and Santa Cruz Churches were supported by a predominantly Chinese 
following with a small minority of Portuguese descendants, whilst the Church of the 
Immaculate Conception3 had a strong Khmer community. The presence of these 
ethnic groups was reflected in the priests’ correspondence, lists of financial donors, 
as well as other miscellaneous documents such as wills, catechist documents and 
correspondence from local authorities. The Chinese, in particular, were easily 
identifiable by their names. Often they and others who mention them would prefix
! During his embassy to Ayutthaya in 1685, the Chevalier de Chaumont noted the presence o f  
“Moors” (Turks, Persians, Moguls, Golcondas, and “those o f  Bengal”), Malays, Peguans, Laotians, 
Cochin-Chinese, Dutch, English, French, Portuguese, and even Armenians -  see Chevalier de 
Chaumont (trans. M. Smithies), Aspects o f  the Embassy to Siam, 1685 (Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 
1997), pp. 82-6. In addition, de la Loubere also mentions and maps the presence o f  the Chinese, 
Macassars, and Japanese communities, see Simon de la Loubere, The Kingdom o f  Siam  (Oxford 
University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1969), pp. 6-7 and p. 112.
2 A lso known as ‘Kalahwa’ or ‘Calvary Church’.
3 A lso known as ‘Conception Church’.
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their names with “Jin” or “Jek”4 to indicate their ethnicity. In formal Thai-language 
documents they would also sign with Chinese characters indicating that the Church 
accepted these idiosyncrasies.
Much of the strength of these parishes derived from their relatively longer 
history (rivalled only by the eastern parishes) as well as access to a greater number 
of facilities, social connections, and opportunities, befitting capital district parishes. 
Holy Rosary Church, for example, was dominated by members of the Chinese 
migrant community that was heavily involved in business. On the other hand, 
Assumption Cathedral acted as an important centre for Catholic expatriates, while its 
schools attracted a wide range of clientele from the sons of ministers to orphans. 
Indeed, a major part of the Mission’s ‘influence’ derived from these schools and its 
healthcare provisions, which were active and visible manifestations of the social 
benefits of the Catholic Mission. In the words of one French observer, the 
missionaries were not only working “for the conversion of the souls but also for the 
development of the minds”.5
While Vicar-Apostolic Ferros did not break from the longstanding tradition 
of providing educational facilities in all parishes,6 undoubtedly the provision in 
Bangkok was more lavish. It can be argued that, in the absence of mass conversions, 
the Catholic presence in Siam during this period, and up to this day, has been built 
on the twin pillars of education and health. The institutions in Bangkok acted 
effectively as the shining paragons of this principle. At the same time, the facilities 
also served to enhance the reputation of the Catholic Church in various quarters of 
society and gave the Mission access to a network that it otherwise may not have had.
4 Usage o f  the words in the modem day is, at best, politically incorrect, at worst, gravely insulting.
5 M. Peleggi, Lords o f  Things: The Fashioning o f  the Siamese M onarchy's Modern Image (University 
o f  Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2002), p. 147.
6 Along with a chapel and a priest’s residence, a school would usually be set up in new parishes.
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The success of the Bangkok ventures would be instrumental in encouraging similar 
developments elsewhere during this period, most notably in the north. Thus, while it 
can be said that the Church had failed in its original mission to effect mass 
conversions, it had succeeded spectacularly in fulfilling the divine command to “go, 
therefore, and teach all nations”.
Education, Healthcare, and the Social Network
The Reverend Fathers o f the Assumption had brought nothing but g o o d -  and great
good— to the country.1
King Prajadhipok, 1926
The role of Assumption College in fostering useful social networks is particularly 
interesting since it highlights the effectiveness of these networks in producing results 
and, at the same time, suggests that the relationships within these networks were 
based as much on loyalties to individuals as to institutions. Nowhere is this 
effectiveness more evident than in the role o f Fr. Emile Colombet in the 
establishment and initial miming of the school. Ostensibly, Fr. Colombet was just 
another parish priest, although his status was confirmed by his appointment in 1907 
as pro-vicar apostolic.s Yet, he appeared to have an equal if not superior status vis- 
a-vis Siamese society than his actual superior. By the time of his death in August 
1933, he was a chevalier in the Legion d’Honneur and had also been inducted into 
the Siamese Order of the White Elephant.9 Although Vicar-Apostolic Perros too 
would eventually receive a decoration from the Legion d’Honneur in 1930,10 it seems
7 ‘Assumption College: Notable Royal V isit’, Bangkok Times, 7 May 1926.
8 The position was largely a ceremonial post in normal circumstances, but should the vicar-apostolic 
become incapacitated or otherwise prevented from carrying out his duties, the pro-vicar apostolic was 
authorised to take over as caretaker until the situation could be permanently resolved.
9 M.E.P.A., Fr. Emile Colombet -  Notice Necrologique, Compte-Rendu 1933.
10 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros made Chevalier in Legion d’Honneur, July 1930, 73/1/22.
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that he would not integrate so well into Siamese society." Most of the time, this was 
due to differences in character. Vicar-Apostolic Perros took a more meditative and 
detached approach to problems, while Fr. Colombet was very much pro-active.
Like many of the missionaries of the M.E.P. during this period, Fr. Colombet 
was immediately dispatched to Siam shortly after he was ordained in 1871, aged 22. 
While Vicar-Apostolic Perros’s background prior to his appointment saw him 
training in the local languages and his work confined mostly to the seminary with a 
brief stint in a provincial parish, Fr. Colombet was much more active. On his 
appointment as resident priest to Assumption Cathedral in 1875, Fr. Colombet 
observed that the parish lacked a school and so he proceeded to set one up. Against 
many initial obstacles -  he was unable to find instructors and funding -  a school was 
eventually established. In many ways, this school was visionary and, in terms of its 
language provisions, ahead of its time. The school was to be open to children of all 
religions and taught standard subjects such as history, geography, physics, chemistry, 
music, art, and mathematics. Notably, while the college prospectus stated that 
“moral education” would be provided, there is no mention of a formal course in 
religious studies. Thus, in spite of priests running the school, the provisions were 
largely secular. Also remarkable was that, for the first time in Siam, instruction was 
offered in English and French alongside Siamese.12 In this regard, the school could 
be regarded as the first (and, in some ways, superior) incarnation o f the ubiquitous 
International Schools of the present day.
Despite its visionary curriculum, at the beginning of 1885, the parish school 
had only 80 pupils. However, what happened next is a testament to the power of 
patronage and networks in Siamese society as well as the elite’s interest in modem
" He did not receive the Siamese honours bestowed on Fr. Colombet.
12 B.A.A., The Assumption College Bangkok Prospectus, Undated, 73/3/2.
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education during this period. Within a few years of the school opening its doors, Fr. 
Colombet was able to court the interest and patronage of some of the highest 
personalities in Siamese society. The most prominent of these were members of the 
royal family and the prince-ministers, whose involvement spurred others to follow 
their example. Regardless of how the priest had procured their support, the results 
were clear. In January 1887, Prince Devavongse approved Fr. Colombet’s plans to 
expand the school into a college, the main difference being that the college was open 
to everyone rather than just to those within the parish jurisdiction. Thus the school 
was opened to a wider market. Significantly, King Chulalongkorn as well as many 
princes and officials of the court paid subscriptions to support the plan. The king 
contributed 4,000 francs, while the queen donated 2,000 francs.13 Royal interest in 
the venture continued in the succeeding generations and was expressed through 
official visits, such as one made in May 1926, when King Prajadhipok praised and 
acknowledged the work of the missionaries in Siam and the monarchy’s role in 
encouraging these developments:
[The King] said in reply that the Kings of Siam had always encouraged 
missionaries, particularly the Assumption College. More particularly King 
Chulalongkorn and King [Vajiravudh] had always realised the boon that had 
been conferred on Siam by the establishment of the Assumption College... 
For the Siamese nation, it was a good thing. His Majesty was pleased that his 
predecessors had seen fit to encourage missionaries, for the Reverend Fathers 
of the Assumption had brought nothing but good -  and great good -  to the 
country.14
Although the statement glosses over more troubling aspects in the past 
relationship between the state and missionaries, the message for the 1920s was clear 
enough — the monarchy saw the value of the work of the missionaries and was
13 M .E.P.A., Fr. Emile C o lom b et-N otice  Necrologique, Compte-Rendu 1933.
14 ‘Assumption College: Notable Royal V isit’, Bangkok Times, 7 May 1926.
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willing to encourage their development. It is arguable that what mattered was not so 
much the scale of the monarch’s financial or political contribution to the 
missionaries’ projects, but the fact that the King consented to give in the first place, 
thereby spurring others to follow. The local press also helped to advertise the cause 
to the local European expatriate communities, and more donations continued to flow 
in. When the College had finally completed its expansion in 1889, the number of its 
pupils had increased to 400. This number was still modest, especially by modem 
standards, but it would continue to grow throughout this period. By the time of 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros’s appointment in 1909, the school’s population was nearing 
1,000, and by the time of King Prajadhipok’s visit in 1926, numbers stood at around 
1,700.15
The schools were not the only institutions that received royal and general 
patronage. The Mission’s other venture, St. Louis Hospital, was also a subject of 
royal interest. Prior to its formal opening in 1898,16 during the time of Vicar- 
Apostolic Vey, Bangkok still lacked hospitals that could cater to the needs and 
expectations o f the European expatriate community. Although St. Louis Hospital 
was not the first medical institution to be established in Bangkok, observers were 
generally impressed with the results:
If one might venture to sum up the general opinion expressed, it might be put 
that Bangkok was genuinely surprised to find so splendid a hospital opened 
in its midst. Indeed the new institution is so complete in all its details, and so 
admirably suited for the purpose, that a good many asked the question ‘Is it 
not too good for Bangkok?’17
Apart from its facilities, one of the hospital’s distinguishing characteristics 
was its pricing policy. In-patients were ranked into three different tiers and paid
1:1 ‘Assumption College: Notable Royal V isit’, Bangkok Times, 7 May 1926.
16 The hospital had already been operating for some time prior to its formal opening.
17 B.A .A ., ‘Other Days in Bangkok’, Bangkok Times, 16 September 1898, 102/1/15.
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according to their “class”. First class patients were Europeans and the “assimilated” 
-  these had to pay 8 baht per night and enjoyed a private room. Second class 
patients were defined as Eurasians, Chinese, and Siamese. The fees they had to pay 
were significantly less at 4 baht, and they would also have access to a private room, 
although if  the hospital was full they might have to share with one other patient of 
the same class. The people in the third class, which included anyone who was too 
poor to pay the top-tier fees, had to pay only 2 baht per night but were allowed use 
only of the general ward. The standard of treatment for all tiers was the same, the 
only differences being the amenities available. The hospital appeared to have been 
popular; certainly its usefulness was appreciated and it was one of the few works of 
the Mission that was not shut down entirely during the Second World War. Royal 
patronage for this institution was usually manifested in the form of donations, such 
as the 1,000 baht given by the Queen on the occasion of her birthday in 1929.18
The assistance that Fr. Colombet received is a testament to his personal 
ability to mobilise Siamese social networks to further the Mission’s interests.19 It 
also served to highlight the networks’ utility to the Mission and stimulated the idea 
of the Church cultivating a network of its own, rather than having to rely on the 
network o f others, and that if, for example, a former pupil became the interior 
minister, they could appeal directly to him. The question was how could the Church 
achieve this objective?
Conversions were an obvious and direct method, but this was unreliable since 
it was rare for Siamese in the higher echelons of society to convert. Even if  there
18 B.A.A., H M ’s Privy Purse Department to Vi car-Apostolic Perros, 31 December 1929, 102/1/33.
19 From the available accounts, Fr. Colombet was exceptionally kind. For example, Phraya Anuman 
Rajdhon, a former pupil o f  Assumption College, did not mince words when it came to the severity o f  
the discipline meted out by some o f  the teachers. Nevertheless, he only had kind words for Fr, 
Colombet and his reasonable and humble personality that probably helped to endear him to the 
Siamese elite, see Sthirakoses, Looking Back: Book One (Chulalongkorn University Press, Bangkok, 
1992), p. 320.
were the rare converts from this section of society, some came under heavy family 
and social pressure to return to their original religion, thereby limiting the utility of 
the connection. This method was thus problematic and had the potential to backfire 
on the Mission. However, the success of Assumption College provided the 
missionaries with an alternative solution. Since it was clear that the Mission would 
be unable to construct a powerful network through direct conversions, the next best 
option was to establish a network with those whose views of the Mission and its 
works would be favourable, even if they would never convert to Catholicism. By the 
time of Vicar-Apostolic Perros’s appointment, the Mission was certainly attuned to 
the need for the latter network, as can be seen in a 1923 report:
We have, next to the Church of St. Francis-Xavier a College for boys or 
affluent students. It is urgent that we establish a similar institution for girls.
It is by this method that we can reach the high classes of society, who 
influence everything here.20
The colleges, schools, their alumni societies, and hospitals were ideal 
vehicles for just such an undertaking. To encourage non-CathoIics to apply, the 
major schools and colleges stressed that they “in no way concentrated on the 
propagation of religion as the principle plank in its curriculum. The boys were free 
to follow their own religious upbringing. The Brothers did not encourage criticism 
of any religion”. Curiously, Fr. Colombet is quoted as saying that “Education should 
be based on Dharma”.21 Notwithstanding the religious freedom, the schools did 
manage to effect conversions but the numbers were small. During this period the 
annual figures rarely broke into double digits.
20 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros Report, 8 September 1923,40/4/11.
21 B .A.A., Assumption Cathedral, 1 September 1935, 31/1/10.
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The majority of students who attended the Mission’s schools were Buddhists 
rather than Catholics. Yet it could be seen that they formed connections to the 
school, the Mission, and to each other through the alumni networks. In the case of 
Assumption College, Fr. Colombet set up the Assumption Alumni Society in 1904 
and, by the time of his death in 1933, the network had blossomed. The extent of the 
network can be seen in a meeting of the Assumption Alumni Society in 1933, at 
which it was decided that an orphanage would be set up to honour the late founder of 
Assumption College. The meeting was reported in local newspapers and one 
speaker at the event was confident that:
Old Assumptionists were scattered all over the Kingdom, and it should be an 
easy matter if  one and all put their shoulders to the wheel to establish an 
institution [the orphanage]. Old Assumptionists were to be found in all walks 
of life, but there was no doubt they had sufficient influence to carry their 
project through.22
A committee was then set up to oversee the project, and its composition 
reflected the diversity of the school. Out of thirty members of the committee, there 
were 1 Mom Chao, 13 Phrayas, 1 Phra, 4 Luangs, and 5 Chinese, with members of 
the European expatriate community and one ordinary Thai rounding off the 
committee.23 One year later, the Association was able to solicit donations from 
virtually all sections o f upper class society, ranging from the king (1,000 baht), 
prime minister (100 baht), and a number of Chao phrayas and Phrayas, to the 
French Legation (275 baht) and the Bank of Indochina (205 baht).211
The networks were not solely confined to the Assumption College, however. 
Indeed, the popularity and success of the Assumption College led to the 
establishment of other schools along similar lines that proved to be equally popular
22 B.A.A., Fr, Colombet’s Memorial, 1 September 1935, 31/1/10.
23 Ibid.
24 ‘The Late Pere Colombet’, Bangkok Times, 16 October 1934.
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and, in turn, formed their own networks. St. Gabriel’s College in Samsen and the 
Mater Dei Institute are cases in point. St. Gabriel was a school for boys run by the 
same religious order as at Assumption College, while the Mater Dei Institute was the 
female counterpart to Assumption College mn by the Ursulines, although its 
kindergarten section was, and continues to be, mixed. The most famous alumni of 
the Mater Dei kindergarten during this period were the then-Prince Ananda Mahidol 
and Prince Bhumibol Adulyadej, the future King Rama VIII (1935-46) and King 
Rama IX (1946-present) respectively, while St. Gabriel has since produced at least 
two prime ministers in modem times, although not necessarily with the same 
political allegiances.2'1
Despite the close association of the schools with the aristocracy, the schools 
did not suffer a decline following the 1932 coup. It was clear, however, that the 
attitudes within and outside the school were changing. The change was epitomised 
by a student-led strike at Assumption and St. Gabriel Colleges in September 1932. 
The ring-leaders of the strike were Somchit Joti Dilok, son of Colonel Phraya Aphai 
Songkhram (who became a cabinet minister in the 1934 government), Charoon 
Siddhisen, son of Phra Pramod Krayanukich, and Sukri Vasuvat, a nephew of an 
Assembly member. Three demands were put forward to the directors of the colleges. 
The first was for a reduction in tuition fees. The second was for the colleges to grant 
holidays on major Buddhist festivals: one day for Vesakha Bucha (the birth, 
enlightenment, and death of the Buddha), another for Makha Bucha (a day 
traditionally reserved for the veneration of the Buddha on the full moon day of the 
third lunar month), and three days for Khao Pansa (the start of the Rains Retreat, 
also known as “Buddhist Lent”). The third demand was for the reinstatement of
2:> General Surayud Chulanont (1 October 2006-29 January 2008) and Samak Sundaravej (29 January 
2008-9 September 2008) being the most recent.
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Sakul Samsen, a son of another Assembly member, who had been expelled from the 
school for wearing a '‘comical” costume to school.26
Apart from revealing the illustrious clientele of the Colleges, the incident was 
the first in the histoiy of the school in which religion had become an issue of 
contention. Indeed, a year earlier, at an Old Boys’ gathering, an alumnus gave a 
speech that addressed the same matter but with a radically different approach:
This College is a cosmopolitan institution...composed of many nationalities 
and many creeds. To make the point clearer I wish to say that on one 
occasion when I came across a statement in the Press that the Saint’s day of 
one of the Reverend Brothers had been successfully celebrated, and as the 
said Brother happened to be one of my past teachers, I sent a letter of apology 
to the effect that I could not be present because I believed that the occasion 
was related with religion. The said Brother sent me a reply, thanking me and 
saying that, ‘An Assumptionist has 110 concern with caste or religion, except 
the one word Assumptionist only’. This is what I consider cosmopolitan.27
Apart from causing a temporary and very public closure o f the two Colleges, 
and striking terror into the hearts o f busy parents who had to unexpectedly take back 
their sons, the boys’ demand for Buddhist holidays was the first sign of a shift in 
social attitudes. Religion had emerged as an issue of contention. The fact that many 
of those involved were connected to figures in the new constitutional government 
probably did not give the Mission much comfort. Not that the members of the 
government would automatically applaud the actions of their children, even if 
observers suspected that the students were merely following in the footsteps of their 
parents, as one newspaper article noted:
Bangkok is keenly interested in this movement on the part o f its youth...
The members of the People’s Association28 must be particularly pleased that 
the school-boys are to be taught a very plain lesson, for most people are
26 ‘Schoolboys on Strike’, Bangkok Times, 9 September 1932.
27 ‘Assumption College: Old B oys’ Dinner’ in Bangkok Times, 30 March 1931.
28 That is, the People’s Party or Khana Rasadon .
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asking if the strike is not meant as an imitation of the movement that led to 
the formation of the Association.
The same article also noted that, on learning of the incident, the parent of 
Sakul Samsen (the student at the centre of the boys’ third demand) had “hastened to 
the Assumption College to inform the Rev. Brothers that he did not side at all with 
his son... He further approved of the action of the Director in so expelling the youth, 
whom he really had little use for and did not care to recognise as a son”.29 In 
addition, Vice-Admiral Pliraya Rajawangsan,30 the Minister o f Defence (1932-3), 
came in person to express his sympathy for the school directors and to “make a 
personal enquiry as to when the school would be reopened because he also happens 
to have a son at the College”.31 Public opinion at the time was also veiy much 
against the actions of the students, and one parent was worried that the students had 
been too influenced by the recent political disorder:
A compromise never solves a problem; and where there is departure from 
principle, there must be confusion. Now, there seems to be a departure from 
principle evidencing itself in the activities of the Government and civil life. 
What can be the result? Chaos! For without discipline, there can be no 
efficiency.32
The opinions of the public and the influential were thus on the side of the 
Catholic school directors, allowing them to expel the ringleaders and punish the rest 
as appropriate. Furthermore, in response to the boys’ demands, the directors argued 
publicly that they had already reduced tuition fees in more than 400 cases, while 
around 70 students paid no fees at all. This figure did not include the 80 boarders
29 B.A.A., Unknown newspaper clipping, Undated, 72/1/50.
30 Bom  in 1886, Vice-Admiral Phraya Rajawangsan was the chief o f  staff o f  the navy in 1932. He 
became the Siamese Minister in Paris in 1936 and died in 1940. See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes 
Thailand, p. 373.
31 ‘That School Strike’, Bangkok Times, 15 September 1932.
32 ‘Correspondence: Schoolboys on Strike’, Bangkok Times, 11 September 1932.
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who did not have to pay anything for their board and lodging, tuition fees, clothes, 
and books. As for the issue of the Buddhist holidays, they argued that “no objection 
is ever raised when parents ask for such days off for their sons. But the College 
cannot give holidays for every nationality”.33 The crisis was thus resolved but the 
sudden assertion of Buddhism’s paramount status in what had been largely a secular 
and cosmopolitan institution was the first sign that all may not have been well in the 
new order inaugurated by the 1932 revolution.
For the remainder o f the 1930s, the Bangkok schools encountered no more 
trouble from its students. By all accounts, the schools continued to maintain their 
popularity and networks right up to the outbreak of the Thai-French conflict, in spite 
of increased interference from the Siamese educational authorities. Indeed, the 
Siamese government’s later efforts at standardising education resulted in a lowering 
of standards in many of the Mission’s schools. Reforms made the teaching of 
Siamese compulsory and imposed tighter restrictions on who was qualified to be 
headmasters and teachers.
Chinese schools were supposedly the target of the former legislation, but 
Catholic-run schools were inevitably affected by both, where some teachers were 
disqualified because of their lack of Siamese language abilities, while the provision 
of tuition in English was advocated by the government at the expense of other 
languages such as Chinese and French. The parish schools thus had to be brought 
into line with the state regulations,34 or closed down altogether.
After Fr. Colombet’s death in 1933, the Catholic Church’s correspondence 
with figures in the government dwindled significantly, although this development 
may have had more to do with the change from an absolute to a constitutional
JJ ‘Schoolboys on Strike’, Bangkok Times, 9 September 1932.
34 B.A.A., Fr. Oilier to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 11 September 1940, 31/4/77.
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monarchy. Even if the 1932 coup had weakened the bond between the Church and 
the Siamese government, it did not mean that the latter would automatically become 
hostile to the former. Indeed, the evidence suggests that at this stage the state still 
valued the Catholic Church’s contributions to society. What was lacking was the 
dynamo of personal relationships. The funeral of Fr. Colombet on 26 August 1933 
vividly illustrates this point. In attendance on the day were Prime Minister Phraya 
Phahon and various government officials, together with members of the diplomatic 
corps, as well as more than 2,000 other mourners.35
Like many missionaries of the M.E.P. during this period, Fr. Colombet ended 
up spending more time in his adopted country than the country of his birth, to which 
he returned only once -  and that was for the purpose of soliciting the support of the 
Brothers of St. Gabriel for his new school, which he obtained. Siam had a place for 
Fr. Colombet and many like him. Thailand, however, would prove to be a different 
place. Thus, while the funeral of Fr. Colombet was for a “great Frenchman”, as the 
M.E.P. obituaiy put it, it was also the end of an era.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the parishes in Bangkok well illustrate the diverse ethnic composition 
o f Catholicism in the capital. This diversity was especially apparent during the early 
period, fading as communities learnt to integrate into general society or were 
forcefully integrated as part of a formal government policy, as was the case during 
the first Pibul government, where the labels such as Thai-Chinese, Thai-Malays, 
Thai-Vietnamese were abolished in favour of the general catch-all label o f “Thai”.36
3;> M.E.P.A., Fr. Emile Colombet -  Notice Necrologique, Compte-Rendu, 1933.
36 C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H istory o f  Thailand (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005), p. 133.
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That the diverse ethnic groups were able to integrate this religion in the early 
period without any apparent problems indicate that religion at this stage did not clash 
with these ethnic identities but was arguably to be regarded as a complementary 
component. The Chinese and the Vietnamese did not stop regarding themselves as 
Chinese or Vietnamese upon conversion. They were Chinese and Catholic, 
Vietnamese and Catholic, or Siamese and Catholic where ethnic and religious 
identities were not mutually exclusive.
Arguably, the Mission played a role in perpetuating these dual identities 
through their tolerance of this diversity and its willingness to cater for the different 
needs and idiosyncrasies of the various groups. These special provisions were not 
unique and can also be observed in other regions, particularly the east. However, in 
the capital, this aspect was especially distinctive in its treatment of the ethnic 
Chinese parishes, where the need for Chinese-language education was catered for 
and where important documents such as wills and contracts were processed either in 
a mixture of Thai and Chinese or purely in Chinese. These idiosyncrasies were 
gradually eliminated over time through legislation such as those regarding education 
(where teaching in the Siamese language became more emphasised) and the 
aforementioned re-labelling of ethnic minorities.
Furthermore, as can be seen from the establishment of the Assumption 
College, indirect support (that is, support from those who did not convert) also cut 
across class boundaries. In Bangkok, the Mission was patronised by both the elite of 
society, as well as immigrants who may not have had such long-established roots. 
Elite support at this pre-1932 stage also supports the argument that the nationalism 
of King Vajiravudh, despite its new Buddhist emphasis, was not imposed on the 
Missions. Changes in this policy only became apparent after 1932. The student
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strike in September 1932 suggests that a more demanding form of nationalism had 
penetrated the youth but remained unsupported by the elite at the time, as can be 
observed from the reactions of the students’ parents.
Elite support for the work of the Missions was arguably influenced by three 
factors. The first was the Siamese desire to modernise; the missionary schools and 
hospitals were effective (although, by no means, the only) vehicles to achieve this 
objective. The second, and related, factor was the pressure of colonialism. The 
Siamese government simply could not afford to furnish western powers with an 
excuse to increase their demands, especially given the role the grievance of 
missionaries had played in the run up to the Paknam incident in 1893. The final 
factor to take into consideration was the dynamics of personal relationships, in 
particular between Fr. Colombet and the prince-ministers of the court. In the light of 
the subsequent success of Assumption College, the Mission had clearly formed a 
positive and effective relationship with the ruling classes, which held firm until the 
coup d’etat in 1932.
However, paradoxically, the case of Fr. Colombet and his role in establishing 
the Assumption College also demonstrates the key weakness of the relationship: the 
reliance on personal rather than institutional contact. Although, judging from the 
parents of the rioting boys in the Mission’s capital schools, the new post-1932 elite 
continued to patronise Mission-run institutions (again, emphasising the cross-class 
appeal of the schools), the relationship between the constitutional government and 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros clearly had different dynamics from that between Fr. 
Colombet and the absolutist government. Most notably, the Vicar-Apostolic did not 
solicit any support, financial or otherwise, on behalf of the works in Bangkok or 
indeed anywhere else from the Siamese government.
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There are a number of factors to take into account in analysing this difference 
in approach. The first factor could be the Vicar-Apostolic’s desire to separate 
ecclesiastical interests from that of the state, as according to the 1909 Papal 
encyclical, Maximum Illiid. However, as Chapter II has shown, the Vicar-Apostolic 
was not adverse to accepting money from the government of French-Indochina 
during the 1930s. A second, more plausible factor, is the political turbulence that 
followed 1932 as well as the global economic depression that continued to affect the 
country, both of which would make any such campaign for finance from the 
government difficult. The third, and arguably most compelling factor, was that the 
Vicar-Apostolic was simply not inclined to get involved with the post-1932 
government. As can be seen later in this chapter, in his arrangements for the schools 
in Chiang Mai, the Vicar-Apostolic preferred to work directly with religious orders 
rather than the government. This approach is a direct contrast to that of Fr. 
Colombet, who went first to the influential figures in Siamese society, before 
soliciting the assistance of the Brothers of St. Gabriel.
However, it cannot be said that the Mission did not attempt to cultivate 
institutional loyalty. The establishment of the Assumption Alumni Society in 1904 
was arguably the first attempt by the Mission to achieve this. The Mission had 
effectively eliminated the necessity of conversion through the “cosmopolitanism” of 
the Assumption College. Conversion was no longer a necessary requirement for 
those wishing to belong to the Catholic network. Undoubtedly, this attitude would 
have weakened the will to conversion, but on the other hand would expand the 
Mission’s network beyond what it would have been had conversion been the sine 
qua non of admission into the network.
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The West
The Catholic Church is not an intruder in any countiy; nor is she alien to any people. 
It is only right, then, that those who exercise her sacred ministiy should come from  
eveiy nation, so that their countiymen can look to them for instruction in the law o f  
God and leadership on the way to salvation.
- Pope Benedict XV, Maximum Illud (16), 30 November 1919
Despite the Mission of Siam’s successes in the fields of health and education, its 
expanding activities placed both personnel and financial resources under severe 
strain. The achievements of the Mission during this period came at the price of 
massive annual deficits, especially from 1929 onwards. The Mission found itself 
equally stretched when it came to personnel. In some instances, there were simply 
not enough priests to cover the needs of parishioners in the areas under the Mission’s 
responsibility. Church records during this period are littered with requests from both 
parish priests and parishioners for Bangkok to send them additional priests, 
regardless of whether they were residential or itinerant.37 Sometimes, the Vicar- 
Apostolic would respond positively but, more often than not, there were no priests 
available. Furthermore, on occasions when priests were sent, sometimes they were 
found to be ‘substandard’ and added to local problems.
The Parish of Saint Antoine (Tha Kwien) in Prachinburi in the east of
Thailand illustrated the effect of the overstretch. From the late 1920s, Antonia
Himinkum, a female parishioner, had been petitioning Bangkok for a resident priest,
since the parish was not being served at all. However as late as 1932, no priest had
been sent and the petitioner reported that “because the parish is not in your thoughts,
[the parishioners] have all returned to their gentile ways. I have been here at Tha
37 The areas that had a shortage o f  priests were usually administered by itinerant priests who were 
based in a “central” and accessible parish. For example, the priest at Conception Church in Bangkok 
was also responsible for some parishes in Ayutthaya. While the parishioners were glad to have access 
to a priest, the inadequacy o f  this measure was often expressed.
129
Kwien for five years, yet you have never thought of me”.38 Nevertheless, the 
eventual arrival of the requested priest caused additional problems. A letter from the 
same informant dated May 1935 was a litany of the inadequacies of the priest who 
had been sent. The informant complained that “he would not pay attention during 
confessions and preferred to live in comfort”, and that the priest would “constantly 
complain about the difficulties and that he did not want to go to Tha Kwien”.39 The 
last letter in the series, dated August of the same year, saw similar complaints but 
also indications that local frustration was intensifying because of the troublesome 
priest and his remarks, such as “The teachers at Tha Kwien cannot be trusted”, a 
comment that would have concerned Antonia, who was a teacher at Tha Kwien.40 
There are no more letters from this parish after this date. Perhaps the tensions there 
had somehow been resolved or Antonia had moved, or perhaps even returned to 
“gentile ways” out o f frustration.
Whatever the case, from the early 1920s, the Propaganda Fide had realised 
that the resources o f the Mission of Siam were overstretched, and that this was 
having an adverse effect on current and future projects. At the same time, the Papal 
encyclical Maximum I  I hid in 1919 expressed concern over the entanglement of 
various missionary orders with the interests of the European colonial powers. Thus, 
during his visit in 1923, Monsignor Leocroart, the Apostolic Delegate, suggested the 
further division of the Mission of Siam to take some of the administrative burden off 
the M.E.P.41
The division aimed to fulfil objectives on two levels. On the ideological 
level, the suggestion was inspired by the Papal encyclical Maximum Illud that
3S B.A.A ., Antonia Himinkum to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 10 January 1932, 41/2/11.
39 B .A .A ., Antonia Himinkum to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 25 May 1935, 41/2/12.
40 B.A .A ., Antonia Himinkum to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, August 1935,41/2/13.
41 The other earlier division was the creation o f  the Mission o f  Laos which covered French-controlled 
Laos as w ell as the northeast o f  Siam in 1899.
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encouraged the acceptance of religious congregations from nations other than those 
of the established missionaries. Thus, for example, the French missionaries in Siam 
were encouraged to accept missionaries from orders based in the United States or 
Italy, rather than confining themselves solely to the French religious orders. The 
intended effect was thus the dilution of the French character of the Church in 
Thailand, in effect making it more “Catholic”. At the same time, the division was 
potentially a step in forming a local hierarchy, which in turn would lead to the 
ultimate objective of all Missions, a diocese led and maintained by an indigenous 
clergy.
On a practical level, the divisions would take some of the burden of 
administration off the Vicar-Apostolic of Bangkok. The new Missions could also 
request additional funding from the Propaganda Fide and other agencies as separate 
entities, and be used to test the leadership abilities of the local clergy. If everything 
turned out well, then the next step to forming a local hierarchy could then be taken, 
and if not, then the damage to the Bangkok Mission could be limited and contained.
The Mission of Ratchaburi
My political views are those o f  the Lord’s prayer.
St. John Bosco
Initially there was some resistance from the M.E.P. to the establishment of new 
Missions in its Southeast Asian territories. The objections, made confidentially in an 
M.E.P. circular dated to October 1926, were on the grounds that it would contravene 
various articles and regulations of the missionary society:
I conclude that the Regulations have not been observed, neither in letter nor 
in spirit, despite the stipulations of Article 19, the Central Administration and
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the Superior of the Society have been excluded from the negotiations 
affecting the territorial status of the Society, with the risk that one day or 
another we may only learn that our Vicariates have been modified, divided, 
or even abolished through the newspapers.
The letter also questioned the authority of the Apostolic Delegate in making 
the suggestion in the first place:
The Nuncio in a Catholic country is not the Pope; even less so is the 
Apostolic Delegate in a missionary country. His role is clearly delimited by 
Canon law 265 and the following regulations. He absolutely cannot take the 
place of the Bishops in the direction of the Mission and its personnel, nor 
interfere in the administration.42
In sum, certain Missions under the M.E.P. clearly felt that they would lose 
out if  the Apostolic Delegate’s suggestions were implemented. It has to be 
remembered that at this point, outside of Siam, the M.E.P. was also in charge of the 
majority of the Missions in Southeast Asia. In some cases, such as Vietnam, these 
Missions were hard-won with the blood of martyrs. Furthermore, should the order 
allow another order access to its territory, the existing financial and political benefits 
would have to be divided. Nevertheless, there is no record that Vicar-Apostolic 
Perros held similar misgivings. Indeed, the Vicar-Apostolic’s actions indicate that 
practical considerations and the suggestion of the Apostolic Delegate had prevailed 
over the misgivings over the alleged violation of M.E.P. regulations and Canon Law.
Vicar-Apostolic Perros proposed to split the Mission of Siam further into 
three parts: Chiang Mai, Bangkok, and Ratchaburi-Chumpon,43 with Ratchaburi- 
Chumpon the first to be created. In accordance with Maximum Ilhtd, a religious 
order that was noticeably non-French was sought to administer the new Ratchaburi
42 B .A .A ., M.E.P. Circular, Paris, 5 October 1926, 90/1/9.
4j The northeast was already being administered by the Mission o f Laos, and the south was 
technically under the jurisdiction o f  the Missions o f  Malacca and Western Burma, although the 
absence o f  parishes in the area during this period meant that authority was not exercised.
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Mission. By 1926, the Mission of Siam and the Italian Salesian Society (also known 
as the Salesians o f Don Bosco, or the Society of St. Francis de Sales) had come to an 
agreement, although the new Mission in Ratchaburi would not be formally set up 
until June 1930. This religious order was young, having been founded by Don John 
Bosco in Italy and gaining Papal approval only in the late nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, by 1911 the order had expanded worldwide, with communities in 
China, Tunisia, South Africa, and the United States. Considering the work of the 
founder of the Salesians in the field of education44 and the development of the young, 
the order seemed an appropriate choice for the Mission of Siam. The key role of 
education for the Catholic Church in Siam in effecting improvements in its social 
standing, establishing valuable social connections, and encouraging conversion has 
been discussed, and its choice of the Salesians suggests that the Mission of Siam 
wanted the Salesians to take the same approach.
It is also likely that the Vicar-Apostolic took the ethnic make-up of the 
parishioners into account when making his decision. Many of the parishioners in the 
Ratchaburi parishes were ethnic Chinese, mainly from the modem day Chinese 
provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi. As Vicar-Apostolic Perros wrote 
flatteringly to a Chinese Salesian abbot in 1933:
Flere, the Chinese are numerous, they dominate nearly all commercial 
activities, the majority of the rice mills, and orchards while the Siamese 
dedicate themselves to the cultivation of rice. The Chinese are the most 
active (I might also add intelligent) and enterprising part of the population, 
and most of our converts come from among them. In many of the Churches, 
the minishy is conducted in Chinese: prayers, teachings, catechism, 
confessions, etc. either in the Teochiu or Hakka dialects.45
44 One o f  Don B osco's first works was the foundation o f a school in Valdocco near Turin.
43 B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Yang Kiaping, Abbot o f  Our Lady o f  Consolation Monastery,
Beijing, 8 March 1933, 90/5/2.
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Prior to their arrival in Siam, the Salesians had a base in southern China in 
Swatow,46 and some of the first priests of the order in Siam came from another of the 
order’s bases in Macao. The Salesians were thus more than adequately prepared to 
look after the ethnic Chinese parishioners.47 The agreement between the Mission of 
Siam and the Salesians, signed on 6 December 1926, relieved the Mission of its 
authority over the existing parishes in nine areas (Bangchang, Mottanoi, Maekhlong, 
Wat Phleng, Donkrabuang, Banpong, Bangtan, Tha Wa, and Tha Muang), as well as 
future parishes in the west and southwest of Siam. The only exception was the 
seminary at Bangchang, which was to remain under the Mission of Siam until a new 
seminary could be established.48 Nevertheless, the land value of these parishes alone 
was worth around 497,500 baht. Thus, even if a 4,400 baht debt in Donkrabuang 
was factored in, the Salesians appeared to have sufficient means to operate and 
expand their Mission.
By themselves, the reforms still could not make up for the shortfall in the 
number of clergy in the territories administered by the Mission of Siam, as shown by 
the Tha Kwien case, which occurred after the arrival of the Salesians. However, in 
Ratchaburi itself, the reforms heralded the arrival of an unprecedented number of 
missionaries. Between 1927 and 1930, a total of 11 priests, 31 seminarians, and 10 
brothers arrived to take up their ministries in the new Mission.40 The majority were 
Italians and, despite their unity in Catholicism, the priests and their methods would 
soon distinguish them from their French counterparts, much to the latter’s chagrin.
46 Shantou in present day Guangdong province, China.
47 The same considerations may also have been made when authority over the northeast, populated 
mainly by ethnic Laotians, was ceded to the Mission o f  Laos.
48 This was to be the seminary at Sri Racha, which was closed down during the Pacific War, but has 
since reopened and continues to operate today.
49 R. Costet, Siam-Laos: H istoire de la Mission, p. 417.
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Integration and Conflict
All for God and fo r  His Gloiy. In whatever you do, think o f the Glory o f  God as
your main goal.
St. John Bosco
As mentioned, the Salesians’ record in education and youth development suggested 
that the order would integrate well into the structures and precedents established by 
the M.E.P. missionaries. For the most part, the documents indicate that the Salesians 
were capable of adapting to the challenges of the new Mission and were largely 
successful in their work, although not to the extent seen in Bangkok or Chiang Mai. 
During this period, Ratchaburi did not have a ‘flagship’ school equivalent to 
Bangkok’s Assumption College, St. Gabriel’s 01* the Mater Dei Institute or Chiang 
Mai’s Montfort school, although it continued to maintain the existing parish schools. 
Furthermore, there is a notable absence of conflict with the local authorities in the 
correspondence, suggesting that the Salesians were successful at integrating into 
local society. Indeed, Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti o f Ratchaburi was happy with the 
order’s integration and was enthusiastic at the prospect of continuing his work in 
Siam, writing in 1934:
The dear people o f Siam and the government have embraced the work of the 
Salesians with sympathy and benevolence. These are blessings of the Lord. 
We have no other desire than to love and to serve the Nation that has 
accommodated us, that is Siam. Chaiyol50
At the same time, given the similarities of their focus, it could be argued that 
the Salesians were potential competitors to the French establishment in the Mission 
of Siam. Plowever at this stage there is no evidence that the Vicar-Apostolic of 
Bangkok saw them as such. On the contrary, the documents suggest that Vicar-
50 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti to Kiam Sun, 8 October 1934, 44/4/23.
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Apostolic Perros’s view regarding the Salesians remained positive, although it would 
undergo a great change following the events of the 1940s. Nevertheless, at this stage, 
the inter-clerical friction between the two Missions did not arise from competition. 
Instead, it was caused mainly by mutual mistrust between the Salesians and the 
established priests. For example, one priest in Naklion Prathom complained to 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros in February 1929 that he was being unfairly accused by a 
Salesian priest o f exchanging a piece of land for another that was not of the same 
value, as well as for taking a “beautiful” chalice from one o f the parishes, despite the 
fact that both the accuser and the accused had never seen this “beautiful” chalice for 
themselves.51
In addition, even if  the Salesians attracted fewer complaints than priests in 
other regions, the majority of these complaints were focused on property matters.
The focus on property arguably originated from the order’s lack of liquid assets. 
Superficially, substantial assets had been bequeathed to the Salesians upon the 
division of the Mission but most was tied up in fixed assets, such as land and 
buildings. Thus it was necessary that the Ratchaburi Mission convert some of these 
fixed assets into cash for the smooth running of the Mission. However, the process 
was fraught with difficulties since sales of fixed assets inevitably led to evictions and 
other uncomfortable disruption. Some of the difficulties could have been 
ameliorated through formal contracts. The problem was that, in some parishes, 
binding contracts had not been understood and/or signed by tenants, which 
inevitably caused problems when the Church wanted to use the land for other 
purposes. The parish of Wat Phleng was a case in point, where the Salesian’s pursuit 
of liquidity and the absence of contractual understanding led to a potentially
51 B.A.A., Parish priest o f  Nonghin, Nakhon Prathom to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 3 February 1929, 
39/1/16.
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explosive rift that was repaired only after pressure from, not one, but two M.E.P. 
Vicars-Apostolic.
The parish of Wat Phleng was one of the existing parishes that was 
transferred to the Salesians. However, tensions increased in early 1932 when abuses 
by the parish priests went unnoticed by the local Salesian leadership, despite 
numerous petitions. In the face of inaction, the desperate local parishioners 
submitted a petition to Mgr. Isidore Dumortier, the Vicar-Apostolic of Saigon,52 after 
having closed down their church in protest. Significantly, Dumortier did not belong 
to the Salesian Society but was, like Vicar-Apostolic Perros, a member of the M.E.P. 
Not that this helped the case at all, since Saigon merely referred the case back to 
Bangkok.
The letter is significant because it showed the extent of distrust that the 
parishioners had for the local leadership (both Salesian and M.E.P.) and their ability 
to address the parish’s concerns. By bypassing his authority, the parishioners felt 
that Vicar-Apostolic Perros was unwilling or unable to act when it came to the 
Salesians. At the same time, they lacked confidence in Mgr. Pasotti’s sense of 
justice, branding his actions up to that point “a disappointment”. The complaints 
centred on the Salesians’ “obsession” with managing parish property rather than 
attending to matters of the soul. According to the petition, since the time the 
Salesians had taken charge of the parish, “not one soul has been brought to the 
knowledge of God”. It was clear to the parishioners why this was the case:
The only thing that concerns them is money and, failing that, the expulsion of 
parishioners from Church land that the parishioners had held and cultivated 
since the time of their grandparents.
52 In the Apostolic Vicariate o f  Occidental Cochinchina.
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The parishioners’ claims with regard to their forbears and Church lands 
suggest that, in this case, the Mission and its tenants had very different 
understandings of the status of the Church lands. The Mission clearly saw that it 
was within its rights to do anything with the land, as long as it fulfilled its 
contractual obligations (if any), while its tenants saw that the land had been given to 
the Mission to provide a livelihood for local parishioners, and that it should not be 
sold, especially if  the sale would lead to the eviction of Catholics. More specifically, 
the parishioners blamed the incumbent parish priest for the deteriorating situation:
A great number of the faithful at Wat Phleng have been lost because of Fr. 
Martin (the parish priest o f Wat Phleng), who never reflects before he 
commences his hunts.53 Later, when he recognises his errors, it is too late, 
the evil is done, but he claims that he had advised the evictees. An example 
of one o f his victims was Nang Lek, who was chased out and with her went 
six or seven of the faithful.
Therefore, having reached the limit of their tolerance, the parishioners 
decided to close down their church. Notably they claimed that this action “does not 
signify a rebellion or a desecration of sacred things or the saints that we venerate, but 
it is solely to prevent new scandals that have affected the pagans and the children, 
leading them to hold negative opinions against the Christian religion and contempt 
of the holy name of God”. Discontent at this stage is thus still couched in a purely 
religious context. However, the petition also stated that “the local authorities were 
aware of the state of affairs and are impatiently awaiting the sanction of the Catholic 
Church”.*4 It is unclear from the letter whether the authorities were waiting to act 
against the priest or the striking parishioners. Regardless, any intervention by the
That is, evictions.
54 B.A.A., Parish Petition to Mgr. Dumortier, Vicar-Apostolic o f Saigon, 16 March 1932, 42/1/18.
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local authorities in the matter would have concerned the Church authorities and 
spurred them to pre-empt such an embarrassing interference.
In the end, Vicar-Apostolic Perros had to press for a solution to the crisis, 
suggesting none-too-subtly to his Ratchabnri counterpart that “Easter was a good 
occasion to restore peace” and that it would be best if a priest that spoke Siamese 
was sent to celebrate Mass at Wat Phleng.55 While at pains to stress that his ministry 
had not been idle in trying to find a solution, it appears that the prodding from 
Bangkok (and possibly from Saigon as well) was the key to getting Superior Pasotti 
to appoint a new parish priest to Wat Phleng. The documents do not indicate 
whether the new priest was successful in solving the problems left by his 
predecessors, but the absence of further complaints from Wat Phleng suggests that 
he was successful, at least in not antagonising the parishioners further. Nevertheless, 
the entire episode is indicative of the problems that attended the division of the 
Mission during this period, that is, the need for the Mission of Siam still to intervene 
or mediate the internal affairs of an apparently independent Mission.
By 1939, the once unified Mission of Siam found itself split into three and, 
potentially, four parts, given the plans for Chiang Mai. Ratchaburi, the latest of the 
divisions, was on the whole remarkably trouble-free. The new arrivals rapidly 
integrated into local society, even if their actions caused minor conflicts between 
clerics from different religious orders as well as parishioners. Nevertheless the 
complaints from existing priests during this period were tempered by the fact that the 
Salesians had been introduced into an area that was not high on the M.E.P.’s 
priorities. Throughout this period, the M.E.P.’s expansion efforts were focused more
55 B .A .A ., Report from Vicar-Apostolic to Mgr. Dreyer, Apostolic Delegate, 1 April 1932,42/1/19.
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on the north, with its competing Protestant missionaries, rather than the west or the 
south. Thus the risk of inter-order ‘competition’ was minimal.
Yet the separation of the two Missions was also a cause of confusion, some 
of which proved to be useful during the first half of the Second World War, in light 
of the fact that much of the anti-Catholic sentiment was couched in anti-French 
rhetoric. The extent of the confusion can be seen in a Siamese newspaper article 
which implied that the Mission was undergoing a schism rather than a purely 
administrative division. The article stated that the Propaganda Fide had instructed 
the Mission of Siam to divide into two, one governed “purely by Italians” that would 
“report directly to the Bishop of Rome” and the other “mixed”, and would continue 
to be under Vicar-Apostolic Perros’s direction.56 In actual fact, both remained 
directly answerable to the Pope. With regard to the Siamese state, its official 
recognition of the new Mission and its rights came only in January 1933. The late 
recognition came about not because of any antipathy on the part o f the constitutional 
government (which, in the event, extended the same rights held by the Mission of 
Siam to the Mission of Ratchaburi)37 but mainly due to the late submission of the 
request, as well as the political turmoil surrounding the 1932 revolution and its 
aftermath.
Nevertheless, judging from its actions in the 1940s, the Thai government 
understood the division to be more than just an administrative reorganisation.
Indeed, this perception would have been encouraged by the presence of the Italian 
leadership that differed from the more familiar French leaders who had been the 
public face of the Missions of Siam and Laos for several centuries, as well as the 
noticeable lack of antagonism from the Salesians. Even if the haphazard menage of
36 B.A .A ., The Roman Catholics to Divide into Two, August 1930,44/4/5.
37 B.A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Superior o f  M.E.P., 15 January 1933, 44/4/16.
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the division still required intervention from Bangkok, the interventions were made in 
a purely internal manner, with no involvement of either the local or central 
government. However, as will be seen, the northeast, that had been divided much 
earlier from the Mission of Siam would present a very different, and more troubling, 
picture.
Conclusion
In conclusion it can be seen that even at this early stage, the Italian identity o f this 
area was already so distinctive that the authorities and the media were already 
treating the new community as a separate entity from the old French Mission that 
was based in Bangkok. This outcome was precisely what the papal encyclical, 
Maximum M ud , intended. The identity of a part of the Mission was now 
distinguishable from the French, who had long dominated missionary efforts in the 
country in the preceding centuries. After the entry of the Italian Salesians, 
missionary efforts in Siam therefore could no longer be termed as exclusively 
‘French’.
Nevertheless, the division did not occur without difficulties. Some problems 
that should have been localised still required the intervention of the Mission of Siam 
to solve. In the case of the west, the problems that occurred during this period could 
arguably be categorised as teething problems. In contrast, as Chapter IV will 
illustrate, the situation of the Mission in the northeast would reveal fundamental 
flaws in this system of arbitrarily dividing missionary jurisdictions, especially when 
these divisions did not conform to national borders.
Externally, the new Mission did not encounter any serious trouble. However, 
like in the east, internally there were conflicts among the clergy and between the
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clergy and the Catholic communities they served. That much of these disputes were 
about property issues illustrate how Mission property could easily form the centre of 
local disputes and conflicts, even in peaceful times. It was thus unsurprising that in 
more economically and politically turbulent times the Missions’ properties became 
instigators of conflicts.
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The North
So success is assuredC hiang Mai cannot but become a prosperous mission.
Mission Report on Chiang Mai, 21 July, 1931
Since their arrival in Siam during the reign of King Narai in the seventeenth century, 
French missionaries had put themselves at the forefront of missionary activities. 
While it is true that the Portuguese arrived in Siam first and technically had 
jurisdiction over the area under the Treaty of Tordesillas, by the 1660s, the 
Portuguese had long ceased to be a force for significant economic and missionary 
activities in Siam. Even so, the remaining Portuguese priests belonging to the Goan 
chapters of the Dominicans and Jesuits continued to resist the de facto French 
supremacy.58 Notwithstanding the legalistic quibbles of the Portuguese faction, it 
can be argued that during their centuries o f activity in Siam, French missionaries 
encountered little in terms of real competition from other Catholic orders and 
Christian denominations for converts.
However, just as the French missionaries had managed to re-establish 
themselves in Bangkok, competition arrived in force in the form of Protestant 
missionaries from various denominations and countries. The first of these that came 
to the notice of Mission authorities was Karl Giitzlaff, a German doctor, and Jacob 
Tomlin, an Englishman, who were sent to Siam by the London Missionaiy Society 
via Singapore in 1828. According to the Vicar-Apostolic of Bangkok at the time 
(Mgr. Esprit Marie Florens, 1811-34), the two had caused quite a stir by 1929:
We have here a biblist and a doctor of medicine, whom they say is German. 
They have been giving out a great number of books to the Chinese. One 
suspects that the number of conversions is being counted by the number of
38 D. van der Cruysse, Siam and the West, pp. 159-63.
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books that have been distributed. I have seen with my eyes that this is 
without a doubt impossible [i.e. that a person’s acceptance of the Protestant 
missionaries’ books meant a conversion]. The good books have been used to 
make cones for the sweets that the Chinese sell to the public.
The Vicar-Apostolic noted that the king was almost inclined to expel these 
unfamiliar missionaries, but was persuaded to leave them alone.59 The two 
European missionaries were followed by their mainly American counterparts; the 
Baptists arrived in 1833, the missionaries of the American Board of Commissioners 
for Foreign Missions in the following year,60 the Presbyterians in 1840, and the 
missionaries of the American Missionary Association in 1851.61 In their work, the 
Protestants encountered problems and experiences similar to the Catholic 
missionaries. For example, the first convert of the Presbyterians in Siam was a 
Chinese in 1849, while they managed to obtain their first Siamese convert only in 
1860 -  twenty years after their arrival.62
The approach that the Protestant missionaries took in the face of the failure to 
effect mass conversion was also similar to that taken by the Catholic missionaries: 
they devoted themselves to the provision of healthcare and education. Thus, the 
similarity in approach placed the newcomers in direct competition with the 
established Catholic missionaries. However, since the Catholic position was already 
well-entrenclied in Bangkok, there was little need for the Catholic Mission to fear
59 R. Costet, Siam-Laos: Histoire de la Mission, p. 206.
60 Dr. Dan Beach Bradley was initially affiliated with this group when he first arrived in Bangkok in 
1835. By January 1848 he became associated with the American Missionary Association. Dr. 
Bradley’s missionary efforts were not effective in producing conversions and his legacy lie more in 
the fields o f  medicine and printing. In the former field, he was the first to introduce smallpox 
vaccination to Siam in 1838, while in the latter area he was the founder o f  Siam’s first newspaper, the 
Bangkok R ecorder  in 1844, an almanac, the Bangkok Calendar from 1859, and the printer o f  Siam’s 
first printed book in Siamese in 1835, whose subject was the Ten Commandments. See Sinlapachai 
Chanchaloem, Mo Bradlay kab K nm g Siam  [Doctor Bradley and Siam] (Chulalongkom University, 
Bangkok, 1994), pp. 83-88 and Sukanya Sudbanthat, M o Bradlay kab karn nangsuephim  haeng 
Krung Siam  [Doctor Bradley and the Newspapers o f  Siam] (Matichon, Bangkok, 1994), pp. 21, 46-51.
61 R. Costet, Siam-Laos: Histoire de la Mission, p. 352.
62 R. Costet, Siam-Laos: Histoire de la Mission, p. 353.
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competition there. The primary concern in the capital was that some of the more 
radical Protestants might provoke an official backlash against all Christian 
denominations by their aggressive methods but, in the end, this fear did not come to 
pass because the mainstream Protestant denominations became as adept as the 
Catholics at reading and responding to the sensitivities of Siamese society.
However, the position of Catholicism was different in the north of Siam. 
Unlike Bangkok, the Mission of Siam had no established presence there prior to the 
arrival of the Protestants. More importantly, it was one of the Protestant posts 
outside Bangkok that met with some semblance of success, having established itself 
in Chiang Mai in 1868 and later expanded to neighbouring provinces such as 
Lampang (1880), Lamphun (1891), and Phrae (1893). The Protestant missionaries 
o f the Chiang Mai post had first distinguished themselves through the distribution of 
quinine, used for the treatment of malaria, but later developed to provide educational 
services as well as a more formal healthcare system in the form of a hospital by 1901. 
Thus, when the Mission of Siam decided to expand its activities to the north in the 
1930s, they found not virgin territory, as in the past, but a well-established Protestant 
presence that was already conducting similar activities to the Catholic missions 
elsewhere in the country.
Establishing a Presence
Among the native Protestants, who compose a good part o f the population, there is 
at present a veiy decided movement towards Catholicism.
Vicar-Apostolic Perros, July 1933
The Mission was not totally unaware of the developments in the north and had 
known of the expansion of the Protestant missions in that area. The Mission had
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sent two priests to the area to ascertain the situation in 1843, but nothing concrete 
came of this enterprise. In addition, the limited financial and personnel resources of 
the Church had been used up in the establishment of the Mission of Laos in the late 
nineteenth century. Thus, it was only during the ministry of Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 
beginning in 1909, that the plan for a post in northern Siam returned to the attention 
of the Mission and, once again, became financially feasible.
The first real sign of the Mission’s intention to expand to the north during 
this period was the sending of two priests to Chiang Mai to reconnoitre the area 
again in 1914. Following their positive report, some land was brought along the 
river in Chiang Mai, but further plans were suspended at the outbreak of the First 
World War when the Vicar-Apostolic, along with a number of other French priests, 
was recalled to France. The conclusion of the First World War did not guarantee the 
continuation of the scheme for Chiang Mai. Indeed, efforts were still hampered by 
the lack of personnel and financial resources and it was only in 1930, ironically in 
the midst of a global economic depression, that the first real effort was made to 
establish a Catholic presence in Chiang Mai.
The pre-existence o f hospitals and schools built and run according to a 
European model in the area meant that the Mission could not afford to take the 
standard approach of establishing a chapel, a small parish school, and possibly a few 
other facilities, since these would not stand out from the competition. The Mission 
clearly required something more outstanding, and was more than willing to seek 
loans and run up deficits and even personal debts in pursuit of this goal. For 
example, the Vicar-Apostolic would contract a personal debt of 12,500 baht in order 
to buy land and two large houses in Chiang Mai, one for the use of a priest and the
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other to be used as a religious house for indigenous nuns or priests/’3 In addition, 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros was able to secure an interest-free loan for 200,000 baht from 
the M.E.P. in November 1931 for the purpose of establishing a college in Chiang 
Mai.64 The College was to be Montfort College, another distinguished Catholic 
educational institution that would survive into the twenty-first century.65
On the personnel front, the Vicar-Apostolic approached ‘safe’ religious 
orders that already had a record of success in Bangkok in running educational 
institutions, such as the Brothers of St. Gabriel and the Ursulines. The Ursulines had 
a further advantage in having their own financial resources, having been able to 
secure 6,000 pounds sterling from the order’s head office in Rome for the 
establishment of the Regina Coeli girls’ school in Chiang Mai, which opened its 
doors in 1932.66 Matters were not so simple with regard to the Brothers of St. 
Gabriel, with the Director of the new boys’ college complaining about the 
difficulties encountered while operating in such a remote region. Nevertheless, 
following their first year o f operation the two schools had acquired just over 200 
pupils between them.67 Incomplete records suggest that the schools experienced a 
slow but constant growth throughout the 1930s. By the end of the decade, Montfort 
School had increased the number of pupils to 178 from its original figure of 103,68 
while the number of pupils in Regina Coeli had increased to 138 from its original 
111 by 1935.69
63 B.A.A., Report, 21 July 1931, 37/2/13.
64 B.A.A., From Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Director Principal o f  Montfort College, 10 November 1931, 
37/2/14.
^  The most controversial alumni from this school being Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime 
minister o f  Thailand from 2001-2006.
66 B.A.A., Report, 21 July 1931, 37/2/13.
67 B.A.A., Montfort School Report, 1 April 1933, 77/1/6 and B .A .A ., Regina Coeli School Report, 1 
April 1933, 81/3/21.
68 B.A.A., Montfort School Report, 12 September 1938, 77/1/22.
69 B.A.A., Regina Coeli School Report, April 1935, 81/3/46.
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The Bangkok schools’ network also had a role in the schools’ success, as a 
1931 report noted:
I do not exaggerate when I say that the College of the Brothers and the 
Institute of the Ursulines are assured of success. In Chiang Mai, there is a 
great number of former students of the Brothers of St. Gabriel who have 
promised us their children, not to mention the others who, like them, 
appreciate the instruction and education given by the Brothers and Sisters.70
Thus, after only two years of commencing operations in the north, the 
Catholic presence was growing fast, at least in terms of educational provision. 
However, in its healthcare provisions, it still lacked the resources to set up a hospital 
to rival that already established by the Protestants, but the Vicar-Apostolic was 
actively looking for the remedy. Indeed, the provision of healthcare became an 
urgent matter as the Catholic presence and influence began to grow at the expense of 
the Protestants. The Protestants’ attitude towards Catholic expansion is indicated in 
a letter in which the Vicar-Apostolic requested the involvement of the Society of 
Catholic Medical Missionaries, a missionary order that specialised in medical care, 
based in the United States:
There is McCormick Hospital71 up there but this is in the hands of the 
American Presbyterian Missionaries who are becoming more and more 
aggressive and even bitter in their propaganda. Among the native Protestants, 
who compose a good part of the population, there is at present a very decided 
movement towards Catholicism.72
70 B.A.A., Report, 21 July, 1931, 37/2/13.
71 McCormick Hospital was where Prince Mahidol (1892-1929), father o f  Kings Ananda Mahidol and 
Bhumibol Adulyadej, worked following his return from Harvard University in 1928, when his 
princely status precluded the grant o f  an internship at the state Siriraj Hospital, There he was known 
to patients as “Mho Chao Fa” (the Doctor Prince). After three weeks working in the hospital, he 
returned to Bangkok for the funeral o f  an uncle. However, his health (which had never been robust) 
deteriorated thereafter and he never returned to Chiang Mai. He died the following year on 24 
September 1929.
72 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Dr. Anna Dengel, 13 July 1933, 53/3/19.
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Notwithstanding the rivalry with the American Presbyterians, in the 
following years, the Mission’s activities would continue its expansion to Wieng 
Papao in Chiang Rai and Phitsanulok. But it was the institutions in Chiang Mai that 
would continue to flourish and become well-known across the country.
The nature and scale of the financial and personnel resources the Mission was 
willing to expend on the north suggests that there was a conscious effort to replicate 
the successes of Bangkok, despite the global economic depression. The importance 
of the lack of resources in delaying the founding of the northern mission stations and 
the expenditure of money and effort in the face of the difficult economic situation 
raises some questions. Why did the Church suddenly feel the need for the frenetic 
burst of activity in the north? Part of the answer lies in the status of Chiang Mai as 
the second largest city in Siam, as well as its strategic location as a base for 
launching future missionary efforts into northern Burma and Laos or southern China. 
Indeed there were several expeditions, including one where the future Blessed 
Nicolas Kitbamrung, was sent into northern Burma to assess the viability of the plan. 
Furthermore, the Mission of Siam had held a longstanding ambition to expand there. 
But surely, the most important factor behind the Mission’s efforts was the prior 
dominance of the Protestants in the area, a dominance that the Catholic Mission felt 
they had to urgently balance. While from the conventional viewpoint, the Protestant 
presence posed a challenge to Catholic efforts in the area, in fact it inadvertently 
assisted the Catholics’ conversion efforts through the introduction o f basic Christian 
concepts to the local populace. Thus, unlike other regions where Catholic teachings 
had to be explained with reference to Buddhist concepts, the missionaries in Chiang 
Mai could readily build on the foundations prepared by the Protestants.
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The Protestant Challenge
I ’m heartily sick o f  hying to do good among persons o f  high rank in Siam. My 
business it seems to me is properly with the poor and the helpless.
Dr. Dan Beach Bradley, 1837
What really distinguishes the documents of the northern parishes from all the others 
was their commentary on the Protestant presence and activities there. Although 
Bangkok also had a notable and successful Protestant presence, their activities hardly 
attracted the comment of the Catholic missionaries there. On the other hand, neither 
is there evidence that the Bangkok Protestants expressed any bitter attitude towards 
the Catholic Mission, unlike those in the north. The documents indicate that there 
were three reasons for the cold relationship between the northern mission stations 
and the local Protestants. The first was the ‘poaching’ of converts. The second 
reason was the two sides’ treatment of the others’ “apostates”. The final reason was 
the Catholic fear of the Protestants gaining too much influence through their 
provision of healthcare and especially education, the very same methods used by the 
Catholics to expand their social influence.
The ‘poaching’ of converts from each other was the major contentious issue 
between the Catholic and Protestant missionaries. For the Catholics, recent 
Protestant converts were far easier to convert than Buddhists. As Fr. Mirabel noted 
on his visit to a village outside Chiang Mai in March 1933 prior to an expedition to 
northern Burma:
The instruction of the latter group [i.e. Buddhists] requires a little more time 
since they are totally ignorant of the Catholic doctrine. It’s not the same for 
the Protestants, with whom we only have to correct and complete their 
understanding of the doctrine.73
73 B.A.A., Fr. Mirabel to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 31 March 1933, 37/3/5.
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It did not help relations when these conversions were made en masse, where 
the local social dynamic determined that if the leader of the village converted, 
everyone in his immediate (and wide) social group would follow suit and cut all 
contact with their former pastors. This was the case with the villagers visited by Fr. 
Mirabel. What is equally interesting in this case is that the Catholics had, at that 
time, veiy little to offer to the converts in terms of material goods, in contrast to the 
Protestants who already had a well-established infrastructure for education and 
healthcare. No school had been built in the area, for the letter made a request for one 
to be built, since the adjoining villages also did not have a school. The nearest 
school was located three kilometres away. Not only was the school a state school, 
which had limited willingness and capacity to cater for the needs and sensibilities of 
Christians (Catholic or Protestant) but the school admitted children only from the 
age of 11 to 14.74
Naturally, the ease with which the Catholics made headway in the area made 
the Protestants uneasy and drove some to actively resent the Mission and its new 
followers. Indeed, Vicar-Apostolic Perros saw the Protestants' standing monopoly 
on the provision of healthcare in Chiang Mai as a Sword of Damocles hanging over 
the heads of the Catholic converts and converts-to-be, especially if they had a past 
relationship with the Protestants:
There would be many more converts were the people not held back by the 
thought of what might happen if they become ill. It would be practically 
impossible for them to return to the Protestants for help; Bangkok is over 400 
miles away and there is not a Catholic doctor in Siam [sic].75
74 B.A.A., Fr. Mirabel to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 31 March 1933, 37/3/5.
13 B .A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Dr. Anna Dengel, 13 July 1933, 53/3/19.
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Although there is no evidence to suggest that the Protestants turned away 
patients from their facilities just because of their religious background or history, the 
point was that the fears of the Catholics and their converts were sincerely felt. 
Equally, the Protestants had their fears and were not afraid to address them directly 
to the Catholic Mission, as one Dr. Kneedler did in 1933:
Speaking as a Protestant, I know that there are beliefs which the Roman 
Catholic Church considers essential, which I could never accept. But it 
would be far from me to want to confuse the mind of a Catholic by tiying to 
convert him to Protestantism... Now when I ’m giving my life in Christian 
service in a non-Christian land, it makes me sick at heart to see the un­
christian way in which my fellow-Christians of the Catholic Mission are 
acting towards the still weak Protestant Christian Church of this district.76
While the weakness o f the Protestant position in Chiang Mai as portrayed by 
Dr. Kneedler was obviously an exaggeration, the same cannot be said about the 
Protestant position in Siam in general, which did indeed remain weak. Despite early 
attempts to set up posts in other provinces, most of these met with failure, with the 
notable exception of Chiang Mai. In effect, Chiang Mai was vital to the Protestants 
as one of their few viable footholds outside Bangkok. However, the arrival of the 
Catholics threatened to undermine what was perceived to be a precarious position.
At the same time, the Mission was far from alone in attempting to ‘poach’ for 
converts. Protestants were equally guilty of attempting to do so, as can be seen from 
a report by a parish priest regarding a visit by a Protestant pastor to his village:
The leader of the Protestants has come here to convert people to Christianity. 
He has come here many times but has been unable to convince anyone; 
indeed their faith has become stronger. Last Sunday he came with some gifts, 
but nobody would receive them apart from the people at the house where he 
was staying.77
76 B.A .A ., Dr. W. Harding Kneedler to Mission o f  Chiang Mai, April 1933, 37/3/9.
77 B.A.A ., Fr. Vincent to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 2 July 1932, 37/2/26.
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The villagers’ ‘cold-shoulder’ treatment of the visiting pastor would not have 
helped ecumenical relations,78 and would have exacerbated fears among Protestants 
that the Catholic Mission was using its new-found influence in the area to undermine 
them. It is also doubtful whether the American Presbyterians would have found 
much comfort in the Mission’s trite but true lecture on the topic of freedom of 
conscience:
I came to Chiang Mai to convert the pagans, not the Protestants. But when a 
Protestant came to me to inquire about the Truths of the Catholic Faith, I 
considered my duty to give him the desired information... It is my opinion, 
Doctor Kneedler, and yours also, I think, that each one enjoys freedom of 
conscience, and it seems to me that when members of the Protestant Christian 
Church of this district came to inquire about our religion, they did nothing 
more than make use of the liberty we all enjoy. No one, therefore, can 
reproach them their conduct, nor can anyone reproach us for having received 
them.79
Although what was ostensibly at stake throughout this bitter conflict was the 
responsibility for the souls of the inhabitants of the district, it can be argued that both 
denominations were actually fighting for influence. From their longer experience of 
Siam, it was clear to the Mission of Siam that the only method by which the Mission 
could acquire influence to protect its interests was to demonstrate its social utility in 
promoting and providing education and healthcare. As already seen, this approach 
had proved to be highly successf.il in Bangkok. Thus, in view of the Protestant 
activities in the north, which followed the same approach, it is not surprising to find 
the Mission concerned at the spread of Protestant influence.
Equally, even though the Mission of Siam was successful in making 
connections in high society and could exert some influence, these efforts were
78 Ecumenical (inter-church or inter-religious) relations and dialogue were not a high priority in 
Catholicism until the conclusion o f  the Second Vatican Council in 1965.
79 B.A.A., Chiang Mai mission station to Dr. W. Harding Kneedler, 19 April 1933, 37/3/8.
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restricted to very specific spheres. Mainly, the interventions were in the realms of 
education, guaranteeing religious freedom, and the rights and privileges of the 
Church and its clergy (for example, exemption from conscription and certain taxes 
where most of these privileges were already confirmed for Buddhist monks). In 
many of these cases, the Mission of Siam and the central government had already 
negotiated a solution: but this solution was not being applied to the local clergy or by 
the local authorities, thus requiring intervention by the centre. Furthermore, even 
when this influence was reinforced with intervention from the French diplomatic 
representatives in Siam, the Church did not always obtain what it asked for, as will 
be seen in the northeast.
Notably, there is no evidence to suggest that the Mission used its influence to 
sabotage the growth of the Protestant churches in Siam. Neither is there evidence 
that the Protestants would use their influence to undermine the activities of the 
Catholics in Chiang Mai. However, it is clear that both sides distrusted each other, 
accusing each other of proselytising and of ‘poaching’ new converts. Thus, from the 
Mission’s perspective, the Protestant position in the north had to be challenged, if 
only so that future projects of the Mission in the area would not have to rely on the 
Protestants’ good-will to succeed.
The capitalist twist to this situation was that the locals were the clear winners 
in the conflict and competition between the two denominations. Whereas converts 
or “apostates” of the two groups might be restricted by their conscience or face, the 
Buddhists were not constrained by the same considerations, and could pick and 
choose between the two denominations. It is possible that the Protestants were 
aware of this factor. Certainly the Catholic mission station was under no illusion
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even before the first Catholic schools were set up in Chiang Mai, as indicated in its 
initial report in 1931:
At first one may fear the competition o f the American Protestants, but 
everyone in Chiang Mai knows, and the Americans themselves know, that 
many of their students will pass between their schools and our schools 
without saying to us which school they originally came from.80
On balance, this situation seemed to favour the Catholics where, prior to their 
arrival, locals would have had a choice only between the state schools with their 
limited facilities and the European-style schools of the Protestants. With the arrival 
of the Catholics, they had another solid alternative, mainly at the expense of the 
Protestants whose monopoly on European-style education had been broken.
Mission activities in the north during this period were thus defined by the 
attempt to build a Catholic presence in the face of an established Protestant 
competitor. The unique combination of active competition, as well as the strategic 
position of Chiang Mai, convinced the Mission to fully engage in what it did best 
and most professionally in Bangkok, if only in order to balance the Protestant 
influence in the area. The Mission’s obsession in this task is indicated by the 
minimal conflict with the local authorities, in contrast to most o f the other regions. 
Where conflicts did occur, they concerned schools that had been set up in haste 
without due regard to changes in Siamese school regulations and its attendant 
paperwork (mainly to do with establishing the ownership of the schools). Even so, 
these conflicts were resolved without requiring major intervention. Some schools 
were inspected by suspicious local authorities, but they remained open.
80 B.A .A ., Report, 21 July 1931, 37/2/13.
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Unlike in most regions, there were no ‘strikes’ by the parishioners or overt 
conflict with the local authorities. Indeed the novelty of the Catholic missionaries, 
their activities, the reputation of their work in Bangkok, as well as their role in 
balancing the Protestant presence may have been welcomed by some. The only area 
where the Mission did not look so healthy was in its finances. Not surprisingly, the 
schools proved to be the largest drain on Church finances and by 1939 the Mission 
authorities had come to the realisation that the situation was not sustainable in the 
long-term, especially in the light of the overall deficit in the general budget of the 
Mission of Siam. Although two schools (one in Bo Sang and one in Chiang Dao) 
were closed in 1938 and 1939, the Mission was looking to further limit its activities 
by cutting down on the number of non-Christian pupils admitted and prioritising the 
building of new schools in areas with known Catholics. As the head of the Chiang 
Mai mission argued in 1939, there seemed to be only two solutions:
It [the deficit] has to be so, unless the Mission furnishes the necessary funds 
to continue at this pace, or finds some other means to restrict the expenditure 
in this district.81
In fact, there were two additional choices. The first, a complete withdrawal, 
was the unspoken (perhaps unthinkable) solution. The second solution, the division 
of the Mission, seemed perfect since it would allow another religious congregation to 
take over the financial and administrative burden of the Chiang Mai Mission (as the 
Salesians had done with Ratchaburi). Failing that, it could request additional 
funding from the Propaganda Fide for the new Mission. Even if  the first division of 
the Mission, that of the northeast, had not performed to expectations, the later 
division of Ratchaburi certainly had. The documents suggest that the Mission of
S1 B .A .A ., Chiang Mai Mission Financial Report, 28 February 1939, 37/4/35.
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Siam had chosen to explore the second solution and was on the verge of enacting it 
but was interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War:
The Holy See has already pointed to us the possibility of detaching the 
northern part o f the Thai kingdom to make a new Mission as soon as the 
number of Christians allowed hope of the great development. Alas! The 
current war prevents the new apostolic workers to come to our aid.82
Thus, at the outbreak of the Second World War, what occupied the thoughts 
of the Catholic missionaries in the north was how the mission should be split and run 
in the following years, and not the remote possibility of a state persecution against 
Catholicism.
Conclusion
Once again, as the Mission moved into a different area, it adapted to the local 
challenges, conditions, and circumstances. Again, the conditions in the north were 
unlike the ones the Mission had faced in the other regions: that of a dominant 
Protestant presence. The Mission’s entry into the area undoubtedly caused friction, 
although this did not seem to overly concern the Mission. Indeed, the Catholics 
were more worried about whether they would be able to sustain the momentum of 
their efforts in the face of poor financial prospects.
In gearing up to compete with the well-established Protestant presence, it was 
possible that the Mission could have utilised its Bangkok network to accelerate its 
progress in the region. However, if Vicar-Apostolic Perros did use the network it 
was not anywhere near as effective as Fr. Colombet’s earlier efforts. Whereas 
Colombet went straight to the key figures in Siamese society and quickly won their
s" B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Rev. John Scally, Director o f  the Society o f  the Propagation o f  
the Faith, New York, 24 August 1940, 55/2/39.
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support, Vicar-Apostolic Perros went instead to the religious orders for help and 
employed his own resources, including getting into personal debt. Arguably, the 
differences in approach were a reflection of the different personalities of the two 
clerics, as well as changes in political circumstances. During the period of absolute 
rule before 1932, the Mission only needed to approach a few influential princes to 
solicit aid. However, after 1932, such political power was re-distributed among 
more people. In addition, the political turbulence that continued after 1932 would 
have made a repeat of a Colombet-style campaign even more difficult.
Filially, there is an issue pertaining to identity. The entry o f the Catholic 
missionaries into the area also meant that some converts became effectively double 
converts: the first time was to Protestantism, the second time to Catholicism (or vice 
versa). There is insufficient data to evaluate the implications of a double conversion, 
but seeing that the Catholic missionaries were able to build on the spiritual 
foundations prepared by their Protestant rivals with relative ease suggests that a 
second conversion may not have been as problematic compared with the first 
conversion.
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The East
For the past ten years, I  have gradually withdrawn European missionaries from the 
area [the East], in order to encourage the local clergy> to administer all the
Catholics there.S3
- Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 1943
On the surface, there is nothing remarkable about the parishes in the eastern part of 
Siam during this period. Unlike the northeast, there were no explosive conflicts with 
the local authorities. There were no plans to divest responsibility of the region to 
another, unfamiliar entity, unlike in the west. Furthermore, unlike the north, there 
were no Protestants to contend with, and there was no drive to ‘showcase’ 
achievements in order to gain influence and thus safeguard the Mission’s social 
legitimacy, as in the capital. The picture the documents give is that of a prosperous 
and functioning provincial parish system that was running without major problems.
It is, however, precisely this lack of a problematic characteristic that makes 
the eastern parishes remarkable. The special circumstances in the other parishes had 
inevitably influenced the direction and approach of the Mission. Thus, the eastern 
parishes provide an invaluable picture of how the provincial parishes were intended 
to function, that is, without all the mitigating circumstances that reordered the 
Mission’s priorities. The region also acts as a perfect foil to the troublesome 
northeast. The two regions are similar in that they are located near the border of a 
colonial power, and one with which Siam was at war in the early 1940s. Moreover, 
following the 1893 crisis, French troops had been garrisoned in the Chantaburi 
region up to 1904.
83 B .A .A ., Informationes quod futuram Missionem de Chantabun, 15 July 1943, 35/4/8.
The region thus had a troubled political history yet, in spite of this past, the 
lack of ill-will from state agencies and the local non-Catholic communities in the 
documents suggests that both the Mission and local Siamese authorities had taken 
steps to ensure a harmonious co-existence, an approach which would pay unexpected 
dividends later.
Parishes...As They were Meant to Be
Love never says 7 have done enough
St. Marie-Eugenie de Jesus
The Catholic presence was first established in the region around 1710, thereby 
making the communities there among the oldest in the Mission of Siam. By the 
twentieth century, the area possessed altogether five major parishes: two in 
Chantaburi province (Sacred Heart and Immaculate Conception), two others in 
Chonburi province (SS. Philip and Jacob and The Holy Name of Jesus), and one in 
Paetriu (Chachoengsao province). However, the true number of Catholic 
communities in the east was significantly higher since these five parishes acted as 
the bases for the itinerant priests that served the smaller, more isolated communities 
in the area.
According to 1943 statistics, the area was home to 9,530 Catholics, spread 
across six provinces (Chantaburi, Chachoengsao, Prachinburi, Chonburi, Rayong, 
and Trat) with the majority residing in the vicinity of Chantabun (4,900) and Paetriu 
(2,070).84 Bearing in mind the effects of the persecution, the numbers were probably 
even higher in the 1930s. The outward prosperity of the Chantabun area is indicated 
in the impressive and, up to 1908, continually expanding church that served the
84 B.A.A ., Informationes quod futuvam Missionem de Chantabun, 15 July 1943, 35/4/8.
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community o f the Immaculate Conception. The church would later be designated a 
cathedral as part of a later division in the Mission during the early 1940s.
The area was equally rich spiritually. It was home to the Mission of Siam’s 
new seminary at Sri Racha that was set up following the creation of the separate 
Mission o f Ratchaburi. There was also a convent that belonged to the order of 
Amantes de la Croix de Jesus-Christ, a religious order that had a distinct eastern 
touch, not only in its spiritual approach but also in its historical origins in Vietnam. 
The latter was arguably one of the key factors behind the order’s success in the area. 
An undated list of the Catholic dignitaries in the Immaculate Conception indicates 
that all were ethnic-Vietnamese.85 Other reports indicated that, while there were 
other Christian ethnic groups in the area (Chinese and Siamese), this particular 
parish was still, in the Mission’s view, a “Vietnamese church”,S6 and the Vietnamese 
there were the oldest and most substantial among the ethnic groups in the area.87
By the time of the anti-Catholic persecution, the province had a total of 19 
primary schools and two secondary schools.88 Reflecting the communities they 
served, the schools’ curricula were eclectic and ranged widely from the basic to the 
international. For the Immaculate Conception community, two brothers of St.
Gabriel were brought in by the Mission to run the school. The Mission thus saw the 
area as significant, since the order also ran the ‘flagship’ schools in Bangkok (St. 
Gabriel) and Chiang Mai (Montfort). The two priests were tasked with giving 
instruction on the catechism and the biblical stories in both Vietnamese and Siamese,
S:> B.A.A., Liste des noms des dignitaires de l ’Eglise de l’lnnnaculee Conception a Chantabun, 
Undated, 35/5/4.
So B.A.A ., Fr. Etienne Oilier to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 27 September 1934, 35/2/60.
87 B .A.A., Informationes quod futuram Missionem de Chantabun, 15 July 1943, 35/4/8.
88 Ibid.
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and providing a basic course in Siamese language skills (speaking, reading, and 
writing), as well as basic arithmetic.89
Other communities, such as the parish of SS. Philip and Jacob in Chonburi 
also catered to the more elaborate needs of the local community, in this case the 
Chinese, who were being discriminated against by the local authorities, as the parish 
priest wrote in June 1931:
At this time there are around 20 Chinese students at our school under the 
instruction of the [Chinese teacher]. This [Chinese teacher] is Christian. The 
reason that he brought the students here is because the provincial governor 
would not allow them to set up a separate school because they did not know 
the Siamese language and could not teach it.90
The same school also responded to local demands by expanding its provision 
to include English-language teaching in the following year.91 The provincial school 
could thus teach an impressive array of languages by the early 1930s -  Siamese, 
Chinese, and English.
Provisions in Paetriu were arguably the most elaborate in the area. It was a 
centre of education during this period, hosting a teacher training school (St. Tarcisius) 
as well as the St. Paul Secondary School, which received funding from the French 
Indochinese government. The latter school was staffed by French, Spanish, and 
Siamese teachers and offered a two-tracked curriculum. One was solely conducted 
in Siamese, tuition fee being one baht per month. The second track offered a bi­
lingual curriculum, conducted in Siamese and English until students reached the 
Grade 10 (Matihayom 4) level, at which point they also started learning French. The 
tuition fee for this track was two baht per month. The school also accepted boarders
89 B.A.A ., Projet de Contrat redige par le P. Peyrical, Undated, 35/5/11.
90 B.A.A ., Fr. Alphonse to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 20 June 1931, 36/5/7.
91 B.A .A ., Fr. Alphonse to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 14 September 1932, 36/5/21.
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at a cost of 20 baht per month.92 The only factor that prevented this school from 
becoming a ‘flagship’ school of the Mission, it seems, was the fact that it was not 
located in a population centre as large or influential as Chiang Mai or Bangkok.
In addition to the schools, the Mission also ran three orphanages in the area -  
one each at Huaphai, Paetriu, and Chantabun.93 All of these educational and social 
institutions required funding as a matter of course. Even if various international 
organisations, such as Sainte Enfance (also known as L ’Enfance Missionaire) for the 
orphanages and the French Indochinese government for one school in Paetriu, were 
persuaded to contribute financially to the Mission’s work in the area, the reality was 
that some parishes were encountering financial difficulties. For example, by 1932, 
the parish priest o f SS. Philip and Jacob had contracted a debt of 3,000 baht,94 while 
new projects were being hampered by lack of funding.95
The general picture presented by the communities in this area is thus one that 
is not that different physically from Bangkok. The parishes were miming smoothly, 
albeit with severe financial constraints. The east may not have been the equal of 
Bangkok in terms of its economic or political influence, but the area’s spirituality 
arguably surpassed that of the capital parishes. The presence of the convent, the 
seminary, as well as other educational infrastructure, certainly facilitated this 
development and the area even had an alleged Marian apparition, although the priest 
who wrote the report urged people to “listen but not believe just yet”.96 Furthermore, 
the stability of the parishes in this region was encouraged by the lack of longstanding 
conflicts with the local communities and authorities, which seemed to occupy the
92 B.A.A., Regulations for St. Paul School, Undated, 75/5/52.
9j B.A.A ., Informationes quod futuram Missionem de Chantabun, 15 July 1943, 35/4/8.
94 B.A .A ., Fr. Alphonse to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 27 September 1932, 36/5/22.
93 B.A.A ., Fr. David to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 24 December 1939, 35/3/35.
96 B.A .A ., Marian Apparition at Thasala (Fr. Simon), 13 November 1937, 35/3/25.
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attention of parishes in other regions. However, it is perhaps this lack of galvanising 
external conflict that allowed some of the parish priests to indulge in various 
‘luxuries’ such as internal politics.
Trouble in Paradise
As a youth, I  prayed  ‘Give me chastity and continence, but not y e t’.
St. Augustine of Hippo, Confessiones, VIII.7
The characteristics o f parishes in the other regions covered in this chapter have often 
been defined by the local conditions and experiences. The documents speak of their 
problems and, at the same time, suggest that it was the resolution of these problems 
that was foremost in the mind of the parish priests and Mission authorities, thereby 
affecting the direction and running of the parishes concerned. In the case of the 
eastern parishes, the absence of problems with the local authorities and communities 
did not mean that they were entirely problem-free.
Among the documents that report the construction o f new schools and 
churches, there is an extraordinary amount of material about alleged and actual 
misconduct of priests in the eastern parishes. The extent of this phenomenon 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s suggests that the eastern parishes were not being as 
hard-pressed by external problems as other parishes. Given the dominance of the 
indigenous clergy in the eastern provinces, it is also possible that the allegations 
were part of the jockeying for position. From a more modem perspective, many of 
the allegations and complaints are rather trivial. For example, in 1932, the 
indigenous parish priest at Immaculate Conception church was accused of indulging 
in conduct unworthy of a Catholic priest by arranging a drama troupe performance, 
musical entertainment, and a dance on church grounds on the occasion of a feast day,
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as well as other unspecified “loose behaviour”. In certain parts of the modem day 
Catholic Church, this sort of behaviour would probably have passed without notice, 
but in the early 1930s, “it was the cause for Christians to look down on priests and 
an obstacle to their spiritual development”.97
In the following year, another indigenous priest, Fr. Boniface, was accused of 
buying and drinking moonshine, when the resident priest had forbidden the 
production of moonshine in the parish. Furthermore, it was alleged that Fr. Boniface 
“liked to frequent the houses of drunkards” and even the children were noticing that 
the priest liked to get drunk. The allegations appear to be trivial, but they become 
more serious once seen in the social context of Catholic communities living among 
Buddhists, with the fifth precept prohibiting the consumption of intoxicating 
substances. Thus, the letter asked that the priest be temporarily transferred 
elsewhere.98 The case appeared to be straightforward, but in a twist, Fr. Boniface 
had his own accusations against his fellow indigenous priests. Fr. Clement was 
accused of neglecting the Vicar-Apostolic’s instructions for him to learn Chinese, 
was “addicted to Thai newspapers and novels”, and neglected his confessional duties 
at the convent in favour of frequenting the local households. Fr. Simon, another 
indigenous priest, who had accused Fr. Boniface of misconduct in the previous day’s 
letter, was himself attacked for failing to control Fr. Clement.99
Given the timing of the letters, it was clear that there was political 
manoeuvring and that the head parish priest at Immaculate Conception Church had 
lost control over his subordinates. Eventually, Fr. Boniface was replaced by Fr. 
Norbert, another indigenous priest, in 1935. Far from settling the issue, however, the
97 B.A.A., Fr. Theophane, Clement, and Frederic to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 9 December 1932,
35/2/48.
98 B.A.A., Fr. Simon to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 24 July 1933, 35/2/51.
"  B.A.A., Fr. Boniface to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 25 July 1933, 35/2/52.
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arrival of the new priest was a cause of more trouble. Prior to his arrival, the priest 
had already been implicated in a misconduct occurring in Chantabun as well as in 
distant Chiang Mai. This time, even by modern standards, the allegations were 
scandalous. They involved improper conduct and relationships with certain nuns, 
persuading nuns to leave their vocations, and of disobeying the Vicar-Apostolic’s 
order to move to Chantaburi. In the words of the parish priest:
Your Grace wrote to me that ‘Now you should be glad since I have 
transferred Fr. Boniface from Chantabun, and have sent Fr. Norbert in his 
stead’. I can only answer with a proverb: ‘Out of the frying pan into the 
fire’.100
In reality, it was not until much later in the 1940s that Fr. Norbert was 
involved in any significant trouble.101 Nevertheless, the Catholic and non-Catholic 
communities’ attention were fixed on the priest who had a prior reputation for such 
things, and so Fr. Norbert was apparently transferred to another parish,102 since the 
correspondence failed to mention him again.
A more immediate crisis broke out in 1937 when Fr. Simon failed to publish 
a public apology for falsely accusing Fr. Frederic of misconduct, when the latter had 
already “announced eveiywhere, his victory over Fr. Simon”. The resulting conflict 
engulfed the lives of the other parish priests and opened a rift between the ethnic 
Vietnamese and the ethnic Cambodian priests, something that a report on the 
situation touched upon:
100 B.A.A., Fr. Simon to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 25 October 1935, 35/2/51.
101 In 1940, Fr. Norbert was implicated in an improper relationship with a nun [B.A .A., Fr. Simon to 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 13 July 1940, 35/3/46], although the facts are murky since the parishioners, 
the priests, and the non-Catholics were all making assumptions and accusations at that point. It was 
established that a nun had become pregnant and had left the convent, but the child’s parentage was 
never established [B.A.A., Fr. Simon to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 16 July 1940, 35/3/47],
102 B.A.A., Fr. Simon to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 30 July 1940, 35/3/49.
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As for me, I don’t see what is so reprehensible about the conduct of the 
priests at Chantabun but I do see what is reprehensible about the conduct of 
the Cambodian priests.103
In addition, the affair affected Fr. Andre, a priest in Bangkok, whose 
“simplicity and gullibility was truly extraordinary”. The report summarised the 
conflict as follows:
What I do understand is that Fr. Frederic is becoming more and more furious 
that there has been no publishing of his innocence at Chantabun by Fr. Simon, 
and that he is always looking for ways and occasions to get the upper hand.10-1
There was thus an unmistakably poisonous atmosphere between individual 
members of the clergy in the parish.
What is intriguing is that the records of these cases continued right up to 
1940, at which point there is no further mention of any scandal. Judging by the 
nature of the other regions, the congregation of the eastern parishes certainly had 
enough reason to be discontented with the conduct of their clergy, while the non- 
Catholic communities may have been equally scandalised -  had they been aware of 
the situation.
However, unlike its northeastern counterpart, much of the tensions and 
damage in the eastern parishes were internalised, since the origins and targets of the 
accusations were internal (that is, made by members of the clergy or Catholic 
community) rather than external. Indeed, there are no reports of contacts with or 
threats of intervention from the local authorities with regard to local scandals, which 
would be an indicator of a wider circle of disaffection. The exceptions were the 
occasional court case regarding land and rent disputes, but there was nothing in the
J B.A .A ., Fr. David to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 2 March 1937, 35/3/15. 
104 Ibid.
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nature of these cases or their aftermath that indicated anything remotely explosive 
and no foreign representatives were called to intervene.
What is noteworthy is that the majority of those involved in these incidents 
were indigenous rather than foreign priests. Although foreign priests were present in 
the area, their role was limited to administering schools and reporting on the 
situation as the more serious cases arose. Questions regarding the extension of the 
role of the indigenous clergy had been raised by foreign missionaries, but it was only 
in the east that a concrete effort was made to prepare the indigenous clergy for the 
formation of an indigenous Archdiocese, thereby spelling the formal end of the 
Mission of Siam. The fact that the ‘experiment’ took place in the east, with its rich 
spiritual centres and institutions that resembled those in Bangkok, suggests that 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros was serious about promoting the role o f the indigenous 
clergy. Furthermore, there was historical precedence for the move since some of the 
first priests who came to the area (Fr. Nicolas and Fr. Jacques Tchang) in the 
eighteenth century were converts from Ayutthaya, while out o f the 48 indigenous 
priests serving the Mission in 1943, 15 were from this region.10''1 The leadership of 
the Catholic Church in eastern Thailand could, therefore, be said to have a distinctly 
Asian, if  not Thai, face, unlike many o f its counterparts in Siam at the time.
However, at this stage, far from using their new-found freedom to espouse or 
support Thai nationalist concepts, the priests still demonstrated their dependence on 
the Mission authorities through their complaints against each other, and requests for 
priests from other parishes to act as impartial observers or mediators in their disputes. 
Nevertheless, the eastern project should be considered a success. In spite of the 
internal conflicts, tensions, as well as financial difficulties, the parishes were still
105 B.A .A ., Informationes quod futuram M issionem de Chantabun, 15 July 1943, 35/4/8.
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running smoothly. It was thus not surprising to see the area being designated a 
Vicariate Apostolic in 1944, the first of the mission in Siam to be completely run by 
the indigenous clergy, with the first indigenous bishop, Vicar-Apostolic James Louis 
Cheng, in charge.
Although it is debatable whether this last development would have come 
about so soon without the wartime and nationalist pressures, in the light of the 
history of the Mission, the step was inevitable. It was the Mission’s history, its 
indigenous face, and the internalised nature of the local conflicts that prevented Thai 
nationalism from inflicting catastrophic damage on the parishes in this region, as it 
did in the northeast.
Conclusion
To conclude, although there are some similarities between the conditions in the east 
and that of Bangkok, such as the provision of customised schools and a 11011- 
homogenous ethnic composition, there were also significant differences. Whereas 
the public face of the Mission in Bangkok was clearly French, the face of 
Catholicism in the east was demonstrably Asian, if not Thai.
The dominance o f the indigenous clergy in the east was the result o f the 
Mission’s intention to gradually hand over control of the Mission to the indigenous 
clergy. At this stage, this policy was implemented for pragmatic and long-standing 
ecclesiastical reasons. Indeed, the whole point of setting up a Mission in the first 
place was so that a self-sustaining indigenous hierarchy could be built so as to render 
the role of missionaries unnecessary. The establishment of the east as a testing 
ground for the abilities of the indigenous clergy was another step towards fulfilling 
this ultimate missionary objective. As Chapter VI will elaborate further, this policy
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was in line with the instructions contained in the 1909 Papal encyclical, Maximum 
llhtd , as well as certain M.E.P. encyclicals.
Thus, the Mission’s pre-1940 policy in this area did not stem from any local, 
nationalistic demands. Not that there were any such demands before 1940. What 
discontent there was in this area was, like in the west, directed inwards, with the 
indigenous clergy in conflict with each other as opposed to with their French 
superiors. In spite of this internal conflict, there was a notable absence of conflicts 
with the local communities, Catholic and non-Catholic alike. It suggests that 
externally the Mission was functioning harmoniously, while internally it faced the 
same problems as any other human communities.
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General Conclusion
Calm contimieth not long without a storm.
Anonymous
This chapter has demonstrated that despite being in the same country, the Catholic 
presence in these four regions, the central plain, the north, the west, and the east had 
distinctively different characters and concerns. In Bangkok, it concentrated on its 
social works and enjoyed the support of the elite. Meanwhile, in the north, it faced a 
strong Protestant presence, which it worked hard to challenge. At the same time, the 
Mission of Siam had ceded its authority to another religious order in the west, 
thereby changing the identity o f the Catholic Mission in Siam from being a purely 
French-led organisation to one that was more mixed, albeit still with a European face. 
Nevertheless, the Mission was working towards further changes by making the east 
effectively a testing ground for indigenous priests being groomed for further 
responsibilities. There, at least, the face of the Catholic Church was distinctively 
Asian.
Given the dissimilarities between these regions, casual observers could be 
forgiven for thinking that there were different churches at work -  not one. The 
differences, however, did not stem from a lack of a coherent policy. They originated 
from the varying conditions the Mission encountered in each region and its attempt 
to adapt to them. In the light o f the different identities and conditions in each region, 
it is not surprising to find that when the persecutions occurred, they also had an 
inconsistent character. These differences in character between the regions were also 
encouraged by the divisions of the Mission. By 1939, the Catholic Church in Siam 
was being administered by three Missions: the Mission of Laos in the northeast, the 
Mission of Ratchaburi in the west, and the Mission of Siam in the rest o f the country.
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As the situation in the west demonstrated, these divisions did not always 
work as planned. Sometimes, intervention from the Mission of Siam was still 
required, even though the new Missions were meant to be autonomous. However, as 
Chapter IV will demonstrate, the administrative difficulties in the west, and indeed in 
all the other regions covered in chapter, were very mild indeed when they are 
compared with the problems that were encountered in the northeast.
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IV
The Northeast, 1909-39
The Siamese government see that the missionaries are instigators o f  French 
encroachment and occupation.
M.E.P. Report, 1886
The administrative arrangements made for the northeast were far more complicated 
than for the other regions. During the persecution of the 1940s, this area saw the 
worst excesses, including the initial arrest of Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung and the 
intimidation and mass extra-judicial execution of lay and religious Catholics in 
Songkhon village. Much of the excesses in the persecution in this region can be 
attributed to the earlier effects of this complex administrative set up, as well as issues 
arising from the proximity of the area to an ‘enemy’ state, in this case French 
Indochina.
Historically, Catholic missionary activities in the northeast or Isaan region of 
Thailand began relatively recently, commencing in the late nineteenth century. Prior 
to this period, Catholic missionaries had visited the area, but had not conducted any 
significant missionary activities. At that early stage, the jurisdiction of the northeast 
still belonged to the Mission of Bangkok. However, this administrative structure had 
not taken into account the practicalities of operating mission stations, for example, in 
terms of available infrastructure, health, and difficulties in communications. Indeed, 
during the Ayutthaya to early Bangkok period, the northeast was not a priority since, 
at that time, missionary activities were focused on gaining and widening access to 
new areas for evangelisation and administering existing parishes in the capital and 
central plain.
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Nevertheless, by the late nineteenth century, the practical considerations of 
administering parishes that were far away from the capital area had to be taken to 
heart by the vicars-apostolic of Siam, as missionary activities expanded beyond the 
capital and the central plain. The eventual solution appeared to be simple and 
practical in nature. The control and administration of the Catholic parishes in the 
northeast of Siam were to be ceded to the authority of the Mission of Laos on 4 May 
1899. The Mission was based in French Indochina which, at the time, was easier to 
communicate with than Bangkok. For example, at one stage, it took one Church 
expedition just under one month to journey to Ubon Ratchatani from Bangkok,1 
even with the Bangkok-Korat railway that was built in 1900.2 In addition, like the 
Mission of Siam, the Mission of Laos was under the direction of the M.E.P.
It was tine that, in terms of internal Church organisation, the arrangement 
allowed for easier communication between the relevant Church authorities in the 
day-to-day running of parishes, for example, for the purposes of formalising 
baptisms, confirmations, ordinations, and other common religious rites.
Nevertheless, in terms of the relationship between the Church and state entities, 
changes in the administration of Siam were to affect this arrangement, such as to 
render it almost impractical and, at times, extremely problematic. More often than 
not, for these matters the Mission of Laos had to refer constantly to the Mission of 
Siam and request its assistance in matters ranging from litigation in Siamese courts 
to facing down hostile local authorities. It seems that while the Mission of Laos was 
competent in handling the Church-side organisation, it had insufficient knowledge 
and connections to handle Siamese matters pertaining to the Church, in stark contrast
1 The whole expedition took place over 102 days from 1919-20, R. Costet, Siam-Laos: H isloire de la  
M ission , pp. 302-4.
" H. Evers, R. Korff, Smith-east Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power o f  Social Space (LIT 
Verlag, Minister, 2000), p. 99.
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with the Mission of Siam. At the same time, the Mission o f Siam no longer had 
jurisdiction over priests operating in the northeast, with the result that decisions had 
to be sent inefficiently back and forth between Bangkok and the Mission of Laos.
The problems were exacerbated by the advent of firm territorial borders, with 
their attendant restrictions on the free movement of goods and people. The fact that 
the Mission of Laos straddled this border led to serious legal confusions, among 
other problems. These misunderstandings frequently threatened to erupt into full- 
scale communal rifts, while local authorities, urged on to differing degrees by the 
central government, remained suspicious of the intentions and loyalties of the French 
priests across the border and thus, by implication, the Catholic population within 
their own border.
Furthermore, events that preceded and occurred during the initiation of 
missionary efforts in the northeast only served to engender local suspicion of the 
missionaries. Most prominent among these was the 1893 Paknam incident that 
resulted in the loss of territories by Siam. But in terms of later Catholic persecution, 
it was arguably the smaller, localised events involving French missionaries that 
would push local authorities from merely resenting the presence of Catholics to 
promoting their persecution, some because they were genuinely convinced of the 
Catholics’ disloyalty and others because they stood to gain in one way or another.
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Loyalty Demands Dissent
The passive or merely physical presence at non-Catholic funerals, weddings, and 
similar occasions because o f the holding o f  civil office, as a courtesy, or other 
serious reasons (in case o f  doubt, the bishop’s approval should be sought) can be 
tolerated, provided there is no danger o f  perversion or scandal.
Canon 1258.2, 1917 Codex luris CanonicP
Following the 1893 Paknam incident and the establishment of a geographically- 
based boundary between Siam and French controlled Laos, there appeared to have 
been a crisis of faith among the Siamese authorities regarding the loyalties of 
citizens, particularly those in the border areas. Ethnically, the northeastern people 
are closely related to their Laotian neighbours and thus it was quite conceivable at 
the time that these border people might initiate their own separatist movement or else 
encourage the French to establish another protectorate. Indeed, the Paknam and 
other incidents demonstrated that France’s local colonial agents were quite willing to 
do so, especially if they could furnish themselves with a good and, at least in the 
eyes of other Europeans, acceptable excuse.
One of the Siamese solutions to counteract this situation4 during this period 
was the arrangement of public ceremonies that involved locals pledging their loyalty 
to Siam through the phithi thuenam (a ceremony involving the taking of an oath of 
allegiance and drinking consecrated water). For the Catholics, the original ceremony 
and the oath itself have clear pagan themes, thereby making it unacceptable for the 
local Church authorities to allow their parishioners to attend.
3 The complete text o f  the 1917 Canon Law can be found in its original Latin at: 
http://www.intratext.coni/X/LAT0813.HTM [Last Access: 19 January 2009].
4 Other measures pre-dating this period included the setting up o f  a system o f  commissionership as 
well as an expansion o f  judicial power and political force, backed by the army. The centre o f  this new  
thrust by Bangkok into the northeast was Nakhon Ratchasima. See Chaiyan Rajchagool, The Rise  
and F all o f  the Thai Absolute Monarchy (White Lotus, Bangkok, 1994), pp. 28-34.
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Moreover, this ceremony has been a longstanding point of dispute in 
relations between the Thai state and the Church. One of the most notable incidents 
occurred during the reign of King Taksin (late 1767-82). At the time, the ceremony 
was to be administered to court and military officials only which, even at that time, 
included Catholics. On the one hand, from their religious point of view, the 
missionaries viewed the ritual as clearly “pagan”. However, King Taksin saw the 
missionaries’ religious objections as disloyal intransigence on the part of his 
Catholic subjects. According to Bishop Pallegoix’s (1841-62) later account, three 
Catholic officials chose to swear a Christian version of the oath in the following 
manner:
The time to take the solemn oath having come in September 1775, three of 
the main Christians, appointed mandarins and officers of the King instead of 
going to the temple to find the monks to drink the water of allegiance.. .went 
to the church in the morning and there, before the altar, in view of a great 
crowd of Christians they took their oath of loyalty to the King in the Siamese 
language on the gospel which was in the hand of the Bishop who gave them a 
formal certification of it.5
King Taksin was deeply unimpressed. The incident led to the arrest, torture, 
and imprisonment of the three Catholic officials together with the bishop and two 
other missionaries involved in the ceremony.
The monarch’s displeasure with the missionaries can be explained by the 
fragile political situation of the monarchy at that time. In ethnic terms, King Taksin 
was essentially a foreigner due to his half-Chinese heritage and lack of blood links to 
the old ruling family of Ayutthaya. Moreover, despite his spectacular military 
victories, he remained vulnerable to accusations of having abandoned the old capital 
during its time of greatest need. The decision to move the capital from Ayutthaya to
3 Bishop J. Pallegoix, Descriptions o f  the Thai Kingdom  (White Lotus, Bangkok, 2000), p. 387.
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Thonburi should be seen as reflecting the monarch’s lack of traditional means of 
establishing his legitimacy.6
Given his tenuous position, King Taksin’s sole recourse to cement his 
legitimacy was through Buddhism. Religion was to be the main avenue for the new 
monarch’s apotheosis from being merely a successful military commander to the 
devaraja (god-king) or, better still, dhammaraja (virtuous-king), o f the new capital. 
Therefore, any challenge to the monarch’s version of Buddhism and its ceremonies 
were perceived to be tantamount to a threat to the legitimacy of the fledgling dynasty. 
By implication, those who excluded themselves from the ceremonies also excluded 
themselves from the kingdom, as the monarch once exclaimed when some Catholic 
soldiers had come to claim their pay: “What does it serve to give pay to these people? 
They do not want to attend any of my ceremonies”.7 Despite the missionaries’ 
efforts in attempting to negotiate compromises, the crisis had escalated to the extent 
that all Catholic missionaries were expelled by the end of 1779.8
Evidently, the oath-taking ceremony was deemed to be important for the 
security and welfare of the state which, at that time, would have meant the person of 
the monarch. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the state would have achieved 
anything concrete by coercing Catholic officials to do what they thought was profane. 
Indeed, rather than gaining their loyalty, the ceremony would be neither binding nor 
affect their morale, other than to offend the religiously inclined, and thus encourage 
disloyalty rather than devotion as intended. In King Taksin’s case, his paranoia was, 
therefore, self-fulfilling.
6 Subsequent Taksin legends, such as the phantasmal torments he endured during a stay in the palace 
grounds o f Ayutthaya could also be read in this light.
7 Bishop J. Pallegoix, D escriptions o f  the Thai Kingdom, p. 391.
8 B.J. Terwiel, Thailand's Political History, p. 56.
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Following the establishment of the Chakri dynasty in 1782, the missionaries 
were allowed to return. Nevertheless, the dispute over the oath ceremony had not 
been satisfactorily resolved for either side. Eventually a compromise was agreed. 
Catholics would be able to give their oaths of allegiance to the state (that is, the 
monarch) in the ceremony, so long as they could swear in the Catholic manner.
Even so, the dispute regarding this matter continued to the time of Vicar-Apostolic 
Perros, as the ceremony grew to involve ordinary citizens. In addition, other newly 
introduced bureaucratic formalities required oaths, such as giving testimonies in 
court, thereby making the practice more widespread, where previously it would have 
been administered only to select officials of the court.
As more and more state organs from the various government ministries to the 
local administration were coming into contact with ordinary citizens, some of whom 
were Catholics, the problems regarding the oaths reoccurred. While by the late 
1920s, the court and the central ministries were familiar with Catholic sensitivities as 
well as the solutions that had been worked out between the two parties, it was a 
different matter for the provincial authorities who did not seem to be aware of the 
religious sensitivity, some thinking that reluctance on the part of the Catholics was 
actually recalcitrance. Although, when complications arose, the Vicar-Apostolic 
communicated with the relevant central ministries to remind them o f existing 
arrangements, thereby solving the immediate problems, the alternative procedures 
were not as well known as the Church assumed. This discrepancy indicates that, 
although the amelioration of Catholic grievances concerned the central government, 
it did not see the matter as relevant to provincial administration, despite the 
expansion of missionary efforts into the provinces. More significantly, it may also
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indicate a loose central grip on the local state apparatus in terms o f policy 
implementation.
Even as late as 1916, local missionaries in the northeast still cited the oath 
ceremony as one o f the major obstacles in the Church’s relationship with the local 
state apparatus, an indication perhaps of the ceremony’s late introduction into the 
area, since no mission station in other areas reported problems to such an extent. On 
the other hand, the situation in the northeast was not helped by what could be 
perceived, from the local authorities’ perspective, as ‘imperialistic’ behaviour 011 the 
part of the missionaries themselves. Indeed, in some cases, rather than ignorance 011 
the part of the local authorities, it was the priests who did not know the procedures 
that had been established between the Thai state and the Church. This ignorance was 
arguably a consequence o f these missionaries being subject to the Mission of Laos 
rather than the Mission of Siam. The situation was especially volatile given the Thai 
authorities’ paranoia over Catholic citizens working with the French colonial 
authorities to annex territory. At the same time, the local authorities’ resentment that 
threatened to spill over into harassment could well have furnished local French 
colonial agents with the necessary pretext to intervene and ‘protect’ their fellow 
Catholics from ‘persecution’.
One case raged for three months, from July to September 1916. The case 
involved alleged coercion by local authorities against a village headman who was 
supposedly coerced to go to a Buddhist site to give his oath of allegiance. The 
general situation was outlined in a memorandum submitted to the Mission of Siam 
by Wolcott Pitkin, a General Advisor in Foreign Affairs to the government of Siam, 
who was investigating the incident. According to Pitkin’s memorandum, Nai Siha 
Butr, the village headman of Seisang had been compelled by the district chief officer
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to go to a Buddhist temple and was ordered to take the oath and drink the water of 
allegiance in front of a portrait of the king. Compulsion was necessary because the 
headman “had previously failed at the proper time to apear [sic] for this purpose at 
Ubol [sic] Town”. Nevertheless, the parish priest, Fr. Leon Quentin complained 
bitterly to the authorities and “alleged that the headman had already taken the oath at 
the monthon”? contrary to the evidence presented by the district official. To make 
matters worse, the memorandum states that: “The father is said on this occasion to 
have made use of extremely insulting language and gestures” .10
However, according to Fr. Leon Quentin via the Vicar-Apostolic of the 
Mission of Laos, the headman had not failed in his duty, and had duly taken the oath 
at Ubon, with a priest as his witness. Nevertheless, for some unknown reason, the 
district chief officer o f Lum Phuk insisted on getting the headman to drink the water 
of allegiance again, apparently through the use of threats:
At length, by means of threats and lies, the [district chief officer] succeeded 
in inducing him to the Court. From the Court, he was led to the Pagoda and 
there, under new threats, yielding to them, he drank the water o f allegiance.
The priest then defended his subsequent actions as “verbal representations 
worthy of the case”. More worrying, the priest also cited another case of harassment 
by the district chief officer of Sasunthon on similar grounds, adding ominously that 
“people there being more sensible and less timid, nothing as yet has occurred”.11 
The situation thus was threatening to degenerate into a volatile clash over the word 
o f the foreign priest and the word of the local authorities.
9 A monthon was a country subdivision o f  Thailand, being essentially a collection o f  provinces. The 
system was adopted in 1897 but had been abolished by 1933.
10 B.A.A., General Advisor in Foreign Affairs to Fr. Colombet, 15 July 1916, 46/1/34.
11 B.A.A., Fr. Colombet to the General Advisor in Foreign Affairs, 27 September 1916, 46/1/38.
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Subsequently, the Mission of Siam reaffirmed the fact that “formulae [for the 
oath] have been presented to the high authorities and approved by them”, that the 
priests in the missionary stations had been informed of the changes, and that 
“nowadays, they are generally known and applied everywhere”. Nevertheless, while 
the same letter indicated that there had been frequent conflicts over the oath-taking 
ceremony in the past, it also suggested that these cases had been successfully 
resolved, albeit with some difficulties.
For reference, the same letter cited one case that had occurred in Korat 
(Naklion Ratchasima) in 1915 where a Catholic headman was compelled to 
participate in the ceremony at a Buddhist site. In the end “the matter was reported to 
the Catholic Mission, and Mr. Garreau, then the Acting French Consul, was sent 
there to investigate the case together with the Siamese authorities of Korat”. 
Ultimately, for the 1915 case, both the Siamese and French authorities concurred and 
concluded that “the conduct o f the [district chief officer] was blamed as abuse of 
power and he had to apologise” .12
However, the General Advisor found a different account for the 1915 case. 
Rather than involving an oath ceremony, the 1915 case involved Nai Sali, a Catholic, 
being ‘involuntarily’ made to prostrate himself in front o f a Buddha statue. Contrary 
to what was implied in the Mission o f Siam’s letter, the General Advisor stated that:
.. .the assistant district officer was taking Nai Sali to the [District Office] to 
enquire into some other offence, when they came near Wat Noi. Nai Sali 
then asked to be allowed to go and do worship there as he felt remorse at 
having forsaken the Buddhist religion. The [assistant district officer] granted 
him the request and thus it was clearly proved that no force had been used 
against Nai Sali.
B.A.A., Fr. Colombet to the General Advisor in Foreign Affairs, 27 September 1916,46/3/38.
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The eventual censure against the assistant district officer was for “the dilatory 
manner in which he carried out his duties”. As for the 1916 case, the General 
Advisor concluded that the district official was partly to blame for the incident and 
that he would “recommend that the [assistant district officer] be asked to use more 
tact and cany out his duties in a more conciliatory manner”. At the same time, he 
also recommended the Mission to maintain a better control of the behaviour of its 
priests.13
This exchange of letters indicates the extent to which both the Mission of 
Siam and the Mission of Laos were out of touch with information on the ground.
The situation is reminiscent of the government in European colonies, that is, while 
the central government ostensibly determined the general policies, in reality, it was 
the local agents that had a greater role in making on-the-spot decisions. Furthermore, 
through the effective control of information sent to the centre, the local agents can, to 
a great extent, determine policy directions. In the Church’s case, it was clearly the 
parish priest who held most of the power to make decisions on the ground, especially 
if their posts were located in remote areas. While it is hue that both the Mission of 
Siam and Mission of Laos had the authority to act as they saw fit, they still greatly 
relied on their parish priests to relay the relevant information. Thus, by controlling 
the flow of information, the parish priest could greatly influence decisions, unless the 
centre had an alternative ‘agent’ to whom they could turn, such as a parishioner or a 
concerned official.
A more serious implication is the amount of local resentment generated by 
the occurrence of these incidents. From the General Advisor’s report, it is clear that 
both the priest and the local authorities were culpable in the escalation of the crisis.
13 B.A .A ., General Advisor in Foreign Affairs to Fr. Colombet, 10 October 1916,46/1/42.
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While there is no documentation to indicate the extent of public resentment 
regarding these interventions, it is conceivable that the incident could be construed 
as evidence of Catholic disloyalty. Furthermore, even if Catholics chose to conform, 
the parish priests would make an issue of it and, if necessary, involve higher 
authorities, both domestic and foreign. Together with the difficulties in 
communication between the parties involved, situations tended to fester for far 
longer than necessary.
Although the issue of the oath also arose in other mission stations, for the 
most part they involved individuals who were working in various official capacities14 
and could quickly be resolved through civil memoranda to the relevant ministries 
rather than through the heavy-handed intervention of international and domestic 
representatives. The memoranda were mainly directed to various provincial 
governors under the Ministiy of Interior and officials at the Ministry o f Defence.
For example, in one 1916 memorandum to the Ministiy of Defence, along with 
asserting the right of Catholic soldiers to receive the sacraments while being 
hospitalised and to take leave for religious reasons, the Church acknowledged that 
the alternative ceremony may not be as well-known outside Bangkok:
In Bangkok, it is a custom for the participants to assemble at the Ministiy of 
Defence with a priest and high official acting as witnesses when the water 
oath ceremony is performed. As for the provinces, there has not been an 
established custom, thus the civil servants do not know how to conduct 
affairs in the proper maimer.15
Indeed, as late as 1927, the Church still had to prod provincial governors into 
action over local authorities overstepping previously agreed limits. Some of the 
responses, however, confirm that the Catholic ceremony was not well-known to local
14 The majority o f  cases involved enlisted soldiers and officers.
15 B .A .A ., Memorandum to the Ministiy o f Defence, 30 May 1916, 59/3/7.
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provincial authorities and, more significantly perhaps, by the participating Catholics 
themselves.
Regarding the matter that Muen Anukul reported to you, I don’t think he 
believed what he was saying himself or perhaps another party instigated him 
to bring the inappropriate complaints to you. In the matter of swearing the 
oath according to one’s religion, I have performed this ceremony with the 
police for 24-25 years now and, unlike in the present case, the Christians I 
encountered did not have any problems. The Christians in the present case 
have never been through the ceremony before and were probably over­
excited. 16
Clearly, in this matter, there were problems in communication, not only 
between the government and its provincial arms, but also within the Church 
establishment itself. The Siamese government appeared to be unaware of the spread 
of the missionary efforts, while on the Church’s side, the deficiency can be attributed 
to an organisational structure that did not fit the new national boundaries. 
Technically, it was the Mission of Laos that should have informed and disciplined 
the priests in the northeast o f Siam, yet it can already be seen from these two cases 
that this arrangement was impractical and that matters pertaining to the Siamese 
authorities could be dealt with effectively only through the Mission o f Siam in 
Bangkok.
While the 1916 case was remarkable in itself and in its implications, one of 
the most interesting of its aspects was its background. The case occurred at around 
the same time as another controversial incident. The incident involved the transfer 
and slaughter of cattle between Catholics that contravened a newly promulgated law. 
From the Siamese point of view, the law was introduced to tackle one of the 
problems that arose from having a firm border with French-Indochina, but from the
16 B .A .A ., R esponse from the Governor o f  Minburi, M ay 1927, 60/1/16.
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Mission of Laos’s point of view, the law was deemed to be unworkable and therefore 
should not be followed.
The incident and the legal case that followed was to last a total of three years, 
from July 1916 to July 1919 and would come to involve the Missions of Siam and 
Laos, the French authorities, and Siamese ministry officials. It is possible that these, 
and other cases, were the source of local resentment against Catholicism and the 
French. Thus when the central government eventually voiced its support of anti- 
French measures (and by implication anti-Catholic), it did not take much for locals in 
the northeast to throw their support behind the initiative, even if they became more 
‘creative’ than the central government would probably have liked.
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Border Crossings
Peace never respects borders.
Loesje, 2004
One o f the major problems that arose following the establishment of a firm border 
between Siam and French-controlled Laos derived from the administration that was 
created to manage movements across the new, porous border. Some historians have 
argued that proximity to a strategic borderland, especially when one side is ruled by 
an imperial power, usually increased the probability of violence.17 In the case of the 
Catholics in the northeast, this proximity to French colonial territory led to several 
potentially explosive court cases.
The border established between Siam and French Laos was especially 
problematic since it created a boundary where previously there had been relatively 
free movement of people and commerce. With the border came the need for security, 
that is, control of the movement of people and goods and the economic benefits that 
derive from this control through tariffs and custom duties. Naturally, the states 
involved were the main beneficiaries o f this arrangement, but for the people who 
lived near the borders and who had been free to move from one side of the river to 
the other, the new arrangement caused obvious difficulties and, undoubtedly, 
resentment. At the same time, the states also encountered new problems in terms of 
trans-border crime, with the added complication that some ‘crimes’ were not illegal 
until the establishment of the border, while others were considered legal in one 
territory but not the other.
All of these developments not only led to the establishment of the ‘other’ 
across the border but also gave rise to resentment against those who were ‘others’
17 N. Ferguson, The War o f  the World (Penguin, London, 2007), p. 635.
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but ‘inside’ the border. In effect, the borders encouraged what Thongchai 
Winichakul has termed “negative identification” where ethnic groups define 
themselves in terms of their differences from each other, rather than shared 
characteristics.18 Thus, even though the Laotian ethnic groups on the Siamese side 
of the border may share some characteristics with groups on the French side of the 
border, the border itself encourages, and in a way, creates a sense of ‘otherness’ 
despite the existence of shared characteristics.
From a more practical point of view, the border was also a source of 
grievances. The Catholics were particularly vulnerable to this pressure, and local 
resentment increased when it was perceived that priests would cite foreign law or 
invoke higher authorities in their defence when they, or their parishioners, had 
violated local laws. While this approach was perhaps conducive in promoting the 
loyalty of parishioners to an institution that could protect the interests of its members, 
it no doubt spurred resentment among the non-Catholic locals who were also 
affected by the same laws and regulations, yet did not have such vigorous 
representation.
Certainly, teething problems could be expected from a newly established 
border, but it was still the source of dispute several years after its establishment.
One 1921 report remarked: “The regulation of the border incidents between the 
French and Siamese authorities do not always pass without difficulties”.19 As for the 
northeast, there were three cases that were of particular concern. The first case 
highlighted the nature of the Mission of Laos, as it concerned the ownership of land. 
Traditionally, as a foreign entity, the Mission of Siam had an arrangement under 
various agreements to purchase and own land. However, upon the transfer of
18 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam M apped: A H isto iy  o f  the Geo-body o f  a Nation  (Silkworm Books, 
ChiangM ai, 1998), p. 5.
19 B.A .A ., Rapport de tournee, 4 July 1921, 46/2/21.
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jurisdiction to the Mission of Laos, the status of its existing lands, as well as the right 
to purchase further land in the northeast, was called into question, since the Siamese 
government had no such agreement with the Mission of Laos.
The land holdings of the Mission of Siam were formalised as extensions of 
the commercial treaties with France. While these treaties guaranteed the Church 
freedoms unseen since the Ayutthaya period during the reign of King Narai, they 
also contributed to the Siamese perception that the Catholic Church was a French 
institution, as opposed to a multinational organisation. Nevertheless, by the 1910s 
the right of the Mission of Siam to hold land within Siamese territory was no longer 
a matter of dispute, although the quota of land it could hold was still in contention. 
The transfer of jurisdiction over parishes in the northeast to the Mission of Laos, 
however, raised an entirely new point of contention between the Siamese 
government and the Missions of Siam and Laos. The basic issues that had to be 
resolved were: is the Mission of Laos a separate entity from the Mission of Siam? If 
so, on what grounds should the treaty rights granted to the Mission of Siam be 
extended to the Mission of Laos? The Siamese government also had to consider 
whether the extension of such rights would affect national security.
However, these basic issues remained unresolved for several decades after 
the division in 1899, since the issue did not come to the attention of the courts and 
central authorities until the late 1920s. As late as 1926, the Vicar-Apostolic of Laos 
still had to request his Bangkok counterpart to assist in the regularisation of the land 
situation.20 The Ministry had concluded that:
20 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Petros to Prince Traidos Devawongse, Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, 7 June 
1926, 46/4/7
189
.. .the question of deciding under what conditions the provision of the Decree 
of 1909 shall be extended to cover the lands owned by the Catholic Mission 
in Nong S[a]eng [which was under the jurisdiction of the Mission o f Laos in 
Siam], must be discussed entirely apart from Treaty rights [that is, the rights 
granted to the Mission of Siam].21
The uncertain status of the Mission of Laos’s ownership of land in Siamese 
territory placed it at a disadvantage in court cases where land and property rights 
were in dispute. It took two more years of information-gathering and negotiations 
for an agreement to be reached. The 1928 agreement extended the rights of the 
Mission o f Siam, as covered by the August 1909 agreement, to the Mission of Laos, 
with the exception of three articles. One of these exceptions was directly relevant to 
the Mission of Laos, while the other two were irrelevant.22 According to the 1909 
agreement, the Mission of Siam was entitled to own a maximum of 3,000 rai23 in a 
given province. Later agreements also allowed the Mission to transfer quotas from 
one province to another, if  necessary. However, for the 1928 agreement, this was 
limited to 1,000 rai per province for the Mission o f Laos. The Siamese authorities 
gave the following justification:
The recommendation that the maximum area be thus reduced in Nong 
S[a]eng is not due to any changed attitude of His Majesty’s Government 
towards the Catholic Missions but to the difference in circumstances. The 
Decree of 1909 was the result of a compromise. At that time certain 
Missions in the Bishopric of Bangkok owned large amounts of land for 
endowment purposes. While the Mission of Nong S[a]eng have existed for 
some thirty years, the largest amount o f land held for endowment purposes in 
any [province] is less than 600 rai so that a maximum of a thousand rai still 
leaves a considerable margin for new acquisition.24
21 B.A.A., From the Office o f  the Advisor in Foreign Affairs, 18 June 1926, 46/4/8
1" The other two exceptions were related to specific provinces within the Bangkok area and the extra­
territorial courts’ jurisdiction over disputes concerning Catholic-held lands, which no longer applied, 
since these disputes had come under the jurisdiction o f  the regular courts.
J  1 rai is equal to 1,600 m2.
24 B.A .A ., Memorandum concerning Catholic lands in the Vicariate-Apostolic o f  Nong Saeng, 10 
December 1928, 46/4/39
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The authorities also noted that many other countries either restricted or 
banned the purchase and ownership of land by religious organisations for purely 
investment or endowment putposes. The new limits could be interpreted in terms of 
national security where Siamese authorities were uncertain about the credentials of 
the unfamiliar Mission of Laos, in stark contrast to the members o f the Mission of 
Siam, many of whom were personal acquaintances of the princes. It is also likely 
that the authorities were aware of the emerging tensions in the area and were 
unwilling to aggravate the situation by granting a foreign Mission permission to buy 
up large parcels of cheap land. In addition, the negotiation of the treaty, even if it 
was ultimately successful, reinforced the notion that the Mission of Laos was a 
foreign entity.
While the negotiations took place, the Mission of Laos was encountering 
difficulties in the encroachment of its lands. One case of note in 1923 involved local 
officials in Ubon Ratchatani who requested the return of some parish land ostensibly 
for military purposes (indicating the strategic value of lands held by the Church).
The Mission of Laos complied but, subsequently, the land deeds were never returned, 
while the government requisitions went far beyond what was initially requested. As 
one missionary’s letter to the local authorities stated:
Various governors have requested that the Catholic Church return some of 
the land granted to it by Chao Krom Thewa in order to establish a barracks, 
and up to today those lands have never been returned. You have also 
continued to ask for this land piece by piece so that the land that could be 
used to support the Catholic Church has been much reduced.
Although this situation could simply have been the result of bureaucratic 
forgetfulness, suspicion of ulterior motives behind the encroachment is raised by the 
fact that during that period, Ubon Ratchatani was experiencing an economic boom.
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The parish priest was clearly worried, since the local boom had brought with it new 
problems in the Catholic and surrounding communities: “The town has since 
continued to develop but now its citizens are jealous of each others’ lands and vie for 
them. They have even encroached onto the lands of the Catholic Church”.25
The encroachment was facilitated by the fact that the land held by this 
particular parish had not been properly demarcated. From the correspondence, it is 
clear that there had been a change in personnel, where the agreement reached 
between the previous parish priest and the authorities was only ‘formal’ as long as 
the official who made the agreement remained in charge. In such cases, these 
agreements may, or may not, be continued by subsequent officials. Additionally, 
with the growth of the bureaucratic state, all such informal deals would either have 
had to enter the formal system or be rendered null and void.
Problems regarding Catholic lands in the 1920s were thus characterised by 
the uncertain status of the rights of the Mission of Laos, and various sections of 
society taking advantage o f the process of change from an informal state to one more 
formally governed by bureaucrats. Part of this transformation was the promulgation 
of various new regulations, which were often flawed (or perceived to be flawed) in 
practice. Two such laws proved troublesome for the Catholic community in the 
northeast throughout the 1920s, and as late as the 1930s the customs situation 
remained unsettled. As mentioned in the previous section, a case pertaining to the 
registration and slaughter o f animals occurred almost at the same time as a dispute 
concerning the oath of allegiance, that is, around July 1916, and thus the two cases 
were dealt with concurrently by the foreign advisors. However, unlike the oath, the 
matter of the transfer and slaughter of cattle was not properly resolved until July
25 B.A.A ., Letter to the District C hief Officer o f  Ubon, 23 July 1923,46/2/48
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1919, Furthermore, the fact that the legal case appeared before the dispute over the 
oath of allegiance suggests that it was this legal case that began the local animosity 
between the Church and the local authorities. This particular case also highlights the 
difficulties of operating cross-border parishes.
The essence of the case, as summarised by Wolcott Pitkin, was this:
Nai Kene and Nai Prom are accused by the local officials of transferring 
cattle without appearing before the [district officials] in violation of the Beast 
of Burden Act of the year 119 and of killing cattle without permission in 
contravention of the Cattle Diseases Act of 119.26
Supposedly, the two laws were designed to prevent trans-border cattle thefts 
as well as the spread of cattle diseases, as Pitkin points out:
[The Acts] have not been put into force to obtain revenue from the fees, as 
may be supposed, but for the reason that cattle theft is veiy prevalent in the 
Provinces. Before the Act stolen cattle were easily disposed of by thieves, 
either by sale at a small price or by their being slaughtered and the meat and 
hide sold.27
The case was further complicated by the fact that Fr. Leon Quentin, the same 
priest implicated in the dispute over the oath of allegiance, later appeared to take 
responsibility for the ‘crimes’, and to take away the cattle hides that had been seized 
by the authorities following the incident. It was also initially noted that the 
perpetrators, Nai Kene and Nai Prom, were “said to be novices in this mission”.28
The matter was referred to the Mission of Siam. However, it becomes clear 
that the working relationship the Bangkok-based mission had cultivated with the 
authorities had not been transferred over when the administration of the northeastern 
parishes was ceded to the Mission of Laos. As Fr. Colombet explained, the Bangkok
2b Year 119 corresponds to 1900 A.D.
‘7 B.A.A., Wolcott Pitkin to Fr. Colombet, 10 October 1916,46/1/42.
B.A.A., Report on the Case o f  Fr. Leon Quentin, 15 July 1916, 46/1/34.
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Mission and the Siamese authorities had encountered the problem before and had 
worked out a solution:
.. .with regard to the first case of Father Quentin, the high authorities of the 
Ministry of the Interior have several times been approached by me and now 
by the Right Revd. Bishop Perros on similar cases, and the application of the 
Act regarding the killing of cattle having been proved as impracticable in 
many instances, we have been advised in these cases to give it satisfaction in 
paying only the tax imposed upon killing cattle when it is claimed.29
Thus, the case of Fr. Quentin should have been resolved on the basis of the 
agreement negotiated with the central authorities by the Bangkok Mission, since the 
circumstances were certainly ‘impracticable’, as Vicar-Apostolic Prodhomme of 
Laos (1913-20) who was present during the incident noted:
The distance from the parish to the residence of the [district chief officer] and 
the delay involved in obtaining the [authorisation] are such that (sometimes it 
can take up to 8 or 10 days) we would be dead of hunger 10 times before we 
received this permit for the slaughter. These considerations, it seems, should 
be made known to the high authorities in Bangkok who should be able to 
remedy the situation.30
Nevertheless, it seems that any attempt at conciliation was too late by this 
point, since the foreign advisor charged with dealing with the case took a legalistic 
view: “the statutes create criminal offences and no one can evade responsibility for 
such an offence by showing that he was directed by his employer to commit if ’.31 
The Mission o f Siam was resigned to accept this judgement, but the Mission of Laos 
was unwilling to let the matter go so easily:
Although certain that Your Excellency has brought in the examination of this 
matter the greatest spirit of conciliation, I am afraid, however, that the Bishop 
of Laos be somewhat not satisfied of Your Excellency’s point of view 
regarding the case of Nai Kane and Nai Prom, if they are prosecuted without
29 B.A.A., Fr. Colombet to Wolcott Pitkin, 27 September 1916, 46/1/38.
30 B .A.A., Response o f Mgr. Prodhomme, Vicar-Apostolic o f  Laos, 23 August 1916, 46/1/40.
31 B .A.A., Wolcott Pitkin to Fr. Colombet, 10 October 1916,46/1/42.
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granting to them the benefit of the doubt for having transgressed the law not 
of their own accord and to their own profit, but solely to please and render 
assistance.32
In other words, the Mission of Laos did not wish to pay tax. The matter was 
then forwarded back to the Mission of Laos and the Bangkok archives have no more 
documents regarding it until December 1916, when the Interior Ministiy officially 
stated that it had dropped all charges against the offenders, with the provision that a 
compromise solution (presumably the one that had already been negotiated between 
the Mission of Siam and the Siamese government) be followed in the future.33 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros immediately agreed to the conditions.34
While this particular case was ended amicably with the compromise, the 
negotiated solutions appeared to have been unknown to new priests or were 
purposefully ignored, since the same matter was raised again three years later, in 
1919. The complaints from the Mission of Laos rested on the same basis as the case 
in 1916, that is, the impractical nature of the procedure. However, this time they 
were augmented by more serious allegations of bias among Siamese judges and of 
double-standards among the officials, none of which impressed the Office of the 
Advisor in Foreign Affairs:
The charges made by Mgr. Prodhomme as to the Siamese judges are serious, 
if they are founded in fact, but they also furnish no justification for a refusal 
to obey the law, nor does a rumour that Siamese and Lao Mandarins [sic] are 
permitted to slaughter the cattle whenever they please form any excuse to 
disobey the law.33
32 B.A.A., Fr. Colombet to W olcott Pitkin, 17 October 1916,46/1/43.
33 B.A.A., Ministry o f  the Interior to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 8 December 1916, 46/1/47.
34 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to the Ministry o f  the Interior, 9 December 1916,46/1/48.
35 B.A.A., Office o f  the Advisor in Foreign Affairs to Fr. Colombet, 17 May 1919, 46/1/55.
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The Bangkok Mission once again attempted to negotiate on behalf of the 
Bishop of Laos with the Siamese authorities. There is a hint of local frustration and 
resentment at the end of the correspondence, where it was emphasised that “the law 
is not a new one and no complaints have been received from the Siamese cattle 
owners who are in the majority, as compared to the members of the Catholic 
Mission”.36 It is clear from the correspondence that there had been a transgression 
against Siamese law, yet the French consulate at Ubon Ratchatani, together with its 
Bangkok counterpart, had declared that the laws did not apply to the Bishop of Laos 
because he was a French subject. Thus, this second violation was demonstrably born 
out of a provocative attempt to claim colonial rights, rather than ignorance of local 
laws, as was the case with the 1916 incident.
Nevertheless, the Siamese Mission still attempted to negotiate a compromise 
between the two parties, where the Vicar-Apostolic of Laos would submit to 
regulations concerning the registration of animals, while the fee for doing so would 
be waived.37 However, this offer was rejected by the authorities, who cited the fact 
that even animals belonging to government ministries had to be registered and paid 
for, and that any exemption would give rise to others claiming the same privileges, 
and even if the privileges were to be granted it would cause complications for the 
administration and may even render the law null and void.3S It seems as if  the case 
had been left unsatisfactorily for both sides; the Vicar-Apostolic o f Laos remained 
reluctant to accept the laws of the Siamese authorities, despite compromises already 
brokered by his Bangkok counterpart, while the Siamese authorities were 
undoubtedly becoming exasperated by the former’s recalcitrant stance.
36 Ibid.
37 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to the Office o f  the Advisor in Foreign Affairs, 26 May 1919, 
46/1/57.
38 B.A .A ., Office o f the Advisor for Foreign Affairs to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 18 July 1919, 46/1/60.
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The last controversial case of the mission concerned the seizure of goods 
from two priests who were travelling from an annual meeting of the Mission clergy 
at Nong Saeng to Tha Rae in January 1938. The priests complained that the search 
was not conducted in their presence and that they were not transporting any illegal 
goods.39 However, the Siamese authorities disagreed. The list of seized goods 
included over one hundred bottles of wine40 and a less impressive two packets of 
cigarettes, totalling 14 chests. Siamese regulations stipulated that these goods must 
be taxed if they travel beyond 25 kilometres from the border, and thus the authorities 
charged the two priests with tax evasion.41
The matter eventually concluded with the priests agreeing to pay taxes on the 
goods, albeit with much complaint. What was significant about this case, however, 
was not the nature of the violation of the law, but the level of local resentment 
against the Catholic Mission it indicated. In the previous incidents examined, it has 
been seen that although the two sides of the dispute disagreed, neither the authorities 
nor the general public demonstrated overt ill-will during the proceedings. However, 
when examined in detail, this case demonstrates that there were elements within both 
the general public and the local authorities who were no longer afraid to express their 
resentment against the Church, especially if it profited them.
How the case was initiated is telling. The authorities had acted because “an 
anonymous citizen who has received a bounty had declared that the goods were
39 B.A .A ., Re: Transport o f  goods to Sakhon Nakhon and Illegal Search, 17 January 1938,47/3/33.
40 The precise words used by the authorities were: sura tangprathet (foreign alcohol) but it is later 
confirmed that the priests were transporting supplies for the Mass [B.A.A., 47/3/41]. There is no 
record as to the reaction o f  local Buddhists towards clerics stockpiling such a large amount o f  alcohol, 
but it can be assumed that the reaction, if  any, would not be positive.
41 B .A .A ., Re: Transport o f  goods to Sakhon Nakhon and Illegal Search, 18 January 1938, 47/3/34.
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evading tax”, which already indicates a degree of local resentment, albeit for pay.42 
More significantly, the local authorities were no longer being co-operative as 
previously, as one of the priests later complained:
I, Fr. Bayet, the parish priest of Tha Rae...am veiy saddened that Lieutenant 
Ee displayed such vulgar behaviour against a member o f the clergy. I have 
met in my time the whole gamut of officials; from the high to the low but 
I’ve never met anyone who displayed such awful behaviour.43
Bizarrely, a year later, this incident was seized upon by the Siam Nikom 
(Siam Territory) newspaper, among others. As Fr. Bayet, the head priest of the Tha 
Rae parish, wrote to Vicar-Apostolic Perros on 19 February 1939:
The Siamese newspapers have reproduced, without any checks, the biased 
and wholly inaccurate account of their correspondent in Sakon [Nakhon] 
regarding the little incident involving Fr. Lacombe.
The priest then proceeded to recount the particulars of the incident, and asked 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros to rebut the newspaper article, and if necessaiy, invoke the 
assistance of the French consulate.44 Tellingly, the Bangkok bishop merely used one 
of his connections to get the Siam Nikom newspaper to publish a verbatim translation 
of Fr. Bayet’s 19 February 1939 letter,45 once again highlighting the differences in 
the approaches to the Siamese government between the two Missions. The Mission 
of Siam was extremely careful to be conciliatory with the Siamese authorities, using 
French representation as a last resort, while the Mission of Laos appeared bent on 
provoking a conflict at every opportunity.
42 Ibid.
43 B.A.A., Re: Illegal Search and Behaviour o f  Pol-Lt. Ee, 22 January 1938, 47/3/35.
44 B.A.A., Fr. Bayet to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 19 February 1939,47/3/41.
45 B.A.A., Memorandum from the Siam Commercial Company Ltd., 2 March 1939,47/3/43.
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Personal Fiefdoms and Fifth Columnists
It is true that we do not see you, father, doing anything wrong. But we have heard 
news that yon have come to preach the Roman Catholic faith in the hope o f 
preparing the way fo r  the French to occupy this place.
A Buddhist monk to a Catholic missionary, 1933
From the Mission of Laos’s stance towards state religious rites and laws alone, it is 
easy to see how the local public and local authorities could come to resent the 
presence of the missionaries. In addition, as a consequence of the mediation of the 
Mission of Siam, the two missions were effectively lumped together, despite the two 
being quite separate entities with no real control over each other’s administrative 
affairs or priests.
At the same time, it is also true that the parishes of the northeast were not the 
only ones who were ‘troublesome’ to the local authorities and public. As outlined in 
the previous sections, parishes in other regions also had disagreeable encounters with 
figures among the local authorities and public. Yet the extent of the persecution in 
those other regions during the 1940s could in no way match that which occurred in 
the northeast in the same period. An alternative explanation could lie in the region’s 
proximity to a border area, neighbouring an imperial power. But if this factor was 
the key, then those parishes in the eastern seaboard, which had a close proximity to 
the French protectorate of Cambodia, would also have seen similar levels of 
resentment and persecution, and this was not the case.
The main difference between the northeast and the other regions was 
arguably the local population’s prior negative pre-disposition towards ‘outside’ or 
‘foreign’ elements. The origin of this hostile attitude could be the relative isolation 
of the region, as well as the central authority’s wariness of the region, due to
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previous unrest and lack of formal administrative control and protocols. The 
problematic oath of allegiance ceremonies were likely off-shoots of a general policy 
by the central administration to secure the region. Nevertheless, this policy that 
sought to reinforce loyalty and legitimacy in the face of colonial encroachment also 
encouraged the local population to be more suspicious of outside elements, 
particularly those that seemed overly Western. The Catholic situation, however, was 
exacerbated by the fact that the ethnic backgrounds of parishioners in the northeast 
had more in common with groups across the border than with those in Bangkok, 
while some were not even Siamese but French subjects. The fact that the majority of 
the parish priests in the region were French also did not help matters.
O f all the accusations and suspicions held by the local authorities vis-a-vis 
the Catholic communities in their jurisdiction, the one that was the most significant 
was the view that the Catholics were nothing more than pawns in the hands of the 
French parish priests, who were determined to annex more territory from Siam. This 
nationalistic view would crystallise and become more widespread during the rule of 
Pibul, but it is intriguing to find that similar sentiments were current in the northeast 
before the Leader had passed the first o f his Cultural Mandates.
The distrust of the motives of the Catholic Church in the area goes as far 
back as 1886, shortly after its initial foray into the territory. The period corresponds 
with the cross-border tensions that would eventually lead to the Paknam incident in 
1893 and the ceding of Siamese territories to French Indochina. That the association 
occurred during this period indicates that the connection between the Catholic 
Church and the actions of the French government, however misunderstood, was
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formed very early on. Undoubtedly, the French authorities under Auguste Pavia46 
were adept at exploiting the deaths, injuries (perceived or otherwise) of its subjects 
within Siamese territories to great effect. Some observers could also make the 
argument that, superficially, the Church gained indirect benefits from the French 
annexations as they no longer had to be so attuned to ‘strange’ local laws and 
customs.
Nevertheless, there are no documents that show or indicate the complicity of 
the Siamese Catholic Church in these matters. On the contrary, at the height of the 
French aggression in the late nineteenth century, the Church leadership in Siam was 
veiy aware of the potential problems of being accused of aiding French efforts in 
annexing additional Siamese territory. As one missionary recorded:
The Siamese government see that the missionaries are instigators of French 
encroachment and occupation. It seems this sentiment originated from their 
view of past events in Tonkin, not to mention the European newspaper 
articles or even the overbearing arrogance of our country’s government.47
To this effect, the predecessor of Vicar-Apostolic Perros, Monsignor Vey, 
gave explicit instructions for missionaries to avoid areas that were being claimed, or 
could fall under the claims that were being made, by France at the time. These 
included the areas around Champasak and Nong Khai. It was partly due to this 
reason that the northeast was one of the last regions to have Catholic mission stations, 
the self-imposed ban on missionary activities in this area ending only in 1893 — after 
the border between Siam and French Indochina had been settled. In reality therefore,
46 Auguste Pavie began his career as a surveyor. During 1879-95 he conducted a survey o f  the 
Indochinese peninsula, the Missions Pavie, which significantly contributed to the shaping o f  France’s 
policies in Indochina. He became France’s first vice-consul to Luang Prabang in 1886, becoming 
consul in 1889 and consul-general in 1891. In 1892 he became the French resident minister in 
Bangkok, during which he played a key role in rally French public opinion behind the seizure o f  the 
left-bank o f  the Mekong, which was conceded to France following the naval blockade o f  the Chao 
Phraya River in 1893 (also known as the Paknam incident). He later became the first commissioner- 
general o f  Laos (1894-5).
47 M .E.P.A., 21 January 1886, v. 895/406.
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rather than aiding missionary efforts, the actions of the French government agents 
actually hindered the expansion of the Mission in Siam.
The Church’s effective work in education, as documented in the previous 
sections, may also have backfired against it in the northeast. Furthermore, the fact 
that the parish priests who ran the schools were invariably Europeans (the majority 
being French) or otherwise from an ethnic background other than Siamese (for 
example Chinese or Vietnamese) would not have given local officials much comfort. 
A major part of the congregations in this and other areas were from a variety of 
ethnic minorities where some, such as the Lao, may have had stronger ties with their 
ethnic group across the border than with the Siamese of the central plain, spurring 
further fears of separatism under a Franco-Catholic aegis.
In remote and sensitive border areas, the Church’s schools were a double- 
edged sword. In many cases, not only were they the more effective and attractive 
alternative to state schools (especially for the ethnic minorities) but occasionally they 
were the only choice available for locals who wanted their children to be formally 
schooled. The Hobson’s choice undoubtedly worried some local authorities, 
concerned over the possibility of the young being indoctrinated by foreigners, 
whether to their religious or other causes. Their concern was increased by the 
effectiveness of the education. The Songklion School was certainly one of such 
schools that was located very near to the border, in a remote region, and was the only 
locally available option for a formal education, as the parish priest noted in 1933:
When I arrived at this parish, the government came to close the school which 
had been established by the [district chief officer]. The lack of budget has 
imposed this measure on a good number of schools...48
48 B.A.A., Re: Opening o f  Churches and Songklion School matters, 20 May 1933, 47/2/11.
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It was suggested in the same letter that the local authorities -  the local official 
representing the Ministry of Education, the district chief officer, and the governor of 
the province -  had expressed appreciation of the achievements of the new school, 
notwithstanding the fact that it was the district chief officer’s school that had closed 
down, and the Catholic school that survived.
Church documents from this period do not contain any evidence directly 
linking the local official’s resentment against the actions of the Catholic Church, but 
earlier missionaries did voice their suspicions. The advent of the Catholic 
missionaries in the area in the late nineteenth century saw a marked decline in the 
‘slave trade’*49 that still continued in this remote region, notwithstanding the 
proclamations from the central government from 1874 abolishing the practice. To 
the poor and the displaced on whom the ‘slave traders’ preyed during this period, the 
Catholic Church was certainly one of the few institutions that could protect them 
from rapacious officials.50 In addition, some missionaries felt that their teachings 
concerning equality and respect were not welcome by those officials who wished to 
exploit the corvee system of labour that was still practiced or those who were 
involved in the illegal slave trade.
Even during this early period, the authorities had a mixed reaction to the 
actions of the Catholic Church. Some, notably officials at Sakon Nakhon, were 
overtly hostile and threatened the locals with punishment if they met with
49 Missionary accounts mention the ‘slave hade’ but it is unclear whether they were confusing the 
slave trade in the conventional sense with the Siamese practice that bore similarities to the European 
system o f  indentured servants -  i.e. labour under contract. In either case, the Church’s capacity to 
‘buy out’ contracts or prevent abuses against converts would have made the prospects o f  conversion 
even more attractive to some.
50 R. Costet, Siam-Laos: Histoire de la M ission , pp. 315-6.
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missionaries.51 On the other hand others, such as the officials of Ubon Ratchatani, 
encouraged the missionaries to obtain as many converts as possible. The contrast 
between the provinces did surprise missionaries at the time, and Fr. Dabin suspected 
that there were ulterior motives behind the mission’s promotion at Ubon Ratchatani, 
that is, the official wished for more settlers in the area so that more people would be 
available for corvee labour.52 There is no evidence to confirm Fr. Dabin’s suspicions, 
but the differences in the attitudes of the authorities presaged the inconsistent 
conditions that would be seen in the early twentieth century.
Differences in attitudes were not solely confined to local officials, however. 
While some poor locals did undoubtedly welcome the presence of missionaries, 
others openly expressed their suspicions. The discoveiy of suspicion, accusations, 
and fears of Fifth columnists may not be surprising during times of acute tension and 
crisis, such as around the time of the 1893 Paknam incident, the Thai-French War 
(1940-1), or following the promulgation of anti-foreign laws such as the Cultural 
Mandates. But it is surprising to find them being raised in otherwise peaceful times, 
when there were no “hot” conflicts or the prospects of one. As late as 1911, Vicar- 
Apostolic Peixos still had to consult and request the Interior Minister (then Prince 
Damrong Rajanubhab)53 to intervene in the matter of abuses against Catholics in the 
northeast.54
31 R. Costet, Siam-Laos: Histoire de la Mission , p. 317.
52 Ibid.
53 A son o f  King Mongkut, Prince Damrong was bom in 1862, He became the Ministry o f  the North 
in 1892, which became the Interior Ministry in 1894. Among other tilings, during his time as minister, 
he was responsible for the overhauling o f  the provincial administration system and overseeing 
reforms in the national education and health systems. He resigned from his post in 1915 and was the 
founder o f  the Royal Institute o f Thailand. After the 1932 revolution, he was exiled to Penang. He 
was allowed to return in 1942 and died a year later in 1943.
54 B.A .A ., Notes on Visit to Prince Damrong, 9 January 1911,46/1/10.
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Furthermore, in 1933 the Vicar-Apostolic of Laos still had to appeal to the 
Siamese Prime Minister to crack down on anti-Catholic sentiments in the northeast, 
in particular in Sakon Nakhon:
The key point is, when we come to a village where Buddhism is in the 
majority, even if  there are Roman Catholics present, we hear people saying 
the most hurtful things such as ‘It is true that we do not see you, father, doing 
anything wrong. But we have heard news that you have come to preach the 
Roman Catholic faith in the hope of preparing the way for the French to 
occupy this place’.^
The appeal also reaffirmed the loyalty of the priests in Siamese territories to 
the newly promulgated Constitution, and to the Church’s non-interference in 
political matters as per the instruction of Pope Pius XI. Nevertheless, the rumours in 
1933 appeared to be so strong that even a forest monk had come to hear them. As Fr. 
Bayet noted, he and the parish catechist had on many occasion debated religion with 
the monk. However, meeting the monk on a trip in 1933, the monk said that: “I have 
heard a great deal that you did not come here so much for preaching religion! But 
that you’ve come here to take Thai land and give it to the foreigners”.56
Thus the link between the Catholic Church and French territorial 
encroachment was surprisingly strong in this area even in 1933. Consequently, some 
parishes suffered serious problems with anti-Catholic officials during this period but 
they were rare. For example, in a 1933 report, a parish priest noted the abusive 
nature of the local officials when the Catholic head of a new village o f Catholic 
converts was unceremoniously dismissed from his position by a higher official:
One or two days before he [the high official] left Sakon, he went to the new 
village and, without any semblance of formality, discharged the village
55 B.A.A., Appeal to the Siamese Prime Minister from Bishop Gouin, Vicar-Apostolic o f  Laos, 3 
August 1933,47/2/24.
d6 B.A.A., Re: Infamous Rumours, 21 August 1933, 47/2/34.
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headman from his post. As an explanation, he said to the headman: ‘You’re
of two hearts now,’ and that was it.57
The priest who compiled the report was in no doubt that the incident came 
about directly because of the village chiefs recent conversion to Catholicism, rather 
than for “other reasons” as stipulated by the local authorities.
Apart from once again highlighting local fears of Catholics being of “two 
hearts”, this incident also illustrates how local authorities could arbitrarily use their 
power. In remote regions, it is possible that some areas could be considered the 
“personal fiefdoms” of officials (or later, of elected officials), so long as their actions, 
legal or otherwise, remain hidden from higher authorities. At the same time, the 
situation indicates inconsistencies within and between the hierarchies of the Siamese 
local authority in terms of attitudes towards the Catholics. The lack o f a consistent, 
central policy arguably exacerbated this.
Thus, the inconsistent nature of the persecution of the Catholic Church in the 
1940s should perhaps be explained as much by the attitudes of the local authorities 
as through central policies. In the more remote regions, it was possible for local 
authorities to get away with various abuses, be they against ordinary citizens or 
Catholics, especially if they went unreported to the central authorities. The more 
unscrupulous local authorities could utilise anti-foreign rhetoric as convenient 
excuses for abuse, as well as a method for deflecting criticism, harassing 
communities (be they Catholics, ‘Fifth Columnists’, or later on, Communists and 
alleged drug dealers), as well as a way to acquire material benefits. But it was only 
when they knew that the central authorities would do little or nothing to mitigate or
57 B.A.A ., Report from Tha Rae, 21 August 1933,47/2/35.
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condemn their abuses that this became widespread, as was the case during the 
persecution.
Out of all the regions examined, the area governed by the Mission of Laos 
was by far the most problematic, with Sakon Nakhon being historically the most 
trouble-plagued area. While parishes in other regions encountered problems with 
local authorities and various members of the public, the extent and nature were very 
different. The Mission of Laos encountered regulations and laws that were specific 
to the region, and failed to establish a rapport with the authorities to negotiate a 
mutually acceptable compromise. Occasionally, they made matters worse by 
attempting to place themselves outside Siamese jurisdiction, consequently increasing 
resentment among the local authorities and public.
Nevertheless, ail the transgressions alone would still be insufficient to 
provoke a full-scale persecution, even during the war years. The northeastern 
parishes shared the same common characteristics with parishes in other regions, such 
as proximity to border areas, congregations consisting of ethnic minorities, the 
domination by foreign priests, and problems with local authorities. Yet other regions 
did not experience the same levels of persecution as the northeast. Moreover, the 
experiences between different parishes within the northeast were markedly different. 
Therefore, how could these inconsistencies be explained?
Arguably, the decisive factor was the region’s pre-disposition to anti-foreign 
rhetoric. To a certain extent, the rhetoric originated from an opportunistic desire of 
various parties to profit from the vulnerable legal and political situation of the 
Mission of Laos. By the 1930s the region was a cauldron of suspicion, directed 
unofficially at the French priests and their parishioners. Some of this sentiment was
207
built on unfounded rumours. But surely the perceived abuses by Catholic authorities 
and the reluctance of Catholics to involve themselves in communal displays of 
loyalty to the state would have created further suspicion among the local population 
or the Buddhist-centric authorities.
All that remained for a full-scale anti-Catholic persecution to be unleashed 
was for a leader in the central government to emerge and imply, regardless of the 
truth, that the French were indeed enemies of the state, that the Catholic religion was 
‘French’, and that their followers were ‘Fifth Columnists’. Pibul’s ideas were 
certainly novel in parts of the country, but in the northeast o f Thailand, his ideas 
merely reinforced existing pre-conceptions, and encouraged people to act on them 
when they may not have done so previously. Coupled with the freedom that local 
authorities in remote regions had to use or abuse their power and the result is almost 
predictable. Already, prior to the ascent of Pibul, some local authorities in the 
northeast were abusing their power against Catholic interests. While some officials 
may not have held any particular grudge against the Catholic Church, there were 
others who were merely waiting for a convenient excuse or pretext to act, which 
Pibul effectively provided.
Where was the Mission of Siam in all of this? The Mission of Siam was 
effectively caught between the Mission of Laos and the Siamese government. In 
theory, its role in this region should have been extremely limited, and ideally 
nonexistent. However, in practice, the Mission of Siam became the reluctant 
intermediary between the Mission of Laos and the Siamese government. While the 
priests and leader of the Mission of Laos were quite ready to invoke French 
intervention and extra-territorial rights at eveiy sign of Siamese intransigence, the 
Mission of Siam was much more cautious in its approach. Given the troubles
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provoked by the Mission of Laos and the Mission of Siam’s role in calming them, it 
is surprising that there was no pressure from the Mission of Siam leadership for the 
reversion of the northeast to it. It is likely that the Mission of Siam thought that the 
trouble would eventually go away, since they made no moves to suggest revisions in 
the arrangement. At the same time, even if there was a full reversion, the Mission of 
Siam, already financially hard-pressed, would have found it difficult to allocate 
additional funds for the parishes that would return to its control. All the Mission of 
Siam could do was to use a conciliatory approach to blunt the undiplomatic actions 
of its Laos counterpart. Yet it was this very association with the recalcitrant Mission 
that encouraged others to see the Mission of Siam as a collaborator of French 
‘colonial aggression’, especially following the 1893 crisis.
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Conclusion
To punish a man because we infer from the nature o f some doctrine which he holds, 
or from  the conduct o f other persons who hold the same doctrines with him, that he 
will commit a crime, is persecution, and is, in every case, foolish and wicked.
Thomas Babington
In conclusion the chapter has shown that the northeast was already a problematic 
area, even before the outbreak of the Thai-French War in 1940. The issue over the 
oath of allegiance ceremony directly raises the question of religious identity and 
national loyalty. As problematic as this issue came to be, arguably it should have 
been a non-issue. Historically, the problem was not a new one, having emerged as 
early as the late eighteenth century during the reign of King Taksin, and, indeed, the 
Mission of Siam had already negotiated and resolved the problem with the central 
authorities.
The real problem was that while the Mission of Siam knew the solution to the 
problem, the Mission of Laos, which was in charge of the northeast o f Siam, was not 
clear on this issue. Even when the Mission of Laos wanted to implement the 
Bangkok-negotiated solution, some of its priests, particularly the French ones, were 
often uninformed about the procedure. Consequently, these priests’ refusal to allow 
their congregation to participate in the ceremony encouraged the damning suspicion 
among locals that Catholics were disloyal subjects. Moreover, even when priests 
were aware of the procedure, it was sometimes the case that the local state officials 
were unaware that such a special procedure existed.
This situation implies that there is a dysfunctional relationship between the 
central organisations and their local agents during this period. It seems that neither 
the state nor the Mission authorities had a firm control over their agents. Although
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the central organisation could impose their will on their agents, this could only occur 
if  they were focused on the issue. In the 1920s and even up to the late 1930s, the 
government and the Missions were quite willing and able to co-operate to resolve 
issues. But because of the turbulent situation of the 1940s, their focus laid elsewhere. 
Consequently, local agents came to have more freedom of action than ever before, 
without having to be accountable to the centre. It was this dysfunctional relationship 
and the fact that the government’s attentions were diverted elsewhere that would 
allow the localised persecution events of the 1940s to take place.
In addition, there were also issues that exacerbated local tensions. The most 
significant were the issues that came with having a fixed geographical border. The 
border itself served as an active reminder of Siamese territorial losses following the 
1893 Paknam incident, especially for the locals whose families straddled the Mekong. 
These families were now subjected to new Siamese and French regulations that came 
with the border. Resentment on the Siamese side was also exacerbated by some 
Mission of Laos priests attempting to bypass the Siamese regulations with threats 
and bluster. This attitude directly contrasts with the Mission of Siam’s activities in 
the east. In that region, there were also parishes near to the border, but if  there were 
similar problems they were never so prominent in correspondence. This difference 
arguably stemmed from the presence of indigenous priests in the area and the fact 
that this area came under the jurisdiction of the Mission of Siam. Both the 
indigenous priests and the French leadership of the Mission of Siam were already 
experienced in Siamese law and effective methods of conducting negotiations with 
the Siamese authorities, unlike the Mission of Laos whose priests were perhaps more 
used to operating under the more accommodating French Indochinese conditions.
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The behaviour of the Mission of Laos priests further contributed to widening 
the gap between the Catholic and non-Catholic communities. They encouraged the 
suspicion that the French had designs on the territory: that the Catholics under their 
jurisdiction were Fifth Columnists who would eventually help the French 
colonialists to annex the area. This impression was strengthened by the arbitrary 
division of the Mission areas, where in the northeast these did not conform to 
national boundaries, unlike in the Mission areas in the west and the north.
The area was therefore already tense before 1940. All that was needed to 
trigger the persecution was official sanction. This came partly when conceptions of 
Thai identity changed. The behaviour of the students in Bangkok (as shown in 
Chapter III) indicated that this process of raising Buddhism’s role in the Thai 
national identity was already underway by as early as 1933. However, this change 
alone would have been insufficient to provoke such a violent reaction against the 
Catholic presence since, as Chapter I described, King Vajiravudh had earlier 
employed the idea without any untoward effects on the Mission. The decisive factor 
was arguably the Thai-French War. It furnished the government with an active and 
visible enemy with which to distinguish itself (for example through an emphasis on 
differences in religious beliefs: French Indochina was ‘Catholic’ while Thailand was 
‘Buddhist’) and encouraged anti-French attitudes throughout general society. In the 
rest of the Mission, this factor may have encouraged some mild actions against some 
Catholic parishes. However, in the northeast, they combined with pre-existing 
factors to produce some of the worst and most violent persecutions the Catholics 
were to see in the twentieth century.
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V
Persecution, 1940-45
He who mocks the infant’s faith  
Shall be mocked in age and death.
He who shall teach the child to doubt 
The rotting grave shall ne ’er get out.
William Blake, Auguries o f  Innocence
The situation outlined by the previous chapter is that of a Mission in administrative 
fragmentation, resulting in different emphases and activities, under the common 
aegis of Catholicism. By 1939, Siam, or Thailand as it became that year, was 
divided administratively into three separate Missions -  the Missions of Ratchaburi, 
Siam, and Laos, with the North potentially making a fourth. Most importantly, the 
local reception of these separate Missions varied widely, which was remarkable 
since they were operating in the same country, along the same religious principles. 
The most recent of the divisions, the Mission of Ratchaburi, was largely welcomed 
despite (or perhaps because of) the difference of the new priests’ nationality from 
their M.E.P. predecessors. Similarly, the Mission of Siam was operating on a largely 
amicable basis and its expansion to the north was welcomed by most, with the 
possible exception of the existing Protestant communities there. Although the 
Mission of Siam came into conflict with the central government in terms of 
education policies in the closing years o f the 1930s, the extent of these problems was 
incomparable to the problems that plagued the Mission of Laos.
In contrast to the Mission of Siam’s conciliatory approach, the Mission of 
Laos seemed to provoke confrontation with the Siamese government on every 
possible occasion. Coupled with pre-existing anti-French sentiment in the area, it 
was not surprising that anti-Catholic persecution, when it occurred in the first half of
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the 1940s, was the most intensive in this area. That persecution had not emerged in 
the pre-1940 period in the northeast was arguably due to a lack of opportunity rather 
than a lack of intention. While other areas, notably Bangkok, Nonthaburi, and 
Singhburi, also saw warning signs of a change in government and local attitudes 
towards the Catholic Mission, they were not taken seriously at the time by the 
Mission authorities. Even so, these signs cannot fully explain the outbreak of 
intimidation and assault in areas that, previously, had not seen any significant trouble 
between the clergy and elements of the local community. The explanation for these 
incidents, it seems, can be found as much in the effects of nationalistic propaganda 
as in other ulterior motives, such as personal conflicts and the desire for material 
gain.
Opportunity for would-be persecutors came in the form of the irredentist 
movement, whose aim was to reclaim territory ceded to the French following the 
Paknam crisis of 1893. For the government, the irredentists were arguably one of the 
first public movements to surface after the 1932 coup. Before, politics in democratic 
Thailand was restricted to conflicts between various factions within parliament, and 
outside and direct participation by the population was rare. The movement thus 
presented the government with a dilemma. Would the government deny the 
aspirations of the movement, however detrimental it may be in the long-term, 
thereby damaging its democratic credentials? Or would it attempt to exploit the 
movement as a vehicle to further its own interests, popularity, and thereby extend its 
grip on power, regardless of the constitutional consequences?
When the persecution broke out, the wide variations that occurred across the 
country — from a brief ‘token’ intimidation to extra-judicial executions — suggest a 
lack of a unified, consistent government policy against the Catholic Missions.
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Within the Missions themselves, there were also contradictory forces at work, 
especially among the French priests that still remained in Thailand. When Thailand 
went to war with French Indochina, on whose side would the French M.E.P. priests 
stand? Would they stand on the side of their original motherland? If so, did they 
care that the government of Indochina nominally owed its allegiance to the Vichy 
government? Or would they stand on the side of their, as they themselves termed it,
“patn'e d'adoption \  even as they faced local hostility purely for their national origin? 
Or would they be diplomats and declare themselves for the Catholic Church and 
render nationalities irrelevant? Then there was the question of the Italian Salesians -  
how far would they exploit their advantageous position at the expense of their 
French colleagues? Finally and most importantly, there were the indigenous priests 
and parishioners. Some indigenous priests who had been perfectly content under the 
French administration took the opportunity to agitate for greater powers. In some 
cases, particularly for the parishes on the eastern seaboard, it was a perfectly logical 
progression. However, other cases raise questions as to whether this agitation was 
really a result of principles, bom from effective nationalistic propaganda or a more 
personal matter. These cases suggest that the phenomenon of the anti-Catholic 
persecution can also be explained through an examination of personal and economic 
interests.
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Auguries of Violence
The Indian plays much the same vole in our American society that the Jews played in 
Germany. Like the miner's canary,1 the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to 
poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment o f Indians, even more 
than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic
faith.
Felix Cohen, 1953
While there is a world of difference between the experiences of the Native 
Americans and the Catholics of Siam, the missionaries and their congregation can 
still be regarded as ‘canaries’ reflecting the rise and fall of the 1932 Constitution’s 
strength and the extent to which Pibul’s brand of anti-French nationalism, that is the 
official endorsement of anti-French attitudes as opposed to the pre-existing unofficial, 
localised phenomenon had been received.
Already, it can be assumed that there were certain areas that would be more 
susceptible to anti-foreign sentiments than others. The northeast was a case in point. 
There were frequent and vehement conflicts with the local authorities and the 
documents give the impression of an atmosphere that was rather hostile to 
missionary activities. In addition, even with the Mission of Siam’s forbearance in 
entering the area during periods of French belligerence in the late nineteenth century, 
there were already signs of distrust in the motives of the missionaries among non- 
Catholic locals. Together with the region’s proximity to French colonial territories 
and the transfer of leadership to the foreign Mission of Laos in 1899, the northeast 
was a powder-keg waiting to be ignited. It is thus unsurprising to find that the worst
Before the advent ot modem safety devices, one o f  the few early warning devices available to those 
involved in mining were canaries -  singing birds that would succumb to the toxic gases before it 
affected the miners. Should the canaries fall silent, it meant that the air was about to be too dangerous 
for humans.
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of the incidents -  the Songkhon incident and the arrest of Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung, 
occurred within this region.
Yet the fact remains that there were many more isolated Catholic villages and 
communities in the northeastern region and elsewhere and, while they faced various 
manifestations of persecution, it was never to the extent of Songkhon, Thus one can 
conclude that there were two forms of persecution: controlled and uncontrolled.
Both forms were repressive, but while the controlled version shared the aim of 
suppressing the French presence and activities in Thailand, it never would go to the 
extent o f taking lives (or, indeed, even formal internment) and seemed largely 
capable of making the distinction between national and religious identities. On the 
other hand, the uncontrolled version was unpredictable and, in most cases, lacked a 
strong basis in the policies of the central government. This version was not at all 
adverse to subjecting victims to false accusations, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, 
violence, and even death, regardless of the orders of the central government, 
established laws, and the 1932 Constitution.
The unique characteristics of each region also arguably encouraged variations 
in persecution. The region most likely to see the controlled persecution prevail is 
Bangkok, given its proximity to the central government. The stations in the north, 
with their newly opened facilities, would place local authorities in a dilemma -  
would they turn on the missionaries and deprive themselves of the Mission’s schools 
and other benefits? Or would they attempt to strike a balance between the edicts of 
the central government and their own attitude towards the missionaries and their 
facilities? The east, given its proximity to the French protectorate of Cambodia and 
a key naval battleground during the French-Thai war, was also a region at risk. Yet 
some of the risk could be mitigated by the presence of a longstanding indigenous
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clergy that had little conflict with the local authorities. Out of all the regions, it 
appeared that the west was the safest from persecution. Not only was there an 
absence ot volatile conflict with the local authorities but, crucially, the leadership of 
the Mission there was not French. Yet the difference in nationality would give rise 
to conflicts within the Mission itself, as the French missionaries saw their hitherto 
unchallenged influence wither in the face of persecution, and the Salesians filling the 
resulting vacuum.
It is clear therefore, that there were some areas that were safer than others -  
areas where the canaries were still singing, as it were. But such clarity is achieved 
through hindsight. To contemporary observers, the signs were obscure and often 
clouded by local dimensions and other considerations. A land dispute at Immaculate 
Conception Church in Bangkok is a case in point. The parish had been a 
battleground between some tenants and the indigenous parish priest, Fr. Andre, since 
the late 1930s. The dispute involved a group of residents that had been evicted from 
church land. Their eviction followed complaints from other parishioners about the 
evictees’ illegal and “immoral” activities on parish land.2 A later petition by some 
parishioners goes into further detail: the thugs were involved in setting up gambling 
dens and the manufacture of moonshine and were intimidating the local community, 
so much so that “many had sold their property to escape the troubles”. More 
worryingly, at least one member of the gang appeared to have the support of the son 
of an aristocrat (Chao Khun Samut Sakdarak) and a printing press.3 It was this 
access to a patron and a printing press that escalated the conflict beyond the bounds 
of the parish. The battle was fought out in newspapers and even Pibul publicly 
expressed his opinion that Fr. Andre should be stripped of his post and another priest,
2 B.A .A ., Fr. Andre to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 18 March 1937, 30/1/40.
3 B .A.A., Petition to Fr. Andre, 7 November 1937, 30/1/48.
Fr. Henri, should take his place.4 The fact that figures in government were willing to 
interfere in what was essentially a local and ecclesiastical matter should have been of 
some concern to the Mission authorities but it appeared that they remained 
unperturbed. Indeed, despite the escalation of the situation, the Mission still saw the 
matter as a purely local problem, rather than as an indicator of the government’s 
intensifying animosity towards the Catholic Missions.
More worrying for the Mission were the June and September 1930 incidents 
at Bangbuathong (Nonthaburi province) and Ban Paeng (Singhburi province), where 
circumstances were much murkier. There, churches had been burnt down and the 
local and Mission authorities disputed the causes of the blaze. In a letter to the 
French charge d ’affaires, the Vicar-Apostolic insisted that the cause of the fire was 
deliberate:
The fire started outside in the part of the property where there are no houses 
and the incredible violence of the flames during the peak of the monsoon is 
proof that the cause of the flame was malicious. 5
On the other hand, initial official reports denied the possibility of arson, 
insisting that the incident was accidental.6 A second investigation was called at the 
behest of the French charge d’affaires, but that too failed to turn up anything that 
indicated arson. The police investigation did turn up evidence that there were some 
in the community who were discontented with the parish’s refusal to allow their 
cattle to graze on parish grounds, but it quickly added that this was an insufficient 
motive for arson.7 Whether this judgement is accurate or not will never be known.
4 B.A.A ., Fr. Andre to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 13 April 1937, 30/3/42.
5 B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic to French Charge d’affaires, 26 September 1930, 43/1/31.
6 B.A.A ., Ministry o f  the Interior to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 11 October 1930,43/1/30.
7 B.A.A ., Secret Police Report, 22 December 1930, 43/1/32.
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Nevertheless, in the annual report to the M.E.P. headquarters in Paris, the 
Vicar-Apostolic remained uncertain whether the incidents were “due to fortuitous 
accidents or ill will”, adding that “we are unable to find out any more in either 
case”.8 The Mission, therefore, seemed aware that local hostility had the potential to 
manifest itself in violence against property: but this case occurred in 1930, a decade 
before the persecution movement occurred. That violence did not occur on the scale 
of the 1940s during this period was arguably because the Mission still retained the 
full public support of the government, while nationalist rhetoric during this period 
was still not explicitly anti-French. It was perhaps the absence of these two elements 
that lulled the Mission into a false sense of security in the 1930s and allowed it to 
view the events as a purely local phenomenon. The missionaries could have 
expected further trouble from this particular parish, but they could not predict that 
this sort of incident would soon occur across their holdings.
What also encouraged the Mission to continue in this complacency were the 
mixed messages being given out by the constitutional government. As late as 1939, 
the Mission was still being invited to participate in state celebrations and was not 
being excluded in any way. On the newly promulgated Constitution Days (24 June — 
the anniversary of the 1932 revolution and 10 December — the anniversary of the 
promulgation of the permanent 1932 Constitution), churches were to be decorated 
with the national flag, bells were to be rung, and Masses were to be said “for the 
prosperity of the Thai nation”.9 The Mission had been involved in such celebrations 
since 193210 and, on occasion, had even been praised for its participation. In 1934 
the Prime Minister, Phraya Phahon, wrote to Vicar-Apostolic Perros congratulating
s M.E.P. A., Compte-Rendu, 1931-32.
9 B .A.A., Bangkok City Hall to Fr. Oilier, 7-12 June 1939, 31/4/69-71.
10 In this case, it was for the 10 December, the day when the permanent 1932 Constitution was 
promulgated: B .A .A ., Ministry o f  the Interior to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 3 December 1932, 60/1/27.
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him on the occasion of a Mission school winning first prize in a float competition 
during the Constitution celebrations of that year, and expressing his appreciation for 
the “love of the nation, the monarchy, and the constitution” held by the Catholics." 
The celebrations of 1936 appeared to have been especially successful, with officials 
praising the participation of the Catholic schools, writing that “the results were very 
pleasing to the general population”. The Vi car-Apostolic was subsequently invited 
to be one of the members of the committee co-ordinating student activities.12 Even 
Pibul was still inclined to be diplomatic in 1938, writing personally to Vicar- 
Apostolic Perros on the occasion of the death of Pope Pius XI, expressing his 
“personal sincere grief and sympathy on this sad occasion”.13
Superficially, therefore, there was little reason for the Mission to be 
concerned. Undoubtedly there were government intrusions into the Mission’s 
traditional spheres of interest and outbreaks of worrying incidents, but these could be 
dealt with on a case-by-case basis or could be dismissed as purely local phenomena. 
To that end it could be said that, by 1940, most of the canaries were still singing with 
the possible exception o f those in the northeast. Even if the Mission had been fully 
aware of the threat (and it clearly was not), by 1939, there was little that could have 
been done short of handing over control of the entire Mission to an indigenous 
clergy that was not yet ready for the responsibility. The matter would also have to 
be referred to M.E.P. headquarters, as well as the relevant Vatican agencies, since 
the Vicar-Apostolic was not empowered with the authority to create an indigenous 
ministry on a personal whim, even in extremis. Indeed, the effect of such a 
premature move taken under duress would arguably have been as devastating as the
" B.A.A., Phraya Pliahonphonphayuhasena to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 29 September 1934, 59/4/6.
12 B.A.A., Committee for the 1937 Constitution Fete to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 14 September 1937, 
60/6/4.
13 B.A.A., Pibulsongkhram to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 18 February 1938, 60/6/8.
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outbreak of persecution, if not more so, to the long-term development of Catholicism 
in Thailand.
When the government’s attitudes changed, it was sudden, occurring on the 
back of unexpected military and political developments in Europe and Asia. France 
had fallen to the Nazi blitzkrieg unexpectedly quickly, while Germany’s Asian ally, 
Imperial Japan, was inexorably expanding its influence southwards. At the same 
time, the shift in the Thai government’s attitude was built on the foundation of 
longstanding anti-French resentment. The resentment could be traced as far back as 
the attempted colonial incursion in the seventeenth century but, more recently, to the 
Paknam incident of 1893. The latter incident led to the loss of territory to the French 
at the expense and humiliation of the Siamese, and influenced the nationalism of 
Vajiravudh, from which many of the visions of Pibul took their cue. The Paknam 
incident had occurred under the absolutist government. Would it therefore not be 
tempting for the new, constitutional government, anxious to differentiate itself from 
the failures of absolutism, to make the redressing of this historic wrong the first in a 
long line of crowning achievements when the opportunity presented itself?
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Manifestations
Even in the first three centuries, when persecution after persecution, inspired by Hell, 
fell upon the infant Church in a raging attempt to crush her, even then when the 
whole o f civilisation was deluged with Christian blood, out on the far frontiers o f the 
Empire the heralds o f the gospels journeyed, announcing their tidings.
Benedict XV, Maximum Illud, 30 November 1919
The opportunity for the Thai government to engineer the return of territories lost to 
French Indochina came through a conjunction of three factors. The first was the fall 
of France, which left the French central government and many of its colonies in 
disarray.14 French unity was further undermined by the creation of the Vichy 
government and the emergence of the Free French forces. The resulting weakness 
offered the Thai government an unprecedented opportunity to exploit. The second 
factor were the ambitions held by Imperial Japan, vis-a-vis the European colonies in 
Southeast Asia.13 The strategic position of Thailand meant that any Japanese attempt 
to incorporate Malaya, Singapore, or Burma into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere would have to take the attitude of the Thai government into consideration.16
14 The situation in French Indochina was not immediately exploited by Thailand but Japan, which was 
eventually allowed to set up military bases in French Indochina. Probably inspired by Japan’s 
example, the Pibul government subsequently asked to settle the disputed border between Thailand and 
French Indochina. The French response was a mixture o f  delay, which indicated weakness, and 
defiance, both o f  which provoked a more aggressive Thai response, eventually leading to the border 
skirmishes and the Thai-French war, see Direk Jayanama, Thailand and W orld War II (Silkworm 
Books, Chiang Mai, 2008), pp. 23-4, 32, 35.
b Matsuoka Yosuke, the Japanese Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, had outlined the concept o f ‘Japan’s 
living sphere’ as early as 30 July 1940. Although there had been earlier formulations, they were not 
as thorough. Included in this sphere were French Indochina, Borneo, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch 
East Indies, Australia, N ew  Zealand, and India, and Thailand. It seems that, in this scheme, the 
Philippines came under another zone. In any case, according to its “Asia for Asians” slogan, it was 
clear that Japan was unwilling to see these territories “remain under the administration o f  any country 
outside East Asia”. See W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945  (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1991), pp. 227-8.
16 In their calculations for the defence o f  Malaya, the British authorities were unclear as to where the 
Japanese would attack until they began the construction o f  bases in southern Indochina, raising the 
possibility that the attack would come through southern Siam. Operation Matador was thus 
formulated, where British forces based in Malaya would effectively invade southern Siam to take up 
position to repel the Japanese invasion. The plan had the fatal flaw in that it relied on Japan violating 
Siam’s neutrality first (since one o f  Japan's likely points o f  invasion was southern Siam, the plan 
would be and was effectively pre-empted). In the event o f the actual invasion, the Japanese forces 
landed at Songkhla, Pattani, and Kota Bahru. Following the end o f  the Pacific War, the British were
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There was the danger that Japan would simply take over Thailand: but the invasion 
and occupation of the only independent nation in Southeast Asia would have 
undermined the Japanese propaganda o f ‘liberating’ colonies from Western 
imperialists.17 As such, the situation allowed the Thai government significant 
leverage in obtaining reluctant Japanese support for its ambitions. The third factor 
was domestic support through the vocal irredentist movement, whipped up in part by 
government propaganda efforts. Previous political activities were largely restricted 
to conflicts between political factions, mainly inside the Assembly. The rebellions 
and coup attempts throughout the 1930s were arguably the continuation of such 
politics by other means. The irredentists, however, were different, since they were 
arguably the first instance of a mass public movement in Thai political history. 
Certainly they were the first to employ mass street demonstrations in Thai history 
and it seems Pibul was conscious of the importance of the movement, since he 
personally came to receive irredentist student demonstrators on at least two 
occasions.18
The “Thai Blood” Group (.Khana lueat Thai) that was responsible for much 
of the uncontrolled persecution was an offshoot of the irredentist movement. At first, 
the group appears to be an unofficial, independent group. However, their unusual 
level of organisation indicates a degree of official sanction since they had chapters in 
Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and Phanasnikhom in the east of the country. Indeed, their
certainly more conscious than ever about the strategic position o f  Thailand in the defence o f  Malaya. 
See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand (University o f Hawaii, Honolulu, 1991), p. 202 and N.
Barber, Sinister Twilight: the F all o f  Singapore (Collins, Glasgow, 1985), p. 10, and Direk Jayanama, 
Thailand and World War I f  p. 327.
17 In contrast to North Asia, the Japanese envisioned their role in Southeast Asia as a combination o f 
Britain’s role as the Taw-giver’ and France’s role as the ‘civiliser o f  liberated peoples’. Figuratively, 
the relationship was to be a paternalistic one, like that between a little brother and a big brother (even 
if  in reality this was far from the case), see W.G. Beasley, Japanese Im perialism , pp. 245, 256.
18 The main destination for these rallies was the Ministry o f Defence, where Pibul would come out 
personally to welcome them. Many o f  the gatherings were also instigated by the Thai Blood Group.
See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, pp. 154, 157.
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leader was Prasert Tharisawat, an official in the Government Propaganda Bureau.19 
Prasert himself was the younger brother of Luang Thamrongnawasawat, the Minister 
of Justice from 1938-44.20 However, there appear to be no other government 
officials directly affiliated with the group, suggesting that if they were not opposing 
the agenda of the Thai Blood Group, they were not comfortable actively promoting it 
either.
Nevertheless, this group was the only one to be consistently mentioned by 
name in missionary accounts as a major perpetrator of harassment against the 
Catholic Church, its property, and its personnel. From the group’s announcements it 
seems its campaign sprung from the belief that Buddhism was the only valid religion 
for Thais -  a belief that arguably drew some inspiration from the nationalism of King 
Vajiravudh but was further reinforced by the Cultural Mandates and its support for a 
“Thailand for Thais”. Looking back on the events that had befallen them, the 
missionaries were clear in their view as to how the persecution occurred. The 1940- 
46 report of Vicar-Apostolic Perros argued that:
The political conflict was the occasion of an open persecution against the 
Catholic religion. Under the pretext of national religious unity, the Catholics 
were declared enemies of the state [and] all sorts of calumnies and 
accusations were levelled against them without control.21
This view has been echoed in subsequent explanations and accounts of the 
Thai persecution against Catholicism.22 As an immediate cause of the outbreak of 
violence against Catholics, this argument is certainly attractive. However, it ignores
u  J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, pp. 153, 174.
0 Born in 1901, Luang Thamrongnawasawat (also Thawal Tharisawat) was a naval promoter who 
studied at the Thai naval academy. He held various cabinet posts, including Minister o f  the Interior, 
1936-8, Minister ot Justice 1938-44, as w ell as the position o f  prime minister from August 1946- 
November 1947. See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 377.
21 M.E.P.A., Compte-rendu, 1940-45.
“  R. Costet, Siam-Laos: H istoire de la Mission , pp. 427-8.
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the local conditions and the inconsistencies in the methods of persecution. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, each region had its own relationship with the local 
authorities and communities. Sometimes they were cordial, as in the case of the 
Mission of Ratchaburi; in other cases, like the northeast, they were problematic, at 
best. The correlation between good community relations, or lack thereof, and the 
severity of the persecution is strong. During the persecution, none o f the 
northeastern parishes was left untouched. All had seen either their facilities closed 
down, destroyed, or otherwise confiscated. On the other hand, while the parishes of 
Ratchaburi did encounter some problems with the local authorities during this period, 
they occurred at a much later date (after 1943) and were incomparable in severity to 
that of, say, the case of Songkhon.
The lack of a clear policy against the Catholics (or against their persecutors) 
reflected the contradictions within the central government -  essentially an uneasy 
coalition of politicians divided along military and civilian lines, ultra-nationalist and 
constitutionalist lines, as well as pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese lines. Ultra­
nationalist slogans such as “Thailand for Thais” were useful in galvanising popular 
support for the government at a difficult time, but there was a danger that, when 
taken too far, they would undermine a government whose legitimacy was based on 
the 1932 Constitution -  one that guaranteed certain rights, such as freedom of 
religious belief, to all citizens. Pridi’s alacrity in reaffirming constitutional liberties 
following the fall o f the first Pibul government in 1944 is an indication of the 
constitutionalist’s concern at the damage that had been wrought during the rule of 
Pibul’s military faction. At the same time, some members of the Pibul cabinet had a 
personal stake in keeping ultra-nationalists on a tight leash. For example, Luang 
Aduldejarat, a Muslim, was certainly uneasy with the uncontrolled (perhaps, to an
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extent, uncontrollable) actions of his subordinates in his capacity as the police 
director-general and deputy prime minister.23 He, along with many others in the 
government, would have been conscious that if the ultra-nationalists went out of 
control, there was no telling who or what other religious or ethnic minority they 
would target next. At the same time, there was also a danger that if the government 
did not appease the rampaging mobs, they would be accused of failing to respond to 
the ‘democratic’ aspirations o f the people.
The delicate balance was heavily influenced by international developments. 
Undoubtedly, there were some who could not resist profiting politically and 
economically from the fall or weakening of the European colonies in the face of a 
seemingly invincible Japan. On the other hand, the inevitability of the Allies’ 
victory after 1943 allowed the constitutionalists, along with the members of the Free 
Thai movement, sufficient leverage to ease Pibul’s government out of power and 
initiate attempts to reaffirm the constitutional order.
The persecution itself conformed to two broad categories. The first type, the 
controlled persecution, was centrally driven and much of it was directed against 
French nationals and the Chinese ethnic minority rather than specifically against 
Catholics. Notably, the controlled persecution was limited in its time-span (the 
duration of the Thai-French War) and territorial extent (mainly to provinces close to 
the Thai-French Indochina border, as covered by the emergency decrees). 
Nevertheless, given the ethnic composition of the Catholic parishes and clergy, these 
measures inevitably had an indirect effect on the operations of the Catholic Missions.
“3 B om  in 1894, Luang Aduldejarat was the son o f  a British subject from Ceylon. He graduated from 
the Thai military academy in 1915, the same year as Pibul. He was a member o f  the junior army 
promoters’ faction and became the deputy director-general o f the police in 1933, rising to director- 
general o f  the police in 1935, a position which he kept until 1945. He also held the post o f  deputy 
prime minister from 1941 to 1944. He was one o f  the leaders o f  the Thai resistance (Seri Thai) 
movement, became Army commander in 1946 and retired from public life in November 1946. See 
J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 367.
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In contrast, the second type of persecution was uncontrolled, unpredictable, and 
more driven by local groups and interests. Ulterior motives made themselves clear 
in the uncontrolled persecution through the many incidents of confiscation, rather 
than destruction, and may also explain some of the most severe cases of persecution 
-  the Songkhon murders and the arrest and trial of Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung.
In most cases there was no linear progression or a fixed pattern to the 
persecution. Indeed, some parishes like Songkhon experienced multiple 
manifestations. First, the village priest was expelled, according to the official orders, 
and this was shortly followed by the assassination and executions. The transfer of 
the local police unit responsible for the murders did not end the persecution as the 
villagers faced manipulative local officials,24 as well as the destruction of their 
chapel.2"’ In contrast, within the same period, eastern parishes faced minor 
harassment from the local authorities or incidents of vandalism. However, by 1944, 
when churches were still being burnt down in the northeast, priests and nuns in the 
eastern parishes were free to go on a major boat trip (requiring five boats) with their 
parishioners in Rayong province to the site of one of the naval battles of the Thai- 
French War. The trip was possible because of a jump in the parish’s revenue, when 
they managed to sell 10,000 baht worth of fish that year,26 in spite of the Thai Blood 
Group calling for a trade boycott against Catholic businesses in a nearby province. 
The lack of uniformity and co-ordination in the persecutions outside the official 
expulsion orders suggests that, ultimately, they were a local phenomenon rather than 
the results of a centrally co-ordinated policy.
24 Archbishop Lawrence Khai Saen-Phon-On et al, Bunyarasi lhang jed , pp. 54-5.
0  B.A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti to Interior Minister, 10 September 1944 in V. Larque, En 
Thailande de 1940 d 1945, pp. 215-218.
26 B.A .A ., Fr. Thomas to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 1 February 1944, 35/4/14.
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Controlled Persecution
I  do not ask you to hate the Chinese; I  ask only that you think more o f  yourselves.
King Vajiravudh
On 28 November 1940 all Europeans, specifically French citizens, were ordered to 
vacate the border areas in the northeast and the east within 24-48 hours and were 
given the choice of either coming to Bangkok or leaving for another country.27 The 
policy followed an incident in which five French planes had flown over Naklion 
Phanom with “dubious intent”. Thai fighters were scrambled to intercept whereupon 
the French planes bombed the town, resulting in the injury of six civilians. The Thai 
air force then retaliated on the same day with a bombardment of French military 
barracks across the border.28 However, even at this early stage, the implementation 
of the forced evacuation was inconsistent. Some priests, such as Fr. Paul Figuet, the 
parish priest o f Songkhon, were able to leave relatively easily by merely crossing the 
Mekong into French Indochina. In contrast, priests in other areas encountered 
problems ranging from harassment to violence and detention. For example, three 
priests in Nong Saeng including Mgr. Gouin, the Vicar-Apostolic of Laos (1922-43), 
were jailed in a “cage” by soldiers and the police before being expelled. Meanwhile, 
Fr. Excoffon, the Provincial o f Laos, was badly beaten while a nun o f the same 
parish, Sister Yvonne of the Order of St. Paul, was pushed off in a small boat and 
abandoned in the middle of the Mekong without a rower. Foreign priests in the 
eastern parishes also received similar treatment. Fr. Richard in Paetriu,
“7 At this point, the order only applied to the northeast, the east, and certain provinces in the north. 
However, French priests were still allowed to stay in certain areas (as Vicar-Apostolic Perros and the 
leadership o f  the Mission o f  Siam did in Bangkok throughout the war) and none were officially  
expelled although many faced unofficial pressure not to return. If priests and nuns left the country, it 
was either because it was easier than going to Bangkok or found that their expertise would be put to 
better use elsewhere.
2S Direk Jayanama, Thailand and World War // , p. 40.
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Chachoengsao province, was taken in the middle of the night by a dozen policemen, 
beaten, and exposed to a mob before being beaten again. After that he was taken to 
another police station and made to sign a declaration that he would leave the area 
within 48 hours, at which point he was freed. At the same time, other priests like Fr. 
Carrie were merely threatened and made to promise that they would leave in 48 
hours.29
At this stage, the central government’s main concern was for the aliens to 
vacate the crisis area for either another country or to Bangkok, where they could be 
placed under the government’s control and scrutiny: both alternatives were designed 
to curtail the activities of foreign agents in the approaching conflict with French 
Indochina. Nevertheless, it is telling that the government did not issue orders to kill 
or harm those who had to be evacuated but merely to detain and force them to leave, 
or arrest them and send them to police headquarters if they resisted.30 In the absence 
of clear orders, local authorities implemented their own interpretation o f the official 
policy. Even so, at least up until December 1940 when full-scale hostilities broke 
out between Thailand and French Indochina, local authorities were prepared to act in 
this manner only against foreigners.
Following the commencement of hostilities, a further order was given by the 
police on 6 January 1941 for all remaining French missionaries in the provinces to 
assemble in Bangkok,31 indicating that the earlier forced evacuation had not been 
entirely successful. There were also additional instructions for the police that “in 
informing them of this measure, the police must inform them with absolute 
politeness with no exceptions, unless they are ordered to do otherwise by the chief of
29 B.A.A ., Treatment inflicted on missionaries in Thailand, Undated, Beatification Documents 166/1.
30 C.B.A., Police Department Order 6/2483, Re: Dealing with French citizens in certain instances, 28 
November 1940.
31 B .A.A., Notes on the religious events in Thailand, October 1940-March 1941, 24 February 1941, 
Beatification Documents, 182/2.
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police”,32 suggesting that the police were aware of the abuses that had taken place 
under the previous evacuation order. Nevertheless, the police restrictions on the 
movement of the missionaries meant that they were unable to work and, by February 
1941, many had decided that it was better to leave the country and be more 
productive elsewhere. In total, 13 priests from the Order of St. Gabriel, 13 
missionaries, and 12 sisters from the orders of St. Paul and Ursulines had left in this 
manner.33 It is telling that neither they, nor the Mission hierarchy in Bangkok, were 
officially expelled from the country by the central government at any point during 
the Thai-French or the Pacific Wars.
By July 1941, the Thai-French War was over and the orders issued on 28 
November 1940 and 6 January 1941 were rescinded. The head of the police, Luang 
Aduldejarat, also confirmed that French citizens were free to travel to the provinces, 
as long as they observed the relevant laws. Furthermore, any weapons that had been 
confiscated as per the order of 6 January 1941 could also be reclaimed.3,4 Such a 
quick restoration o f ‘official’ rights was arguably helped by the fact that despite the 
aimed clashes between Thailand and France, a state of war was never officially 
declared, while diplomatic relations between the two countries continued during the 
conflict.3- The unusual state o f affairs suggests a degree of ambiguity within the 
government with regard to the actions against France. Certainly, French diplomats 
were appreciative of the “impartial attitude and statesmanlike qualities”36 their Thai 
counterparts displayed during the negotiations, notwithstanding the vociferous anti- 
French protests that were taking place at the time.
C.B.A., Police Department Order 1/2484, Re: Dealing with French citizens in certain instances, 6 
January 1941.
33 B .A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to French Ambassador to Japan, 17 April 1941, Beatification  
Documents, 193.
j4 B .A .A ., Police order 9/2484, 28 July 1941, Beatification Documents, 191.
33 Direk Jayanama, Thailand and World War II, p. 45.
36 Ibid., p. 46.
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Furthermore, following the cessation of hostilities in January 1941, officials 
in the Thai central government were publicly condemning the excesses that had been 
committed in the name of religion during the conflict with France. For example, on 
1 February 1941, Luang Aduldejarat tried to convince Thais that “from now on the 
pressure, threats, and compulsion with regards to religious conformity must come to 
an end”, and that such matters should be left to the police. The police chief gave the 
following reasoning:
In supporting the government’s call for a rectification of the border between 
Thailand and French Indochina...some people have been excessively 
violent...some cases were covers for corruption and personal interests and 
even murders and assassinations.. .all of this has an impact on foreigners with 
friendly relationships to Thailand.. .and is against government policy. It is a 
reason for unrest and is immoral, inhuman, and unbecoming of a civilised 
race.37
Thus, by this evidence alone, it seems that the centrally directed ‘persecution’ 
of the missionaries was over by July 1941. Furthermore, Luang Aduldejarat’s words 
provide strong evidence that there was indeed no official policy against the Catholics 
and that certain members of the central government were aware of, and discouraged, 
the policy abuses in the provinces. Certainly normality had nominally been restored 
in parts of the country by April 1942 when the Vicar-Apostolic wrote:
At this time the troubles have much subsided. The government have seen 
that those who truly hold the Catholic religion are trustworthy and good 
citizens and have permitted the re-opening of many Catholic churches that 
had been closed down such as in Chonburi, Prachinburi, Kok Wat, Ubon, 
Nakhon Phanom, Tha Jin, and so on.38
However, the Mission continued to be affected indirectly by other policies, 
such as the twelve Cultural Mandates that were issued by the government between
37 Nikorn newspaper, 4 February 1941 in B .A.A., V. Larque, En Thailande de 1940 a 1945, p. 143.
38 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Governor o f  Phitsanulok, 23 April 1942, Beatification  
Documents, 209.
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June 1939 and April 1940. The Cultural Mandates affected everyone in Thai society 
but the one that had the most effect on the Catholic community was the second, 
issued on 3 July 1939 that urged Thai citizens not to act as proxies for foreign 
powers and not to sell land to foreigners. Again, the measure was not expressly 
directed at the French or the Catholics. Indeed the government applied these 
measures only to those not covered by treaty obligations (i.e. the Chinese) and, since 
the Missions operating in Thailand were covered by several treaties, they were 
legally safe. Nevertheless, the foreign composition of the Missions1 leadership, as 
well as their substantial landholdings placed them in a particularly vulnerable 
situation -  one that could be exploited by the unscrupulous.
Indeed, the main targets of the Cultural Mandates were the Chinese. The 
Chinese schools felt as much pressure from the ninth Cultural Mandate issued on 24 
June 1940 as the Catholic schools that remained open. The ninth Cultural Mandate 
required all Thai nationals to know and use the Thai language. While the Catholic 
schools were consistent in their attempts to apply government standards in their 
institutions before 1939, many Chinese schools were not as assiduous, and thus the 
1940s saw the mass closure of Chinese schools in Thailand. By the end of 1940 
there were no Chinese schools outside Bangkok, while in 1941 there were only two 
Chinese schools in the capital.39 Some restrictions, such as the prohibition on buying 
land and the forbidding of entry into certain parts of the countiy, were similar to 
those that applied to the missionaries. However, the Chinese faced additional limits 
on their activities, such as the ban on entering certain professions as well as 
additional taxation.40 In the case of the Chinese Catholics, of which there were a 
substantial number, it is difficult to assess whether they were being persecuted
39 Liang Chua Morita, ‘Language Shift in the Thai Chinese Community’, Journal o f  Multilingual and  
M ulticultural D evelopm ent, 24, 6 (2003), p. 490.
40 Ibid., pp. 491-2.
233
because they were Chinese or because they were Catholic. Certainly their status as a 
double minority left them vulnerable to exploitation one way or another.
The Cultural Mandates were thus instrumental in continuing the persecution 
against Catholics well beyond July 1941. Nevertheless, while discrimination against 
the Chinese ethnic minority was officially expressed numerous times through the 
Cultural Mandates, as well as through direct legislation, discrimination against 
Catholics was never officially sanctioned. If anything, the government remained 
confused over the issue. For example, on 12 May 1944, the Office of the Prime 
Minister issued a Viratham khong Chat Thai (“Heroic Virtues of the Thai Nation”) 
designed to “support the orderly building of our nation, as appropriate to a nation 
with a civilised culture”. The fourteen virtues were arguably a distillation of Pibul’s 
vision of Thai identity. These ranged from the nationalistic “Thais love the nation 
more than life” along the lines of King Vajiravudh, to the authoritarian “Thailand is 
an obedient nation and follows its leader”, to the more benign “Thailand is a nation 
that extols children, women, and the elderly” and “Thailand is a nation that loves 
peace”. Out of fourteen virtues, the one most relevant to Catholics was the eighth 
which read: “Thailand is a nation that worships the Buddhist religion like life 
itself’.1,1 Yet this declaration seemed to be a contradiction of PibuFs position where 
he held that:
In practical terms, I have the opinion that all religions have the same 
teachings and whichever is the most efficacious or appropriate is up to the 
conscience of the individual.142
At the same time, certain members of the Pibul government were themselves 
in a vulnerable situation when it came to religious matters. Luang Aduldejarat, for
41 Thamsuk Numnond, Mttang Thai sam ai Songkhram lok khrang thi sons* (Saitharn, Bangkok, 2005),
p. 100.
42 Tamruat newspaper, Undated, in B .A.A., V. Larque, En Thailande de 1940 a 1945 , p. 143.
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example, was a Muslim, which allows for an alternative interpretation of his 
statement against religious persecution in February 1941. Given how far the 
persecution of the Catholics had gone beyond central control, some government 
officials perhaps wondered where such a ‘grassroots’ movement left unchecked 
would go next. Certainly, Muslims were not left untouched, as one Bangkok Times 
article indicated:
The University, I understand, does not allow Mohammedan students to study 
there, though one of its teachers, is said to be a Mohammedan convert. I do 
not know whether or not there is also discrimination against Thai Christians 
in the University. As you must know, Christians are now debarred from 
becoming officers in the Army, Navy, and Police, and more or less in the 
Civil Service too. To put it frankly, the article in the Constitution about 
religious liberty is now a dead letter.43
In the same period, Malay leaders sent petitions to British colonial authorities, 
which probably did not endear them to the Siamese authorities, given the content of 
the missive. One sent by Tengku Abdul Jalal and other Malay leaders on 1 
November 1945 described the measures Siamese authorities were imposing on the 
Muslims: “The Siamese [officials] are trying their best to put the Islamic religion out 
of existence in the State by forcing the Malays to believe in Buddhism instead”.44
It did not help that the government was deliberately stoking public paranoia 
regarding Fifth Columnists and spies. On 27 December 1940, the Ministry of the 
Interior issued secret orders for its civil servants to the following effect:
1. Assemble ordinary citizens and inform them of their duties [to 
counter Fifth Columnists and spies], the methods with which to go 
about these duties, and the importance thereof.
43 Thai Ekaraj newspaper in Bangkok Times, 15 October 1941 in B.A.A., V. Larque, En Thailande de 
1940 a 1945, p. 161.
44 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Prem ier, p. 133.
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2. Inform the [Buddhist] monks and abbots as well, and ask them to give 
homilies 011 the subject as according to their abilities.
3. Assemble the teachers, whether they are government, municipality, or 
private and ask them to talk to their students about this matter.
4. Various provincial organisations, such as the municipality and 
provincial councils should also do the same.
5. Apart from the above, perhaps some signs should be made with large 
letters, spelling out easy to remember slogans such as “Beware of the 
Fifth Column”, “Beware of Spies”, “Beware of Sellers of the Nation”, 
“Let’s help each other destroy Sellers of the Nation”, “Help each 
other destroy Enemies of the Nation”, and so on. These should be 
posted in public places, and should be useful.'15
The order, as well as the meetings they engendered, undoubtedly created an 
atmosphere of mistrust among the provincial communities. Furthermore, their secret 
nature arguably allowed the more unscrupulous local authorities to interpret the 
order and conduct meetings as they saw fit and, in some instances, use them as a 
platform for opportunistic anti-Catholicism. Apart from calling for local monks to 
give homilies, the order itself had no religious reference. Nevertheless, arguably, 
this order was the one that gave credence to the allegations of “secret orders” being 
sent from the central government to destroy Catholicism.
In official terms, despite growing evidence to the contrary, the government 
and certain sections of the media remained adamant that the Constitution was still 
being observed and expressed their shock when they found that this was not so.
Some radio stations still proclaimed religious liberties,46 while certain newspapers 
such as the Thai Ekaraj (Thai Independence) were also vocal in calling for liberty of 
religious belief, as stipulated in the 1932 Constitution, to be properly practiced and 
enforced by making the following appeal:
During the dispute [Thai-French War] and in spite of the fact that their 
churches were closed down, these patriotic people were not in the least
4i C.B.A., Interior Ministry’s secret order to ail provincial governors, 458/2483, Re; prevention o f  
sabotage, 27 December 1940,
46 B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Petros to French Minister, 24 April 1941, Beatification Documents, 189/1.
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discouraged, for they made every possible effort to respond to the Country's 
appeal. Why then, in the name of common sense, should these people be 
badly treated in return for their generosity?
The article went on to relate the vandalism inflicted on the Catholic churches 
in the northeast, some of which were “carried out with impunity at a distance of two 
hundred metres from the police station”. It also addressed the inconsistencies 
between the official endorsement of the Constitution and the actions of local officials:
To say that the [Provincial] Commissioner and the [district chief officer] or 
the Police have had no cognizance of the facts sounds absurd... One is 
tempted to ask: “Are there no officials to keep sacred the integrity of our 
beloved Constitution, and is Article 172 of the Criminal Code47 no longer in 
force in those places?”4S
From the perspective o f official decrees, the anti-Catholic persecution was 
largely an unintended, indirect result of emergency measures and other legal 
measures aimed at other foreign minorities. Nevertheless, it was the combination of 
these measures, together with the anti-French rhetoric in government propaganda, 
that created the poisonous atmosphere that let loose the uncontrolled anti-Catholic 
persecution and allowed it to thrive.
Following the fall of Pibul’s government in July 1944 and the ascendency of 
Pridi Phanomyong’s faction, the regime moved quickly to address the issue of 
religious liberty. In his address to the Council of Ministers and the Ministers of 
State on 8 August 1944, a week after Khuang Aphaiwong’s formal appointment as 
Prime Minister, Pridi, in his capacity as the Regent, emphasised that:
Remember also that in our Thailand there are people in many provinces who 
are Muslims while others have embraced Christianity or other religions. The
47 In the present criminal code, the article relates to the giving o f  false testimonies -  the penalty being 
up to two years’ imprisonment, a 4,000 baht fine, or both.
48 B.A.A., Thai Ekaraj newspaper in Bangkok Times, 20 October 1941 in V. Larque, En Thailande de 
1940 a 1945, p. 164.
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Constitution accords to the people the liberty to profess the religion of their 
choice. The Constitution also stipulates that the King is the protector of all 
religions. Also, the Government has the task of contributing, where it is 
possible, to the prosperity of every religion that has been embraced by the 
people. This support, in my view, is not contrary to the principles of 
Buddhism, since Buddhism preaches loving kindness as its fundamental 
principle.49
Although the statement and change of government did not completely stop 
the persecution, it served to reassure the Mission of the benign intentions of the new 
government.
After the surrender of Japan, the Seni Pramoj government found no evidence 
that supported the view that the Pibul government had actively worked to pressure 
religious minorities out o f the civil and military services. Indeed, Seni contended 
that:
There is no evidence [for the Pibul government’s pressure on civil servants]. 
There is only evidence that the prime minister at that time wished to know 
the number of those who held the Catholic religion in the service. There 
were no dismissal orders but there may have been people who acted beyond 
their competence. Those who were dismissed in this manner have the right to 
appeal, and the government shall consider their cases.50
Pibul’s question was surely an ominous sign, but there is no documentary 
proof of his real intentions. During its investigation for the beatification of the 
martyrs of Songkhon, the Thai committee attempted to follow every lead that could 
have led to such evidence, which would have been proof o f the existence of odium 
fidei. For example, in 1952, investigators sought testimony from Mr. Bovo, the 
Italian consul, on the existence of a letter that allegedly expressed Pibul’s “regret that 
the Italian priests were going to the Isaan region, because his intention was to
4> B.A.A., Address o f  Pridi Phanomyong to the President o f the Council o f  Ministers, 8 August 1944 
in V. Larque, En Thailande de 1940 a 1945 , p. 297.
Ml B.A.A., R.S.O. Sudjamlong to Fr. Carreto, 21 October 1945, Beatification Documents, 247.
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destroy the Christian religion”.51 However, Mr. Bovo had never heard of such a 
letter, adding that, even if such a document existed in the past, it would have been 
incinerated on the expulsion of Commander Crolla, then the Italian Minister, 
following the surrender of Italy in 1943. Mr. Bovo further testified that Luang 
Vichitvatakam52 had “never articulated an anti-Catholic sentence”.53
In the absence of conclusive documentary evidence, it has to be assumed, for 
now, that there were no formal orders from the central government authorising local 
authorities to persecute Catholics within their jurisdiction. This assumption leads to 
another problem, however. How can the absence of a formal order be reconciled 
with the claims made by local authorities during the persecution that such a policy 
existed? For example, the distr ict chief officer of Phimai claimed that:
I want to inform you that the true policy that has not yet been revealed by the 
government is to destroy the Catholic religion. At this moment every official 
from village headmen to ministers have to be Buddhists — they cannot be of 
another religion... From now on, every Thai will have to be Buddhist. 
Therefore, we don’t want any priests here. As for the Catholic parishioners, 
for now we are persuading them kindly; we’ve warned them to change their 
religion to Buddhism. But if they don’t comply, then we will see that they 
are stubborn and un-cooperative. Then we will use other methods to cause a 
religious revolution and within three or four days there shall be no Catholics 
left.
The statement would indicate the existence of a ‘secret’ government policy. 
But if such a policy indeed existed, it was not consistently applied either in the 
context of the local or central government. As Fr. Larque pointed out in his reply to 
the district chief officer of Phimai’s claim:
M S.N.A., Vicar-Apostolic Bayet o f  Tha Rae to Vicar-Apostolic Chorin o f  Bangkok, 19 July 1952.
~2 Luang Vichitvatakran became the ideological spokesman o f the first Pibul government. He also 
held the post o f  Foreign Minister between 1942-3 and, by 1952, he had become the Thai ambassador 
to New Delhi.
33 S.N.A., Vicar-Apostolic Chorin o f  Bangkok to Vicar-Apostolic Bayet o f  Tha Rae, 24 September 
1952.
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That is strange. In the Tambon where I lived earlier, there were seven village 
headmen. They were all Catholics, along with one kamnan. As for Luang 
Adul Aduldejarat, the head of the police, he holds the religion of Mohammed 
-  not Buddhism.54
It seems that Fr. Larque was successful in calling the district chief officer’s 
bluff when it came to government policy. However, government policy has to be 
separated from the unofficial views and orders of certain members o f the government. 
As R.S.O. Sudchamlong wrote at the end of the war:
During the conflict with French Indochina, [the government] opposed the 
Mission through the orders for those Catholics in the civil service to change 
their religion, against the constitution. These were the actions o f 4-5 
statesmen and politicians; the five are known to me and in the coming future 
they may have to pay for their sins as war criminals.55
In addition, an anonymous letter also contended that it was Pibul alone who 
was responsible:
The hatred of Luang Pibul Songkhram was not appeased, he sent a secret 
order, written (one of my priests read it with a friendly [district chief officer]) 
to all the [district chief officers] to force the Christians to apostasy, especially 
the priests. In the event of success, he promised monetary incentives and 
promotion.56
Thus while there is little evidence for government complicity in the anti- 
Catholic persecution, there appears to be more substance to the claim that certain 
members of the government abused their power to secretly effect the persecution, 
although there is no conclusive documentary evidence for this. The policy was a 
reflection of the personal preferences of individuals rather than the stance of the
54 B.A.A., Conversation between Fr. Larque ancl District ch ief officer o f  Phimai, 15 February 1942, 
Beatification Documents, 202/6-7.
55 B.A.A., R.S.O. Sudchamlong to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 11 September 1945, Beatification  
Documents, 245.
56 B.A.A., Anonymous to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, Undated, Beatificationis sen declarationis martynii 
servi dei Nicolai BunkerdKitbamrung: Positio Super M artyrio (1999), pp. 179-80.
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government although, thanks to the wide-ranging influence of those allegedly 
involved, it was often mistaken for government policy. The policy’s largely secret 
character would explain the absence of documentary evidence, while its clandestine 
nature may have left the policy open to interpretation, which would account for its 
inconsistent implementation.
Consequently, officials in local government who were friendly towards 
Catholics could easily ignore or ‘delay’ the implementation of the secret policy 
indefinitely, without fear of a government follow-up. After all, the secrecy of the 
policy was an indication of insecurity among the conspirators, while no penalties 
were prescribed in the event of ‘failure’ on the part of local officials. On the other 
hand, for the local authorities who were already hostile towards the Catholic 
Missions before the outbreak o f the Thai-French War, the secret, unofficial order, 
together with the promise o f rewards (official or otherwise), furnished them with a 
further incentive to prosecute a campaign against Catholics. The nationalist policies, 
in particular the Cultural Mandates, had already created an atmosphere conducive to 
anti-Catholic persecution that did not need to be centrally driven, while the relative 
prosperity of Church properties made them tempting targets for confiscation.
Potential rewards from the central government were merely another bonus. 
Ultimately, a major motivator for the persecution may not necessarily have been 
government orders or nationalist rhetoric, but purely the desire for material 
advancement.
Indeed, even if the elimination of Catholicism had been Pibul’s intention, 
there was no need for him to act openly since there appeared to be so many 
government officials who willingly “acted beyond their competence”. Many of them 
were encouraged by the lack o f consistent, clear policies dealing directly with the
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Catholic question throughout the tenure of the Pibul government. Equally, the 
government created the conditions and opportunities for the unscrupulous to exploit, 
for example through the calling of meetings to counter vague “Fifth Columnists” and 
“spies”, as well as through the cultivation of communal paranoia. This situation 
opened loopholes for the unscrupulous to exploit and expose inconsistencies 
between central policies and the unofficial attitudes held (or at least thought to be 
held) by its officials. As Fr. Surachai Chumsriphan, the priest in charge of collecting 
and analysing Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung’s beatification documents, summarised:
I have to make a distinction. The official position of the Thai government of 
that time was “no religious persecution”. The constitutions, the official 
announcement of the chief of police, the minister of the interior all said that 
Thailand allows religious freedom, but the unofficial position was to have 
Buddhism as the national religion since some person disliked whoever was 
Catholic or whoever followed the French in matter of religion or politics in 
any way whatsoever. Through the radio and other means of communication, 
newspapers, they tried to convince the Thais that they were Buddhists and 
must preserve Buddhism because Catholicism will destroy Buddhism.57
The attitude also suggests a destmctive development in the role o f Buddhism 
in Thai national identity. Whereas King Vajiravudh, in his support for Buddhism, 
had the intention of establishing Buddhism’s credentials as a religion equal to that of 
any in the West (albeit one that was most suitable for Thais),58 under Pibul, the 
position was that Buddhism was superior to all other religions, with the devastating 
unofficial implication that those who were not Buddhists were un-Thai -  even 
though the 1932 Constitution that was still in effect contradicted this view. The 
emphasis on Buddhism and its use as a central, legitimating device is similar to the 
policies of during the King Taksin period in the late eighteenth century, which also 
saw the disappearance of traditional political institutions. Like during the reign of
57 B.A.A., Beatificationis sen declarationis martyrii sem i dei N icolai Btmkerd Kitbam n/ng: Positio  
Super M artyrio, pp. 22-23.
58 W.F. Vella, Chaiyo! (University Press o f  Hawaii, Honolulu, 1978), pp. 219-220.
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King Taksin, the political ascendancy of Buddhism led to problems for the Catholic 
Missions. However, in the 1940s there was also the added element of the disjunction 
between the formal policies and the unofficial views of members of the Pibul 
government, which opened up an array o f opportunities for the unscrupulous to 
perpetrate excesses against the Mission and its congregation without explicit 
directives from the centre.
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Persecution by Local Groups
A solemn treaty is but a scrap o f paper;
Laws are disposable when necessity requires.
- King Vajiravudh, Thammathamma Songkhram
The disjunction between official policy and local attitudes can be seen in a 
conversation between Fr. Larque, a French M.E.P. missionary, and a local policeman 
in Nakhon Phanom in 1942. The conversation took place some months after the 
order forbidding French citizens from travelling to the northeast had been rescinded. 
It can be seen that local authorities remained resistant to the presence of French 
priests performing their religious duties in the area:
Pol. Capt. Sanoh:
Fr. Larque:
Pol. Capt. Sanoh:
Fr. Larque:
Pol. Capt. Sanoh:
Fr. Larque:
Pol. Capt, Sanoh: 
Fr. Larque:
Pol. Capt. Sanoh: 
Fr. Larque:
What religious duties? That religion no longer exists 
here.
Then let me see if it’s true. I intend to go to some 
churches like Nong Saeng and Tha Rae.
You can’t go to Nong Saeng -  it’s a forbidden area. 
You’re also not allowed to leave this hotel.
How? Am I not allowed to get food?
You can, but you can’t wander around. Eat and come 
back. Just know that you cannot stay here for long.
You’re forbidding it? The Thai government has 
permitted French citizens to stay anywhere like before.
I don’t forbid it. But it’s not safe here.
If  you don’t forbid it then it’s only unsafe. I ’m 
unafraid, I shall stay here; I shan’t leave.
You cannot stay here for long. Wherever you have to 
go, you must hurry and go there. Where else do you 
want to go?
To Tha Rae and Sakon Nakhon to see the churches 
there. I also have the intention to move here.
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Pol. Capt. Sanoh: That’s not possible. You must know that no priest
should come and stay here.59
The contradictions between official policy and local attitudes are clear. 
Officially, Fr. Larque was free to travel anywhere he liked, unofficially the police 
captain wanted him to be as far away from his district as possible, regardless of the 
government’s proclamations. Similarly, in April 1941, the governor of Chonburi 
was resolute in demanding that a priest leave his province within six months, never 
mind the fact that the restrictions had been lifted and that the priest in question was 
Swiss and not French.60
Although from the perspective of the central government, the anti-Catholic 
‘persecution’ that was tied up with the emergency war measures had ended as early 
as January 1941, there is overwhelming evidence that persecution in the provinces 
continued up to, and in one case, even after the surrender of Japan in 1945. However, 
as the previous section has shown, there was much ambiguity in the government’s 
attitude regarding this matter, and it was this ambiguity that opened up opportunities 
for the unscrupulous. On the Catholic side, there was always a lingering suspicion 
that ‘secret orders’ were being despatched to the provinces by the central 
government. The general direction of these ‘secret orders’ was described in a 
petition by Thai priests to Vicar-Apostolic Perros in 1941:
The Interior Ministry has issued orders to various provinces to persuade Thai 
Catholics to abjure their faith and become Buddhists. If abjuration is not 
forthcoming, they are threatened, cruelly assaulted, detained for four to five 
days and if they then abjure they are set free. If those who refused were in 
the civil service, they are forced out of their positions. Apart from that,
59 B.A.A., Conversation between Fr. Larque and Pol. Capt. Sanoh, 1 February 1942, Beatification  
Documents, 200/1.
60 B.A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to French Minister, 24 April 1941, Beatification Documents, 189/1.
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Catholics are not allowed to be the owners or the managers of schools and it 
is for this reason that many Catholic schools have been closed down/’1
Earlier, Fr. Chorin, the French procurator of the Mission of Siam, also 
concurred, arguing that “The local authorities have always pressured Christians to 
abjure their Catholicism”.62 Indeed, many of the incidents saw direct involvement 
by local government officials. One well-documented incident was the arson of a 
church at Nonkaew in Nakhon Ratchasima province on 2 February 1944. The 
incident involved a night-raid on the priest’s residence, in which the priests were 
shot at to the cries of “Shoot! Shoot! Don’t stop!” and “If you value your lives don’t 
come out, don’t come down, don’t go near the church!” as the village church went 
up in flames.63 Vicar-Apostolic Perros in turn relayed the report to the French 
Minister, adding that:
It is regrettable to note that the violent acts were largely the effect of the 
attacks by certain orators on the local radio against Christianity in general 
and the Catholic Mission in particular.64
Those involved in the incidents were no ordinary criminals or casual thugs. 
Further investigation by the priests suggested that those participating in the incident 
included one palat tambon (secretary of a sub-district), two village heads, one deputy 
from the local Forestry Department, and two policemen.65 The government was
61 B .A .A ., Petition o f  Fr. Andre et al to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 8 October 1941, Beatification  
D ocum ents, 195/1.
62 B .A .A ., Fr. Chorin to Apostolic Delegate o f Indochina, 24 February 1941, Beatification Documents, 
182/1.
63 B.A .A ., Report o f  Fr. Larque et al on Nonkaew incident, 11 February 1944, Beatification  
Documents, 220/1-5, 221.
64 B.A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to French Minister, 12 February 1944, Beatification Documents, 
222 / 1.
65 B .A .A ., Fr. Deschamps to French Minister, 8 April 1944, Beatification Documents, 224/1-3.
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urged to conduct an inquiry; however progress was slow, probably due to local 
obfuscation, since by October 1944, the authorities were “still investigating”.65
The key factors behind the local authorities’ overstepping orders from the 
centre appear to be a combination of the innate hatred for France and, more 
importantly, how the Cultural Mandates came to be perceived as either superseding 
or having equal power to the Constitution. A conversation between Fr. Larque and 
the district chief officer of Phimai on 15 February 1942 was representative of this 
mentality among the hostile local authorities. On that day, the district chief officer 
had arrived with a group of scouts to conduct an impromptu search of the parish 
priest’s house for suspected hidden weapons. When nothing incriminating was 
found, a conversation ensued during which a number of allegations surfaced. The 
first point was the district chief officer’s contention that the Thai government was 
still hostile towards France, despite the signing of the Treaty of Tokyo in May 1941 
and the lifting of restrictions on the movement of French citizens. The district chief 
officer argued that:
The government does not like France; they are reluctant for the French to stay 
even in Bangkok. Last year there was the affair between Thailand and 
French Indochina. Even if there is a treaty of friendship between Thailand 
and France, this affair isn’t finished. Furthermore, Thailand is now at war 
with Great Britain and the French are on their side. Therefore we cannot trust 
the French.
In response, Fr. Larque offered to leave and have a Thai priest come and 
replace him, but this offer was refused with the district chief officer arguing that:
“We don’t want them here because your religion is a French religion”, a point which 
Fr. Larque soundly refuted:
B.A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Interior Minister, 9 October 1944, Beatification Documents, 228.
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That’s not true. Catholicism was bom in Asia, in Palestine. Catholicism is 
universal; there are Catholics everywhere in the world. There are around 400 
million Catholics right now. The head of the Church is His Holiness the 
Pope in Rome, Italy, and the first to propagate the faith in Thailand were not 
the French but the Portuguese -  the French came later.
The district chief officer dismissed the claim, arguing that the “Portuguese, 
Italian, French are all the same — they’re all Western”. Fr. Larque then brought up 
the Constitution and its stipulations on religious liberty. The district chief officer’s 
response is revealing:
Apart from the Constitution there is also the Cultural Mandates that was 
made by Thais for the Thais and in the Constitution there is an article that 
says that Buddhism is the religion of the Thai nation.
Although Fr. Larque did not dispute the district chief officer’s constitutional 
claims, in actual fact the 1932 Constitution had no such stipulation regarding the 
status of Buddhism.67 The article that was closest to the claim was Article 4 of 
Section 1, which stated that the monarch had to be Buddhist, yet act as the protector 
of all religions held in respect by his subjects. Clearly there were conflicts between 
the articles of the Constitution and the Cultural Mandates, where the authority of the 
latter appears to have superseded the former.
The disregard for the Constitution was not limited to local government 
authorities, but extended to other state-controlled sectors, most notably the state 
schools. The closure of many Catholic schools in the provinces forced many 
Catholic children to attend state schools if they wished to continue their education.
In some cases they were coerced into doing so and became victims of cruel religious 
discrimination at the hands of state teachers. The childhood experience of Lawrence 
Khai Saen-Phon-On, the Archbishop of Tha Rae and Nong Saeng (1980-2004),
67 Indeed, none o f  the many subsequent constitutions drafted after 1932 had the stipulation.
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illustrates this phenomenon. When his seminary, the Sacred Heart minor seminary 
in Nong Saeng, was violently closed and destroyed by the police in 1940, he was 
forced to return to his village and continue his studies in a state school. According to 
his account:
Right there I met the persecution against the Catholic faith... At the school 
the teachers forced me and my friends to deny the Catholic faith and to adore 
the statue of Buddha. They said “There is no more other religion to practice 
except Buddhism”. The teachers set up the statue of the Buddha in the hall 
and they forced us students to adore.68 We refused to obey. They hit us with 
sticks. They forced us to kneel in front of the statue of the Buddha, pressed 
our heads down with their strong hands.
.. .Very often we were sent out of the classroom to do the labour works in the 
schoolyard instead of having the ordinary lessons. The teachers said “Who 
do not want to adore the statue of Buddha, get out of the classroom and work 
like slaves in the schoolyard”. ...W e were forced to stare at the sun with the 
open eyes. The teachers watched us with sticks in their hands and hit us 
heavily whenever we closed our eyes. They shout “Look up straight to the 
sun and pray to your God and we will see if there will be any God coming to 
shade the sun from your eyes!” The sun continued to shine brightly. They 
mockingly laughed at us, “You see, there is no God, no Jesus. Why do you 
believe the poor missionaries who told you bad lies. Adore the statue of the 
Buddha and we will stop torturing you”.69
In his protests against these incidents, the Vicar-Apostolic consciously 
appealed to the 1932 Constitution. Reacting to a further incident of Buddhist 
teachers whipping their students to conform, as late as 28 December 1945 (several 
months after the end of the Pacific War on 15 August 1945), the Vicar-Apostolic 
wrote to the Thai education minister that:
Article 13 of the Thai Constitution says: “Everyone has the perfect liberty in 
religious beliefs and has the freedom to conduct ceremonies according to 
their own beliefs when it is not contrary to the duties of the citizen, the public 
peace, or the citizens’ morals”.
6S In fact, what the teachers were trying to coerce their students into doing was against all Buddhist 
principles such as the practice o f  metta (loving kindness), while technically Buddhists themselves are 
not supposed to “worship” the Buddha, never mind coerce others to do so.
69 B.A.A., Archbishop Lawrence Khai to Fr. Larque, 1 May 1984 in V. Larque, En Thciilcmde de 1940 
a 1 9 4 5 ,-p. 171.
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Catholic students are not acting contrary to their duties as citizens, the public 
peace or the citizens’ morals. Therefore, those who force Catholic students 
to pray in a manner not in accord with their religious beliefs are acting 
against the Constitution.70
Furthermore, the eclipse of constitutionalism can also be seen outside the 
state apparatus and officialdom to incorporate what can be described as a semi­
grassroots movement. For the Mission, the most prominent of these movements was 
the “Thai Blood Group” that, with informal government backing, had set up chapters 
across the country by the early 1940s. The group’s ideology can be easily grasped 
from its propaganda leaflets:
As for those who hold the faith of our enemies, we consider them to have 
completely forgotten their true nation and religion and are lost to our enemies. 
Consider the government’s arrest of the Fifth Columnists; all o f them were 
Roman Catholics who received instructions from the enemy, tiying to find 
ways to make us slaves and destroy the nation. We must be carefi.il of Fifth 
Columnists and help each other to utterly destroy this religion.71
The ideology was thus centred on encouraging citizens to rally around 
Buddhism as the national religion, and branding those who refused as “traitors” or 
“Fifth Columnists”. The smear was especially effective in the light of the 
government’s public sanction against Fifth Columnists. Thus, given its ideological 
stance, unsurprisingly, the group was frequently cited in Mission correspondence as 
the element responsible for the violent persecution and propaganda against the 
Mission, its priests, its property, and its congregation.
The Thai Blood Group’s propaganda also successfully influenced those who 
were not officially affiliated with the group. For example, in one village meeting, a
70 B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to the Education Minister, 28 December 1945, Beatification 
Documents, 251/2.
71 B .A .A ., Declaration o f  Thai Blood Group o f  Phanasnikhom, 25 January 1941, p. 159.
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village leader stood up and began an impromptu lecture 011 Catholicism and Fifth 
Columnists. The speech was clearly inspired by the Thai Blood Group’s propaganda:
The Roman Catholic religion is a propagated religion. For example, the 
French first brought this religion to Vietnam. Later they had a war with 
Vietnam and Vietnam collapsed because of the Catholic Fifth Columnists. 
When France went to war with Germany, that time Germany was defeated 
because this religion sabotaged it. Now the Germans will not allow the 
Catholic religion in its borders and when they went to war with France again, 
they won in seven days because Germany no longer had this religion and its 
Fifth Columnists. Thailand must do the same; Thais must not be Catholics; if 
they are then they are not Thais.72
The rhetoric translated into a campaign of trade boycotts against Catholics, 
suspicion, and violence. The Thai Blood Group in Chiang Mai, for example, 
announced a boycott on contact with the Catholic clergy and parishioners in 
February 1941,73 while the Thai Blood Group in Phrapradaeng in eastern Thailand 
urged its community to heed the following seven points, emphasising that those who 
did not, would be considered “traitors to the nation”:
1. Cease trade and social activities with Roman Catholics.
2. Cease buying all types of goods from Roman Catholics.
3. Cease selling all types of goods to Roman Catholics.
4. Be cautious o f Roman Catholics.
5. And of the Fifth Columnists from this group.
6. Do not speak of any secrets 01* work where they can listen.
7. There are many Fifth Columnists in Phrapradaeng.74
Thanks mainly to the presence of the Thai priests in the region, most of the 
eastern parishes were able to escape the worst excesses of violence, that is, nobody 
was killed or executed extra-judicially.7'1 However, the ethnicity of the priests did
72 B.A.A., Testimony, 3 July 1942 in V. Larque, En Thailande de 1940 a 1945, p. 207.
73 S.N.A., Declaration o f  Thai Blood Group, Chonburi, 1 February 1941.
B.A.A., Thai Blood Group Letter, Undated in V. Larque, En Thailande de 1940 d 1945, p. 160.
75 The picture here is again mixed, although in general they fare better than their northeastern 
counterparts. O f the eight eastern parishes, three were completely destroyed while five were partially 
damaged. The properties o f  three o f  these parishes were also forcibly taken over -  see B.A.A., State
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not prevent the Thai Blood Group from harassing them, for as long as they remained 
dependent on the French leadership in Bangkok and followed a foreign religion, they 
were regarded as ‘agents’ of the enemy, as one Thai priest discovered from a 
warning letter he received from the group:
The Thai Blood Group of Phanas has unanimously agreed that the cross on 
top of the church and other places under your governance is an unforgettable 
eyesore to the members of the Thai Blood Group.
Therefore, we request that all crosses in your church be removed as soon as 
possible. Otherwise the Thai Blood Group of Phanas will come and deal 
with it ourselves as we see fit.
On another note, the Group wishes to inform you that you, in particular, 
should disown Catholicism and quickly convert to Buddhism. If  you will 
spread this news to your relatives and disciples and persuade them to convert 
to Buddhism it would be a great work. The Group hopes and has confidence 
that you will comply by no later than 1 February 1941.
Finally, the Group wishes to thank you in advance and is confident that you 
will comply and help us to maintain the national culture and our and your 
beloved great empire of Thailand.76
The warning is in stark contrast to circumstances in other parishes where 
attacks and accusations occurred without any kind of formal warning. The subaltern 
nature of the uncontrolled persecution arguably made it difficult for anyone to 
control, and thus incidents in this category prevailed for the longest, with churches 
being burnt down as late as 1944. Given the international situation at the time, there 
was perhaps little that the government could have done to rein in the excesses of the 
movement without damaging its democratic credentials. Yet, paradoxically, the 
objectives of the movements were disturbing perversions of the concept of
o f Material Damage follow ing the Persecution, in Biography o f  the B lessed Nicolas Bimkerd 
Kitbam ning  (Unpublished), p. 99.
76 B.A.A., Thai Blood Group o f  Phanasnikhom to parish priest, 29 January 1941, Beatification  
Documents, 179.
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democratic rule, and its results were immensely destructive to people, property, and 
even democracy itself.
Taken as a whole, the character of the local persecutions was inconsistent. 
The north experienced a very different style of persecution from that of the 
northeastern parishes. For example, at the parish of St. Theresa in Wiengpapao, 
Chiang Rai province, church gatherings were banned by the local army commander 
in March 194477 but otherwise the situation continued to be tranquil and the only 
complaint by the parishioners was about the price of rice and other goods.78 Some 
churches were closed down and certain local officials expressed negative attitudes 
towards Christians, but in the words of a priest who visited the parish in July 1944, 
“The lives of the Catholics here are normal, and there is no persecution”.7,)
The picture was similarly confused for the missionaries in the neighbouring 
province of Chiang Mai. There, in January 1943, the Catholic missionaries received 
orders for foreigners to “temporarily” leave within twenty days (by 9 February 
1943),so but it appears that the indigenous Catholic clergy were allowed to stay, since 
the correspondence did not end.81 Later in the year, the authorities exerted pressure 
on the other religious minorities in the area -  the Protestants and the Muslims -  to 
come to religious meetings where presumably they were pressured to convert to 
Buddhism. The Catholics, however, did not receive an invitation.82 In any case, the 
Allied bombing of Chiang Mai, which also affected the Mission properties, soon 
meant that most of the inhabitants wanted to leave the city anyway, regardless of 
their nationality or religious background. In the words of one priest, by December
77 B.A.A ., Fr. Thongdee Kritjaroen to Vicar-Apostolic Petros, 23 March 1944, 37/1/7.
78 B.A.A ., Fr. Paul Thavon to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 20 August 1944, 37/1/8.
79 B.A.A., Fr. H. Thongdi to Vicar-Apostolic Petros, 29 July 1944, 37/5/15.
Among other exceptions, the order also exempted foreigners with relatives in the police from the 
evacuation order, B .A.A., Police Order, 20 January 1943,37/5/11.
8^  B .A.A., Fr. Maurice Meunier to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 25 January 1943, 37/5/7.
82 B.A.A., Fr. Michel Baklychit to Vicar-Apostolic Petros, 30 October 1943, 37/5/10.
1943, “Chiang Mai was like a desert”.83 But correspondence from the Chiang Mai 
parish nevertheless continued uninterrupted throughout the war, indicating that some 
Catholic priests were never compelled to leave.
That the persecution against Catholics occurred in the first place is, at face 
value, a testament to the effectiveness of the government’s anti-French propaganda. 
However, the persecution’s inconsistent nature suggests a disjunction between 
central policies and local actions. Even so the disjunction alone does not account for 
the inconsistency. The other key factor was arguably individual, ulterior motives, 
some of which dated from before the Thai-French conflict but much of which was 
merely opportunism. As will be seen, conflicts were most violent in cases where 
material or social gains were at stake.
83 B.A.A., Fr. Michel Baklychit to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 27 December 1943, 37/5/12.
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Confiscations and Ulterior Motives
Let me speak o f the meaning 
Behind the three colours.
White is fo r  purity and betokens the three gems 
And the law that guard the Thai heart.
Red is fo r  our blood, which we willingly give up 
To protect our nation and faith.
Blue is the beautiful hue o f the people’s leader 
And is liked because o f him.M
King Vajiravudh
The propaganda of the Thai Blood Group talked much about “eliminating” and 
“destroying” the Catholic religion. Undoubtedly it was successfiil in physically 
destroying some churches and coercing people to convert to Buddhism. However on 
closer examination, in many cases, a remarkable number of properties were 
preserved, even in the regions most affected by violent persecution. For example, in 
the case of the churches and adjunct properties of the 26 northeastern parishes, ten 
had been either destroyed or partially destroyed by September 1944. The rest of the 
sixteen remaining properties were confiscated and converted to other uses, mainly 
schools, Buddhist temples, and residences for Buddhist monks.85
If the confiscations were the result of a centrally-driven persecution, the 
properties should have reverted systematically to the central government. In fact, 
many of the confiscated assets went into private ownership for private profit, 
specifically to individuals in the local community who precipitated the confiscations 
in the first place. Indeed, it could be argued that a significant proportion of the anti- 
Catholic persecution was bom, not out of an ideal of religious conformity or 
nationalist hatred fomented by an effective government propaganda machine, but 
from local political and economic opportunism.
84 W.F. Velta, Chaiyo/, p. 140.
83 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti to Interior Minister, 10 September 1944 in V. Larque, En 
Thailande de 1940 a 1945, pp. 2 1 5 -2 1 S.
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Typical cases were the parishes of Tha Lad and Tha Kwien in Chachoengsao 
province. On 27 March 1941, 150 people assembled at the parishes claiming that 
they had orders from the district chief officer of Bang Klila to destroy the church, the 
residences of the priests, nuns, and teachers as well as the school. In fact, they could 
not even follow this ‘order’ properly. Instead they began a fire sale o f the parishes’ 
property. Subsequently, in October 1942, the Mission was successful in its appeal to 
the central government and had its rights to the property reconfirmed. However, as 
the Vicar-Apostolic reported, the local authorities remained reluctant to recognise 
the Mission’s claim in spite of the orders from the central government:
But the [district chief officer] of Bang Khla is still barring the parish priests 
from looking after the interests of the Catholic parish of Tha Lad and have 
allowed those who have no right to the land to reap its produce according to 
their whims without permission from the Mission. Moreover, he has 
announced that as long as he remains at Bang Khla, he will not allow a priest 
to stay.86
The conflict of interest becomes clearer in an additional letter detailing the 
events, transactions, and relationships between the district chief officer and members 
o f the local community. The district chief officer did not take control o f the property 
himself, and neither did he cede control to a public body but to a private individual — 
a Nai Prakob Sundaradilok. Earlier, Prakob was involved in intimidating and 
tricking the priests and nuns of the community into leaving for Bangkok by feeding 
them false reports of oncoming violence, thereby paving the way for the confiscation. 
Furthermore, rather than using the property for the public good, Prakob was using 
church land as a cattle pen solely for his own profit. The district chief officer may 
also have reaped some benefits, considering his frantic reaction to the return of
86 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Interior Minister, 24 October 1942, Beatification Documents, 
216.
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Catholic priests to the community, when he arranged for the local police to arrest 
those who had provided accommodation to the priests who had come to re-establish 
the Mission’s claim to its property, while threatening others with the same treatment. 
For those still in doubt:
The [district chief officer] then said...he had the right to do anything, which 
frightened the villagers who understood that the government really wanted to 
destroy the Catholic religion, otherwise the district chief officer would never 
dare to act in this manner.
The Mission was not oblivious to the possibility of economic motives being a 
major factor in these incidents. The introduction of its letter to the Ministiy of the 
Interior clearly stated as much:
As you well know, during the conflict between Thailand and Indochina the 
majority of citizens understood that the Catholics were with the French and 
so took the opportunity to take the Mission’s property for themselves or else 
hope to use [the situation] for the purposes of obtaining bribes.87
An example of the latter can be seen in another eastern parish -  SS. Philip 
and Jacob in Huaphai, Chachoengsao province. Between 1941-2, the parish was 
subjected to various persecutions standard to other parishes, such as Buddhist monks 
being sent to preach nationalist homilies according to the “demands” of local 
Christians,88 the demolition of the Stations of the Cross by the local chapter of the 
Thai Blood Group,89 as well as threats by some locals to arrest and sue the parish 
priest for business reasons under the guise of patriotism:
I have done no wrong; except perhaps in the case of Nai Charoen that came 
to rent the school but without reaping the results he desired. The authorities
B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Interior Minister, 24 October 1942, Beatification Documents, 
217/1-3.
88 B.A .A ., Khun Vijarnbanakit, District ch ief officer o f  Pan Thon? to St. Philip parish priest, 16 July 
1941,36/3/3.
89 B .A .A ., Fr. Jacobe to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 20 February 1942, 36/3/11.
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have asked him to come in and return the school but he refuses to go and 
instead says that he will sue the [provincial governor], the [district chief 
officer], and myself for obstructing the founding of the school. As for me, he 
will say that I am the servant of the bishop, a representative of foreigners, 
which is against the [Cultural Mandates] and the law.90
However, these threats came to an abrupt end when a deal was struck 
between the Mission and the local authorities in May 1942, by which some land 
would be ceded to the local authorities for “public use” and, in return, the Mission 
would still be allowed to send a priest to be resident at the parish, repair the church 
and the residence, and run the school, as well as the other operations of the parish as 
normal, but with the explicit protection of the local authorities.91 The local 
authorities appeared to have stuck to their end of the bargain since by October 1942, 
Fr. Jacobe, the indigenous parish priest, wrote the following of his parish and fellow 
indigenous priests: “I just want to let you know that Fathers Jose, Leonard, as well as 
all the Christians are happy and well” .92
Considering the strong evidence for the existence of ulterior motives behind 
parts of the persecution movement, is it possible that the most malicious and 
prominent cases of persecution — that of Songkhon and Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung 
could be re-evaluated in such terms? For the Songkhon case, there was an obvious 
clash of personalities and worldviews. Nai Bunlue, the policeman in charge of the 
execution, in his subsequent testimonies for the beatification investigation committee, 
consistently denied ulterior motives, saying that the women did not die for “political 
reasons” but because “they were unwilling to abandon their religion” and admitted
90 B.A.A ., Fr. Jacobe to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 18 November 1941, 36/3/8.
B.A.A., Fr. Jacobe to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 1 May 1942, 36/3/14.
9" B.A.A ., Fr. Jacobe to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 29 October 1942,36/3/17.
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his “utter confusion at the women’s dedication to their faith”.93 However, the events 
and other witness testimonies suggest that there may have been both personal and 
sociological factors behind the killings.
In terms of personal factors, some witness reports suggested that Nai Bunlue 
was infatuated with one or more o f the nuns, and their consistent rebuff of his sexual 
advances, in favour of keeping tine to their religious vocation, had led to a severe 
loss of face. Certainly, on his arrival, he had been associated with a number of 
women in the village, allegedly forcing some to be his lovers.94 Such an infatuation 
would also explain his insistence that the nuns remove their habits. In the basic 
Buddhist understanding, the removal of sacred clothing was effectively the removal 
of the person’s sacred aura, authority, and obligations.95 So, while the nuns 
themselves, and the other Catholics around them, understood that they were still very 
much nuns and had relinquished none of their religious vows or obligations by 
taking up ordinary clothing, in the mind of policeman Bunlue they had become 
‘available’. His behaviour following the nun’s taking up of ordinary clothing 
confirms this speculation.96 According to one testimony:
At that meeting, Sisters Agnes and Lucia had already abandoned their habits 
and later on the policeman [Lue] came to the teacher’s residence asking for 
flowers in a courting manner.97
That the nuns continued to rebuff his courtship and defied his authority by 
‘returning’ to their sacred clothing, symbolised their defiance against an abusive
93 S.N .A., W itness statement o f Police Officer Bunlue, 6 April 1961.
 ^Archbishop Lawrence Khai Saen-Phon-On et al, Bim yarasri thang fed, p. 18.
The comparative ease with which Buddhist clergy can leave their religious vow s is illustrated in 
literature in Khun Chang Khun Paen . There, within the space o f  a few pages, Plai Kaew (Khun Paen) 
was able to leave the monkhood to make love with Pimpilalai before returning to the monastery, 
which he leaves later -  this time permanently. See National Library o f  Thailand, Khun Chang Khun 
Paen chabab H orsam u t haeng chat [Khun Chang, Khun Paen: National Library Edition] (Klilang 
Withaya, Bangkok, 1963), pp. 83, 100, and 130.
96 S.N .A., Testimony o f  Vincent Taenu, 15 February 1949.
97 S.N.A., Testimony o f  Paul Tieng, 15 February 1949.
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local authority as much as their dedication to the Catholic faith, and would have 
caused a massive and irreparable loss o f face for the policeman. Their actions would 
have placed them in great danger under ordinary circumstances, never mind during 
such a sensitive time.
Nevertheless, personal infatuation alone is arguably insufficient to explain 
the deaths, especially of those who were not directly involved in Nai Bunlue’s 
infatuation. After all, other officers under his command had been interested in some 
of the other villagers, in particular, Cecilia Budsri, one of the teenagers who was 
eventually killed. But according to witnesses, rather than embarking on a 
psychopathic rampage upon rejection, they were willing to leam the catechism in 
order to get closer to the women they were trying to court.98
The threat that this development would have posed to the police intention to 
convert the village to Buddhism was clear, and arguably it was this threat to the 
police plans and social authority that sealed the fate of the women. Already, before 
the nuns had taken up the mantle of the village’s religious leadership, Philip Siphong 
had succeeded in undermining the efforts of the police to convert the village, in spite 
of the absence of the French parish priest. His elimination was thought to be critical 
to weakening the resolve of the villagers. What the police underestimated was the 
effective leadership of the women in the parish. The switch of the leadership to the 
nuns appeared to have caught the police off-guard. Instead of being more yielding 
after the violent death of Philip Siphong, the nuns became even more determined to 
preserve Catholicism at all costs.
The patriarchal police organisation was clearly irked by the presence and 
success of the resistance of this group of nuns, who had neither formal rank nor
9S S.N.A., Testimony o f  Cecilia Son Suwan o f  Songkhon, 15 February 1949.
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significant political or social affiliations in the Thai world view. Undoubtedly, they 
were enraged by the defiant letter that was sent by the sisters that betrayed absolutely 
no fear of the police, despite their dire threats. Given the women’s defiance o f the 
police, their effective leadership -  to the extent that they were, probably 
unintentionally, about to convert the police rather than vice versa -  meant that they 
had to be eliminated."
The ulterior motives behind the arrest of Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung are more 
obscure. Unlike Philip Siphong and the nuns of Songkhon, Fr. Nicolas was not a 
resident of the parish where he was arrested. According to the Mission accounts, Fr. 
Nicolas had spent some days in early January 1941 wandering around various 
parishes in an attempt to meet up with two Thai priests — Fr. Leonard Phonsuwan 
and Fr. Ambrosio Minlukun to conduct their annual retreat which, at that time, 
traditionally began on the Monday after the feast of the Epiphany. Both Fr. Leonard 
and Fr. Ambrosio, however, had already left their posts due to fears for their own 
safety, and so Fr. Nicolas ended up by himself in Ban Han, the parish of Fr.
Ambrosio, on 11 January 1941. In the absence of Fr. Ambrosio and with the 
approach of the feast o f the Epiphany, Fr. Nicolas gathered the parishioners and led 
them in the Litany of Maiy. The following day, the feast of the Epiphany, Fr.
Nicolas rang the church bells at 8.30 in the morning to call the parishioners to Mass. 
On the same day, he was arrested along with eight others, initially on charges of 
violating an official ban on ringing church bells.100 The Fifth Columnist allegations
In spite o f  the assassination and the executions and subsequent persecutions, it is notable that 
Songkhon remains a predominantly Catholic village to this day.
B .A .A ., Beatificationis sen declara tions m artyrii senn dei N icolai Bim kerdKitbam nm g: Positio  
Super M artyrhp  pp. 32-3.
261
seemed to have emerged much later, when the facts regarding the bell-ringing were 
being effectively challenged.
This apparent ban on the ringing of church bells was another irregular law, 
since its contents and enforcement changed according to the whim of the local 
authorities. According to Vicar-Apostolic Perros who was aware of the law, bans on 
ringing church bells were in force only during the night.101 Witness testimonies 
attest that the bells were rung in the morning hours and thus, had the case against Fr. 
Nicolas and the others been based only on this regulation, they would have been 
acquitted. It was probably the realisation of this fact that led to the emergence of 
later charges connecting the incident to Fifth Columnist activities. Before examining 
the charges further, it is worth noting that by 1944, local authorities in some 
provinces like Chantaburi were quite happy to seek the co-operation of Catholic 
parishes to use their bells as a signal for the daily raising and lowering of the national 
flag in the mornings and evenings, and were appreciative of the co-operation.102 
Conversely, the bells themselves could also be a potential source of complaint. It 
would not be the first time that a parish church was met with a noise complaint 
following the celebration of a feast day.103 Considering the day Fr. Nicolas rang the
101 Ibid., p. 33.
101
~ B.A .A ., Fr. Thomas to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 12 April 1944, 35/4/18.
103 In 1922, for example, the Holy Rosary Church in Bangkok was met with complaints from G.H. 
Ardon, manager o f  the local Siam Commercial Bank, who appealed directly to the Vicar-Apostolic:
For the last two mornings, being Saints’ days (presumably) the bell-ringing has begun at 5 
a.m. -  Not a quiet call to prayer, or Mass, which would not disturb anyone ... I am a great 
Believer in Early-rising and am almost invariably up by 5.45 a.m. I contend that any ringing 
o f  bells, beyond a quiet toll, is -  may I say -  inconsiderate a little at any hour before 6 a.m. 
(B.A.A., G.H. Ardon to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 5 June 1922, 50/4/32).
A  lew  months later, the suffering neighbour had reason to complain again, and wrote another 
letter to the Vicar-Apostolic with, literally, cotton wool in his ears complaining of:
The incessant repetition o f hymn tunes, including the nigger melody ‘Old Black Joe’ 
stumbled through for the inevitable three verses, at short intervals, many times badly played, 
followed by a continuous clash o f  Bells, has been going on as I write for well over an hour -  
reading, writing, &/or sleeping [is] out o f  the question -  and it would not be a serious
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bells o f his parish church was the feast of the Epiphany, another major feast-day, and 
given his Chinese background, his bell-ringing may have been considered normal by 
members of the Catholic parish but, at the same time, it may well have been 
perceived as unusual (read suspicious) or a nuisance by the local non-Catholic 
community.
Having failed to find conclusive evidence of Fr. Nicolas’s violation of the 
ban on ringing bells at night, new charges of being involved in Fifth Columnist 
activities emerged. The false testimonies were strengthened perhaps by Fr. Nicolas’s 
seemingly erratic movements from one parish to another in the days preceding his 
arrest and, critically, allegations that the meeting at which he had led the Litany o f  
Mary was in fact a prayer session for the victoiy of France. It had been alleged that 
Fr. Nicolas had instructed Catholics to pray for French victory: in fact he had asked 
the congregation not to hate the French because of their past contribution to 
Catholicism in Thailand.104 Even with such ‘conclusive’ evidence it took a long time 
for the military courts to give a definitive ruling. Following their arrests, the 
suspects were first detained for a week in the local police station, before being 
transferred to the Naklion Ratchasima prison. They remained there for a further 
month and a half before being moved to a prison in Bangkok, where they had to 
endure an 11 month long investigation and trial, at the end of which the suspects
exaggeration i f  I said it had been going on the whole day since daylight (B.A.A., G.H. Ardon 
to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 7 October 1922, 50/4/35).
The M ission authorities forwarded the letters to the parish priest o f  Holy Rosary Church but 
the lack o f  apologies may have irked Mr. Ardon, with the procurator merely writing that: “Yesterday 
was o f  course an exceptional day and unless a noisy display be allowed, Chinese people are not 
satisfied” (B .A .A., Fr. Chorin to G.H. Ardon, Undated, 50/4/35). The feast this time was presumably 
that o f  Our Lady o f  the Rosary, which would have been especially relevant to the Holy Rosary parish.
B .A .A ., Witness testimony o f  Fr. Rene Meunier, 7 September 1993, in Beatificationis sen 
declarationis martyvii servi dei N icolai Bunkerd Kitbam nm g: Positio Super M artyrio, (1999), p. 198.
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received sentences between ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Fr. Nicolas was one 
of those who received the maximum fifteen-year sentence.105
From the Vicar-Apostolic’s point of view, the charges against Fr. Nicolas and 
the others were absurd. In a letter to Luang Aduldejarat, the Vicar-Apostolic argued 
that Fr. Nicolas had been “accused falsely of being a spy by some persons who had 
hated him”.106 Although Fr. Nicolas’s base parish was in Nonkaew (its church was 
burnt down in 1944) and not Ban Han, he appeared to have been a regular visitor to 
Ban Han. According to Mak Ladchanthuk, one of the witnesses arrested with him,
Fr. Nicolas had “visited villagers very consistently so that they all knew him”. The 
same witness also confirmed the poisonous atmosphere at the time, saying that: 
“During the anti-Christianity persecution, village headmen and precinct headmen 
accused us (Catholics) that we were sided with the French, and prohibited us from 
praying in the church”.107 There was thus some clear pre-existing tension between 
the Catholics and the local authorities before the arrival of Fr. Nicolas in January 
1941.
The last factor that could be responsible for the events in Ban Han was the 
character of Fr. Nicolas himself. Although he has been beatified, the investigation 
committee did note he had some character flaws. According to Justin Pages, the 
superior of Penang Seminary (1917-31) where Fr. Nicolas (then called Xun Kim) 
trained before his ordination, the young novice had potential but also some character 
flaws in 1923:
Xun Kim does not please me much. His outward conduct is veiy good, but 
he is self-important and I believe that he does not have right judgement... I
105 B.A .A ., Beatificatiom s sen declarationis martyrii servi dei N icolai Bunkerd Kitbannung: Positio  
Super M artyrio , p. 33.
106 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Luang Aduldejarat, 23 February 1941, in Beatificatioms, p. 182.
107 B.A.A., Witness testimony o f  Mak Ladchanthuk, 13 September 1993 in Beatificatioms, p. 202.
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add that if  he does not change he’ll never be in the priesthood... I hope that 
he will change.108
Matters had improved one year later, although the novice’s stubbornness was 
still remarked upon. However, by 1925, the superior was far more confident of his 
ward’s abilities, reporting that “Xun Kim has improved. He is pious, serious, and is 
not afraid of work”.109 From the witness testimonies, it seems that Fr. Nicolas had 
channelled his stubbornness and transformed it into the virtue of persistence. For 
example, when he was faced with Buddhists fearing the consequences of conversion, 
he said to them that “if people wanted to learn Catechism he would teach them 
anyway, even if  it was at night”,110 When faced with swarms of enraged bees that 
stung anyone in their path, he walked through them anyway -  and was not stung, 
unlike those who went with him.111 Yet, at times he still showed his old stubborn 
streak, fatally it seems in his decision to go to Ban Hail. One witness had asked him 
before his departure where he was going, and Fr. Nicolas’s reply was: “To Ban Han 
village, to open the church there and to be detained”.112 The statement suggests that 
Fr. Nicolas knew what was going to happen, yet he persisted in going anyway. It 
was perhaps this stubbornness, together with his personal charisma, that the local 
authorities found more threatening -  much like the situation at Songkhon. Indeed, Fr. 
Nicolas seemed aware that it was he, and not the other villagers arrested with him, 
who was the target o f the persecution, saying to his fellow detainees that “he alone is 
responsible for all accusations”,113 a fact confirmed by the pressure exerted by the 
authorities on the Catholic detainees to incriminate the priest alone. According to
108 B.A.A., Biography o f  the Blessed Nicolas Bim kerd Kitbamrung: P riest and M artyr, p. 3.
109 Ibid., p. 3.
110 B.A.A., Witness testimony o f  Mrs. Chumchai Deebuakiang, 16 September 1993 in Beatificatioms, 
p. 209.
B.A.A., Witness testimony o f  Mr. Saeng Panyo, 17 September 1993 in Beatificatioms, p. 211.
112 B.A.A., Witness testimony o f  Mr. Mak Paphara, 14 September 1993 in Beatificatioms, p. 205.
113 B.A.A., Witness testimony o f  Mr. Mak Ladchanthuk, 13 September 1993 in Beatificatioms, p. 202.
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one witness, the authorities had told them “to incriminate Fr. Nicolas for espionage 
and worshipping the French religion”, adding that they also had to convert to 
Buddhism or otherwise face execution.114
There is thus reason to believe that the anti-Catholic persecution was more 
than just a response to nationalist rhetoric or alleged government orders. Ulterior 
motives played a role in many of the persecution events; some are transparent, 
thanks to extensive documentation on the causes and consequences of the events, but 
others are not clear because of their innate obscurity or lack o f documentation. What 
is clear is that the defiance o f authority, even if this defiance had a firm basis in the 
law and Constitution, loss o f face, and the possibility of material or social gain were 
factors in precipitating many of the crises. In some cases, local disputes and 
jealousies dated from before the outbreak of the Thai-French War but, in a majority 
of cases, it seems that the actions were the result o f the political and economic 
opportunism that thrived in the poisonous atmosphere that was created by the central 
government.
For the seven martyrs of Songkhon and Fr. Nicolas, their defiance was as 
much an exercise of their political rights as their religious rights — the right to 
practice their beliefs freely, according to the Constitution. That the local authorities 
denied them through assassination, execution, and false imprisonment, effectively 
made them Catholic martyrs in the eyes of the Church. But from a secular 
perspective, for their courageous defiance in the face of rampant abuses by local 
authorities, they could also be regarded as Thai political icons and martyrs to the 
failings of the Thai constitutional order.
114 B .A .A ., Witness testimony o f  Mrs. Champa Phuakchanthuk, Beatijicationis, p. 201.
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Conclusion
You should read histoiy and look at ostracism, persecution, martyrdom, and that 
kind o f thing. They always happen to the best men, you know.
George Eliot
In conclusion by 1939, with the exception of the northeast and some localised 
incidents, there was little indication that the Missions operating in Siam would suffer 
persecution in the following year. The main factor that pushed many areas towards 
conducting actions against Catholic interests was the outbreak of the Thai-French 
War in November 1940 and the emergency measures that were introduced as a 
consequence. The war fanned anti-French sentiments and suspicion of everything 
that was vaguely associated with France and, indeed, all Westerners. This factor was 
further reinforced by indirect government sanctions of the action, such as some of 
the Cultural Mandates, which were viewed as being above the 1932 Constitution, as 
well as the actions of certain minor members of the government, such as Prasert 
Tharisawat, an official in the Government Propaganda Bureau who led the Thai 
Blood Group.
Notwithstanding the active participation of some government members, it can 
be seen that there was not a unified attitude or indeed policy when it came to the 
Catholic question. Differences in attitudes can be seen in the public response made 
by Luang Aduldejarat, the police chief, to the abuses that had been perpetrated 
against Catholics and other minorities under the aegis of the emergency measures. 
Thus, while some government officials may have actively campaigned against 
Catholics, there were others who were equally, if not more, influential who were in 
clear opposition to such campaigns.
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As a direct consequence of the ambivalence of the government, there was no 
unified or consistent policy when it came to the Catholic question. This lack of 
consistency stands in stark contrast to the treatment of the Chinese during this period, 
whose discrimination was the subject of formal legislation. The inconsistent nature 
of the persecution was the direct result of this lack of formal policy where over the 
period 1940-5, the persecution manifested itself across the whole gamut of violence, 
ranging from extra-judicial executions, as in the case of Songkhon, to merely 
shouting abuse at the Vicar-Apostolic in Bangkok.
Finally, local conditions that existed before the 1940s were key additional 
factors in determining the nature of the persecution in their area. In certain areas, 
especially where Missions had not encountered major problems prior to 1940, anti- 
Catholic action did not extend further than verbal abuse or minor vandalism of 
churches. However, in other areas which had these pre-existing problems, the lack 
of a specific government policy did not prevent local elements from exploiting the 
situation, especially when the priorities of the government lay elsewhere. Thus, 
indirect policies such as the emergency measures of the 1940-1 Thai-French War, 
the Cultural Mandates, and the anti-Chinese legislation were used singly or in 
combination to justify attacks on Catholic interests.
268
VI
Manipulating Identities: 
National Identities and the Missionary
One cannot see the modern world as it is unless one recognizes the ovei’whelming 
strength o f patriotism, national loyalty. In certain circumstances it can break down, 
at certain levels o f  civilization it does not exist, but as a positive force there is 
nothing to set beside it, Christianity and international Socialism are as weak as 
straw in comparison with it. Hitler and Mussolini rose to power in their own 
countries very largely because they could grasp this fact and their opponents could
not.
George Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn
The Thai-French War, together with the ensuing persecution, brought many 
background conflicts to the fore. The most significant of these were the issues of 
Catholicism and national identity. The role of the French missionaries was 
transformed from being an asset, in their individual expertise in education and their 
ability to secure additional funding from the French colonial government, to being a 
major liability to the survival of the entire Mission. In appealing for funding from 
the French government, the French missionaries had emphasised their role in 
spreading the gloire of their motherland in Siam. Yet, at the same time, they were 
insistent in their loyalty to their adopted homeland. The two roles were obviously 
irreconcilable following the outbreak of armed conflict between their motherland and 
their adopted homeland. The one refuge remaining was their allegiance to the 
Catholic Church, but by the time of the persecution, the impression that the Mission 
of Siam maintained a close relationship with France had already been implanted.
Unlike their French counterparts, the Italian Salesians had not formed such an 
explicit connection with the government of their homeland. Neither had their 
motherland developed such a bad reputation among Thais, nor indeed in wider Asia.
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At the very least the Italian government had not blockaded the Chao Phraya River 
with gunboats, demanding unjustified financial reparations and territorial 
concessions within the last few decades. Another possible factor was Italy’s 
membership of the Axis but the importance of this is negligible: French Indochina’s 
nominal alignment with the Nazi-backed Vichy government had done little to stop 
Thai and Japanese encroachment on French interests in Southeast Asia throughout 
the war. Nevertheless, although the Salesians in Siam had little, if anything, to do 
with Mussolini’s fascist government, they were able to exploit their national identity 
by moving into areas where French priests were no longer welcome.
The consequent bitterness between the M.E.P. and the Salesians reveals 
much about the territorial nature of missionary efforts during this period, despite the 
profession of a common faith by the religious orders involved. Even when a 
semblance of normality returned throughout Thailand following the surrender of 
Japan, both the French and the Italian priests had lost out. If anything, the episode 
argued more strongly than ever for an acceleration of the handover o f Mission 
operations to the indigenous clergy.
Indeed, given the Missions’ multi-national and multi-ethnic makeup and their 
international connections, the emergence of Thai nationalist politics triggered major 
changes in attitudes within the Missions themselves. The change was reflected in the 
attitudes of the Thai priests and laymen towards the French leadership, and their 
insistence that the Mission become more ‘Thai’, with a greater role for the 
indigenous clergy, though not always for purely altruistic or even nationalistic 
purposes.
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French Missionaries
No one can be the slave o f  two masters: he will either hate the first and love the 
second, or be attached to the first and despise the second.
Matthew 6: 24
A major issue that was raised by the Thai Blood Group, responsible for much of the 
uncontrolled persecution, concerned the loyalties of the foreign Catholic priests and 
how they had allegedly swayed their congregations with their pro-French bias and 
were acting as a “Fifth Column” for the French forces. More seriously, during the 
Thai-French War, it was rumoured that some priests had been involved in attacks on 
Thai territory.1 These accusations echo some of the concerns that had existed in the 
northeast prior to the Thai-French War, as shown in Chapter IV. But they came into 
the official domain when they became part of court proceedings, as was the case 
with Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung who, among other things, was said to have exhorted his 
congregation to “pray for a French victory”, while other priests were accused of 
giving secret signals to enemy forces by flashing lights during the night.2 Clearly, 
some Thai nationalists suspected the French missionaries: but where did the loyalties 
of the French missionaries actually lie? Were they really loyal to France, their 
country of birth? The answer to this question is complex, and has implications for 
the missionary movement not only in Thailand but around the world.
Admittedly, evidence regarding the French missionaries’ sense of their own 
identity is scarce, especially from the reticent Vicar-Apostolic Perros. There are no 
searing, soul-searching diaries or letters that detail the missionaries’ struggle with 
reconciling the work of the Catholic Church, their home countries’ policies towards
’ B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to M. Roger Garreau, Minister o f  France, 28 May 1941, 60/6/25.
" One priest, for example, was accused o f soliciting military information and o f  flashing lights as a 
signal from his church -  see B.A .A ., Court Proceedings, 28 November 1940, Beatification Documents 
171/1-6.
Siam, and their own feeling towards their adopted countries. Thus, it is difficult to 
be certain of what missionaries considered to be their ‘true’ identity, especially when 
they are conscious about addressing different audiences for different purposes. 
Nevertheless, there are several points that are clear, and in the case of the 
missionaries of Siam, they emerge most visibly in extremis.
With the exception of the northeastern region, the loyalties of the French 
missionaries went generally unquestioned by outsiders prior to the outbreak of the 
Thai-French War. Nevertheless, as early as the late nineteenth century, there was 
already some unease within the foreign missionary community itself. The 
ambiguous loyalty of the Mission o f Siam was evident during celebrations involving 
high officials from colonial powers, particularly those from traditionally Catholic 
countries. At one such celebration in 1938 involving French and Spanish officials, 
Brother Ludovico Maria made the following observations:
How many times have I had a bad impression when I saw the French and 
Spanish flags flying in the wind on the towers of the cathedral... Does this 
represent France or the Holy See? I said to myself. This morning at the 
college, I had the same painful impression: at the top of the presidential chair 
there was a Spanish flag flanked by four French flags.3
Some priests were clearly uncomfortable identifying their work with a 
colonial power, or indeed any foreign nation. At the same time, there were others 
who had no such scruples and willingly associated themselves with the interests of 
their homeland. The latter group became a particular concern of the Holy See during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as the colonial powers expanded and 
consolidated their territories. The concern is expressed mainly in papal encyclicals,
3 M.E.P.A., Dossier Bangkok, 1938.
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firstly in Neminem Profecto, issued in 1845 during the pontificate o f Pope Gregory 
XVI. This encyclical was followed by an even more emphatic one, Maximum IUud, 
issued in 1919 by Pope Benedict XV. Indeed, it had been the policy of the 
Propaganda Fide since 16594 to discourage the formation of nationalistic attachments 
among missionaries. Its encouragement of the formation of indigenous clergy was 
also designed to prevent European-nationalist interference in ecclesiastical affairs. 
Neminem Profecto and Maximum IUud were merely reminders of this traditional 
policy. Indeed, Maximum IUud was especially scathing of “patriotic” European 
missionaries. Its cautionary note to foreign missionaries is eerily prescient of the 
problems that would be encountered by the Mission of Siam:
It would be tragic indeed if any of our missionaries forgot the dignity of their 
office so completely as to busy themselves with the interests of their 
terrestrial homeland instead o f with those of their homeland in heaven. It 
would be a tragedy indeed if  an apostolic man were to spend himself in 
attempts to increase and exalt the prestige of the native land he once left 
behind him. Such behaviour would infect his apostolate like a plague. It 
would destroy in him, the representative of the Gospel, the sinews of his love 
for souls and it would destroy his reputation with the populace. For no 
matter how wild and barbarous a people may be, they are well aware of what 
the missionary is doing in their country and of what he wants for them. They 
will subject him in their own way to a very searching investigation, and if he 
has any object in view other than their spiritual good, they will find out about 
it. Suppose it becomes clear that he is involved in worldly schemes of some 
kind, and that, instead o f devoting himself exclusively to the work of the 
apostolate, he is serving the interests of his homeland as well. The people 
immediately suspect everything he does. And in addition, such a situation 
could easily give rise to the conviction that the Christian religion is the 
national religion of some foreign people and that anyone converted to it is 
abandoning his loyalty to his own people and submitting to the pretensions 
and domination of a foreign power. 5
4 R. Costet, Siam-Laos: H istoire de la M ission , p. 424.
5 Benedict XV, Maximum Illud, 19, Society o f  the Divine Word, 30 November 1919, 
http://www.svdcuria.Org/miblic/mission/docs/encvcl/mi-en.htm#114%20Local%20Clergv [Last 
Access: 19 January 2009].
Given Papal concerns regarding this issue, it seems the problem of 
missionaries failing to reconcile their national roots with the work of the Mission 
was not unique to Siam. Yet, in the Siamese case, the interests of colonial powers 
and the interests of the Mission could not always be reconciled. French territorial 
acquisitions at the expense of the Siamese state were costing the Mission Siamese 
goodwill, especially in the northeast. Furthermore, given the secular movement 
within France itself during the early twentieth century, co-operation between the 
French government and the missionary orders was not always a certainty. As the 
Vicar-Apostolic noted in a 1944 report:
It is true that France, more than any country in the world, has sent her sons 
and daughters throughout the world to evangelise, but they are not the 
instruments o f France for French politics or French propaganda. The proof is 
that France has all too often, alas, persecuted the Church, secularised the 
schools, expelled the religious, confiscated the property of religious orders 
while propagating atheism.6
Furthermore, some French diplomatic officials such as Jules Harmand, the 
French consul to Siam (1881-3), were ardently anti-clerical and critical of other 
French officials and the missionaries. For example, Harmand criticised his 
predecessors who gave the missionaries “deplorable habits and encouraged their 
encroachment upon the domain of the Siamese authorities to such an extent that they 
have become petty monarchs” . The missionaries, too, did not escape blame since in 
Harmand’s view they “behave like veritable rebels in a country where they should 
consider it their highest duty and their best policy to show respect for the law and for 
native custom”.7 The same criticism could be levelled against the activities of the 
Mission of Laos in the 1920s and 1930s. In administrative terms, Harmand also
6 B .A .A ., Report o f  Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 1944 in V. Larque, En Thailande de 1940 a 1945, p. 153.
7 P. Tuck, The French W olf and the Siamese Lamb (White Lotus, Bangkok, 1995), p. 48.
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contended that over three quarters of the routine administration of the consulate was 
taken up with conflicts arising from the Mission, while the king also complained 
about the activities o f the missionaries during his first interview with the new 
consul,8 From Harmand’s point of view, therefore, the missionaries were a major 
obstacle to a closer relationship with the Siamese government.
Nevertheless, by the time of Vicar-Apostolic Perros’s ministry, an undeniable 
connection, both in terms of policy and finance, between the French colonial 
government and the Mission of Siam had been established. The origin of this co­
operation can be found in the first years o f Vicar-Apostolic Perros’s ministry, during 
the First World War. As mentioned earlier, although Vicar-Apostolic Perros was 
appointed to his position in Bangkok in 1909, this did not prevent him from being 
mobilised for French military service at the outbreak of war in 1914 and being sent 
back to France. A series of letters survive concerning negotiations between the 
Deputy for French Indochina and the Ministiy of War for the Vicar-Apostolic’s 
release from military service, and they reveal much about the French government’s 
attitude towards the position of the Catholic Church in Siam. The first letter, dated 
May 1915, was addressed to M. Marcou from M. Ernest Outrey, the deputy for 
French Indochina. Revealingly, in support of the Vicar-Apostolic’s case, the deputy 
expressed the view that:
1 am effectively convinced that he [Vicar-Apostolic Perros] will be able to 
render to France services that are more appreciable than the ones that he is 
currently rendering at Belfort.9
The Ministry o f War agreed with the sentiments, even though it took almost a 
month to do so, and granted the Vicar-Apostolic a deferment until October of the
8 Ibid., p. 48.
9 B.A.A., M. Outrey to M. Marcou, 14 May 1915, 65/1/22.
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same year.10 The Vi car-Apostolic would have been under no illusion as to why the 
deferment had been granted. As M. Outrey wrote in the letter that informed the 
stranded Vicar-Apostolic of the decision:
You should not have any disquiet about the limit of the deferment that has 
been accorded to you, once you return to Bangkok it is unlikely that you will 
be subject to a new mobilisation, because the reason for this deferment was 
precisely the influential role you can exercise in Siam for the defence of 
French interests in that country.11
However, what exactly these “French interests” were is not elaborated on in 
the letter. Did the French government intend the Vicar-Apostolic to use his 
influence to steer neutral Siam towards entering the war on the side of France and 
the Allies? Or to increase French influence in the region and block any attempts by 
the Central Powers to undermine Allied interests in the area? Would these activities 
compromise the Mission’s neutrality and thus its position and work in Siam?
As events turned out, the Vicar-Apostolic did not have to deal with these 
difficult questions. Indeed, according to the documents, he did very little to aid the 
French in Siam, since there was veiy little that needed to be done, or could be done 
in the face of British and Chinese commercial dominance in Siam. Furthermore, 
other prominent figures and groups in Thai society were already moving in a pro- 
Allied direction without requiring the encouragement or prompting of a French 
Catholic bishop, since international developments meant that Siam’s neutrality 
became less and less beneficial. By May 1917, King Vajiravudh was already set on 
declaring for the Allied forces,12 even though there were indications that Germany 
and its allies were more popular among the general population, since its colonial 
adventures had not adversely affected Siam, unlike those of the French and the
10 B .A .A ., French Ministry o f  War to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 12 June 1915, 65/1/27.
11 B .A .A ., M. Outrey to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 17 June 1915, 65/1/30.
12 W.F. Vella, Chaiyo /, pp. 107-8.
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British. Furthermore, the Germans were more open to social integration with the 
Siamese through their learning of the language (since few Siamese spoke German), 
intermarriage, and even naturalisation.13 However, at the time, in Thai society 
nobody could be more persuasive than the absolute monarch in combination with the 
international situation. As for the presence of the Central Powers, their influence in 
Siam was already minimal before 1914, and continued to diminish thereafter as its 
property was impounded and its citizens’ liberty was curtailed by the Siamese 
authorities upon the formal declaration of war on 22 July 1917. Thus, apart from 
sending missionaries as interpreters for the token Siamese contingent deployed to the 
Western front in June 1918, it was largely business as usual for the Mission of Siam.
Nevertheless, the French government had obtained what it wanted, the entry 
of an additional ally into the war, albeit at a rather late stage, while the Vicar- 
Apostolic was able to resume his work in the Mission. This deal was only the 
beginning of the symbiotic relationship between the Mission of Siam and the French 
government. Considering the instructions of Maximum IUud, the dangerous flirtation 
of state and missionary interests should probably have ended with the conclusion of 
the Allied victory in 1918. On the contrary, it seems that the Vicar-Apostolic was 
keener than ever to involve the French colonial government in the activities of the 
Mission. As the Vicar-Apostolic noted in 1915, the Catholic Church “constitute the 
principal element of French action” in Siam.14 Indeed, after the war, the Vicar- 
Apostolic succeeded in identifying French interests with the primary activities of the 
Mission in education, charity, and evangelisation:
13 Ibid., p. 102.
14 B .A .A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to French Minister, 30 May 1915, 49/1/12.
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.. .the French influence is not only exercised in our educational and charitable 
establishments in the capital, but also by the work of the missionaries in the 
provinces, where they are often the only Europeans.15
This claim appeared to have gained credence in the French colonial 
government since attacks (physical or otherwise) on the Mission’s schools were 
portrayed as an attack on French interests. When new school regulations were 
passed by the government in September 1921, the Vicar-Apostolic felt he could call 
on the assistance of the French government, since the laws had precipitated an 
“exceptionally critical situation for the Catholic French Missions of Siam and Laos, 
not only from the religious point of view, but also that o f the French”.16
French assistance to the Mission was not limited to diplomacy but, as 
discussed earlier, extended to financial assistance. The French colonial government 
seemed convinced that the teaching of the French language and culture and support 
for the charitable institutions run by French religious orders would work to their 
interests. Certainly, the Vicar-Apostolic advertised the benefits of their indirect 
work for the French government, writing in 1939 that:
We will continue, with all our heart and our strength, to devote ourselves to 
our Works, honoured to be able to contribute a small part to the development 
o f language and culture, and through that, the prestige o f our dear 
fatherland.17
However, since the French funds were ear-marked for specific institutions, it 
is arguable that the French colonial government’s conviction did not extend to the 
rest of the Mission’s work. Also, it was notable that in the Mission’s annual 
accounts, the French colonial government is not mentioned as a patron of the
16 B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to M. Outrey, 23 February 1918,49/4/10.
16 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to M. F. Pila, French Minister Plenipotentiary, 16 November 1921, 
50/3/45.
17 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to French Minister, 14 December 1939, 55/1/82.
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Mission of Siam, but the various religious institutions are. While there were 
legitimate accounting principles behind the non-disclosure, it is also possible that the 
Vicar-Apostolic knew he was in dangerous territory, especially in the light of the 
warnings of Maximum IUud.
Superficially therefore, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Thai 
Blood Group was right -  there was a connection between the French colonial 
government and the Mission of Siam. Yet, the picture becomes complicated when 
the Mission’s correspondence with the Siamese authorities is examined. The Vicar- 
Apostolic proved to be equally keen to court the interest of Siamese high society in 
support of its work. Indeed, to a Siamese audience, his patriotism seemed to lean 
more towards Siam, his country of residence for most of his life, than to his country 
of birth, which he had left when he was only 23 years old. This impression is 
created in letters such as the 1922 missive to King Vajiravudh on the occasion of his 
birthday:
Having made Siam our country of adoption, we have at heart the prosperity 
and happiness of the nation, and the noble examples set before us, serves as 
incentives to more strenuous endeavours on our part.18
Nor did this enthusiasm for his “country of adoption” waver with the change 
to the constitutional monarchy. In 1933, he wrote to Phraya Phahon:
.. .So I intend for the chronicles of Siam to record until the end of time that 
the Roman Catholics do not teach people to only love God, but they also 
teach them to be patriotic, even if they have to sacrifice their lives for the 
greater good.19
18 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to King Vajiravudh (Rama VI), 1 January 1922, 59/2/10.
19 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Prime Minister Phraya Phahon, 27 December 1933, 53/3/38.
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The sentiments were not one-sided. Indeed, the Siamese community often 
reciprocated in words and, sometimes, also in deeds. During the post-1932 period, 
praise was lavished on the work of the missionary schools during the Constitution 
celebrations and Thai government officials were still attending ceremonies, such as 
the funeral of Fr. Colombet in August 1933. The attitude had not changed much 
from the period of absolute monarchy. For example, in one o f the replies to the 
Vicar-Apostolic’s birthday wishes to the monarch in 1911, the Siamese Foreign 
Office had written on the monarch’s behalf:
His Majesty desires me to express to Your Lordship his high appreciation of 
the important work with which the Catholic Church and Community in this 
country have done in promoting the educational and moral welfare of the 
people among whom they have laboured. The connection of the Catholic 
Church with this Kingdom is one of veiy old standing, and His Majesty not 
only recognises it as a connection fruitful of the best benefits to the public in 
general, but also regards members of the Catholic Mission as devoted fellow 
workers with himself in the cause of the country’s progress.20
Indeed, as the rise of Assumption College attests, these sentiments were often 
backed up financially. Such esteem for the work of the Mission, in turn, ensured its 
continuing smooth operation. At the same time, it also granted the Mission 
leadership access to influential communities, such as the Siam Society. In 1914 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros was unanimously invited to join the Siam Society as an 
honorary member “in view of the fact that the Roman Catholic Mission since its 
establishment in Siam has favoured and contributed to scientific researches in the 
land in which its labours are concentrated”.21
The strongest evidence of the Mission’s dedication to Siam was its role in 
attempting to bring the Petain government in to negotiations prior to the outbreak of
20 B.A.A., Siamese Foreign Office to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 11 January 1911, 61/1/11.
B.A.A., Siam Society to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 23 March 1914, 48/6/11.
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the Thai-French War. A letter to the French Minister of 29 September 1940 states 
that it had always been the policy of the Mission to maintain a harmonious 
relationship with the local authorities, but the Mission had become increasingly 
anxious “in view o f the obstacles which, at this moment, threatens to disrupt the 
tradition of amity between our country of origin and Thailand our countiy of 
adoption”. The letter then makes the following request:
If the demands o f Thailand, which in essence is a simple rectification of the 
borders on the Mekong, do not prejudice the vital interests of our nation, we 
would be much obliged if you could push with all your strength for the 
maintenance of peace, justice, and honour for the two nations.22
A further, more urgent telegram sent three days later on 2 October, addressed 
directly to the Petain government, read:
The French Catholic Mission of TFIAILAND begs the French government to 
agree without delay to the amiable rectification of the borders on the 
MEKIiONG between THAILAND and INDOCHINA. The affair is urgent 
and its settlement will honour the two countries with the Mission and we 
believe it will be without real difficulty for FRANCE.23
In addition, a telegram along similar lines was sent to the Superior of the 
M.E.P. on the same day, highlighting the seriousness of the situation.24 While the 
Vicar-Apostolic’s efforts were ultimately fruitless, the telegrams and letters are 
revealing in their contradictions. The Vicar-Apostolic’s identification of the Mission 
of Siam as the “French Catholic Mission” suggests that the Mission was firmly 
aligned with the interests of France. On the other hand, pressing for the alteration of 
the border between Thailand and French Indochina, at this stage, would have 
benefited Thailand more than France. Practically speaking, therefore, despite the
“  B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to French Minister, 29 September 1940, 55/2/38.
23 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Petain government, 2 October 1940, 55/2/38.
24 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Superior o f  the M.E.P., 2 October 1940, 55/2/40.
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Mission’s claim to be the “French Thai Mission” it can be seen that in extremis, the 
Vicar-Apostolic preferred to support Thailand at the cost of France.
Furthermore, the Mission continued to insist on its own devotion, and the 
loyalty of its congregation, to Thailand, even in the face of active persecution. 
Certainly, there were worries that the French missionaries could abuse their hold 
over parishioners and turn them against their own country; but the Vicar-Apostolic’s 
homilies and circulars contest this view. One circular from the 1940s insisted that:
The Catholic Church who willingly embraces all in her aims regardless of 
their nationality or status has a sacred duty, as the leader of humanity, to 
allow all to attain their eternal goal... The Church does not conspire and has 
not conspired to create disorder in the natural order... Every Catholic, 
though they differ in nationality and ethnicity, exist as the children of their 
motherlands and must love their own respective countries with the highest 
love. But in this time of crisis, they must be second to no other patriot in 
giving their lives for their countries if necessary.25
Moreover, even when its priests were arrested or assaulted, the Mission did 
not turn to outsiders but appealed directly to the government for redress. Evidence 
for the Mission’s dedication to Thailand, therefore, can be said to be as strong as that 
which attested to its loyalty to France.
Much of the apparent contradiction comes from the audience being addressed 
by the Vicar-Apostolic and his intentions. Clearly, when applying for funding from 
the French colonial government, it was a good ploy to emphasise the French patriotic 
credentials. On the other hand, to ensure the future smooth running o f the Mission, 
it was a good idea to emphasise the benefits of missionary activities to Thai society 
and the patriotism of the Catholic congregation when addressing Thais. Both the 
Thais and the French were, in effect, being exploited by the Vicar-Apostolic.
2;> B .A .A ., Parish Circular, Undated, 68/3/34.
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Perhaps ‘exploitation’ is too strong a word, since the ‘victims’ did derive benefits. 
The French could be satisfied that the prestige of their patrie was being spread in a 
land over which they had little political and commercial influence, while the Thais 
obtained a wider access to European-style education and healthcare. The 
overwhelming concern for the Mission, it seems, was not loyalty to Siam or France 
but how they can be exploited to benefit the work of the Mission; and if everybody 
gains something through their co-operation and the synergy o f interests, so much the 
better.
Ultimately, it was not the interests of Thailand or France that was foremost in 
the mind of the Mission but the welfare of Catholicism, its works, and the followers 
within its jurisdiction. Although Maximum Mud  had forbidden such a close flirtation 
with nationalist interests, the Vicar-Apostolic’s actions should be considered in the 
context of Thai political reality and the Mission’s poor financial performance. The 
Thai political reality was that it was nearly impossible to initiate any major project 
without sponsorship or patronage from influential figures. At the same time, the 
Great Depression had placed further restraint on the Mission’s already limited 
financial resources. Even during the more prosperous years o f the 1920s, the 
situation had caused acute tension within the Mission leadership itself, between the 
Vicar-Apostolic and his procurator, Louis-August Chorin. The effects of the Great 
Depression and the deficit o f the Mission between the years 1928 and 1939 on its 
work were potentially ruinous, with the Mission incurring heavy deficits as shown in 
Chapter II. Additional funds from anywhere during this period would therefore have 
been very welcome.
It has been said that “no man can serve two masters” but it seems that, by 
1939, the Mission was tiying to serve three: Thailand, France, and the Church. It
was a risky policy, which did allow the Mission to survive the 1930s, despite its 
financial problems. The ploy would probably have worked indefinitely too, if it 
weren’t for the pesky nationalists. For the Vicar-Apostolic and his financially- 
challenged Mission in the late 1920s and 1930s, the lure of additional funds was 
perhaps too much to resist, and the agreement with the French colonial government 
was made. Undoubtedly, the pact was a Faustian one, but he hardly needed to have 
read the play, since the Maximum Illud had anticipated the outcome for some time.
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Italian Missionaries
Fly from bad companions as from the bite o f  a poisonous snake. I f  you keep good 
companions, I can assure you that you will one day rejoice with the blessed in 
Heaven; whereas if you keep with those who are bad, you will become bad yourself 
and you will be in danger o f  losing your soul.
St. John Bosco
In contrast to their French colleagues, the Italian Salesians were able to exploit their 
nationality to their distinct advantage. Their possession of the separate Mission of 
Ratchaburi, legal and administrative separation, along with their dissimilarities from 
the French missionaries, allowed them to exploit the vacuum left by the expelled 
French priests, particularly in the northeast. Certainly, the Salesians knew from veiy 
early on what had befallen their French colleagues and their congregations. In 
December 1940, Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti wrote to his counterpart in the Mission of 
Siam assuring him of the Salesians’ prayers for the M.E.P.-run Missions of Siam and 
Laos adding:
We are all aware of your and your confreres’ pains and we ask the Lord to 
end the days of tribulation. In any event, the humble sons o f [John] de Bosco 
are at your disposition, should they be able to serve you in any way.26
Indeed, initially, the Italians proved more than usefiil to their beleaguered 
M.E.P. colleagues for two reasons. Firstly, in theory, they did not pose an additional 
danger to their parishioners due to their Italian nationality. Secondly, they were 
tolerated or even protected by the authorities, assisted by the fact that some of the 
Salesians were already acquainted with local officials. For example, one priest, Fr. 
Pinaffo, was an old acquaintance of the Governor of Ubon Ratchatani. The 
relationship was certainly beneficial for the Salesians, since a local Thai priest noted
‘6 B .A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 8 December 1940,44/4/41.
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that: “The [district chief officer] and the chief of police were veiy polite with the two 
priests” .27 Together with their nation’s history, that saw the absence of notable 
antagonism against Thailand, the Salesians were able to operate in regions from 
which the French had recently been expelled, purely through advantages that derived 
from their nationality.
At first, the Mission of Siam accepted the presence of the Salesian priests as 
a necessity. The Mission was induced to make the following agreement with the 
Salesians in April 1941:
1. The deputy Vicar-Apostolic will only have the power to appoint Salesian 
priests that have been approved by their Superior to parishes that have 
also been approved of by both the Superior and the deputy Vicar- 
Apostolic.
2. Once these priests have assumed their posts, they will have the right and 
responsibility to govern the Catholics of that parish and manage the assets 
of the parish.
3. The priests will hold their post indefinitely unless either party [the 
Mission of Siam or the Salesians] wishes to terminate the agreement, in 
which case they must inform the other party in advance.
Ostensibly, the agreement had been made because of “the few number of 
priests that are inadequate for the governing of all the parishes in the jurisdiction of 
the Mission of Bangkok”,28 but the note of desperation is palpable. The agreement 
in effect allowed the Salesians to gain footholds in what was traditionally M.E.P. 
territory. Undoubtedly the government’s restriction on the movement of certain 
nationalities, including the French, in certain parts of the country was disrupting the 
operations of the Mission. After all, a shortage of priests was not a new 
phenomenon in the M.E.P.’s operation of the Mission of Siam and, in the past, it had 
been able to cope adequately without resorting to outside help. Similarly, the
27 B.A.A., Fr. Khamchu to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 7 June 1941, 47/3/50.
"8 B.A.A., Agreement between Fr. Joachim Prakobkij, Provincial o f  the M ission o f  Siam and Fr. Juan 
Carretto, Superior o f  the Salesians in Thailand, 3 April 1941, 90/3/3.
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Mission of Laos also requested Salesian priests to be sent to various posts in the 
northeast in October 1941.29 The ascendancy of the Salesians in Thailand was 
confirmed by an April 1941 telegram from the Holy See that charged Vicar- 
Apostolic Pasotti to temporarily assist in the running of the Mission o f Siam.30
Initially, the beleaguered M.E.P. Missions were appreciative of the Salesians’ 
assistance, commending their good work in the midst of great difficulties.31 This 
happy state did not last for long. Indeed, the “temporary” nature of the ascendancy 
did not deter M.E.P. priests from voicing their criticisms. The French priests 
disputed the Salesian vicar-apostolic’s authority, especially over the running of the 
Mission ot Siam. Particularly explosive was Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti’s seeming 
reluctance to allow the return of French priests to the Mission of Siam following the 
cessation of the Thai-French War. Considering the fact that the signing of the peace 
treaty between Thailand and France did not end the persecution of Catholics, Pasotti 
was arguably right to have reservations. Nevertheless, it engendered suspicion 
among his M.E.P. colleagues and one M.E.P. priest, Fr. Pierre Moreau, was 
prompted to ask Mgr. Drapier, the Apostolic Delegate in Hue, Vietnam: “why our 
priests have to obey Mgr. Pasotti”.
Indeed, in 1941, there appeared to have been a campaign among French 
priests, both inside and outside Thailand, to disregard the instructions of the Italian 
vicar-apostolic. Mgr. Drapier was sympathetic to the feelings of the French priests 
but, as Apostolic Delegate, he felt that he could not sanction such a campaign, 
stating that:
B.A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Gouin to Fr. Sinuan, 23 June 1941, 47/3/51, and Vicar-Apostolic Gouin to 
Fr. Theng, 3 October 1941, 47/3/59.
30 B .A .A ., Msgr. Montini to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 21 April 1941, 63/5/4.
31 B .A .A ., Tha Khaek to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 5 June 1942, 47/4/10.
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As much as I admire the ardour o f your priests and their love for a countiy 
that is hostile to them, it is impossible for me to approve the disobedience of 
Mgr. Pasotti’s directives.32
The Apostolic Delegate’s reasoning was that: “Mgr. Pasotti has, in effect, the 
powers o f an Apostolic Delegate and that he was in charge of Catholic interests in 
the eyes of the government”.33 Furthermore, he also pointed out that the M.E.P. 
priests had no evidence against Pasotti, despite all their claims:
You have commented that I know very well the objections of the priests 
against Mgr. Pasotti and the Salesians; but you have remarked that you have 
no proof for your assertions and that the Holy See has allowed the 
maintenance of the status quo.34
The correspondence does not explain what these claims were, but their 
explosive nature becomes clear in a scathing 1944 report drawn up by Vicar- 
Apostolic Perros:
We forgive [the indigenous nationalist priests] willingly when they come 
humbly to us and confide that they had been misguided by certain members 
of the Italian Mission of the Salesians. It seems to us that despite the 
conciliatory and peaceful roles they played, Mgr. Pasotti and Fr.
Carretto.. .have failed their duty since they have encouraged the rebellion of 
Siamese priests against the French priests, and since they hold out that all of 
Siam will soon be solely their apostolic domain and that they will profit 
greatly from the French Catholic Mission’s possessions and their millions.35
Evidently Vicar-Apostolic Petros’s attitude towards the Salesians had cooled 
significantly since their first arrival in Siam, and reflects a break with the Salesians. 
Given the date of the report, there is a possibility of a misunderstanding, arising from 
a repentant indigenous clergy using the Salesians as convenient scapegoats for their 
previous recalcitrance, after they saw that their cause had been lost along with that of
32 B .A .A ., Mgr. Drapier, Apostolic Delegate, to Fr. Moreau, 22 August 1941, 90/3/13.
33 B.A.A., Fr. Moreau to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 26 September 1941, 90/3/19.
j4 B .A .A ., Mgr. Drapier, Apostolic Delegate, to Fr. Moreau, 22 August 1941, 90/3/13.
35 B.A.A., Report o f  Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 1944 in V. Larque, En Thailande de 1940 a 1945 , p. 153.
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Pibul and Imperial Japan. Nevertheless, for the M.E.P. priests at the time, the 
Salesians’ perceived interference, not only in their administration but also in 
influencing the conduct of their indigenous priests, was tantamount to undermining 
the M.E.P.’s authority and thus their long-term hold on the Mission. If the claims 
were true, it provides an example of how foreigners could effectively utilise the 
indigenous nationalism to further their own interests. However, in the Salesians’ 
case, the tactic was dangerous, considering the xenophobic tendencies of Thai 
nationalism during this period. Even if  they had succeeded in removing their French 
counterparts from the missionary scene, it would not be surprising if the Salesians 
themselves later became targets for persecution because of their foreign nature.
Indeed, the Salesians encountered difficulties in the closing years of the 
Second World War precisely due to the changes in Italy’s fortunes. The signing of 
the armistice between Italy and the invading Allied forces 011 8 September 1943 
marked Italy’s abandonment of the Axis cause. Its subsequent declaration of war on 
Japan threw it further into the Allied camp. The Salesians were clearly worried 
about the implications of these developments and wrote to the Mission of Siam in 
September 1943 to work out a tentative arrangement should this happen:
I do not know if the surrender of Italy will have consequences for us. In any 
case, in the absence of Vicar-Apostolic Perros, I ask you strongly that some 
priests be sent to [Bangnokkhwaek] so that they can succeed us in various 
posts in case we need to depart.36
In any event, the Thai government and other organisations were much slower 
in dealing with the Salesians.37 One Salesian priest had been badly beaten by
36 B .A.A ., Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti to Provincial o f  the Mission o f Siam, 9 September 1943,44/4/57.
In contrast, tollowing Italy’s surrender, the Japanese government proceeded to immediately intern 
those Italians within their territory who did not declare themselves for the Axis. Nevertheless, even 
those who declared for the Axis continued to be closely monitored by the Kempeitai.
members of the “Thai Blood” group38 (most likely because he was mistaken for a 
French priest) but the central government was still disposed to granting exemptions 
to the Salesians. For example, their priests were still being granted permission to 
teach in schools in October 1943.39 Nevertheless, some local authorities became 
reluctant to host Salesian priests in the way they had done previously. For example, 
even though five Salesian priests had been given permission to operate in the 
northeast by the police commander himself, the local police excused themselves by 
claiming that since the priests were operating in remote regions, the overstretched 
police force in the northeast found it inconvenient to provide protection for them, 
especially when the Ministry of Interior was becoming suspicious of the motives of 
the Salesian priests by as early as January 1942.40 The solution of the local police 
after September 1943 was to ‘deport’ the priests back to the Mission of Ratchaburi 
for their convenience, as well as the ‘convenience’ of the local police.41
It is notable that an essentially bureaucratic rather than a nationalist excuse 
was officially used by the police to avoid hosting the Salesians. The case suggests 
that local officials were distancing themselves from foreigners who previously had 
been tolerated or even welcomed. Arguably, had the Pacific War dragged on, or had 
Japanese victoiy been assured, the active persecution of the Salesian held parishes 
would have been veiy likely. However, the lack of significant or wide-spread 
persecution of the Salesians, despite the fall of Italy, also suggests that local officials 
were keenly aware of international developments and did not wish to risk post-war 
reprisals from nations whose victoiy now seemed inevitable.
38 M.E.P.A., Compte-rendu 1940-1946.
39 B .A .A ., Police General Aduldejarat to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 15 October 1943, 60/2/26.
C.B.A., Interior Ministry to Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, Re: Italian priests spreading the Roman
Catholic Religion in the Northeast, 14 January 1942, ei. 11598/2485.
41 B .A .A ., Assistant Police Com m ander to V icar-A postolic Perros, 28 October 1943, 60 /2/27.
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The Salesians’ success during the early years of the Second World War 
illustrates the importance of nationality, however superficial, in ensuring the safety 
of the missionaries and their congregation, and how, if the 1944 M.E.P. report is 
taken literally, nationality and nationalism could be used to further an organisation’s 
interests. The same report also suggests that the Salesians recognised the inevitable 
result of Thai nationalism on the Mission — the establishment of a local hierarchy, 
free from foreign leadership. The clash with their French counterparts, who also 
recognised this inevitability, was over methods and timing rather than the principle. 
Examined in these terms, neither of the two competing religious orders can be said to 
have ‘won’. The true victors were the parishioners who could continue to worship in 
safety and the indigenous priests who were now, more than ever, motivated to take 
the Mission into their own hands.
291
Thai Priests and Parishioners
V  V
o <=S q cj
urnm h iiiiflfi
When the tide is up, hurry to scoop up the water.
Traditional Thai Proverb
The outbreak of controlled and uncontrolled persecution across Catholic parishes in 
Thailand left Thai priests and their congregation in a quandary. Many faced a stark 
choice between apostasy and remaining steadfast in their faith. Some travelled the 
safer path of apostasy (although many chose to return to Catholicism after 1945). 
Others, such as the martyrs of Songkhon village, remained true to their principles to 
the very end. At the same time, the Thai priesthood was confronted with the choice 
of either remaining loyal to the French leadership that had financed and nurtured 
them for the past few centuries or taking the opportunity to strike out on their own, 
or under the aegis of the Italian missionaries. For many of those who made the 
easier choice, the key factor in their decision was survival -  of themselves and/or the 
parishioners under their care. Others, however, took the opportunity to voice their 
ambition for a greater role for the indigenous clergy.
Prior to the persecution period, such voices from the indigenous clergy were 
muted, if non-existent. The main reason for this silence was arguably the success of 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros’s gradual top-down reform of the Mission. The question of 
transforming the Mission of Siam into an indigenously-run, as opposed to a foreign- 
run Mission, was a constant theme in the Vicar-Apostolic’s ministry. The approach 
was in line with Papal encyclicals that strongly encouraged existing Missions to 
begin the handover to indigenous priests. The 1919 encyclical entitled Maximum 
Illud  exhorted foreign missionaries to:
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....make it his special concern to secure and train local candidates for the 
sacred ministry. In this policy lies the greatest hope o f the new churches. For 
the local priest, one with his people by birth, by nature, by his sympathies and 
his aspirations, is remarkably effective in appealing to their mentality and 
thus attracting them to the Faith. Far better than anyone else he knows the 
kind of argument they will listen to, and as a result, he often has easy access 
to places where a foreign priest would not be tolerated.
Furthermore, the document was emphatic that indigenous priests were to be 
taught to the same exacting standards as foreign priests. They were “not to be 
trained merely to perform the humbler duties of the ministry, acting as the assistants 
of foreign priests. On the contrary, they must take up God’s work as equals, so that 
some day they will be able to enter upon the spiritual leadership of their people”.42 
The encyclical thus sounded the death-knell of the foreign-run Missions.
Given the difficulties encountered by French priests hying to penetrate Thai 
society, it made more and more sense that the rate of success could be improved 
through indigenous priests. Certainly this objective had become the ultimate vision 
of the Mission by 1934, when the Vicar-Apostolic wrote to the Rector of the 
Pontifical Urbaniana University in Rome (where some Thai priests had been sent for 
their formation) that:
We therefore must have priests who are zealous for the salvation of the souls, 
humble to counter the pride of the Buddhists, versed in knowledge of 
theology and the humanities — both philosophy and science so that they can 
be victorious against error and will not be demoralised by the appearance of 
failure.43
The Vicar-Apostolie’s aims were in accordance with a 1926 encyclical from 
M.E.P. headquarters, which urged its missionaries to: “No longer hesitate to give a
Benedict XV, Maximum Illud, 14-15, Society o f  the Divine Word, 30 November 1919, 
http://www.svdcuria.Org/public/mission/docs/encvcl/mi-en.htm#l 14%20Local%20Clergy [Last 
Access: 19 January 2009].
43 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Rector o f  Pontifical Urbaniana University, 3 March 1934, 
63/3/17.
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place to indigenous clergy in the councils of each Mission”, and gave further advice 
on the distribution o f parishes:
Do not give to the indigenous clergy all the better parishes or the positions of 
trust, but a reasonable proportion of one and the other; and so give them just 
satisfaction for them to get used to exercising and carrying their 
responsibilities.44
In practice, however, there was opposition among the ranks of the 
missionaries against a greater role for the indigenous clergy. In a 1927 report, the 
Vicar-Apostolic wrote:
I do not hide from you, Monsignor, that on this point I have a certain number 
o f colleagues who have always believed that the moment has not come to 
‘push’ the indigenous priests; it is a prideful belief more than anything else.45
If the Vicar-Apostolic proved conciliatory towards the Thai authorities and 
their increasingly hostile new legislation, he certainly was not conciliatory towards 
his fellow missionaries. Indeed, if anything, the Vicar-Apostolic continued the 
process of supporting and giving ever larger roles to indigenous priests. The 
Mission’s support for indigenous priests can be seen in its spending on the local 
seminaries, while the expansion o f the role of indigenous priests was witnessed in 
their numerical supremacy in the eastern parishes. By 1920, there was only one 
European priest in some areas46 and, as already discussed, with the exception of 
internal bickering, arguably normal in most communities, the eastern parishes were 
largely models o f success. By 1939, all that remained was to secure the permission 
of the M.E.P. and the Propaganda Fide to set up an indigenous Mission, work out an 
independent method o f financing the new Mission and, perhaps the most difficult in
44 B.A .A ., M.E.P. Encyclical, 5 March 1926, 67/3/3.
45 B .A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to Monsignor Aiuti, 18 March 1927, 62/4/26.
46 B .A .A ., V icar-A postolic  Perros to Cardinal van Rossum , Propaganda Fide, 29 January 1920,
62/2/62.
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the light of the internal politics of the diocese, find a leadership figure among the 
indigenous clergy to lead a new Mission of Chantaburi.
However, in 1939, the Mission was concentrating its efforts on the creation 
of a Mission in the north rather than in the east. The prioritisation o f the north is 
understandable, given the rapid progress made by the missionaries there, even in the 
face of a longstanding Protestant presence. The persecutions, however, ended that 
project and instead pushed the prospects of the Mission of Chantaburi back to the 
fore, especially when the conclusion of the Thai-French War in favour of the Thais 
failed to end the threats against the Mission. Initially, the Vicar-Apostolic did not 
want to set up the first indigenous Mission in Chantaburi but to go further and set 
one up in Bangkok, in effect handing over the entire Mission to the indigenous 
clerics. The plan, however, was opposed by the Holy See, which was concerned for 
the long-term future o f the Mission, arguing that such a Mission should instead “be 
set up in the best o f conditions for its existence and long-term success”.47 The 
objections were based on material considerations rather than principles and, while 
the decision may have safeguarded the interests of the Mission in the long-term, in 
the short-term it still left the Vicar-Apostolic in a vulnerable position.
The next best option, therefore, was a Mission in Chantaburi. Although it 
now had both the pretext and the will to set up the indigenous Mission in Chantaburi, 
the Vicar-Apostolic was again unable to act with urgency due to Church regulations. 
Decisions of this magnitude had to be relayed to Rome for approval and specific 
instructions had to be formulated and issued. Given the conditions inside and 
outside Thailand, this process was even slower than normal and it was only on 11 
May 1944 that the Mission of Chantaburi was created -  four years after the
47 B .A .A ., A postolic  D elegate  o f  Indochina to V icar-A postolic  Perros, 30 D ecem ber 1942, 66/2/89.
persecutions had started. The continuing difficulties are evident in the fact that Fr. 
Jacob Cheng (Changkoedsawang), a former student of Vicar-Apostolic Perros, was 
not formally consecrated to head the new Mission until the following year, on 11 
February 1945, in the process becoming the first Thai bishop in the history of the 
Church. Just as the conclusion of the Thai-French War did not guarantee a sudden 
end to the persecution, the establishment of an indigenous Mission did not ensure the 
end of the government’s negative attitude towards Catholicism across the country. It 
did, however, grant a reprieve to the eastern parishes, allowing them to argue that 
they were dejure  and de facto  no longer a part of the ‘French’ Mission of Siam 
while its priests were beholden neither to French nor Italian missionary orders but 
directly to the Holy See.
Even so, there still remained the arduous task of actually administering the 
new Mission. Undoubtedly, the task was made more difficult by the unfavourable 
atmosphere and, while some indigenous priests welcomed the opportunity to tackle 
the new responsibilities, others still preferred to be attached to the old Mission of 
Bangkok.118 There was also the risk that promising priests would not deliver when 
they were appointed to the new posts, especially when circumstances, rather than 
careful planning, dictated the appointments. Certainly, this had been the outcome 
when the Vicar-Apostolic appointed Fr. Joachim Teppawan Prakobkij (Paul Theu) to 
the post of the Mission of Siam’s Provincial. There was much that was promising 
about Fr. Joachim. From an Annamite family, he was able to speak Vietnamese, 
Thai, and two Chinese dialects with equal fluency. His record while administering 
Holy Rosary Church in Bangkok was encouraging and he enjoyed popularity among
48 B .A .A ., Inform ationes quod futuram M issionem  de Chantabun, 13 July 1943, 55 /5 /25 .
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the parishioners and his colleagues.49 All of these positive attributes were not 
enough to prevent disappointment. Reporting to the Apostolic Delegate in 1943, the 
Vicar-Apostolic wrote:
I have named as Provincial Fr. Joachim, who at this time enjoys the 
estimation of his colleagues due to his intelligence and age, but this 
nomination has not borne fruit; the new Provincial has disappointed all 
hopes.50
Perhaps the Vicar-Apostolic had put too much hope in one man, since in 
January 1941 he also delegated his authority to Fr. Joachim, citing “the enmity 
between the governments of Thailand and France”.51 However, by the end of the 
year, the Vicar-Apostolic was obliged to resume his position, in public citing the 
conclusion of hostilities between Thailand and France as his reason for reassuming 
his old post.52 The 1943 letter suggests that the real reason for Vicar-Apostolic 
Perros’s return was that Fr. Joachim had “disappointed all hopes”. It seems that the 
short-lived experiment with the indigenous leadership had failed.
The failure was perhaps not surprising, given that the older generation of 
indigenous priests, to which Fr. Joachim belonged, was ill-equipped to deal with 
such a large responsibility all at once. At the same time, priests belonging to the 
more promising younger generation -  a generation that had been educated overseas, 
in Penang or even as tar afield as Rome — had not yet reached the maturity that such 
an important post required, especially in such a turbulent atmosphere. Fr. Nicolas 
Kitbamrang belonged to this group, having been educated at the General College in 
Penang. Even more promising was Fr. Joseph Nittayo who had been educated first
49 B.A.A., Report, Undated, 64/2/21.
50 B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros to M. Drapier, Apostolic Delegate o f  Indochina, 17 January 1943, 
55/5/2.
5‘ B .A.A., Mission o f  Bangkok Circular, 15 January 1941, 67/4/13.
5" B.A.A., Mission o f  Bangkok Circular, 8 December 1941, 67/4/15.
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in Thailand and then to doctorate level at the Pontifical Urbaniana University in 
Rome. Along with an ability to speak four languages, his evaluation was also 
positive, noting his “sane judgement” and “perfect administration of a parish”, as 
well as recognition among his colleagues.53 The only factor against him was age: at 
33 in 1941, he was too young and inexperienced for the post of head of the Mission 
at a very difficult time,''4 and the Vicar-Apostolic voiced this concern in a report.55 
The Mission was thus caught between utilising priests who were mature, but had not 
been trained properly for the immense task, or using priests who had been trained but 
were largely untested. Arguably, had the Mission chosen the second option, the 
result of failure would have been more catastrophic. Apart from the damage to the 
Mission, the failure of the new generation would have led to the discrediting of a 
generation of carefully prepared priests, a loss that the Mission could ill-afford. The 
wiser choice was thus the former option.
All of these developments occurred with surprisingly little agitation from the 
indigenous parishioners and priests. As noted previously, indigenous voices calling 
for the creation of an indigenous Mission were muted, if  non-existent, throughout the 
1920s and 1930s. It is true that parishioners and priests became more vocal as the 
virulent Thai nationalistic propaganda took effect, but on further analysis, their 
demands remained largely local. In many cases, the demands did not originate from 
an intrinsic, or even new-found, hatred o f the French leadership, but was bom out of 
a need to counter hostile local claims against the parish. The demands of the
53 B.A.A., Evaluation o f  Fr. Joseph Khiamsun Nittayo, Undated, 96/4/9.
54 Vi car-Apostolic Perros himself, by modem standards, was young at the time o f  his appointment in 
1909, being only 39 years old. In contrast, Vicar-Apostolic Cheng was 63 at the time o f  his 
appointment, while in modern times in countries such as the U.S., bishops were on average 48 years 
old at the time o f  their appointment. See T.J. Reese, ‘A Survey o f  the American Bishops’ at 
http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/church studies/reese/america/cs-surv.htm [Last Access: 19 January 
2009].
5;> B.A.A., Report, Undated, 64/2/21.
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parishioners o f St. Paul’s Church in Paetriu for the reinstatement o f two Thai priests 
to their parish in December 1941 could be seen in this light. During the period of 
acute crisis, Fr. Carrie, the original and French parish priest, had been replaced by 
the two Thai priests. However, after the atmosphere had calmed down, the French 
priest was reinstated much to the chagrin o f the parishioners. The parishioners’ 
petition to Vicar-Apostolic Pasotti revealed the consequences:
At present the parish is prospering with faith because o f the Thai priests’ 
efforts in persuading those who had lapsed to return. Then Fr. Carrie, who 
had previously overseen the parish, returned causing all the parishioners and 
the priests to fear that danger would come back, so much so that nobody 
would come to church as before while the two Thai priests have left because 
of the same fear.
The petition was emphatic that the persecution was the “consequence of the 
actions of the French priests and citizens”, and that the two remaining churches in 
the area (St. Paul and St. Roch) had survived through the “co-operative efforts of the 
Thai priests and parishioners”.56 Superficially, the overwhelming concern of the 
parishioners in this case was survival, while remaining Catholic. The presence of 
Thai priests was conducive to addressing this concern, while the return of the French 
priest was seen as a liability.
A deeper examination of the parish history reveals another dimension, 
however. It appears that Fr. Carrie had not been popular among the parishioners 
prior to 1939. As early as 1932, when he first came to the parish, Fr. Carrie was 
already sparking complaints from the local community. Among other things, Fr. 
Carrie was accused of being authoritarian, gullible, overly interested in material 
goods and rich parishioners, and short-tempered, so much so that “parishioners fear
56 B .A .A ., Petition to V icar-A postolic  Pasotti, 19 Decem ber 1941, 33 /3 /47 .
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him like they fear tigers”.57 The priest could have hardly endeared himself to his 
congregation by throwing around accusations of communism.38 The experience with 
the new priest must have been disappointing considering the rapport the previous 
incumbent, Fr. Emile, had built with the parishioners. Some parishioners sent a 
petition to Vicar-Apostolic Perros calling for the reinstatement of Fr. Emile,59 but 
this came to nothing and Fr. Carrie left his post only following the outbreak of 
hostilities between Thailand and France. In the light of this bad history between Fr. 
Carrie and his parishioners during the 1930s, it is therefore not surprising to find 
parishioners agitating for the appointment of an alternative priest. Nationalism in 
this instance provided an additional excuse, and also dictated the choice of Thai 
priests as the viable replacements.
This co-existence of legitimate demands and ulterior motives can also be 
seen in the agitation of some indigenous priests. One case that was well-documented 
was that of the case of Fr. Raphael Titra, an indigenous priest who was constantly 
clashing with his French superior throughout the first half of the 1940s. In 1940, a 
group of parishioners demanded that the Vicar-Apostolic rescind Fr. Raphael’s 
transfer from their parish in the vicinity of Ayutthaya to Chantaburi. The strength of 
feeling was such that the parishioners had appealed to the local authorities to 
intervene. According to the district chief officer of Bangsai, who made the appeal to 
the Vicar-Apostolic:
After much consideration, I have seen that this priest is held in general 
respect among the Roman Catholic parishioners and is dedicated to the 
teaching and spread o f the Roman Catholic religion. Apart from his religious 
activities, he has also supported the education of the sons and daughters of
57 B.A.A ., Parishioners o f  St. Paul to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 27 June 1932, 33/3/15.
B.A.A., Fr. Carrie to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 26 February 1934, 33/3/17.
57 B.A.A., Petition to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 3 September 1934, 33/3/19.
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Roman Catholics. His departure will therefore be mourned by the Roman 
Catholics here.60
The parishioner’s actual petition to the district chief officer revealed more 
about the source of the priest’s popularity. According to the petition:
1. He has managed and developed the parish’s education according to the 
government’s wishes.
2. He has encouraged patriotism within the community. For example he has 
persuaded parishioners to make donations in support of the government’s 
efforts to reclaim the lost territories and has persuaded Catholics to 
purchase guns for the government.61
That a priest should have been responsible for raising funds for a war and 
providing weapons for the government would have been scandalous under any 
circumstances. That it was funding for a war in regard to which his superiors were 
desperately trying to steer the Mission into neutrality, placed the priest on a collision 
course with his superiors. Certainly, in such a clash, Fr. Raphael would have been 
cheered by his parishioners’ resolution:
We, as Thais, wish to retain our honour as Thais and express our wish to 
have Thais rule themselves without foreign priests to rule over our spiritual 
lives, which would be an unnecessary smirch on our Thai honour.62
On the surface, these demands for Thai autonomy were in line with the 
nationalistic sentiments at the time. However, once again, history allows a different 
interpretation. In actual fact, Fr. Raphael was proving to be an especially recalcitrant 
priest. Trouble had started well before the Thai-French War, for Fr. Raphael had 
been allegedly involved in sexual misconduct in 1936.63 Problems occurred again in
60 B.A.A ., Khun Sririratket, district ch ief officer o f  Bang Sai to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 14 October 
1940, 45/3/25.
61 B.A .A ., Citizens o f  Tambon Maitra to district ch ief officer o f  Bang Sai, 12 October 1940,45/3/25
62 Ibid.
63 B .A.A., Fr. Andre to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 23 September 1936, 30/1/33.
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1939 when Fr. Raphael was due to be transferred to a parish in Chantaburi, but failed 
to move resulting in his suspension for disobedience.6'1 This was the order that was 
still outstanding in 1940. It is noteworthy that nationalistic rhetoric was absent prior 
to the Thai-French War: certainly there is no evidence that Fr. Raphael or the 
parishioners protested the decision at the time it was originally made, in 1939. The 
absence suggests that there were other motives behind Fr. Raphael’s resistance to the 
transfer order, the most plausible explanation being that the move from the 
Ayutthaya parish would also have entailed moving from the parish of the 
Immaculate Conception Church in Bangkok, which at the time was responsible for 
some of the Ayutthaya parishes. Fr. Raphael may have found the permanent move 
from a capital parish to a provincial parish, away from his established interests, 
undesirable.
The protests and appeals o f the following years can thus be seen as the 
exploitation of nationalism for personal gain. Fr. Raphael’s alignment with the Thai 
government and its nationalism was, in effect, a cover for his personal interests.
This argument is reinforced by evidence of a further appeal from the district chief 
officer of Bang Sai, sent to the Vicar-Apostolic, requesting more of the income from 
the Ayutthaya parish’s land to be ceded to Fr. Raphael. According to the petition, 
income from the land amounted to at least 1,000 baht per year. Ostensibly, the extra 
income was to go towards Fr. Raphael’s efforts in running his school and for “nation 
building”,65 but, given the past histories of the parish and its priest, there are obvious 
reasons to doubt whether the money was to be used for the stated purposes.
The resistance of the Vicar-Apostolic to Fr. Raphael’s demands led to the 
latter’s ever closer alignment with the Thai government. Notwithstanding the
64 B.A .A ., Suspension Order, 29 December 1939, 45/3/24.
65 B .A .A ., District chief officer o f  Bangsai to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 15 December 1941, 45/3/34.
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government’s attitudes towards native Catholic priests at the time, he planned to 
work directly for the state,66 and was acting as a go-between for the police and the 
missionaries by January 1941.67 Despite the display of such patriotic fervour, he was 
still taken into police custody for questioning. Even more ironic was the fact that the 
incident appeared to have blocked his move to Chantaburi for the foreseeable future:
I have to inform you that the police have released m e... I have testified to 
the police that I will not be going to Chantaburi and will on 110 condition 
have any contact with the French. So if I did go to Chantaburi I would be 
arrested for giving false testimony and be suspected as a Fifth Columnist.
The priest ended the missive with a cheeky request that the Vicar-Apostolic 
should contact him when he has “found the solution to this problem”.68 What 
eventually followed was another suspension for Fr. Raphael in 1942. It seems that 
the Vicar-Apostolic could not bring himself to defrock the priest, despite his chronic 
disobedience. It could be that the Vicar-Apostolic was generously holding out for 
repentance from his recalcitrant subordinate: but considering the support the priest 
had had from the local authorities and the parishioners in Ayutthaya, it was probably 
impolitic to defrock the priest, even if  he had wanted to.
The two cases of the parish in Paetriu and Fr. Raphael’s rebellion were not 
unique during this period; other parishes also demanded Thai priests and some Thai 
parishioners did not always co-operate with their French superiors during this period. 
For example, the parishioners of the Immaculate Conception parish in Samsen, 
Bangkok, came out with an announcement in November 1940:
Since the Thai (Catholic) Group of Samsen have considered that the Thai 
nation is the highest object of our worship and esteem and that the duty of
66 B.A .A ., Fr. Andre to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 4 November 1940, 30/2/25.
67 B .A .A ., Fr. Raphael to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 7 January 1941, 30/2/30.
68 B.A .A ., Fr. Raphael to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 16 January 1941, 30/2/33.
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Thai citizens is to reinforce and support the Thai nation and its government in 
every way and in the light of the current political situation, we find it 
necessary to proceed rapidly to request the transfer of the French priest to 
allow a Thai priest who truly loves the nation to safeguard us. This action 
will be in accordance with the popular principle stating that “Thais should 
rule over Thais” as well as our happiness and collective safety.
Although the group was clearly influenced by the government’s “Thailand 
for the Thais” campaign, they nevertheless added that they had no specific 
complaints against the French priests in the parish but were merely reacting to the 
conflict between Thailand and French Indochina.69 Catholics at Our Lady of 
Lourdes parish in Pakkhlongtalad also made similar demands but with the addition 
of allegations of misconduct by the resident French priest: he was alleged to have 
been fond of chatting with a female teacher until eight o’clock at night and of turning 
some of the congregation away from the Catholicism.70
In the majority of cases, Thai nationalism was being used at the micro-level 
as a tool to pursue ulterior motives. National identity was used to either gain an 
advantage or to reduce the advantage of others in negotiations, and it acted as a cloak 
for both legitimate concerns, such as the parishioners’ dislike of the parish priest, as 
well as illegitimate claims, such as Fr. Raphael’s attempt to escape from 
ecclesiastical penalties for his misconduct. At the same time, it has to be noted that a 
remarkable majority of indigenous priests and communities remained steadfast in 
their Catholicism, even if some had to temporarily resort to the Italian, rather than 
French, leadership. In these cases, the survival of Catholicism appeared to be the 
dominant consideration for parishioners. The silence of the majority o f indigenous 
priests, most of whom were deployed in the eastern parishes (where Fr. Raphael
69 B .A .A ., Announcement o f  the Thai (Catholic) Group o f  Samsen, Bangkok, 21 November 1940, 
Beatification Documents, 169.
70 B .A .A ., Roman Catholic Group petition to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, November 1940, Beatification  
Documents, 170/1-2.
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refused to go) suggests that they were content with the arrangements made by their 
French superiors. Furthermore, it may also indicate the priests’ self-awareness that 
they were not yet ready to take on the full responsibilities of an indigenous Mission, 
especially at such a difficult time. Some may have considered the possibility of 
setting up a ‘patriotic’ Church but the lack of will on the part of the Thai government 
to support or initiate these plans (as the Japanese military government did in the 
same period, and later Communist China did in the 1950s) not to mention the 
problems that a break with the Papacy would entail, ended such aspirations. The 
absence of these plans in the presence of the Japanese model also suggests that the 
Thai government was not serious about eradicating or, indeed, controlling 
Catholicism for its own ends.
The key role played by Thai nationalism in inspiring demands and defiance 
by certain priests is confirmed by the abrupt disappearance of nationalistic demands 
following the conclusion of the Pacific War. It suggests that, at best, those involved 
were trying to secure their vulnerable position against would-be persecutors and, at 
worst, were taking advantage of the situation. To paraphrase a Thai proverb, they 
were “hurrying to scoop up the water when the tide was up”. The turning of the tide 
against the Axis powers and the subsequent fall of Pibul’s government led to a sea- 
change in attitudes. For example, by 1947, the Vicar-Apostolic could report that Fr. 
Raphael Titra had repented of his wrongs which, apart from his disobedience, 
included fathering a child with a young convert in 1939, the event that appeared to 
have triggered the contentious transfer order in the first place. Matters were not to 
end that easily however, since the Vicar-Apostolic saw in April 1947 that:
305
The only way he [Fr. Raphael] could escape danger was to retire to a house 
of prayer, he understands that and wishes to take refuge in the monasteiy of 
Our Lady of Annam.
In effect, while the Vicar-Apostolic obtained the repentance he hoped for in 
Fr. Raphael, he would no longer tolerate such a turbulent priest in his jurisdiction.
To make sure that Fr. Raphael actually departed for his new post, the Vicar- 
Apostolic went so far as to appoint a chaperone in the form of another priest who 
was “devoted to saving his colleague”, to stay with Fr. Raphael until his entry into 
the monastery in Vietnam, while thanking the abbot for “this work of charity of the 
first order”. 71
So ended the saga of Fr. Raphael Titra. For better or for worse, the priest’s 
dextrous exploitation of Thai nationalism and manipulation of his patriotic 
parishioners to further his own interests opened the eyes of the French leadership to 
the true vulnerability of its position in Siam. Indeed, to paraphrase George Orwell, 
patriotism was a powerful force, where no amount of explanation or innocence was 
going to prevent it from causing damage. Even if the French missionaries regained 
their pre-eminence in the short-term following the defeat of Japan, few believed that 
the position was sustainable in the long-term, especially if the missionaries 
genuinely cared for the well-being of their parish communities. Their previous 
dominance in the management of the Mission, even if  they had managed its affairs 
reasonably well, had led to the mistaken impression that Catholicism was a ‘French’ 
religion, and had placed thousands of their converts in danger and had even led to the 
death and injury of many. If the persecution taught the French missionaries anything, 
it was that the only sure method of preventing the re-occurrence o f the persecution
71 B .A .A ., V icar-A postolic  Perros to Abbot o f  Notre Dam e d ’ Annam, 29 April 1947, 30 /2 /58 .
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was to end the centuries old role of the French in the Mission of Siam and turn the 
rest of the Mission over to indigenous priests as soon as possible.
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Conclusion
The ‘doer ’ is merely a fiction added to the deed -  the deed is everything.
Friedrich Nietzsche
In conclusion this chapter has demonstrated that for practical purposes, the concept 
of identity is fluid and was exploited by the various nationalities within the Mission 
according to changes in domestic and international political circumstances. These 
changes in circumstances did not have a uniform effect on the Missions instead they 
had differing effects on the composite elements of the Mission. This phenomenon 
was demonstrated by the roles the Italian Salesians, who were in charge of the 
Catholic mission in western Siam, and the indigenous priests and congregation 
played during this period.
During the 1930s, the influence of the Salesians was mainly restricted to the 
west of Siam. However, in the course of the 1940s, as the French missionaries were 
literally forced out of their former mission territory as a consequence of the 1940-1 
Thai-French War, the Salesians were able to exploit their Italian identity in the face 
of public anti-French sentiments, to expand their influence. The total dominance of 
the Salesians in Thailand was only prevented by the fall of Italy to Allied forces in 
September 1943.
At the same time, the anti-foreign element of Pibul’s nationalism, as 
embodied in the Cultural Mandates, the Heroic Virtues, and government slogans 
such as “Thailand for the Thais” was used by some indigenous priests and their 
congregation to push for greater autonomy from the French missionaries, particularly 
in areas outside the east of the country, which had not enjoyed de facto autonomy 
prior to 1940. However, there was also an element of opportunism where, in certain 
cases, appeals to Thai patriotism were actually a method for avoiding persecution
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from the non-Catholic community, ecclesiastical discipline or self-enrichment. In 
these cases, it was more opportunism rather than principles at work.
French identity during this period also proved to be just as flexible. The 
French missionaries actively courted the support of both the Thais and the French. 
Indeed, to both parties, the missionaries1 French identity was an asset from the 1910s 
to 1940. To the Thais, the French missionaries were another force of modernisation, 
specifically in terms of educational and health provisions, while to the French the 
missionaries were a possible method of exerting French influence in a country where 
there was otherwise an insubstantial French presence. While emphasising its 
qualities differently depending on the audience they were addressing, the French 
missionaries were, in reality, only interested in gaining the Catholic Church an 
advantage.
The radical change in the fortunes of the French missionaries after 1940 
(from being close to the elite, as demonstrated in the Bangkok section of Chapter III, 
to being suspected as Fifth Columnists) illustrates the fluidity o f identity during this 
short period o f Thai history and how it was exploitable for material gains according 
to circumstances. At the same time, these changes also reflected changes in value as 
to what was acceptable in terms of “Thainess” over time. In the 191 Os, 1920s, and 
even up to the late 1930s, it was acceptable for foreigners to be involved in national 
development and the economy. This attitude is reflected in the high tolerance and 
even appreciation of the work of the Catholic missionaries, as well as the presence of 
foreign advisors in the Thai government. This value clearly changed under the first 
Pibul government which, through the Cultural Mandates, advocated a greater role for 
Thais as opposed to foreigners, regardless of whether they were westerners or 
Chinese.
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VII
Conclusion
The Catholics were suffering because o f  us.
- Vicar-Apostolic Gouin of Laos, 1941
With the victory o f the Allies in 1945, much of the anti-Catholic persecution was 
brought to an abrupt end.1 Nevertheless, in a practical sense, the implications of the 
persecution continued to reverberate for many years after, while, in a theoretical 
sense, the persecution held some serious implications with regard to the defining of 
Thai identity. In long-term history, the persecution of the 1940s could perhaps be 
considered as an anomaly in the history of the Catholic Church in Thailand akin to 
the incidents that occurred during the reigns of King Narai and King Taksin, as 
illustrated in Chapter II. However, in the short-term, the thesis has also 
demonstrated that this ‘anomaly’ had a firm historical basis and, in hindsight, its 
occurrence was arguably predictable, especially if the local conditions pre-1939 are 
taken into account.
Less predictable perhaps were the effects of the central policy in the run-up 
to and during the persecution itself. Judging by the reaction of the chief of police, 
Aduldejarat, who condemned the abuses of the emergency measures (Chapter V), 
even some members o f the central government, it seemed, were caught off-guard by 
the unexpected repercussions stemming from its war-time measures which, by the 
standards of the time were mild. According to the central policy, French citizens 
were never required to leave the country -  they should have done so only if it was 
more convenient for them to leave than to travel to Bangkok. Furthermore, in the
1 Most of the violence and vandalism ended, but isolated incidents o f  discrimination, especially in 
schools, continued up to December 1945.
310
event that they did travel to Bangkok, there was no formal system of internment and 
these measures were revoked soon after the conclusion of the armed conflict with 
French Indochina in 1941.
Nevertheless, it was precisely these policies that created the opportunities for 
local elements to express their discontent with their local Catholic presence, 
especially if their relationship with the Missions had been fraught prior to the 
outbreak of the Thai-French War in 1940. The thesis has shown in Chapter IV that 
the northeast was already problematic in this regard, with tensions miming high, 
spurred on by the previous actions and intransigence of the Mission of Laos. Indeed, 
these local elements were further encouraged to see Catholics as ‘enemies of the 
state’ by policies that were intended to increase war-time vigilance, but ultimately 
ended up fostering a poisonous atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia, particularly 
towards anything that was perceived to be remotely ‘French’. Furthermore, even in 
areas which may not have had a fraught relationship prior to 1940, economic 
incentives proved to be the decisive factor in motivating anti-Catholic action. Such 
arbitrary seizure of property was effectively covered by ‘patriotism’ and justified 
with reference to both the open and ‘secret’ policies of the Leader. The fact that 
these abuses went against the stipulations of the 1932 Constitution that guaranteed 
freedom of religious belief and which remained in effect at the time suggests that, 
despite it being the foundation of the new ruling elite’s legitimacy, it was in practice 
unable to safeguard the rights it was meant to enshrine.
Local conditions can, therefore, be said to have amplified and prolonged the 
persecution. At the same time, particularly in areas without a noticeable French 
presence (most notably the west and the east) or a notable prior history of problems 
pre-1940 (such as in the north and Bangkok) local conditions served to dampen the
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possibility of violent persecution. This is not to say that these regions were immune 
from persecution: the Salesians were assaulted when they began administering the 
territories outside their jurisdiction — arguably because the perpetrators mistook them 
for being French, while Vicar-Apostolic Perros was in fear of his life for some time, 
so much so that he wrote a last will and testament in 1943.2
However, the fact that the missionaries in these areas were not systematically 
expelled or officially subjected to worse treatment, as in the cases o f Songkhon or Fr. 
Nicolas Kitbamrung, is indicative of the fact that the central government never 
intended to persecute the Catholics. This situation directly contrasted with the fate 
of the Vicar-Apostolic of Laos during the same period. In March 1945, the Japanese 
arrested and secretly executed Fr. Marie-Joseph Gouin, the former Vicar-Apostolic 
o f Laos (1922-43), along with two other priests, Fr. Henri Thomine (the Vicar- 
Apostolic o f Laos, 1944-45) and Fr. Jean Thibaud (the Provincial o f Laos), leaving 
their corpses by the roadside/ The deaths of the three priests were clearly aimed at 
destroying the leadership o f the Mission of Laos. That the same did not or was not 
allowed to occur in Thailand reflected the first Pibul government’s lack of real 
hostility towards the missionaries.
Equally, the disjunction between the expectations of the central government 
and the actual implementation of its policy also highlights the weak and 
dysfunctional relationship between the central state and its local agents, despite 
earlier efforts at centralisation during the absolutist and constitutionalist regimes. 
Firm links between the centre and the village level of administration were 
established only by the 1914 Local Administration Act. In theory the village would
2 The will left his personal property to the M.E.P. or the Mission o f  Bangkok to the exclusion o f  all 
other heirs, including members o f  his family, B.A.A., Vicar-Apostolic Perros’s last testament, 12 
March 1943, 141/4/8.
3 B.A .A ., Tn our Missions o f  Siam and Laos’, 21 November 1945, Beatification Documents, 248/1.
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be subject to the centre,4 but as the circumstances surrounding the later persecution 
of the Catholics illustrated, the opposite appeared to be true. Local police and 
authorities were quite willing and able to defy or bypass government orders in the 
pursuit of their own local policies and interests. Later observations of village-level 
government show the dynamics of how village-level administration treated the 
French priests and Catholics during this period, where the local authority ‘could 
retain his authority so long as he could appear to lead a strong community which he 
protected from powerful outsiders whose interests peasants thought were opposed to 
theirs’.5 In the 1940s, the Catholics with their alleged links to the powerful French 
colonialists could arguably be categorised as ‘powerful outsiders’.
The disjunction between central policy and its implementation becomes even 
more apparent following the revocation of the emergency measures that were 
introduced for the duration of the Thai-French War. Despite the revocation and 
condemnation of the abuses by prominent members of the government, the 
persecution nevertheless continued for several years afterwards, suggesting that the 
government did not have a firm grasp on the country. The implication of this 
situation is ironic: it is that of a purportedly dictatorial government that, in reality, 
was not fully in control.
This dysfunctional relationship may also have some parallels with more
recent Thai history, especially during times of prolonged crises such as the
Communist insurgency (c. 1965-82) or even the more recent 2003 War on Drugs that
was launched by prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra (9 February 2001-19
September 2006). Among Thaksin’s many electoral promises was the pledge to
eradicate the drugs trade, particularly in methamphetamines. Many were cheered by
4 Chaiyan Rajchagool, The Rise and F all o f  the Thai Absolute Monarchy (White Lotus, Bangkok, 
1994), p. 101.
3 Ibid., p. 102.
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his promise that the trade would be eradicated within three months of the start of the 
campaign.6 The following months saw the implementation of a ruthless suppression 
programme. Provincial authorities were given targets that had to be met and various 
police agencies were threatened with transfers if they did not work (or be seen to be 
working) fast enough. Arrests, asset seizures, deaths of alleged drug dealers and 
other statistics were heavily publicised in media outlets. By the end of the first three 
months of the campaign, more than 2,600 people were dead.7
Despite the overwhelming popularity of the campaign,8 there was disquiet. 
Domestic and international human rights organisations criticised the policy’s 
ruthlessness, alleging that a significant proportion of those killed had little to do with 
the drugs trade.9 The impression was bolstered by botched raids, such as the one 
initiated by Yongyuth Tiyapairat10 and some 50 police commandos in Ayutthaya’s 
Bang Sai district on 7 July 2004, which produced nothing except a public relations 
disaster.11
In a chilling echo of the Catholics’ experience in the 1940s, there has also 
been speculation that some of the extra-judicial executions had more to do with local 
interests than the suppression campaign and that, once again, the central 
government's policy was used merely as a cloak for local abuses o f power. Pasuk 
Phongpaichit has compared the situation during the 2003 War on Drugs to the anti-
6 Pasuk Phongpaichit and C. Baker, Thaksin: The Business o f  Politics in Thailand (Nordic Institute o f  
Asian Studies, Copenhagen, 2004), p. 160.
7 Bangkok Post, 11 December 2003.
8 Despite the vocal misgivings o f  the human rights organisations, Thaksin’s popularity actually rose. 
According to one poll, 90 percent were in favour o f  the campaign; see, The Nation, 24 February 2003.
9 The Nation, 2 December 2003.
10 At the time o f  the raid, Yongyuth Tiyapairat was the prime minister’s secretary in the Thaksin 
government (2001-6). He had been acting on an anonymous tip-off that the house in question was a 
drugs factory. Nevertheless, by 2006 he was the Minister for Natural Resources and the Environment. 
He later became the House Speaker on 21 January 200S, resigning a month later in response to a 
charge o f  electoral fraud filed by the Election Commission.
11 The Nation, 25 January 2008.
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communist campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s, by quoting Andrew Turton who 
argues that:
Extra-judicial killings include those of persistent offenders carried out with 
the approval sometimes of whole communities, which are tolerated by the 
police; those carried out by the police themselves, other than with legal 
sanction... In this case the victim is often someone who has been critical of 
local power interests, and whose death is passed of as being that of a 
communist suspect, or alternatively, as having been caused by communists.12
This situation seems to be an echo of the experience of the Catholics in the 
1940s, except that instead of appealing to anti-French rhetoric, the local authorities 
had switched to cloaking their illegal activities behind anti-communist measures.
Naturally, the circumstances surrounding the Catholic persecution in the 
1940s, the Communist insurgency during the Cold War, and the War on Drugs in the 
twenty-first century are completely different. At the same time, there seems to be 
similarities in the interaction between central policies which, intentionally or not, 
gave a free hand to local authorities to act in their own interests, indeed in ways that 
may have been contrary to the original intentions of the government. However, in all 
the situations, the role of the local government apparatus was essential.
At the same time, the thesis has also shown that the description of a weak or 
dysfunctional relationship can also be applied to the Missions and their local agents, 
especially with regard to the northeast. Some problems in the northeast, namely the 
conflict over the oath of allegiance ceremony, had already been encountered by the 
Mission of Bangkok and negotiated solutions were already in existence. However, 
the thesis has demonstrated in Chapter IV that, though these solutions existed, they 
were simply not known or always observed by the local agents of the Church, by the 
agents of the state, and in some cases, neither party knew of the existing solution that
12 Pasuk Pongpaichit and C. Baker, Thaksin, p. 163.
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had been approved by both the Church and the state. With regard to the issue of the 
oath of allegiance, this ignorance arguably contributed to local suspicions that the 
Catholic Church was not encouraging national loyalty but, indeed, was actively 
working against it.
Moreover, this situation was exacerbated by the awkward administrative 
arrangement between the Mission o f Siam and the Mission of Laos, which did not 
conform to national boundaries. Consequently, whereas the Mission of Siam was 
familiar with the methods and avenues available for smooth negotiations with the 
Siamese government, the Mission o f Laos was needlessly antagonistic. Part of the 
reason for this antagonism may have simply been ignorance of Siamese procedures 
and sensibilities on the part of the Mission of Laos, as a result of it being more used 
to administering French-controlled areas. But as the tri-partite negotiations (between 
the Missions of Siam, Laos, and the Siamese government) over the law governing 
the slaughter of cattle has shown, there were also disturbing hints of colonial 
pretensions among the local agents of the Mission of Laos, an element that was 
notably absent in the Mission of Siam, despite it being similarly dominated by a 
French leadership. If  this situation was problematic in the 1930s, it became an 
outright danger for both Missions in the 1940s.
An additional element revealed in the Catholic experience during this period 
was the possibility of national identities being exploited for concrete gain. Anderson 
and Gellner have argued that national identity is essentially ‘imagined’, that is, an 
artificial construct: Anderson defines the ‘imagined community’ as “imagined 
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the
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image of their communion” 13 while Gellner argues that “nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist”.14 However, in his brief examination of Siamese nationalism under King 
Vajiravudh, Anderson does not mention the role of religion. Instead he sees the 
policies of King Vajiravudh as an excellent illustration of the characteristics of 
‘official nationalism’ which he defines, as the “willed merger of nation and dynastic 
empire”.15 In the Siamese case, this merger can be seen most clearly in the 
promotion of the three original pillars of Nation, Religion, and Monarchy where the 
institution of the monarchy was linked with the well-being of the nation.
In addition, Anderson notes that in the Siamese case, this merger was “an 
anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups which are threatened with 
marginalisation or exclusion from an emerging nationally-imagined community”.16 
What Anderson refers to as the “emerging nationally-imagined community” were the 
large and economically influential Chinese communities that had established 
themselves in Siam during the last wave of migration in the nineteenth century. 
Anderson argues that these new Chinese with their continuing concern with the 
politics of mainland China (where the Qing dynasty would be swept away in 1911-2) 
despite their long-term residency in Siam, republicanism, and inability to integrate 
into society, posed a direct threat to the traditional Siamese ‘dynastic principle’. 
Rather than focusing on the effects of this policy, Anderson concentrates more 
closely on the general processes through which nationalistic policies were put into 
place, namely: compulsory state-controlled primary education; state-organised
13 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso, London, 2006), p. 6.
14 E. Gellner, Thought and Change (W eidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1972), p. 168.
15 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 86.
16 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 101.
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propaganda; official rewriting of history; militarism; and the identification of the 
dynasty with the nation.17
This thesis has thus taken a different approach in examining the actual effects 
of the policies or ‘inventions’, focusing specifically on the element of religion. As 
Chapter I discusses, King Vajiravudh elevated the position of Buddhism in the 
national consciousness, linking it through the three pillars with the monarchy and the 
nation. Yet, despite this elevation, the monarch’s religious policy was nuanced.
Other religions, most notably Christianity and Islam, continued to be tolerated and 
even actively supported by the royal institution. Thus Catholic schools and 
institutions continued to be favoured. What Buddhism had achieved under King 
Vajiravudh was effectively the position o f being the first among equals among the 
religions of the Siamese nation, which fulfilled King Vajiravudh’s wider purpose of 
promoting Buddhism as a religion that was as profound as any in the West or, indeed, 
the wider world. More significantly it had also merged itself into the nation, along 
with the monarchy.
As indicated in Chapters II, III, and IV, the 1932 revolution and its aftermath 
had no significant impact on this religious arrangement. It is true that relations 
between the Mission of Siam and the constitutional government cooled but arguably 
this situation was due to the lack of personal and institutional ties between the two 
organisations and general political turbulence, rather than to a conscious policy.
How, therefore, can the shift in the position of Buddhism from being the first among 
equals to becoming the official sine qua non of Thainess be explained?
17 Ibid., p. 101.
The answer to this question can arguably be found with reference to the reign 
of King Taksin (1776-82). The regime o f King Taksin and Pibul’s first government 
had to address one similar issue: the establishment of legitimacy in the face of 
weakened institutions and national turbulence. King Taksin was a commoner who 
lacked blood-links to the ruling dynasties of Ayutthaya while his fledgling kingdom 
remained under threat from the Burmese. Similarly, in the late 1930s Pibul found 
himself in charge of a nation with severely weakened traditional institutions at a time 
of great external pressure, namely from Imperial Japan.
For Pibul, the existing pillars o f the nation at such a volatile time were of 
small comfort. Nation was always a nebulous concept. The institution of the 
monarchy had been significantly weakened and its figurehead, King Ananda 
Mahidol, was still a schoolboy in faraway Switzerland. The Constitution, for all the 
state-sponsored celebration surrounding it, had done nothing to protect the rights of 
political prisoners, never mind the religious minorities. It was essentially a 
powerless piece of paper and Pibul publicly said as much when he termed the charter 
that had been the main focus of the 1932 revolution as merely a ‘notebook’. Thus, to 
strengthen his hold on power and to increase his legitimacy, Pibul added a Fifth 
Pillar -  the Leader thereby giving rise to slogans such as ‘Obey the Leader and the 
Nation will prevail’. This attempted linkage between the Leader and the well-being 
of the nation was perhaps another “willed merger of nation and dynastic empire”.
However, the addition of this fifth pillar by itself was insufficient to buttress 
Pibul’s legitimacy as the Leader, especially given the weakness o f the other 
institutions and in the face of external threats. The solution used by Pibul was 
similar to that of King Taksin -  he turned to religion, specifically Buddhism. King 
Taksin had tried to achieve this through the imposition of traditional as well as more
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esoteric Buddhist ceremonies. However, this policy had led to anger among both the 
Buddhists as well as the ethnic minorities, with disastrous consequences. Pibul’s 
approach was somewhat different and involved the elevation of Buddhism to being 
an essential part of Thainess as espoused in the Heroic Virtues. This policy had the 
advantage of being relatively simple to promote, in contrast to the policies of 
previous monarchs such as King Mongkut who had embarked on a series of reforms 
within Buddhism. Furthermore, the policy could also be built on the secure 
foundations that had already been laid by King Vajiravudh.
Apart from the legitimacy factor, there are also other explanations for Pibul’s 
emphasis on Buddhism. The first is that Buddhism was being used as a unifying 
factor not only internally but also externally as a buttress for the pan-Thai movement 
where Buddhism may have been one of the few common factors between the Thais 
of Thailand and their ethnic Tai brethren beyond the border in the lost territories that 
were being claimed by the Pibul government. The second explanation is that 
Buddhism was being consciously employed as a bulwark against Japanese intrusion 
into internal Thai affairs. For example, in 1942 Pibul justified the controversial 
signing of the Thai-Japanese alliance inside the Temple of the Emerald Buddha, a 
procedure unprecedented in the history of Thailand, by arguing that:
We knew that the Japanese were obliged to do one thing. They had to 
demonstrate that they respected Buddhism so that Asians, most of whom are 
Buddhists, will trust them. Since we have nothing else to rely on, we have to 
rely on the Buddha. Signing this treaty in front of the Buddha, the Dharma, 
and the Sangha will be a better way to force the Japanese to respect the 
treaty... The Japanese will fear that if they infringe on the independence and 
sovereignty of Thailand in violation of the treaty that was signed in front of 
the Emerald Buddha, all Buddhists in Asia will hate them”.18
1S Thamsuk Numnond, Muang Thai sam ai Songkhram lok khrang thi song  [Thailand in the Second 
World War] (Saitham, Bangkok, 2005), pp. 31-2,
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These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Yet, even this additional 
elevation was not sufficient to precipitate a violent persecution against Catholics and 
other minorities. The additional elements were the Cultural Mandates, in particular 
the second that was issued in July 1939, stipulating that Thais should not act as 
agents for foreign organisations or sell land to them. Given the weakening of the 
institutions of the Monarchy and the Constitution, as well as the ascendancy of the 
cult of the Leader, it is not surprising to see the Cultural Mandates, which were 
viewed as the direct policies of the Leader, superseding everything else.
Even so, the persecution of religious minorities in July 1939 was far from 
inevitable. The Cultural Mandates could still be interpreted as being directed against 
the Chinese rather than all religious minorities. The decisive catalyst for the 
persecution of the Catholics was the 1940-1 Thai-French War, which provided the 
central government with the opportunity to delineate the conflict along national as 
well as religious lines (for example, Buddhist Thailand or Catholic French- 
Indochina/France). Together with the war-time emergency measures, this 
ideological modification furnished local elements with the necessary justifications to 
act against the ‘French’ Catholics, even though this may not have been the original 
intention of the central government.
Given the pre-existing tensions in the northeast, the vulnerability of the 
Catholic congregation there becomes abundantly clear given the factors examined 
above. That the persecution did not occur in the 1930s was arguably due to the fact 
that the central government had no conscious policy advocating such a persecution, 
while Buddhism, at that time, remained a dominant but not the central factor in Thai 
identity, as during the reign of King Vajiravudh. Before December 1938, religion 
acted as a marker. In the case of Catholicism, it was a clear marker of differences.
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But how these differences were inteipreted differed significantly according to the 
geographical area. In Bangkok, they marked those who were bringing modem 
education to the nation and, for those who knew the history of Catholicism in 
Thailand, they marked a community that had long been a component of Thai society. 
However, in the northeast and closer to the border, Catholicism became a marker of 
foreignness, specifically of French loyalty. Thus, being a Catholic in the capital may 
not have been a problem, but being Catholic in the northeast, close to the border to 
‘Catholic’ French-Indochina definitely was.
Concepts of identity were thus not monolithic and could vary according to 
their context in space and time, despite their ‘imaginary’ nature. As Chapter VI of 
the thesis has shown, these concepts could be and were exploited for economic or 
social gain by all levels of the government, and not just by the elite. An obvious 
example of the exploitation of nationalistic ideas by the top tier of the government 
was the use of the idea of a pan-Thai identity by some members o f the government to 
encourage support for actions against French Indochina.19 The success of this 
initiative arguably cemented the first Pibul government’s grip on power.
On the other hand, the thesis clearly demonstrates in Chapter V that the local 
administrations and members of the non-Catholic communities also exploited the 
same idea but mainly for private economic or social gain. The ability of locals to 
dextrously exploit fluid international and domestic situations suggests a political 
awareness that, certainly at the time, was seriously underestimated. Indeed, even 
before the revolution in 1932, ironically its promoters had agreed with the private
19 Luang Vichitvatakarn and his writings were instrumental in this endeavour. However, there was 
some conflict within the government at this stage, where Luang V ichit's plays were temporarily 
banned while negotiations for non-aggression pacts with France and Britain were taking place. On 
the one hand, Pibul was conscious that he may lose support if  he did not exploit the weakness o f  the 
French, and on the other hand stood to gain politically if  he was successful in taking back the ‘lost 
territories’. See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 144,
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deliberations o f the absolutist regime they had overthrown that the Siamese people 
were too immature to govern themselves, since most of the population consisted of 
illiterate peasants, while the middle class lacked political and intellectual initiative.20
Yet the events before and during the war years suggest that the local 
authorities and the communities under their control had become much more than that 
by the outbreak of the Thai-French War in November 1940. The Catholic 
experience showed that the local authorities and communities were acutely aware of 
distant events and how a situation could be turned to their advantage or disadvantage. 
They appeared equally adept at assessing both domestic and international events, and 
were able to exploit the macro-level policies imposed by the government to their 
advantage at the micro-level, and impose their own interpretations on central policies.
Furthermore, as Chapter VI demonstrated, the exploitation of national 
identities was not restricted to the realms of the state. Elements within the Mission 
of Siam itself were exploiting their distinct national identities in different ways, 
according to the political circumstances of the time. At first, the French missionaries 
were able to exploit their own identity to solicit additional funding from the 
government of French Indochina. However, following the outbreak of the Thai- 
French War in 1940, their identity became more a liability than an asset. Similarly, 
the Italians were able to exploit their separate identity to preserve the integrity of 
their missionary efforts in Thailand, while at the same time expanding their interests 
in a country that had been dominated by French missionaries. Finally, the Thai 
priests who had hitherto displayed no inclination to take over the administration of 
the Mission used the situation to make their demands. However, as Chapter VI has
"° J.A. Stowe, Siam becom es Thailand (University o f  Hawaii, Honolulu, 1991), p. 12.
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shown, these demands can also be explained with reference to local contexts and 
private interests rather than purely through ideological factors.
It should also be noted that the divisions along lines o f national identity were 
also not as clear cut as might have been expected. The French leader of the Mission 
of Siam did not always support the French cause, as demonstrated in his demands for 
the Petain government to negotiate with the Thai government in September-October 
1940. On the other hand, the French government did not always unconditionally 
support the efforts of the missionaries. Indeed, given the passage of the 1905 French 
law on the separation of the church and state, the French central government was 
perhaps more inclined to be unsupportive of the missionaries. Nevertheless, if the 
French central government was reluctant to render such support, it seemed that its 
representatives in French-Indochina was willing, as can be seen in the financial 
assistance it gave to the work of the Mission of Siam.
From veiy early on, Mission authorities were conscious of the role identities 
played in bringing about the persecution, with Vicar-Apostolic Gouin, the head of 
the Mission of Laos, writing in 1941 that “the Catholics were suffering because of 
us”.21 Consequently, the Church worked hard in the following decades to eliminate 
this vulnerability by finally establishing an indigenous hierarchy. The Mission of 
Laos, which had been so problematic in the 1930s and 1940s, was divided into the 
Prefecture Apostolic of Tha Kliaek on the Laos side, while the Thai side became the 
Vicariate Apostolic of Tha Rae on 21 December 1950. Thus Mission jurisdiction in 
northeastern Thailand now conformed to national boundaries. A further Vicariate 
Apostolic and Prefecture Apostolic were subsequently erected in Ubon Ratchatani 
and Udon Thani in 1953. In 1960, the Mission of Tha Rae was renamed, becoming
B .A .A ., Tha K aek to V icar-A postolic Ferros, 1 August 1 9 4 1 ,4 7 /3 /5 3 .
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the Mission of Tha Rae and Nong Saeng, which was elevated to the status of an 
archdiocese five years later. Significantly, by 1953, the Mission of Tha Rae had an 
indigenous leadership in the person of Bishop Michael Mongkhol On Prakhongchit 
(1953-8). In contrast, the Mission of Bangkok would not have an indigenous bishop 
until 1965, indicating the priority the Church gave to rectifying its previously 
vulnerable position in the northeast. Furthermore, in a reflection of the legacy of the 
historical separation of the Mission of Laos from the Mission of Bangkok, the 
Archdiocese of Tha Rae and Nong Saeng maintained its independence from 
Bangkok, and dioceses in the northeast, namely Naklion Ratchasima, Ubon 
Ratchatani, and Udon Thani, answer to Tha Rae and not Bangkok. Nevertheless, in 
practical terms, co-operation between the two archdioceses and the local authorities 
to the present day is much smoother than during the ministry of Vicar-Apostolic 
Perros.
Other reforms subsequently followed in the areas less affected by the 
persecution. Chiang Mai, which had fared better, was made a Prefecture Apostolic 
in its own right on 17 November 1959. However, the arrangement was only 
temporary since the Missions of the west, east, and north became suffragan dioceses 
of the newly elevated Archdiocese of Bangkok on 18 December 1965. Early in the 
same year, Bangkok had obtained its first indigenous bishop, Joseph Kliiamsun 
Nittayo (1965-72), one of the Thai priests who had been educated in Rome. In the 
1940s, Vicar-Apostolic Perros saw the young priest’s potential, but he had been 
deemed too young to take charge. Considering Vi car-Apostolic Perros’s pre-1940 
attitudes towards the indigenous clergy, these reforms would have occurred in time 
without the persecution. But undoubtedly the persecution accelerated and influenced 
the process. Judging by the later lack of public antagonism towards this advance and
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the fading perception o f Catholicism as being a ‘French’ religion, the reforms should 
be considered a success, a success that would not have been possible without the 
foundation that had been laid by Vicar-Apostolic Perros.
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VIII
Epilogue
Cut is the branch that might have grown full straight,
And burned is Apollo’s laurel bough,
That sometime grew within this learned man.
Faustus is gone. Regard his hellish fall.
Whose fiendish fortune may exhort the wise 
Only to wonder at unlawful things,
Whose deepness doth entice such forward wits,
To practice more than heavenly power permits.
Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus
The theoretical implications stemming from the persecution of the Catholics in the 
1940s has been analysed in the last chapter. To complete the stoiy, the thesis will 
end with an exposition o f the aftermath for the state and the Church.
The State
Why, I  asked Mother, was Father pro-Japanese?
"We were not pro-Japanese ”, she said firmly, "Your father hated the Japanese. But 
what could we have done? They had infiltrated everywhere. I f  we had taken up 
arms, it would have been a disaster. There would have been too many lives wasted. 
Thailand was harmed far less than its neighbours. It was a life under shame — that 
is what it was, a life under shame. But we presented ourselves ”.1
Sirin Phatanothai, The Dragon’s Pearl
In justifying his extreme, and sometimes bizarre, nationalist measures after the fall of 
his government, Pibul appealed to national interests. According to some newspaper 
articles published after the defeat of Japan, all of the measures were intended to 
reinforce and preserve Thai national identity against Japanese encroachment. Thus 
the encouragement o f western dress was to prevent Thais from taking up the kimono.
1 Sirin Phatanothai, The D ragon's P earl (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994), p. 186.
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Spoons and forks were acting as national defences against the invasion of Japanese 
chopsticks, while the new version of the Thai language was a foot-dragging measure 
to prevent the Japanese from forcing Thai schoolchildren to learn Japanese, a 
measure that was allegedly being backed by the Japanese Education Ministry.2 After 
all, how could the local population take up a new language when they had not even 
mastered the new form of their own? If the protection of Thai national identity had 
indeed been his real objective, then Pibul was successful; at the end o f the war the 
Thais had not taken to wearing kimonos and neither was there a popular movement 
to bring the accoutrements of Japanese culture into the daily lives of most ordinary 
Thais.
Yet while Pibul’s nationalism formed the dominant theme of the early 1940s, 
reflecting his political ascendancy, other visions of the nation were not entirely 
forgotten. As Baker argued, the formulation of Thai nationalism during this period 
was evolutionary rather than revolutionary.3 It was therefore possible for 
alternatives to PibuPs brand of nationalism to continue to exist, but not dominate.
Thus, royalist visions of the country persisted and were evident in instances 
of individual resistance, notably by Queen Savang Watthana.4 On being told by 
government officials that her name was too masculine according to the new 
government regulations and that she should change it, the consort of King 
Chulalongkron (Rama V) gave a terse reply: “My name was bestowed to me by His 
Majesty [King Chulalongkom]; His Majesty knew full well whether I am a woman
2 Thamsulc Numnond, Muang Thai sam ai Songkhram lok khrang thi song  [Thailand in the Second  
World War], pp. 103-4.
3 C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H isto iy  o f  Thailand, pp. 105-39.
4 Bom  in 1863 to King Mongkut and Chao Chom Piam, she became the royal consort o f  her half- 
brother, King Chulalongkom. She was the mother o f  Crown Prince Vajirunhis (1878-95) and Prince 
Mahidol (1892-1929). Crown Prince Vajirunhis died before he could succeed, but she lived to see her 
two grandsons, King Ananda Mahidol and King Bhumibol Adulyadej succeed to the throne. She died 
in 1955. See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 374,
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or a man”.3 Government officials met her wrath again when they requested that she 
wore a hat and be photographed for the government’s “Hats lead the nation to 
power” campaign. The queen responded: “Every day you’ve bothered me so much 
that I feel I’m no longer free. Now you’ve come to interfere with my hair... I won’t 
wear it. If they want me to wear it, they can put it on my severed head for 
themselves”.6 On both occasions, the government officials retreated. Clearly, 
despite the political eclipse of royalists, some royals remained too formidable for 
even the Leader to trifle with.7 On a wider basis, royalists also played a large role in 
organising the British branch of the Free Thai resistance. Certainly, the resurgence 
of royalist sentiments was evident in the post-war government with the rapturous 
reception given to the returning king, Ananda Mahidol (Rama VIII), who returned to 
the country in December 1945, and the dominance of the royalist Democrat Party in 
the post-war Assembly. Symbolic too was the renaming of the country. Once again, 
for another brief moment from 1945 to 1948, Thailand would be known as Siam.
Despite the policies of Pibul’s first government and the resurgence of royalist 
factions in government, the constitutionalist version of Thailand did not fade away 
either. If the Catholic experience illustrated anything, the spirit o f the 1932 
Constitution remained in existence, even during the persecution period, although it 
no longer was a dominant theme. The Vi car-Apostolic did not appeal to personal 
connections when confronting the persecution but to the principles enshrined in the
3 Thamsuk Numnond, Muang Thai sam ai Songkhrani lok khrang (hi song, p. 93.
6 Ibid., p. 84.
7 Officials, however, met with more success in Chao Chom Phra Prayurawong, a minor wife o f  King 
Chulalongkom. She, together with the w ife o f  Prince Aditya, the President o f  the Council o f  Regency, 
spear-headed the hats and clothing campaign to great success. See Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, 
Thailand's Durable Prem ier (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1995), p. 119.
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Constitution. Certain quarters of the Thai public were also still willing to stand up 
for these principles, as evinced by articles in the Thai Ekaraj newspaper.8
As for Pibul himself, his past and subsequent relationship with the Catholic 
Missions appears to reinforce his reputation for fickleness and opportunism. When 
he returned to power on the back of a military coup in April 1948, there was to be no 
more anti-French (and thus by implication, anti-Catholic) rhetoric. Indeed, in 
religious terms, Thai Christians and Muslims could not have asked for more from the 
second Pibul government. The annual budget now had allowances for supporting 
Christianity and Islam,9 and the resources of the state were put at the disposal of 
Muslims wishing to go on the Hajj to Mecca. The plan for the Grand Masjid in 
Pattani, which has since become a centre of Islamic intellectual life, was also 
approved by the second Pibul government.10
The changes in Pibul’s political approach were no less radical. Instead of 
promoting himself as the nation’s paramount Leader, as in his first government, 
which would have reminded the population of his unpopular actions during the war 
years and his association with the Japanese,11 he gradually turned to the United 
States and its version of democracy as the new model for Thailand. It was this 
mercurial quality that condemns him in the eyes of many of his critics, but arguably 
it was also these qualities that made him a great politician, one who could overcome 
his arch-nemesis, Pridi. He displayed this quality to the very end, when he sent two
s The newspaper’s stance may have caused it to be shut down and censored. N o copies are kept at the 
Thai National Library, and the only evidence o f the newspaper’s existence are the translations o f  its 
articles in the Bangkok Times.
9 Buddhism also continued to be a major agenda o f  the second Pibul government. The construction o f  
Phutthamonthon, the largest Buddhist space in Thailand, in Nakhon Prathom province, was initiated 
during his second government as part o f  the wider celebration o f  the 2500th anniversary o f  the 
Buddha’s parinirvana. However, the implementation o f  these policies had none o f  the violence seen 
in his first government.
10 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Prem ier, p. 140.
11 B.J. Terwiel, F ield  M arshal Plaek Phibun Songkhram  (University o f  Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 
1980), p. 24.
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of his advisor’s children to China to open a ‘back door’ for negotiations,12 despite his 
anti-communist and anti-Chinese policies, while in the last weeks of his life in exile 
in Tokyo, the former strongman even contemplated a reconciliation and political 
alliance with Pridi against the military faction of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959- 
63)13 and his heir, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (1963-73).14 The formation 
of the alliance would have meant a sensational healing of rifts between the original 
1932 revolutionaries and the formation o f a formidable political alliance.15 
Negotiations between Pridi and Pibul continued after the death of Sarit Thanarat in 
1963, but abruptly ended with the sudden death of Pibul on 11 June 1964.
Like old generals, old nationalisms never quite died. It was the case with the 
Buddhist-orientated strain of Thai nationalism. It re-emerged briefly during Pope 
John Paul II’s visit to Thailand in 1984,16 when a small group of Buddhist 
fundamentalists came out to protest against the Catholic Church, accusing them of 
expanding in Thailand at the expense of Buddhism.17 More recently, in 2007, there 
were prominent efforts by Buddhist monks and some members of the public to
12 Sirin Phathanothai (seven years old at the time) and her 12 year-old brother were secretly sent to 
China as a token o f  the second Pibul government’s goodwill in 1956. They became wards o f  Premier 
Zhou Enlai. The two were children o f  Sang Phathanothai, one o f  Pibul’s close advisors and also the 
writer o f  the “Nai Man and Nai Kong” radio show in the 1940s, which he wrote as part o f  his 
responsibility as the government spokesman for the first Pibul government. Following the exile o f  
Pibul and the arrest o f  Sang Phathanothai for his pro-Beijing stance under the Sarit government, the 
children were stuck in China, and were subsequently caught in the tumult o f the Great Leap Forward 
and the Cultural Revolution.
13 B om  in 1908, Sarit was a career army officer. He commanded the army in Bangkok during the 
1947 coup and the Palace Rebellion. He was the deputy defence minister in 1951, the head o f  the 
army in 1954, and became field marshal in 1956. In 1957 he led the coup that toppled Pibul and 
subsequently led another one in 1958, where he installed him self as prime minister. He died in 1963. 
See C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H isto iy  o f  Thailand, p. 286.
14 Bom  in 1911, Thanom was another career army officer turned politician. He was the right-hand 
man o f  Sarit Thanarat and was prime minister in 1958 and from 1963-73. He was deposed in a mass 
uprising on 14 October 1973, after which he went into exile. His return as a monk in 1976 
contributed to the massacre o f  leftist students who were protesting his return on 6 October 1976, and 
the consequent resurgence o f  the military in Thai politics. See C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A 
H isto iy  o f  Thailand, p. 287.
15 Sirin Phathanothai, The D ragon ’s P earl (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994), pp. 188-9.
16 The visit was the first by a Pontiff to Thailand.
17 Archives des Missions Etrangeres, Asie Religieuse 2005: Chiffres et Donnees, (Eglises d’Asie, 
Paris, 2005), p. 142.
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enshrine Buddhism as the official state religion. The campaign had gained 
momentum and was thwarted only when, in a rare public intervention, Queen Sirikit 
spoke out against the idea, stating that she “did not want Buddhism to be involved in 
politics, which was often dirty”.18 Had the campaign been successful, it would have 
raised some old awkward questions regarding Thai national identity and its 
relationship with religion. It is perhaps an irony of Thai politics that the elevation of 
Buddhism as the official state religion would almost inevitably lead to the creation of 
a most un-Buddhist state.
Even so, the stipulations of the Constitution, whatever they may be, may 
ultimately turn out to be irrelevant, as Pibul and the Catholics in the 1940s, as well 
as the witnesses of the 2006 coup would observe, the paper of the Constitution has 
never carried much weight against raw political or military power. Indeed, despite 
P ibufs late democratic approach, the “hellish fall” of the constitutional order had 
already taken place prior to and during his first government. Observers are left only 
to wonder at how different Thailand would be today had the constitutional order 
been allowed to “grow full straight”.
18 The Nation , 12 August 2007.
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The Church
To forgive is to set a prisoner fi-ee and discover that the prisoner was you.
Lewis B. Smedes
The immediate, collective concern for the Missions following the fall of Pibul’s first 
government was the fate of the prisoners who still languished in jail for alleged Fifth 
Columnist activities. Fr. Nicolas had already died in prison, but he was only one of 
several priests who had been incarcerated following false accusations. In the first 
instance, royal pardon was sought and was initially rejected by the Interior Ministry 
of the Tliawi Bunyaket19 government (31 August-17 September 1945) that “saw no 
reason to grant the pardon”.20 However, the Mission had procured itself an ally in 
the form of R.S.O. Sudchamlong, who saw the splits in the short-lived government 
and so submitted the petition again directly to the prime minister and cabinet. The 
royal pardon was subsequently approved by the prime minister and the cabinet, 
including the Interior Minister, just prior to their resignation on 17 September 1945.
While ministerial politics may have been involved in the delay of the royal 
pardon by the Bunyaket government, the succeeding Seni Pramoj21 government (17 
September 1945-15 October 1946) saw a different reason to delay the process. In its 
haste to free the prisoners, the Mission appeared willing to ignore the legal 
implications and consequences of accepting the royal pardon. In practical terms, it is 
true that the prisoners would have been freed sooner but, in legal terms, it would also
19 Bom  in 1904, Thawi Bunyaket studied agricultural science in France, where he also joined the 
promoters’ group. He was the cabinet secretary from July 1939-February 1943 and was a member o f  
the Seri Thai leadership. He died in 1970. See J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, pp. 377-8.
20 B.A .A ., R.S.O. Sudchamlong to Vi car-Apostolic Perros, 11 September 1945, Beatification  
Documents, 245.
21 Seni Pramoj was born in 1905. A great grandson o f  King Phra Phuttaloetla (Rama II), he was 
educated at Worcester College, Oxford. As ambassador to the U.S. in 1941, he refused to formally 
deliver Pibul’s declaration o f  war on the Allies. The leader o f  the Seri Thai movement in the U .S., in 
1946, he co-founded the Democrat Party, which has since become Thailand’s oldest political party.
He served three brief terms as prime minister: 1945-46, 1975, and 1976. He died in 1977. See C. 
Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A H istory o f  Thailand, p. 286.
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have implied that the prisoners were truly guilty of the offenses for which they had 
been convicted — that of being Fifth Columnists. Thus, with a royal pardon, the 
prisoners and the Catholic Missions would potentially never be able to rid 
themselves of the stain of being “Fifth Columnists” in the public imagination. If the 
Vicar-Apostolic did not recognise this damaging legal implication at the time, others 
in the government certainly made the distinction and, in the interests of the Church, 
pushed instead for an amnesty for prisoners tried by military courts in the course of 
the Thai-French War.22
With the prisoners freed, the Mission was left with the task of clearing the 
damage the persecution had created. In the short term, churches and schools had to 
be reopened, refurbished, or totally rebuilt. Land that was rightfully owned by the 
parishes had to be reclaimed from those who had illegally taken possession of it. On 
this front, at least, the Mission was not without resources. Following the conclusion 
of war in the Pacific, the Mission received a massive financial stimulus from the 
Propaganda Fide. On 7 October 1946, the Propaganda Fide dispatched more than 
1.6 million French francs to the Mission of Siam, much of which was used to resettle 
the returning missionaries (800,000 francs), while other substantial portions went to 
seminaries (320,000 francs) and to support the Mission of Laos (195,000 francs). 
Even with this large expenditure, the Mission was still left with a surplus of just over 
300,000 francs for that financial year.23
The immediate material, post-war needs of the Mission were thus taken care
of but the missionaries still had to re-evaluate their long-term future. Pibul’s brand
of nationalism had unleashed a wave of hatred against the French missionaries and
their ‘agents’, the indigenous priests and congregation. The sharp drop in the
~~ B.A .A ., R.S.O. Sudchamlong to Vicar-Apostolic Perros, 6 October 1945, Beatification Documents,
246.
23 B .A .A ., Prospectus Status M issionis, 30 June 1946, 64 /2/19.
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number of Catholics was a testament to the effects of this strand of nationalism. In 
1940, the number of Catholics stood at 36,12724 but by 1946 the number had 
decreased to 26,132 -  a drop of almost 10,000 or 30 percent.25 Yet, amidst the 
violence, there were also reasons for hope. In spite of the threats, the violence, and 
the harassment, many Catholics remained true to their faith. Even those who 
converted out of fear, soon reconverted back to Catholicism once it was safe to do so. 
By 1947, numbers had grown by over 2,600 from the low of the previous year.26
As for the informal networks the Mission had painstakingly built through its 
schools, they too survived. Although the networks were not strong enough to save 
the Mission and its congregation from the persecution, they were sufficient for a 
certain number of its schools5 alumni. Some of the alumni from Fr. Colombet’s 
Assumption College went on to be active in the Seri Thai movement. One old 
Assumptionist, Payoum Chantaraka, became a captain in the police, and assisted in 
the ‘arrest5 of fellow old Assumptionist, Puey Ungpakorn.27 In actual fact, the police 
captain helped put Puey’s group in contact with India and Pridi Phanomyong, from 
their place of supposed detention. Furthermore, Japanese attempts to interrogate the 
‘prisoners’ were scuppered by their own Japanese interpreter, B. Platano, who also 
happened to be an old Assumptionist and a childhood friend of Puey. It turned out 
that rather than strictly performing his duties, Mr. Hatano saw fit to ‘translate’
Puey’s barefaced and rather unconvincing lies into something more plausible to the 
Japanese authorities, thereby saving his childhood friend, something that greatly
24 B.A.A ., Prospectus Status Missionis, 30 June 1940, 64/2/16.
2=1 B.A .A ., Prospectus Status Missionis, 30 June 1946, 64/2/19.
26 M .E.P.A., Compte-rendu, 1940-48.
27 Dr. Puey Ungpakom later became the Governor o f  the Bank o f  Thailand in 1959-71 under the 
government ot Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-63) and the second government o f  Field Marshal 
Thanom Kittikachom (1963-73), from where he greatly influenced the modern development o f  
Thailand. He also became the rector o f Thammasat University from 1973-76. Following the 6 
October 1976 incident, he was driven into exile by mobs o f right-wing extremists. He died in exile on
28 July 1999.
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amused him even decades after the event.28 Even if  the network had not served the 
Church during its time o f need, at least it served the people it had taught and cared 
for.
When Pibul returned to power as the figurehead of the military coup on 8 
November 1947 (re-assuming the position of Prime Minister in the April of the 
following year), Catholics could be forgiven for fearing a return of persecution. But 
times and political allegiances had changed. Pibul’s mantra was no longer anti­
western or irredentist, but anti-communist. The one element of continuity in the 
second Pibul government was its discrimination against the Chinese, a policy that 
now interlocked with anti-communist policies.29 Chinese schools were once again 
restricted, the alien tax was increased, remittances were curbed, laws restricting 
Chinese employment were reintroduced, the Nationality Law was readjusted to 
impede naturalisation, and Chinese operas were banned in Bangkok.30 However, if 
the second Pibul government had any remaining doubts with regard to the loyalty of 
the Catholics in the now re-named Thailand, this did not manifest itself. Indeed, 
relations became cordial and Brother Hilaire Touvenet, the headmaster of 
Assumption College, was even photographed having a friendly conversation with the 
erstwhile Leader. The Catholic Mission of Thailand, it appears, was willing to 
forgive, even if Pibul would rather just forget.
As for Vicar-Apostolic Perros, the year 1947 also marked the year of his 
retirement, leaving Fr. Louis-Auguste Chorin as his ‘unexpected’ successor. The 
war had left both the Vicar-Apostolic and the Mission greatly drained. Even if some
28 Samakhom Assumption, Assumption Praw at 150 P i [150 Years o f  the History o f Assumption 
College], (Samakhom Assumption, Bangkok, 2003), pp. 942-3.
“9 C. Baker and Pasuk Pongpaichit, A Historv o f  Thailand (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005), p. 145.
30 Ibid., p. 146.
336
apostates did reconvert as soon as it was safe to do so, it was clear that great efforts 
would have to be made to reconstruct the Mission to its pre-war material position. 
Nevertheless, Vicar-Apostolic Perros did leave several lasting legacies, the most 
important of which was arguably the introduction of a Catholic presence to Chiang 
Mai and northern Thailand, as well as the establishment of educational institutions 
there, such as Montfort College and Regina Coeli School. It was to Chiang Mai that 
Vicar-Apostolic Perros retired, after being named an assistant to the Pontifical 
Throne. He was to remain there until he was admitted to St. Louis Hospital in 
Bangkok, where he died on 27 November 1952 at 82 years of age.
Chronology and Appendices
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1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
Chronology (1909-47)
Feb. Death of Vicar-Apostolic Jean-Louis Vey. Rene Perros succeeds
as the new Vi car-Apostolic of Siam.
Jim. Bangkok’s Chinese merchants stage a general strike against the 
government’s decision to levy a head-tax on the Chinese that was 
equal to that paid by the native Siamese. The strike is suppressed by 
the police.
Nov. Pope Benedict XV issues the papal encyclical, Maximum Illud, which 
encouraged a greater role for the indigenous clergy and the separation 
of ecclesiastical and national-political interests in Missions around the 
world
Jan. Vicar-Apostolic Perros is formally consecrated at the Holy Rosary 
Church, Bangkok.
Oct. Death of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V). His son succeeds to the 
throne as King Vajiravudh (Rama VI).
Jun. King Vajiravudh establishes the Royal Pages’ School, a private
school under royal patronage, supported by the Privy Purse. After his 
death, the school became known as Vajiravudh College and continues 
to operate to the present.
Oct. The Wuchang Uprising occurs in Hubei province, China. It marks the
start of the Chinese Revolution that was to overthrow the ruling Qing 
dynasty.
Feb. Puyi, the last Qing Emperor of China, is forced to abdicate. The
Republic of China is established.
An attempted coup by junior military officers fails but nevertheless 
encourages King Vajiravudh to make administrative and personnel 
reforms
Apr. Resignation of Marie-Joseph Cuaz, Vicar-Apostolic of Laos, which is
in charge of Catholic missionaries in northeastern Siam. Fr.
Constant-Jean-Baptiste Prodhomme succeeds him as the Vicar- 
Apostolic.
Mar. King Vajiravudh issues a decree introducing surnames to Thai society
for the first time. However, it would be many years before all Thais, 
particularly in the rural areas, were to have surnames.
Apr. Law establishing the National Savings Bank proclaimed.
Jul. The First World War breaks out in Europe. The Vicar-Apostolic and
other French priests are mobilised and are obliged to return to France.
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1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
King Vajiravudh publishes “The Jews of the Orient” essay, 
comparing the unassimilated Chinese population in Siam with the 
Jews in Europe.
Aug. Siam declares her neutrality in the World War.
Jim. Vicar-Apostolic Perros gains the permission of the French War
Ministry to return to his post in Siam,
Nov. King Vajiravudh announces the adoption of a new “dynastic” name -  
Rama. As he is the sixth monarch of the dynasty, he takes the title 
Rama VI.
Mar. Tsar Nicholas II of Russia is forced to abdicate.
King Vajiravudh founds Chulalongkom University the first, and 
currently, oldest university in Thailand.
Apr. The United States declares war against Germany.
Jul. Siam joins the First World War on the side o f the Allies.
Sept. The red, white, and blue national flag of Siam is introduced. It 
remains in use to the present day.
Nov. The Bolshevik Revolution takes place in Russia.
Jun. A 1,300-man expeditionary force consisting of an ambulance section, 
a flying squadron, drivers, and mechanics is dispatched from Siam to 
France. Some Catholic missionaries act as their interpreters.
A law on private schools is enacted. The law requires all students in 
private schools to be taught to read, write, and understand Siamese 
and instructed in patriotism as well as in Siamese history and
geography. The law was aimed at the assimilation of the Chinese
ethnic minority, but also affects the Mission schools.
Jul. The former Tsar Nicholas II and his family are executed in the 
basement of Ipatiev House in Ekaterinberg.
Nov. Proclamation of the armistice, ending the First World War.
Jun. The Treaty of Versailles is signed in France. Siam is included as a
victor nation signatory.
May The first returning contingents of the Siamese expeditionary force 
arrives back in Siam.
Aug. Death o f Vicar-Apostolic Prodhoinme. Fr. Ange-Marie-Joseph Gouin
340
1921
1922 
1925
1926
1927
1929
1930
1931
1932
officially succeeds him as the Vicar-Apostolic of Laos in April 1922.
Dec. A new treaty is signed with the United States, where it conditionally 
surrenders all fiscal and extraterritorial rights in Siam.
Oct. The Compulsory Primary Education Act came into effect. It
stipulated that all boys and girls from age seven to fourteen had to 
attend school.
Jan. Death of Pope Benedict XV.
Feb. Cardinal Achille Ratti is elected Pope. He succeeds as Pope Pius XI.
Feb. A new treaty is signed with France, where it conditionally surrenders
all fiscal and extraterritorial rights in Siam.
Jit I. A  new treaty is signed with Great Britain, where it conditionally
surrenders all fiscal and extraterritorial rights in Siam. Within the 
next year, all other remaining treaty powers followed suit.
Sept. Birth of Prince Ananda Mahidol, the future Rama VIII, in Heidelberg, 
Germany to Prince Mahidol and Mom Sangwal Mahidol (later 
Princess Mother).
Nov. Death of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI). He left no male heir, and thus 
his younger brother succeeds as King Prajadhipok (Rama VII).
Dec. The Mission of Siam signs an agreement with the Salesians, ceding 
its western parishes and properties to the Salesians, thereby 
unofficially setting up Siam’s first non-Frencli Mission there.
Feb. The first meeting of the Promoters’ group to end the absolute
monarchy takes place in Paris. Seven people are present, including 
Pibul and Pridi Phanomyong.
Dec. Birth o f Prince Bhumibol Adulyadej, the future Rama IX, in
Cambridge, Massachusetts to Prince Mahidol and Mom Sangwal 
Mahidol.
Oct. The Wall Street Crash triggers the start of the global economic 
depression.
Jim. The Mission “sui iuris” of Ratchaburi is formally established in the 
west of Siam. Fr. Gaetan Pasotti is appointed as the superior of the 
new Mission.
Feb. Fr. Lucien Mirabel is stationed at Chiang Mai, marking the start of 
the Catholics’ first formal missionary efforts in the north of Siam.
May Siam abandons the gold standard.
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1933
1934
Jun. The Promoters successfully carry out a bloodless coup against the 
absolutist government. The system of government changes to a 
constitutional monarchy. A provisional draft Constitution comes into 
effect and Phraya Manopakonnitithada becomes Siam’s first prime 
minister.
Dec. After some minor amendments suggested by King Prajadhipok, the 
permanent 1932 Constitution comes into force.
Feb. Pridi presents his controversial draft of the national economic plan.
Mar. The cabinet rejects Pridi’s economic plan by a vote of 17-4.1
Apr. Pridi leaves for France, following the heated opposition to his
national economic plan which was branded as “communistic”. A 
large, friendly crowd sees him off.
The Act concerning Communism is drafted, establishing a penalty of 
up to ten years’ imprisonment or the payment o f a fine if a person is 
found guilty o f writing, publishing or disseminating communist ideas.
Jun. Phraya Phahon leads a successful coup against the Phraya Mano
government. Phraya Mano is exiled to Penang, where he dies in 1948. 
Meanwhile, Phraya Phahon establishes himself as prime minister for 
the next five years.
Aug. Death and funeral of Fr. Colombet, founder of Assumption College.
Two thousand mourners, including the prime minister, senior officials, 
and the diplomatic coips attend
Sept. Pridi returns to Siam and is appointed to the cabinet as a minister 
without portfolio.
Oct. The Bovoradej Rebellion begins. The rebels are motivated by a
mixture o f thwarted ambitions and monarchism. Pibul successfully 
leads the counter-attack and the rebellion is eventually crushed.
Prince Bovoradej escapes into exile to French Indochina.
Nov. The first elections under the constitutional regime are held.
Approximately 10 percent of the population were involved in the 
voting.2
Jan. King Prajadhipok leaves for Europe to get medical treatment for 
cataracts. He was never to return to Siam.
1 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 41.
2 D.K. Wyatt, Thailand, p. 239-40.
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1935
1936
1937
1938
Mar. Pridi is cleared of charges of communism and becomes the interior 
minister.
May The Mission “sui iuris” of Ratchaburi is elevated to a Prefecture 
Apostolic.
Jun. Pridi founds the University for Moral and Political Sciences, better 
known today as Thammasat University.
Oct. While still in England, King Prajadhipok informs the government of 
his wish to abdicate.
Nov. A government delegation is dispatched to England to persuade King 
Prajadhipok not to abdicate.
Jan. Vicar-Apostolic Perros founds a new seminary in Sri Racha,
Chonburi province.
Feb. An assassination attempt against Pibul fails.
Mar. King Prajadhipok (Rama VTI) abdicates while in England. As he had 
no male heir, the Assembly invites his ten-year-old nephew, Prince 
Ananda Mahidol who was studying in Lausanne, Switzerland at the 
time to succeed as King Rama VIII. Prince Ananda accepts the 
invitation and a Council of Regents is appointed by the government.
Feb. Pridi becomes the minister of foreign affairs.
Nov. The second elections under the constitutional regime are held. This
time, the franchise was extended to everyone above the age of twenty. 
A total of 26 percent of the population voted.3
Sept. The government is challenged in the Assembly over the transparency
of its budget allocations. It is subsequently defeated by 45 votes to 31, 
with most of the assembly members having left for the weekend. 
Consequently, Phraya Phahon announced the dissolution of the 
Assembly and the holding of new elections.
Oct. Canton falls to Japanese forces.
Nov. A  second assassination attempt on Pibul fails.
King Ananda Mahidol returns to Siam for the first time as monarch.
The third election is held. Half of the representatives, most of whom 
were critical of the government, were re-elected.4
3 D.K. Wyatt, Thailand, p. 240-1.
4 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 106.
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Dec. Phraya Phahon resigns, citing health reasons. Pibul succeeds him 
as prime minister.
Jan. King Ananda Mahidol returns to Switzerland.
The ‘Songsuradet’ Rebellion is suppressed. Pibul uses the rebellion 
as a pretext to arrest his political opponents who end up exiled, 
imprisoned, or executed.
Feb. Death of Pope Pius XI.
Mar. Cardinal Giovanni Pacelli is elected Pope. He succeeds as Pope Pius 
XII.
Jim. Pibul officially changes the country’s name. Siam becomes Thailand 
as the first o f the Ratthaniyom (Cultural Mandates) is issued.
The Japanese capture Swatow (Shantou), the home of many of the 
Chinese immigrants in Thailand.
Jul. All portraits of King Prajadhipok are removed from official buildings; 
people are encouraged to display portraits of Pibul instead.
Pibul issues his second Cultural Mandate, forbidding Thais to act as 
agents for foreign organisations and selling land to them.
Aug. Pibul issues his third Cultural Mandate, which abolished all ethnic 
distinctions. Thus, labels such as Thai-Malays, Thai-Chinese, Thai- 
Amiamese etc. become obsolete as all of these are now to be called 
“Thais”.
Sept. The Second World War breaks out in Europe as Germany invades 
Poland.
Pibul issues his fourth Cultural Mandate, making it compulsory for 
the public to stand and salute the flag when it is being raised in the 
morning at 8.00 am and lowered at 6.00 pm. They must also know 
the new national anthem. These measures are still active to this day.
Nov. Pibul issues his fifth Cultural Mandate, encouraging the consumption 
of domestically-produced goods.
Dec. Pibul issues his sixth Cultural Mandate concerning the lyrics of the 
national anthem.
Mar. Pibul issues his seventh Cultural Mandate encouraging the public to 
participate in nation building.
Apr. Pibul issues his eighth Cultural Mandate regarding the royal anthem.
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Jun. Britain and France sign non-aggression pacts with Thailand but
France falls to the Nazi Blitzkrieg before the treaty could be ratified.
Pibul issues his ninth Cultural Mandate which introduced new 
regulations to the Thai language and states the duties o f a good citizen.
Sept. The Assembly votes, by a two-thirds majority, to extend the terms of
its appointed members. The 1932 Constitution had only provided for 
a ten-year transitional period for the non-elected members.
Oct. Protests begin in Bangkok, demanding the return o f the “lost
territories” in French Indochina. These territories were lost to France 
following the 1893 Paknam incident.
Nov. Fighting breaks out between Thailand and French Indochina, with
both claiming that the other party was the aggressor.
French citizens in Thailand, including Catholic missionaries, are 
ordered to vacate the border areas within 48 hours, marking the 
beginning of the anti-Catholic persecution.
Dec. Philip Siphong, the headmaster of the school in Songkhon is
assassinated. The police under Nai Bunlue proceed to extra-judicially 
execute six other women, thereby creating the Seven Martyrs of 
Songkhon.
Jan. Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung is arrested for ringing church bells. He is
later sentenced to fifteen years in prison for alleged Fifth Columnist 
activities.
Vicar-Apostolic Perros delegates his authority to Fr. Joachim 
Teppawan Prakobkij, the Provincial of the Mission o f Siam.
French naval forces sink three Thai gunboats and one destroyer off Si 
Chang island.
A ceasefire mediated by Japan is signed between France and Thailand.
The emergency measures against French citizens that were 
promulgated at the start of the Thai-French War are rescinded.
Pibul issues his tenth Cultural Mandate, regulating the dress code of 
the public. Thais were no longer allowed to walk barefoot, men must 
wear shirts and trousers while women must wear gloves and hats.
Apr. The Prefecture Apostolic of Ratchaburi is elevated to the status of a 
Vicariate Apostolic.
May The Treaty of Tokyo, a Japanese mediated peace treaty is signed
between France and Thailand. Thailand gained two provinces in Laos,
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and most of northwestern Cambodia. However, these areas were to 
be demilitarised and it had to pay a compensation o f 6 million baht to 
France.5 The treaty satisfied neither party but increased Japanese 
influence in the area.
Death of former King Prajadhipok (Rama VII) in England.
Sept. Pibul issues his eleventh Cultural Mandate regulating the daily
schedule o f Thai citizens. Thais must eat on time, no more than four 
meals a day, be conscientious at work, take no more than an hour’s 
break in the afternoon, and should use free time in the evening for 
socialising, study, or meditation.
Dec. The Japanese attack Pearl Harbour. Simultaneously, they also attack 
the Pacific islands, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Siam at nine 
points. After some armed resistance, Pibul orders a cease-fire and 
allows Japanese forces free passage through Thailand in return for 
assurances that Thai independence would be respected. A military 
alliance with Japan was concluded in the same month.
Vicar-Apostolic Perros re-assumes his authority as the Vicar- 
Apostolic of Siam.
The British battleship HMS Prince o f Wales and cruiser HMS 
Repulse is sunk by Japanese forces off the east of Malaya.
Pridi is ‘promoted’ to the position of regent.
Jan. Thailand declares war on Great Britain and the United States. The 
Thai ambassador in Washington, Seni Pramoj, refuses to deliver the 
declaration to the U.S. government and sets up the Free Thai (Seri 
Thai) resistance movement.
Pibul issues his twelfth and last Cultural Mandate, which calls for 
better protection for children, the elderly, and the disadvantaged.
Feb. Singapore falls to the Japanese.
May Thai forces bomb Kengtung, the capital of the eastern Shan states,
and a few weeks after invades the area with the Northern Army. The 
area is formed into “The Original Thai United State”.6
Jim. The U.S. Navy inflicts a decisive defeat on the Imperial Japanese
Navy in the Battle of Midway.
Oct. Bangkok and the central plains suffer their worst floods in 25 years.
5 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 191.
6 J.A. Stowe, Siam becomes Thailand, p. 235.
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Jan. The Germans and Italians are defeated in North Africa, while Soviet 
Russia gains victory at Stalingrad.
Jul. Resignation of Vicar-Apostolic Gouin. Fr. Henri-AIbert Thomine 
succeeds him as the Vicar-Apostolic of Laos.
Sept. Italy surrenders to the Allies and subsequently declares war on Japan. 
The Salesians in Siam prepare to evacuate.
Jan. Fr. Nicolas Kitbamrung dies of tuberculosis in Bang Khwang prison, 
Bangkok.
May The Vicariate Apostolic of Chantaburi in the east of Thailand is
formally erected. Joseph Cheng becomes the first indigenous bishop 
of Thailand.
The Viratham khong Chat Thai (Heroic Virtues of the Nation) are 
issued by Pibul. Among them, the stipulation that “Thailand is a 
nation that worships the Buddhist religion like life itself’.7
Jun. The Allies capture Rome and lands on Normandy.
Jul. The Tojo government in Japan resigns.
The Assembly rejects Pibul’s plans to move the capital to Petchabun 
in the northeast of Thailand and the construction of a “Buddhist City”. 
Subsequent to the defeat of the bills, Pibul tenders his resignation but 
retains his position as commander in chief of the armed forces.
Khuang Aphaiwong is appointed prime minister.
Aug. Khuang ‘demotes’ Pibul by stripping him of the post o f commander
in chief and transferring him to the inactive post of superior advisor to 
the armed forces.
Mar. The Japanese cany out a coup against the French administration of
French Indochina and successfully encourages Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia to declare their short-lived independence from France.
Vicar-Apostolic Thomine, the former Vicar-Apostolic Gouin, and Fr. 
Jean Thibaud, the Provincial of the Mission of Laos are arrested by 
the Japanese in Laos. They were later executed and their bodies left 
by the roadside.
May Berlin falls to the Allies, ending the war in Europe.
The Allies capture Rangoon.
Jun. Allied planes drop fifty parachute-loads of medicines in broad
7 Thamsuk Nuamnond, Muang Thai sam ai Songkhram lok, p. 100.
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daylight at Sanam Luang, in the heart of Bangkok.
Aug. The Japanese surrender following the nuclear destruction of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ending the war in the Pacific.
Khuang Aphaiwong resigns, citing his association with the Japanese 
in the past year. The Assembly votes for Thawi Bunyaket to succeeds 
as interim prime minister for 17 days until Seni Pramoj can arrive in 
Thailand to take his place.
Sept. Thailand is renamed Siam, it remains thus until 11 May 1949, when
the country is once again re-named Thailand under the second Pibul 
government (1948-57).
Thawi Bunyaket resigns, Seni Pramoj becomes prime minister.
King Ananda Mahidol reaches his majority, the regency ends.
Oct. Seni Pramoj resigns as prime minister and calls a new election.
Pibul is detained as a war criminal.
Dec. King Ananda Mahidol returns to Thailand to a rapturous public 
reception. Pridi is formally named Senior Statesman.
Siam and Britain ends the state of war with a peace treaty.
Sporadic anti-Catholic incidents continue up to this month.
Jan. The first post-war elections are held. Parties aligned with Pridi are 
elected to power, but the Assembly elects Khuang Aphaiwong as 
prime minister for the second time.
Mar. Khuang Aphaiwong resigns and Pridi is forced to take up the 
premiership.
Pibul is acquitted of all charges of war crimes.
Apr. The Democrat Party is founded by Seni Pramoj. This political party 
currently remains the oldest in Thailand.
May The 1946 Constitution is drafted and comes into force. For the first 
time, a bi-cameral legislature is introduced with a fully elected lower 
house, which would subsequently elect members of the upper house.
Jun. King Ananda Mahidol is found shot dead in his bedroom under
mysterious circumstances. The Assembly invites his younger brother, 
Prince Bhumibol Adulyadej, to succeed to the throne as King Rama 
IX.
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Aug. Tired of being linked to the unsolved death of King Ananda Mahidol, 
Pridi Phanomyong resigns as prime minister. Luang 
Thamrongnawasawat succeeds him.
Oct. The territories Siam gained in the May 1941 Treaty is returned to
France. In turn, France withdraws its threat to veto Siam’s 
membership of the United Nations.
Dec. Siam becomes the 55th member of the United Nations following its
repeal of the 1933 anti-communist law, thereby avoiding a veto of its 
membership by Soviet Russia.
1947 Apr. Luang Thamrongnawasawat successfully survives a no-confidence
vote against his government.
Fr. Claude Bayet is appointed as the new Vicar-Apostolic of Laos.
Jul. Vicar-Apostolic Perros retires. The Mission of Bangkok’s Procurator,
Fr. Louis-August Chorin succeeds as the last Vicar-Apostolic of 
Bangkok.
Nov. The army seizes control of the government in a coup, with Pibul as
their figurehead. Pridi spends a week in hiding before being spirited 
out of the country by British and American agents to Singapore.
With the support of the Democrat Party, Khuang Aphaiwong 
becomes prime minister for the final time. Following Khuang 
Aphaiwong’s resignation in April 1948, Pibul begins his second and 
last term as prime minister. He remains in power until he is ousted in 
a military coup in September 1957.
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Appendix C
*
Catholic Population in the Mission of Siam, 1917-47
Year Catholic Population
1917
1918
1919 24400
1920 26462
1921
1922 27260
1923 27931
1924 28847
1925 29405
1926 30457
1927 31080
1928 31950
1929'1' 32800
1930 26900
1931 27811
1932 29025
1933 29709
1934 30913
1935 32103
1936 32910
1937 33801
1938 34729
1939 35269
1940 36127
1941 36127
1942 34500
1943
1944
1945 34500
1946 26132
1947 28783
’ Source: B.A .A ., 10 May 1919, 62/2/44, 31 July 1920, 107/2/3, 31 July 1922, 62/3/34, 31 July 1923, 
62/3/44, 1 August 1924, 62/3/63, 31 July 1925, 62/4/7, 31 July 1926, 64/1/3, 31 July 1927, 64/1/32,
31 July 1928, 64/4/46, 30 June 1930, 64/1/7, 30 June 1932, 64/1/15, 30 June 1933, 64/1/17, 30 June 
1934, 64/1/23, 30 June 1935, 64/1/26, 30 June 1936, 64/2/2, 30 June 1937, 64/2/7, 30 June 1938, 
64/2/10, 30 June 1939, 64/2/13, 30 June 1940, 64/2/16, 30 June 1942, 64/2/18, 30 June 1946, 64/2/19, 
and M.E.P.A., Compte-rendu, 1940-48.
v Reports for the years 1929, 1931, 1941, and 1945 were missing, therefore the “Previous year’s 
population statistics” o f  the following years’ reports were used instead. Thus, statistics for 1929 can 
be found in the 1930 report, and so on.
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Appendix G 
Mission of Siam Social Works (1930-46)*
Hospitals Nursing Homes
Year Number Beds
1930 4 40
1931
1932 4 40
1933 4 40
1934 4 40
1935 4 40
1936 4 40
1937 4 40
1938 4 40
1939 4 40
1940 4 40
1941
1942 4 40
1943
1944
1945
1946 4 100
Year Number Residents
1930 1 8
1931
1932 1 20
1933 1 16
1934 1 17
1935 1 12
1936 1 8
1937 1 9
1938 1 8
1939 1 10
1940 1 10
1941
1942 1 8
1943
1944
1945
1946 1 6
* Source: B .A.A., 30 June 1930, 64/1/7, 30 June 1932, 64/1/15, 30 June 1933, 64 /1 /17 ,30  June 1934, 
64/1/23, 30 June 1935, 64/1/26, 30 June 1936, 64/2/2, 30 June 1937, 64/2/7, 30 June 1938, 64/2/10, 
30 June 1939, 64/2/13, 30 June 1940, 64/2/16, 30 June 1942, 64/2/18, 30 June 1946, 64/2/19.
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Pharmacies, 1922-46*
Year Number Consultations
1922 5 54
1923 2 133
1924 1 126
1925 1 402
1926
1927 1 385
1928 1 365
1929 1 316
1930 1 970
1931
1932 1 1280
1933 1 1344
1934 1 900
1935 1 1500
1936 1 1850
1937 1 1925
1938 1 2325
1939 1 2410
1940 1 3510
1941
1942 1 3200
1943
1944
1945
1946 1 3800
* Source: B .A.A., 31 July 1922, 62/3/34, 31 July 1923, 62/3/44, 1 August 1924, 62/3/63, 31 July 1925, 
62/4/7, 31 July 1927, 64/1/32, 1929, 110/2/12, 30 June 1930, 64/1/7, 30 June 1932, 64/1/15, 30 June 
1933, 64/1/17, 30 June 1934, 64/1/23, 30 June 1935, 64/1/26, 30 June 1936, 64/2/2, 30 June 1937, 
64/2/7, 30 June 1938, 64/2/10, 30 June 1939, 64/2/13, 30 June 1940, 64/2/16, 30 June 1942, 64/2/18, 
30 June 1946, 64/2/19.
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Orphanages, 1922-46*
Year Number Male Female Total
1922 24 231 442 673
1923 24 276 411 687
1924 24 232 394 626
1925 24 242 409 651
1926
1927 24 187 369 456
1928 24 165 327 492
1929
1930 17 176 238 414
1931
1932 12 191 356 547
1933 12 203 329 532
1934 12 183 316 499
1935 12 154 291 445
1936 12 163 280 443
1937 12 180 352 532
1938 12 157 371 528
1939 12 179 293 472
1940 12 157 252 409
1941
1942 12 63 116 179
1943
1944
1945
1946 7 46 87 133
* Source: B.A.A ., 31 July 1922, 62/3/34, 31 July 1923, 62/3/44, I August 1924, 62/3/63, 31 July 1925, 
62/4/7, 31 July 1927, 64/1/32, 30 June 1930, 64/1/7, 30 June 1932, 64/1/15, 30 June 1933, 64/1/17, 30 
June 1934, 64/1/23, 30 June 1935, 64 /1 /26 ,30  June 1936, 64/2/2, 30 June 1937, 64/2/7, 30 June 193S, 
64/2/10, 30 June 1939, 64/2/13, 30 June 1940, 64/2/16, 30 June 1942, 64/2/18, 30 June 1946, 64/2/19.
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Appendix H 
Mission of Siam Income (French Francs), 1922-47*
Year Rent
Mobile
assets'1'
Propaganda
Fide
Sainte 
Enfance 
and other 
institutions Tithes Donations Loans Total
1922 25200 48076 49100 23000 412 15747.5 150000 311535.5
1923 30600 42443 63450 23000 16651 3031 256392 435567
1924 26880 36797 73400 27000 11400 4944 297060 477481
1925 33950 50008 76300 33000 21881 6556.4 343000 564695.4
1926 138200 275000 105400 73600 78500 11475 0 682175
1927 142000 237000 111000 76600 70500 8000 0 645100
1928 60000 145000 118000 104000 30000 2000 0 459000
1929
1930 45000 40000 32357.26 117000 18000 22000 0 274357.26
1931
1932 30000 25000 116883 113000 1940 0 0 286823
1933 22000 16000 100000 125000 1180 0 0 264180
1934 18000 10000 58710 82000 0 0 0 168710
1935
1936 40000 25000 65000 60500 2000 0 0 192500
1937 32000 25000 89000 96000 11446 0 0 253446
1938 47000 35000 147000 116250 0 0 0 345250
1939 45000 40000 160500 175000 0 0 0 420500
1940 50000 60000 195000 53500 0 0 0 358500
1941
1942 75000 80000 4107 159107
1943
1944
1945
1946 60000 45000 1644000 45000 1794000
1947
* Source: B .A.A., 31 July 1922, 62/3/34, 31 July 1923, 62/3/44, 1 August 1924, 62/3/63, 31 July 1925, 
62/4/7, 31 July 1926, 64/1/3, 31 July 1927, 64/1/32, 31 July 1928, 64/4/46, 30 June 1930, 64/1/7, 30 
June 1932, 64/1/15, 30 June 1933, 64/1/17, 30 June 1934, 64/1/23, 30 June 1935, 64/1/26, 30 June 
1936, 64/2/2, 30 June 1937, 64/2/7, 30 June 1938, 64/2/10, 30 June 1939, 64/2/13, 30 June 1940, 
64/2/16, 30 June 1942, 64/2/18, 30 June 1946, 64/2/19.
Includes income from industry and business investments.
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